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From Guns to Roses
Explaining Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action
Nora J. Keller
As rebel organizations are associated with violence and war, the term “rebel use of nonvio-
lent action” seems paradoxical at rst glance. Yet, some rebel organizations — after pursu-
ing their aims through militant means unsuccessfully — do start to use mass-based nonvi-
olent action, mobilizing and organizing the population to participate in large-scale mass
protests, demonstrations, or boycotts. Sometimes, as evidenced by the cases of Timor-
Leste’s Maubere Council for National Resistance or the Nepalese Maoists, this strategic
shift can bring them considerably closer to their ultimate goal. This study addresses the
following question: Why do some rebel organizations strategically use nonviolent mass
popular action in a civil war?
The aims of this dissertation are two-fold: First, I explore, conceptualize and dene
“rebel use of nonviolent action”. Second, I build a theory to explain to explain whether or
not rebel groups will seize on an opportunity for using strategic nonviolent action that
builds on the rebel group’s internal organizational processes. Precisely because mass-
based nonviolent action is unexpected and very dicult to organize, there can be sig-
nicant strategic benets for rebel organizations who successfully launch a nonviolent
campaign. First, they demonstrate the breadth and depth of their popular support by mo-
bilizing the people to actively and en masse put themselves at risk as protesters. Second,
the use of nonviolent action displays a high degree of movement resilience and control,
as nonviolent events that are most eective in urban areas must be coordinated with a
rebel leadership likely located in the periphery. Third, the rebel group can signal norms
adherence, as nonviolent action is generally associated with democratic values. Fourth,
nonviolent action can garner signicant international attention, as masses of civilians
peacefully protesting against a civil war backdrop create a powerful image.
The proposed theoretical framework takes an organizational approach to understand-
ing rebel group behavior, which accounts for the role of civilians as potential group actors.
The appropriateness of this framework is established through an in-depth theory-building
case study of Timor-Leste’s violent/nonviolent independence struggle. Based on insights
gleaned from this case and a conceptual exploration of nonviolent action as a rebel strat-
egy, my theory is anchored on the insight that a rebel operational shift towards the use
of nonviolent action constitutes a particularly disruptive instance of strategic innovation.
The theory unfolds in two parts: First, I argue that consolidated political authority in a
rebel organization is necessary for disruptive innovation in the form of nonviolent action.
Second, I explore the operational requirements for actually carrying out nonviolent ac-
tion, and argue that embedded organizational structures linking rural rebel strongholds
with urban popular centers are necessary to allow for both popular mobilization for non-
violent action and control of individual events and the organization as a whole. The com-
mon organizational “theme” uniting these two complex features is an operational focus
on functional task dierentiation.
The Timorese theory-building case study analyzes ndings from in-person interviews,
rst-person accounts and historiography of the conict to trace and explore the relevant
mechanisms leading from a violent (guerrilla) to a largely nonviolent conict strategy.
This case study also establishes that the decision to adopt nonviolent action as a strategy
and the actual planning of nonviolent events can be directly linked to a rebel organiza-
tion’s leadership. To test the plausibility of the theory and explore the scope, I present two
additional medium-length case studies of the Nepali Maoists and the Salvadoran Frente
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional.
In addition to providing the rst comprehensive conceptualization of nonviolent ac-
tion as a rebel strategy, this dissertation makes two key analytical and conceptual con-
tributions: First, I provide a framework for studying rebel groups as organizations with
internal frameworks and processes that come together in a dominant structure that can
explain operational and strategic choices, options, and trajectories. A comprehensive un-
derstanding of a rebel group’s dominant structure requires careful over-time analysis.
Second, the example of nonviolent action as a conict strategy shows the necessity of
studying the population — and its ties to the rebel organizations — as active resistance
participants that must be included in a comprehensive organizational analysis of a rebel
group.
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1. Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action:
Framing the Issue
“Nonviolence is not inaction. It is not discussion. It is not for the timid or weak. Nonviolence
is hard work . . . In some cases, nonviolence requires more militancy than violence.”
– Cesar Chavez
1.1 The puzzle
As rebel organizations are associated with violence and war, the term “rebel use of non-
violent action” seems oxymoronic. Yet, some rebel organizations mobilize and organize
the population to participate in large-scale mass protests, demonstrations, or boycotts,
and sometimes this strategy brings the militant group considerably closer to their goal.
To even begin to understand the potential shock and awe eect rebels can have by us-
ing nonviolent action, only consider what the action entails: In a repressive, violent, and
chaotic environment, a militant organization veers from its charted path of organized vi-
olence and motivates a large number of people to publicly advocate the rebel cause at
great personal risk.
Timor-Leste’s Fretilin (later National Council for Maubere Resistance or CNRM) epit-
omizes the unexpected but highly eective nature of rebels using nonviolent action. After
15 years of internecine civil war, CNRM shifted its strategy from guerrilla warfare in the
mountainous periphery of Timor-Leste to a popular nonviolent campaign. Using a clan-
destine information network that connected occupied urban areas such as Dili and Baucau
to the militant rebel leadership in the mountains, CNRM was able to coordinate violent
and nonviolent activism to great success, later even expanding nonviolent action into
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university towns in Indonesia where Timorese students were studying. Ten years later,
under increasing international pressure, Indonesia conceded to Timorese independence.
The rst nonviolent event was triggered by Suharto’s “opening” of the island to foreign
visitors, which suddenly provided a means of reaching the international community. The
rst (and only) foreign head of state to visit the island was Pope John Paul II; a visit by
the head of the Catholic Church was intended to confer legitimacy on the annexation
(Stephan 2006). Through links established in the 1970s and early 1980s for the provision
of information and supplies from the population to the rebels and people hiding in the
mountains and jungle (Clandestine Front), a few hundred young Timorese were mobilized
to protest the Pope’s Mass in a church in Tacitolo, near the capital of Dili (Bexley and
Tchailoro 2013). After the Pope had conferred the nal blessing, the youths ran up to
the front, shouting the slogans of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM,
formerly Fretilin), and unfurling their banners. The Pope was quickly ushered from the
stage and the protesters ed, although a few were captured, tortured, and killed. Over
the next decade, the Clandestine Front, under the auspices of the rebel leadership, would
organize hundreds of protest events both within Timor-Leste as well as university towns
and urban centers around Indonesia.
On all counts, the circumstances at the time did not favor large-scale popular activism.
The civil war – accompanied by one of the worst genocides of the 20th Century – was
still in full swing; about one third of the population had already perished.1 In early 1989,
Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo described the situation in an open letter to UN Secre-
tary General Javier de Perez Cuellar: “We are dying as a people and as a nation” (Lyon
1Estimate from former governor of occupied Timor, Mário Carrascalão, during our interview on
November 27, 2014, in Dili. According to both his own testimony and that of many others, including José
Ramos-Horta, Carrascalão acted as a double agent smuggling information out of Timor (more on this later).
Ocial estimates from Indonesian, Portuguese and Catholic Church sources range from 40,000 to 200,000.
Using a variety of data sources ranging from the Indonesian Army over international organizations to the
Catholic Church and multiple-systems estimation, Silva and Ball (2006) estimate a minimum of conict-
related deaths of 102,800.
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2006, 139).2
The conditions for organizing nonviolent action in Timor-Leste were unfavorable at
best. A former soldier in CNRM’s military wing - Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional
de Timor-Leste or Falintil - as well as nonviolent organizer Constâncio Pinto character-
izes the Situation on the ground in war-torn Timor-Leste before the rst public demon-
stration, highlighting just how dicult and improbable it was to mobilize the Timorese
population for nonviolent action: “We were concerned that it would be dicult to hold a
demonstration because people were not yet brave enough to speak out publicly against
the occupation and the repression. None of us, since the time of the invasion, had ever
participated in any sort of demonstration . . . ” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 107). How was the
Timorese resistance organization able to build a nonviolent popular protest movement
out of the ashes of an internecine civil war almost unparalleled in its brutality against
civilians in the 20th Century? Why were rebel leaders willing to abandon established
and tried violent methods, and why was the population willing to put themselves at risk?
The developmental trajectory of Fretilin or CNRM is particularly puzzling when we con-
sider how many rebel groups become more extremist in their means as civil wars progress
without resolution. From this set of questions and observations, I derive the following re-
search question that guides this dissertation: Why do some rebel organizations strategically
use nonviolent mass popular action in a civil war?3
Although the rebel use of nonviolent action appears to be most common in leftist
militant organizations active towards the end of the 20th Century such as the Fretilin,
the West Sahrawi Polisario, or the Nepali Maoists, the organizations who have used this
strategy are highly diverse, and some are not recent at all. The case of the Pashtuns living
in the North-West Frontier Province of colonial India throughout most of the 19th and
2Together with José Ramos-Horta, Belo received the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership role in
organizing and publicizing nonviolent activism in occupied Timor-Leste.
3I refer to this phenomenon as rebel use of nonviolent action throughout most of the dissertation as
opposed to “rebel use of strategic mass-based nonviolent action,” which is more precise but even more
unwieldy.
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the rst half of the 20th Century exemplify this last point. Organized in a loose military
confederacy, the Pashtuns engaged in periodic guerrilla warfare against the British colo-
nial power for more than eighty years. The British sent more than a hundred punitive
military expedition into the region that was strategically invaluable, as the Khyber Pass
represented the overland gateway to India (Johansen 1997, 57).
The Pashtun resistance seemed as far removed from nonviolent action as possible; this
was by no means a likely strategic trajectory for the movement. The Pashtuns resisted
so ercely that the British were never able to consolidate stable control over the region,
and they were infamous for their exceptional martial skills, which pervaded deep layers
of the Pashtun society; through their code of honor, the Pashtunwali, disputes over prop-
erty, women, or personal injury often resulted in blood feud (Ahmed 1976), and nearly all
Pashtun men carried rearms. In 1842, an army expedition numbering 4,500 British sol-
diers was completely exterminated except for one survivor, who was sent back to Britain
to tell the tale (Johansen 1997). Their martial skills and eectiveness against the British led
to very negative stereotypes about the violent Pashtun nature. In 1896, William Crooke
wrote: “The true Pathan [Pashtun] is perhaps the most barbaric of all the races with which
we are brought into contact,” further describing them as cruel, bloodthirsty, and vindictive
(Crooke (1896, 167-168) quoted in Johansen (1997, 56)).
Abdul Ghaar Khan, devout Muslim and son of a chieftain, founded the Khudai Khid-
matgars (‘Servants of God’) in the 1920s, which based themselves on the Pashtun code of
honor and Muslim beliefs. It was an indigenous army intent on ghting no matter the
cost to soldiers’ physical persons; however, all “ghting” would be nonviolent. Like a
violent army, the Khudai Khidmatgar would be drilled, disciplined, and pledged to ght,
not with guns, but with their lives (Johansen 1997, 58). As in the preceding 80 years of
guerrilla-based resistance, the ultimate goal was home rule of Pashtunistan, and many for-
mer ghters became Servants of God, so that the organization numbered in the 100,000s
in the 1930s, and engaged in hundreds of mass-based actions against the British (Pyarelal
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1950, 37).
Because of their previously loose organization and their anti-colonial (rather than
intra-state) character, the Pashtun example diverges from the established conception of
rebel use of nonviolent action. However, it still exemplies the ability of movement insid-
ers to radically alter contentious course even after 80 years of violent struggle, mobilizing
large numbers of people into risky action, while all the same maintaining the goals of
the previously exclusively violent push. It also shows how nonviolent action has a strong
strategic and contentious character, even though it is commonly thought of as a morally
superior campaign (compared to violent action) aiming to persuade and change hearts and
minds. In fact, the unique power of nonviolent action, especially in a civil war context,
comes from having a moral connotation as well as a strategic, contentious bent, demon-
strating that the two characteristics are by no means exclusive. Accordingly, Ghaar Khan
explicitly told his people: “I am going to give you such a weapon that the police and the
army will not be able to stand against it” (quoted in Johansen (1997, 58)).
More “modern” examples also show how the rebel use of nonviolent action can be
both a conscious and strategic but also controversial and dicult decision. For example,
the Basque ETA, which originally had organized itself around six activist branches (pub-
lications, study groups, Basque language groups, mass actions, propaganda, and military
actions) and had originally focused on propaganda and sabotage quickly decided upon
increased repression that violence was the only way forward and that there was no space
for other methods of resistance (Aiartza and Zabalo 2010, 13). The ETA is often associated
with a relatively tranquil conict transformation, and there are even several instances of
demonstrations for the Basque cause. For example, the 1969 Burgos trial, a show trial to
judge and execute 16 ETA members accused of killing superintendent Melitón Manzanas,
spurred large demonstrations and protest both at home and abroad, not only protesting
the planned executions but also the suppression of Basques. However, these protests were
held within the context of the anti-Franco movement in Spain, and not organized by ETA
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(though ETA soldiers did show up to some of these trials) (Aiartza and Zabalo 2010, 14).
Rather, mass organization for nonviolent action was only adopted by the ETA as a goal
in 1972 at the movement’s fth assembly. The case of ETA usefully demonstrates how
complex the adoption of nonviolent action can be, and in fact ETA split over the decision
to incorporate nonviolent action.
The list of “modern” rebel organizations who used (or currently use) nonviolent action
ranges from the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Basque Country
and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or ETA) in Spain, the Farabundo Martí National
Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, to the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-
M/UPF), geographically spanning four continents. Some organizations, such as the Polis-
ario operating in territory claimed by Morocco, fought for independence. Others, for
example the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) in India, ght for less maxi-
malist goals such as increased self-determination. In some instances, the organizations
were uncontested in their leadership of the movement, such as Fretilin and later CNRM
in Timor-Leste; other rebel organizations, such as the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF), distinguished themselves from formidable rival rebel organizations through their
use of nonviolent action in an attempt at in-bidding. Finally, while nonviolent action is
often associated with commitments to the ethical superiority of nonviolence and there-
fore would appear to be diametrically opposed to attacking civilians, some organizations
have used both nonviolent mass-based action and terrorism targeting civilians, such as
the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey.
While some rebel organizations built their shift from violence to nonviolence on a
prior history of nonviolent action in their country – as was the case with the South African
ANC – this is no necessary condition. Timor-Leste had never experienced any nonviolent
direct action prior to Indonesian invasion.4 Conversely, organizations with signicant
4Interview by the author with former nonviolent activist and Fretilin member Nuno Rodrigues
Tchailoro on November 25, 2014, in Dili. In contrast to Timor-Leste’s unprecedented use of nonviolent
action, the ANC had used nonviolent action exclusively prior to using violent action. The ANC made the
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nonviolent activist history never returned to this strategy once organized violence was
underway. For example, Burma experienced a slew of student groups organizing large-
scale protest marches and demonstrations before organizing an insurgent movement, the
All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) in the early 1990s. The activist movement
lasted for approximately one decade, during which no concessions were made by the gov-
ernment. Subsequently, the organization lost much of its ghting capacity as many of its
members joined ethnic insurgent groups instead, none of which went on to wage non-
violent campaigns. Given the diverse attributes of these violent groups, what structural
or organizational features do they have in common that led to their use of nonviolent
action?
1.2 The eects of nonviolent action in a civil war
What payos can rebel groups derive from the use of nonviolent action? Rebel organiza-
tions rarely achieve their stated outcome goals.5 Using a dataset comprising 310 militant
organizations active sometime between the years 1980 and 2012, Acosta (2014) nds that
18.7% of rebel groups achieved at least part of their stated outcome goals; this number
drops to 12.2% if we only count full goal achievement (149). In achieving their stated out-
come goals, rebel organizations using nonviolent action have been very eective. Both
Timor-Leste’s CNRM and Nepal’s Maoists attained their maximalist goals, so that Timor-
Leste became independent from Indonesia and the Nepalese monarchy was overturned.
Pursuing yet a dierent kind of goal, the ANC in South Africa brought about the end of
centuries of eective and later legal apartheid. Given how dicult it is for rebel orga-
decision to move towards violent struggle hesitantly, with several leaders questioning whether the lim-
its of nonviolent action had really already been reached (Maharaj 2008, 10). This contrast exemplies the
diversity of conict histories behind the rebel use of nonviolent action.
5Acosta (2014) denes “outcome goal” in the following manner: “Outcome goals represent an organiza-
tion’s raison d’être. They signify the purpose of an organization’s genesis and persistence. Outcome goals
exhibit the revolutionary or reactionary demands that militant organizations place on the status quo, which
a particular adversary secures or promotes” (142-143).
7
nizations to win a civil war outright, it is a remarkable feat that 20% of the rebel groups
who have used nonviolent action as a protracted strategy (as identied in Chapter 2) have
attained their goals.6 While the goal of this dissertation is not to conclusively explore the
ecacy of nonviolent action as a rebel strategy, the promising nature of the strategy is
still worth remarking upon.
Rebel groups using nonviolent action have also achieved signicant diplomatic suc-
cesses. For example, West Sahara is recognized by more than 70 countries, plus South
Ossetia (Stephan and Mundy 2006). Going back a few decades, Ghaar Khan’s Khudai
Khidmatgar eventually brought about British reforms and eventually British withdrawal,
although they never attained an independent homeland of their own (Johansen 1997).
Thucydides once stated that “right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals
in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suer what they must.” That
military organizations could actually do better in a war by reverting to explicitly non-
military strategies puts the adage that might makes right - widely accepted by political
realists - on its head.
Rebel groups not only pursue oftentimes lofty goals shared by many in the movement,
but they are also political organizations purporting to represent and govern a population,
often in competition with rival groups who want the same. Without surviving, the or-
ganization cannot hope to attain its stated outcome goal. As argued by Acosta, “militant
organizations pursue two common and distinct aims: to survive and to achieve the goals
that dene their raison d’être” (135). Therefore, while rebels work towards the overall
goal shared by the movement at large, “they simultaneously pursue organizational objec-
tives that benet the groups themselves” (Krause 2013, 259). Rebel organizations therefore
often simultaneously pursue two goals: the public good of national liberation or regime
change as well as the private good of organizational power, primacy, and survival.
6The 20% estimate comes from cross-referencing Acosta’s dataset with my list of rebel organizations
that used nonviolent action. Given the small n, this statistic is purely descriptive.
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This insight dovetails with the maxim of organizational scholars of the “predominance
of organizational survival over the transformation of external reality” (Max Weber quoted
in Della Porta (1995, 84)). Rebel organizations constantly aim to mobilize support from
the population and to outbid other armed groups in the movement; the intermediate goal
is to scrounge up signicant popular and nancial support. Some groups will also look
towards a post-conict social and political order, where they want to be given a seat at
the table (Krause 2013). In other words, the internal organizational struggle for power is
real.
The use of nonviolent action by a rebel organization is both an indication of strong
popular support and can further augment and cement the organization’s standing within
the movement. This complex, mutually reinforcing relationship is one reason why process-
tracing in a small-n research design is ideally suited for this study, as it allows for a better
grasp of how these forces interact and t together. The rebel use of nonviolent action not
only expresses the close population-rebel link, it also also strengthens this relationship
and alters its quality. Through using nonviolent action, the rebel leadership can hope to
solidify its position in the movement, which also makes them likely post-conict polit-
ical power players. In fact, looking through the complete list of rebel groups who have
used nonviolent action (see table 2.2 in Chapter 2), not a single rebel organization that
has utilized nonviolent action has become politically irrelevant, and several of them have
become major political players (think of the FMLN, the PKK, or the JKLF). An important
caveat is that we are more likely to know about the groups that retained relevance, and
might overlook those that drifted into oblivion.
Fatah is a case in point for this phenomenon, too. During the First Intifada, Fatah,
one of the four factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization — the most powerful
faction at the time — was instrumental in supporting and directing the various forms
of nonviolent action used against Israel between 1987 and 1991 (Stephan 2006). During
the Second Intifada, most Fatah leaders turned away from violence completely (in favor of
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institutionalized politics); as a result of their savvy strategic maneuvering of the strategies
of violence and nonviolence, Fatah is now “better recognized and [has] enjoyed greater
support from people across the globe than many current states” (Krause 2013, 276).
The potential pay-os of nonviolent campaigns in civil wars can be important drivers
of the strategic choice to employ it. The rebel use of nonviolent action can also make com-
promise with the central government more likely than if the rebel group conned itself
to purely violent means. Politically, it can be easier for a government to negotiate with
or make concessions to a group with a public commitment to internationally held norms
and democratic governance rather than a known “terrorist,” as many governments cate-
gorically do not negotiate with terrorists. In contrast, the use of nonviolence can make a
group a more palatable political partner, more likely to be ready to be integrated into the
political process. In this way, apart from its direct eect on reducing organized violence
and therefore reducing the loss of lives, nonviolent action can also indirectly aect the
quality of a post-conict peace and solidify the rebel leadership’s political position. The
Nepali Maoists are symptomatic of this: After the US State Department listed the Commu-
nist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as a terrorist organization in 2001, the group became Nepal’s
dominant political party following a widespread nonviolent campaign in 2006. The in-
creased popular mobilization can lead to broader support, or be a symptom of broader
support.
The rebel use of nonviolent direct action can also have a positive impact on post-
conict sustainable peace and democratization. How civil wars are fought can have sig-
nicant eects on post-war politics. This argument is frequently made about the use of
violence. For example, Krause (2013) argues “non-state violence does not simply aect
the course of a military occupation, it also determines which non-state groups survive
or perish, . . . and, in some cases, which non-state group becomes the ruling regime of a
new state” (261). Not only do civil wars aect who is in power after the war, but wartime
rebel-population links can signicantly aect the nature of the political power structure.
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A rebel group practiced at mobilizing the population for nonviolent action will likely have
signicant experience in popular organizing, enjoy broad support, and is more likely to
adhere to human rights and democratic principles. Democracy also crucially relies on the
participation of the population; according to Walzer (2002), “only popular mobilization
will pave the way for the establishment of a free government” (220). Wartime nonviolent
action will develop key skills of democratic participation before democratization is even
attempted. Nonviolent direct action is both an expression of the relationship between
rebels and population and it also serves to strengthen this tie, which can facilitate the
post-war democratization process.
In her dissertation, Huang (2012) argues that rebel governance, which she denes as
“a political strategy of rebellion in which rebels forge and manage relations with civilians”
signicantly aects state-society relations, which in turn characterizes a political regime
(8). Huang further posits that wherever rebels heavily rely on civilians for survival (rather
than foreign sponsors or extracting natural resources), the population will be politically
mobilized. In this way, during the war, the population becomes aware of the possible
meaning of political rights, alternatives to the status-quo, and develops expectations of a
radical break from the autocratic pre-war status quo, which creates at least some pressure
on the post-war elites to cater to the needs of the citizens. Active civilian participation in
rebel-sanctioned or even rebel-organized protest events is likely to multiply the eect of
these mechanisms.
1.3 Rebel use of nonviolent action and the study of
conict
Rebel use of nonviolent action can partly reduce or completely replace the use of violence
in civil wars. While some rebels use violent and nonviolent action concurrently, others,
such as the Western Sahrawi Polisario, completely shift from the former to the latter. In
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either case, the use of nonviolent action implies a de-emphasis of violence, implying fewer
deaths and less human suering. Rebel groups who substitute some or all of their violent
action with nonviolent activism should be of great interest to scholars and practitioners,
as the study of conict is fundamentally concerned with the causes of war and peace and
how violence starts and ends. Yet, partly because of the seeming paradox of the term “rebel
use of nonviolent action,” this phenomenon has received almost no scholarly attention.
This is all the more astonishing as this represents a possible pathway away from civil war
violence that might make both negotiation more amicable and post-war reconstruction
and democratization smoother.
One of the reasons the phenomenon has been largely overlooked is its relative rarity.
The Non-State Actor Dataset, an extension of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset
(ACD), identies 443 rebel organizations (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallensteen
2014). Of these, I identied 15 rebel organizations who used large-scale nonviolent ac-
tion. Yet, given the lethality and scale of some of these conicts, as well as the eect of
nonviolent action, the importance of the phenomenon is clearly evident.
One reason why the rebel use of nonviolent action has evaded signicant attention
and in-depth analysis is that it runs counter to some key assumptions about violence in
terms of what intrastate conict is, why it occurs, and why it ends. Scholars of conict an-
alyze how violence is used as a bargaining chip, how it can bring about negotiations, and
sometimes, how likely it is that violence will recur once the warring parties have reached
a negotiated settlement.7 Yet, traditionally, a conict is identied exclusively based on
the use of violence. If the identication of “civil war” is done through battle deaths, all
commonly used datasets on civil wars and conict actors only consider what goes on as
long as deaths exceed some threshold. Conicts are considered terminated if one side
wins, if there is a negotiated settlement, or if the number of battle deaths drops beneath a
certain threshold (see for example Gleditsch et al. (2002)). Most quantitative datasets on
7See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review of the study of civil wars.
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conict would not recognize nonviolent action as a conict strategy; nonviolent action is
usually accompanied by a decrease in violent action and lowered battle deaths, so that the
conict would not appear in a dataset during the active use of nonviolent strategies even
without formal conict resolution. This exclusive focus on violent contentious action in
conicts at the exclusion of a myriad of alternative contentious strategies is articial and
misleading, and masks important similarities and parallels between violent and nonvio-
lent action.
Nonviolent action, just like violent action, is outside of the institutional realm of pol-
itics, often illegal, and has a strong coercive element (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). I
follow a recent scholarly trend that recognizes nonviolence as a powerful tool to eect
lasting political change, and is just as or even more dicult to organize and carry out
than organized violent action (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). In their seminal 2011 book,
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that nonviolence have a signicantly higher suc-
cess rate than violent campaigns. Their central argument is that nonviolent campaigns
allow for broader public participation because of the lower physical and moral barriers to
this kind of activism, that this in turn makes nonviolent movements more resilient and
better able to innovate, and can cause loyalty shifts towards the movement. However,
while Chenoweth and Stephan signicantly contribute to a broadened and more realistic
assumption of contentious action, they make one crucially restrictive assumption: They
assume that a campaign uses either violent or nonviolent direct action. Just as is done by
many “traditional” conict scholars, this practice falsely constrains organization’s activi-
ties and may thereby overlook much of what a resistance group does and how.8
In contrast, practitioners have long held more inclusive views on forms of contentious
action and struggle. In the African National Congress, one of the best-known exam-
8There is also a signicant, unaddressed selection bias underlying the ndings of Chenoweth and
Stephan (2011): If, for example, cases that have higher underlying grievances are more likely to use vi-
olent rather than nonviolent strategies, then the level of grievances rather than the strategy type explains
the likelihood of a campaign’s success.
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ples of a rebel organization moving from violent to nonviolent action, the organization
maintained the view throughout their resistance struggle that a continuum of contentious
strategies facilitated shifts in strategy and tactics, as they were necessitated by changing
conditions, and therefore made the organization more adaptable. Walter Sisulu, former
Secretary-General of the ANC, summarized the breadth of contentious action strategies
in the following way: “There exist at all times a multiplicity of forms of struggle that a
movement exploits as part of its arsenal of weapons. . . . Even if a given form of struggle
emerges as a dominant one, this does not mean that other forms do not co-exist” (Sisulu
2001, 84). As this shows, some rebel organizations consider nonviolent action a realistic
and viable strategic option; therefore, scholars should study violent and nonviolent action
within the same analytical framework.
Not only has nonviolent action as a conict strategy been largely ignored, it actually
runs counter to our current understanding of conict escalation and de-escalation and
how conicts begin and end.9 Rational explanations of war and violence view conict on-
set as a type of bargaining failure and violence therefore logically following nonviolence.
According to Blattman and Miguel (2010), commitment-problem based explanations for
intrastate violence “one of the most dominant explanations for civil war” whereby com-
mitment problems “prevent socially desirable agreements between ghting sides” (7).
These commitment problems also operate at the end of a conict, as rebels will shy away
from accepting a settlement if the opportunity for post-treaty exploitation persists (Walter
2009).
That a violent group would unilaterally abrogate violence simply does not t into
this framework where an escalatory logic dictates that violence temporally and logically
follow nonviolence. However, the escalatory understanding of violence onset at least
implicitly acknowledges that violence is not the only potential type of contentious action.
9See, for example, Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeer (2004); de Rouen and Sobek (2004),
Toft (2010).
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The insight that nonviolent action can follow violent action and the two can be used by the
same group also puts into question the association of violent action with greater conict
intensity. For example, Gurr’s Minorities at Risk dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009)
recognized three dierent forms of protest based on increasing levels of scope and intensity:
Nonviolent protest ranges from verbal opposition through political organizational activity
to small and large demonstrations, strikes, and rallies. Riot ranges from scattered acts of
sabotage to serious and widespread rioting and armed attempts to seize power locally.
Finally, rebellion ranges from political banditry to protracted civil war in which rebel
military units have base areas.
The analytical focus of this dissertation considers rebel groups as complex organiza-
tions with many actors and internal processes. This makes analysis much more compli-
cated: After all, “the assumption that movements are unitary actors is attractive because it
simplies the complex empirical world into identiable decision-makers whose practices
can be elegantly modeled” (Pearlman 2010, 179).10 Though treating movements as actors
has the advantage of parsimony, analytical leverage is lost, and we might miss a big part of
the causal story. As Pearlman (2010) cautions, many of the causes and processes of civil
violence (and nonviolence) that we attribute to strategic decision-making by a rational
unitary actor can often be traced to originate with dynamics internal to the movement.
With a process as complex as the adoption of nonviolent action by rebel organizations,
I follow what Pearlman (2010) terms a “composite-actor approach,” which brings resis-
tance movements’ multifaceted internal dynamics to the forefront of analysis. Pearlman
identies clusters of actors based on their objectives and motivations, and dierentiates
between elites, aspirants, and masses. Poignantly, she calls on conict scholars to “rethink
the nature of the agents who we regard as driving violence” (198). In this way, Pearlman
10To provide a contrasting example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) focus on movements rather than
organizations as their unit of analysis. Coggins (2011) is another example of a movement-focused approach,
whereas Cunningham (2011) and Cunningham, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2013) follow organization-focused
approaches.
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goes one step further than Krause (2013), who argues that we should dierentiate be-
tween movements and the organizations representing them; the latter pursue objectives
benetting both the movement as a whole and the organization specically. However,
there are also potentially divergent interests within the organization; a rebel group is a
political organ like any other where individuals vie for power and inuence; this needs
careful consideration.
By breaking movements into organizations and organizations into their composites,
we can keep an open mind to “unexpected” conict trajectories and causal processes that
might evade our notice otherwise. For example, Wood (2003) explores how indiscriminate
state violence may provoke moral outrage that legitimizes a turn to rebel violence, for
example in El Salvador in the late 1970s, which then shifted the balance of power within
the opposition to those favoring violence. Alternatively, indiscriminate violence may lead
civilians to perceive that their security can be better ensured if they join the insurgency,
even if they are not concerned with achieving the overall goals of the movement (Kalyvas
and Kocher 2007). Both of these ne-grained explanations dig much deeper than one
could by considering organizations as unitary, rational actors.
By looking at how organizational factors determine the use of nonviolent action by
rebel organizations, I build on a growing literature that challenges a purely rationalist
explanation for contentious action. This literature challenges the frequently cited as-
sumption about organizations’ choice of strategy, including the initial choice of violent
or nonviolent approaches, which assumes that groups pick strategies based on the costs
of those strategies and their anticipated success, and are then assumed to remain on their
chosen trajectory (Cunningham, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2013). Instead, I consider conict
trajectories as multi-layered processes that continuously change and adjust to shifting
circumstances: according to Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009), “just as with
conict onset, during each stage in a civil war actors deliberately choose between vio-
lence and alternative strategies” (574). There is no reason why the strategic, deliberate
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choice of nonviolent action should not be part of this rationalist framework.
Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) also argue that there has been too much focus on the de-
terminants of civil war onset rather than on how civil wars are fought. They argue that
conventional warfare and symmetric nonconventional warfare are used more frequently
than guerrilla warfare in post-Cold War civil wars, so that our analyses of conict dy-
namics are warped. An example of how the study of conict and violence has changed
in recent years is the literature on violent restraint. Scholars of restraint challenge blan-
ket predictions of escalatory violence in situations of competition between rebel groups
(Clauset et al. (2010), Findley (2011), Jaeger et al. (2012), Nemeth (2014), Kaplan (2014),
Stanton (2016)). These approaches explore situations in which rebel organizations exer-
cise restraint in the use of violence over escalation within outbidding dynamics. However,
while restraint is a quintessentially passive move, rebel use of nonviolent action requires
a deep, active commitment to use nonviolent action rather than just sometimes not using
violent action.
There exists some qualitative and policy-related work on related or similar phenom-
ena.11 Using the term “conict de-escalation,” Dudouet (2013) discusses how some violent
movements transition into nonviolent movements. Conict de-escalation, among others,
describes processes whereby “non-state insurgent groups . . . evolve from armed strate-
gies to nonviolent methods of contentious collective action” (402). Dudouet also oers
the term “conict transformation” to describe this phenomenon. The latter term is too
broad: There are many ways in which the nature of a conict may be transformed, and
the term may even describe radicalization and splintering processes. On the other hand,
“conict de-escalation” misrepresents the phenomenon and conveys false assumptions
about the intensity of the conict. Simply because an armed organization moves towards
the partial or full use of non-violent rather than violent action does not mean that the
11See Pearlman and Cunningham (2011), Dudouet (2013) and a collection of qualitative narratives (Du-
douet 2015) are partial exceptions.
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conict is less intense or desperately fought. Other discussions of rebel use of nonviolent
action broaden the term to a point where it has little analytical meaning; for example, in
his otherwise insightful analysis of the Nepali Maoists’ violent and nonviolent strategic
responses to brutal government repression, Bhattacharya (2013) takes “nonviolent action”
to mean mass-based popular protest, negotiations, and the establishment of rural devel-
opment programs, unwittingly demonstrating the dire need for conceptual specicity in
this eld of study.
In exploring and explaining how rebel organizations use nonviolent action, I lean on
pioneering work that not only disaggregates what happens in civil wars, but also dieren-
tiates the component parts of conict actors. In this way, my approach in this dissertation
is similar to how Weinstein (2007, 18) described his own: “This approach recognizes that
patterns of violence and abuse vary in important and measurable ways across conicts,
over time and across space within conicts, and across belligerent groups.” Most of the
literature on civil wars conceptualizes “contentious action” very narrowly, purely based
on the destruction of lives or possibly property. Expanding our conception of conict to
incorporate the rebel use of nonviolent action can further sharpen our understanding of
civil wars and the use of contentious strategic action to win them. In this dissertation, I
aim to do just this by positing that violent action is not the only type of contentious strat-
egy that is used in practice in civil war, and that we need to pay attention to nonviolent
action as a rebel strategy as well. In this, I follow the literature on contentious politics (see
for example Tilly and Tarrow (2012)), which conceives of contentious action as a much
broader action spectrum. My conceptualization of nonviolent action as a rebel strategy is
inuenced by both this literature and and recent work on rebel strategies in civil wars.
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1.4 Analytical approach, argument and contribution
The rebel use of nonviolent action thus not only appears paradoxical, but also runs counter
to some very basic assumptions about conict trajectories. First, the voluntary and un-
conditional move away from violence contradicts the basic tenets of escalatory conicts.
Second, the use of nonviolent action appears surprisingly unconnected to the prevailing
military balance of power in a civil war, or conict type, for that matter. This second
point will become particularly clear in the comparison between the Timorese CNRM and
the Nepali CPN-M. How can we explain a phenomenon that seems to fall this far outside
of existing conceptions of conict? The overall aim of this dissertation is two-fold: First,
I dene, conceptualize and explore the strategic value of rebel use of nonviolent action.
Second, I build a theory to explain whether or not rebel groups will seize on an opportu-
nity for using strategic nonviolent action. There are some obvious factors that facilitate
the rebel use of nonviolent action: A close relationship with the population, a political
ideology favoring democracy and mass action, the presence of urban centers as “staging
areas”, a concurrent popular movement, or a receptive international audience, to name
just a few. Furthermore, nonviolent action, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter
3, can benet many rebel organizations — and yet, few actually use it. However, just be-
cause some or all of these facilitating or triggering factors are given does not mean that
the rebel group, a complex, multi-layered organization replete with contrasting aims and
interests and individual leaders and factions vying for power and inuence, will be either
willing or able to seize on the opportunity to utilize nonviolent action.
The proposed framework takes an organizational approach to understanding rebel
group behavior, which accounts for the role of civilians as potential group actors. The ap-
propriateness of this framework is established through an in-depth theory-building case
study of Timor-Leste’s Fretilin/CNRM. Based on insights gleaned from this case and a
conceptual exploration of nonviolent action as a rebel strategy, my theory is anchored
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on the insight that a rebel operational shift towards the use of nonviolent action con-
stitutes a particularly disruptive instance of strategic innovation. The theory unfolds in
two parts: First, I argue that consolidated political authority in a rebel organization is
necessary for disruptive innovation in the form of nonviolent action. Second, I explore
the operational requirements for actually carrying out nonviolent action, and argue that
embedded organizational structures linking rural rebel strongholds with urban popular
centers are necessary to allow for both popular mobilization for nonviolent action and
control of individual events and the organization as a whole. The common organizational
“theme” uniting these two complex features is an operational focus on functional task
dierentiation.
One interesting theme that emerges throughout the dissertation is the intrinsic ana-
lytical overlap between the questions of why rebel organizations use nonviolent action
and how they do so. If we consider rebel groups as potentially complex organizations
that evolve and adjust over time, then a group’s dominant structure and modus operandi
come to color and delimit the strategies and and trajectories open to the organization; in
other words, how an organization does some things comes to inuence how it acts. This
explains why sometimes throughout the dissertation a group’s way of doing something
and its reason for doing so might appear as one and the same.
In addition to providing the rst comprehensive discussion of nonviolent action as a
rebel organization, this dissertation makes two key analytical and conceptual contribu-
tions: First, I provide a framework for studying rebel groups as organizations with inter-
nal frameworks and processes that come together in a dominant structure that can explain
operational and strategic choices, options, and trajectories. A comprehensive understand-
ing of a rebel group’s dominant structure requires careful over-time analysis. Second, the
example of nonviolent action as a conict strategy shows the necessity of studying the
population — and its ties to the rebel organizations — as active resistance participants that
must be included in a comprehensive organizational analysis of a rebel group.
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1.5 Dissertation roadmap
The remainder of this dissertation will proceed as follows: Chapter 2 explores the concept
of rebel use of nonviolent action, starting with nonviolent direct action in general and
then situating its shape and role in a conict context. Building this conceptualization
and denition, I operationalize terms and concepts and present a full universe of cases.
Chapter 2 also lays out the qualitative research design in-depth, which is based on the
very specic purposes of generating and rening hypotheses on the necessary conditions
for the rebel use of nonviolent action, identifying causal mechanisms, and dening scope
conditions.
Before being able to explore why and under what conditions some rebel groups re-
sort to nonviolent action, I rst explain why they would want to do so. What are the
strategic benets and the risks for rebel organizations using nonviolent action? What are
the costs and challenges associated with nonviolent action that are unique to a conict
context? Chapter 3 explores nonviolent action as a contentious strategy in a civil war,
paying special attention to the strategic, organizational and operational advantages and
disadvantages. In Chapter 4, I explore how Timor-Leste’s Fretilin/CNRM came to use
nonviolent action. It serves as a pathway theory-building case study. Chapter 5 presents
my organizational-process theory to explain the rebel use of nonviolent action. Chapter
6 presents the case of the Nepali Maoists as a most-dierent case study that presents a
plausibility probe for the theory. Chapter 7 presents the case of the Salvadoran FMLN as
a case where nonviolent action was attempted, but failed, as the necessary organizational
conditions were not present. I also introduce two case examples to disprove the remaining
alternative hypotheses.
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation. What can we say about the scope conditions
under which my theory can explain why rebels use nonviolent action? To what extent
might the theory be generalizable to the full universe of cases? I propose several avenues
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of future research on this topic, and outline important policy implications for my theory,
reiterating how important it is to study the organizational processes and developmental
trajectories of militant non-state groups.
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2. Denition, Operationalization and
Research Design
“Fighting is the central military act. . . . Engagements mean ghting. The object of ghting is
the destruction or defeat of the enemy.”
– Carl von Clausewitz
2.1 Denitions and operationalization
How do we dene and study rebel use of nonviolent action and who uses it? Operational-
ization is both particularly important and complicated for this study; there is very little
scholarly work to build on, so that terms have to be dened from scratch. The seemingly
contradictory nature of the phenomenon makes wording and identication tricky. Posing
an additional conceptual challenge, rebels’ use of nonviolent action relies on the mobi-
lization and participation of actors who are not militants themselves (nonviolent activists
from the civilian population), it is tricky to determine at what point we can attribute a
nonviolent campaign to a rebel group.1 Yet, precisely because of the complex organiza-
tional processes necessary for rebels to utilize nonviolent action and the level of specicity
necessary for attribution, we must have a clear understanding of what constitutes a rebel
group and what nonviolent action is in order to determine what it means for a rebel group
to use nonviolent action and why they might do so.
1Rebel group and rebel organization are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation.
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Rebel organizations - what are they and what do they do?
What are rebel organizations, and how are they markedly dierent from other organiza-
tions with violent purposes, such as state militaries or terrorist organizations?2 Is there
something about a group actively organizing violence that fundamentally dierentiates
them from non-violent organizations such as activist groups or even businesses?
I dene rebel organizations both by what they do and by how they are structured.
Rebel organizations mount an organized, violent challenge to existing political institu-
tions in a geographically clearly bounded territory. I focus on organizations that are not
only in conict with state institutions, but wish to replace partially or fully the state’s gov-
ernance capacity either at the central government apparatus or substate territory. This
means that the rebel group is focused gaining increased or complete control over territory,
either by controlling the center or through increased self-determination or secession.3
This distinction matters because the organizational requirements for organizations
that aim for political governance of a territory are very dierent than those of organiza-
tions with less maximalist aims. In fact, some rebel groups already fulll government-like
functions during the civil war, which underlines that they are political actors. As summed
up by Mampilly (2011), “the performance of governmental functions by violent nonstate
actors from across the ideological spectrum has occurred throughout history and is a
far more common occurrence than generally recognized” (2). While they operate out-
side of the realm of institutionalized politics (see for example McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
(2003)), rebel organizations are political at their core, even though they are illegal or extra-
institutional. Rebels’ challenge of the government, which according to Max Weber holds
2Note that some rebel organizations also use terrorist strategies, so that these are not wholly distinct
actor categories.
3This excludes groups that have minimalist aims, such as increased cultural or economic rights that
are not connected to increased self-determination or more political clout at the center. This denition does
include organizations that lay claim to territory currently occupied by more than one state; one example
are the Kurds who consider their homeland to include territory that spans southeastern Turkey, northern
Syria, northern Iraq, as well as northwestern Iran.
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a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a state, necessarily places them outside the
legal realm of the state (Gates 2002).
That rebel groups are political actors who wish to govern territory is an important
deviation from some conceptualizations of rebel organizations. For example, Weinstein
(2007) also considers rebel organizations that ght in “wars in which belligerents use vi-
olence but have no interest in achieving territorial control of any sort (notably terrorist
groups)” (17). Because of the narrowness of my denition, some groups are excluded;
for example, organized crime organizations that do not directly challenge state institu-
tions for governance purposes, or some international terrorist organizations such as most
branches of al-Qaeda if they do not wish to replace one current government structure with
another. On the other hand, the militant group “Islamic State” (IS) would be counted, be-
cause it does aim to govern in a geographically bounded territory. On the other hand, I do
not dierentiate rebel groups based on how they organize violence. A rebel group is the
belligerent, organized opposition in a civil war, irrespective of whether they ght guer-
rilla or conventional wars, though groups using nonviolent action use guerrilla tactics
more often than not.4
At their core, rebel organizations are organizations like any other. Problematically,
many studies investigating why some countries experience civil wars but not others,
when they experience violence, and why some civil wars last so much longer than oth-
ers “have taken organization as a given” (Weinstein 2007), treating the rebel organization
and its internal structure as a “black box,” and therefore as a rational unitary actors with
uniform preferences and incentives. This is a critique that was already leveled against
the rational-actor approach of studying international relations decades ago. For exam-
ple, Allison (1969) famously reprehended established political scholars and analysts for
4Though this is oversimplied, “insurgency” and “guerrilla warfare” are considered as synonymous.
Guerrilla warfare is considered a type of military technology where ghting groups use light weapons and
operate primarily from rural, peripheral bases (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). Guerrilla warfare and what it
means for rebel relations with the civilian population will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter.
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“understand[ing] happenings as the more or less purposive acts of unied national gov-
ernments” based on a rational weighing of perceived strategic benets and drawbacks
(690). Instead, Allison proposed that government “acts” and “choices” were instead to be
considered “outputs of large organizations functioning according to certain regular pat-
terns of behavior” (690). Accordingly, it is crucial to analyze the organizational logic and
processes within rebel groups in order to understand why they act how they do and how
this contributes to conict trajectories and outcomes. Organizational processes are partic-
ularly important for understanding how rebels use nonviolent action, as the coordination
of violent and nonviolent action requires high organizational capacity and innovation
potential.
For Weinstein (2007), organization refers to the internal characteristics of a movement:
Its membership, policies, structures, and culture. These characteristics of an organization
are mirrored by Staniland (2014). To the latter, organizations are collective actors with
formal membership boundaries, where the members know what goals and principles the
organization stands for and members can be identied by at least some other members.
Organizations also have ocial, specialized goals, and they have routinized internal pro-
cesses of decision-making control and the allocation of resources (Staniland 2014; Knight
1992; Elster 2007). This holds for rebel organizations like for any other formal, but non-
violent, organization.
The denition put forth here clearly dierentiates groups from movements, though
the two are often lumped together in the conict literature, where the non-state actors
are seen as a unitary actor. Social movements are dened as “informal interaction net-
works between a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or organizations” with “a shared
set of beliefs and a sense of belonging” that are “engaged in political and/or cultural con-
icts, meant to promote or oppose social change” (Della Porta and Diani 1999, 14-15).
Therefore, it is possible for a social movement to contain more than one organization;
the former is dened by beliefs and a sense of belonging, whereas the latter is dened
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based on its internal structure. For example, the Kashmiri nationalist movement is an
example for a social movement, whereas the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front is one of
the organizations representing this movement.
The dierence between movements and organizations not only matters for the iden-
tication of organizational processes, but it is also crucial to get a complete sense of our
main actors’ goals and motivations. As eloquently argued by Krause (2013), “insurgen-
cies are not unitary actors, but are instead marked by armed groups that pursue strategic
objectives that benet their larger social movements . . .while they simultaneously pursue
organizational objectives that benet the groups themselves” (259). A complete analysis
of conict actors and their choices requires us to consider both organizational goals and
movement goals, as well as the inherent trade-os inherent in weighing these against
one another. Only by dierentiating between movements and rebel organizations can we
fully understand and appreciate the motivations and mechanisms behind specic actions
or strategic choices.
To summarize, I conceive of a rebel group as a collective organization made up of indi-
vidual members, with a self-designated formal name, clear political goals, and formal struc-
tures of command and control. It uses organized violence in order to govern territory and
operates outside the realm of institutionalized politics. Finally, it may or may not be the only
organization purporting to represent a particular political movement.
Dening and operationalizing nonviolent action
What is “nonviolent direct action” both as a type of action in its own right and as a rebel
strategy? One reason why nonviolent resistance is so dicult to dene is that scholars
use dierent terms to denote the same or at least a similar concept, such as “nonviolent
resistance”, “popular resistance”, or “nonviolent struggle.” I use the terms “nonviolent
action” and “nonviolent resistance.” As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) point out, the
term resistance implies that the campaign is launched against the establishment and is
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therefore outside of the standard institutional political framework; it also implies that the
movement is generally confrontational. In this way, nonviolent direct action is outside
the realm of institutionalized politics. According to Cunningham, Salehyan and Gled-
itsch (2013), nonviolent tactics entail some form of non-routine and non-institutionalized
political behavior directed toward some policy change, and these actions do not involve
violence. Nonviolent action, then, it a form of contentious action that operates outside
the framework of legal, institutionalized politics.
Some of these characterizations appear eerily similar to violent action. In fact, even if
the term appears contradictory, violent and nonviolent action have many similarities and
parallels. As such, some denitions of nonviolent action are applicable to violent action as
well. For example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 12) dene nonviolent action as “a type
of political activity that deliberately or necessarily circumvents normal political channels
and employs noninstitutional (and often illegal) forms of action against an opponent.”
This denition underscores the similarities between violence and nonviolence as forms
of organized, contentious action, as does Dudouet (2013, 402), who sees violent and non-
violent action as “alternative methods of popular mobilization for collective, organized,
non-institutional, contentious and coercive action.”
Yet, we must be careful in seeing nonviolent action and violent action as simply two
sides of the same coin. For instance, some conceptions of nonviolent direct action are
“negative” in that they are characterized by all of the factors dening violent action, but
distinguishing itself through an absence of behavioral violence (see, for example, Bond
et al. (1997)). On the surface, then, the key dierence between armed and unarmed ac-
tivism simply lies in the use of direct (behavioral) violence, dened as the intentional
iniction of physical damage to persons or property. However, this makes violent action
appear somehow more “intense” and “dicult”, going one step further than nonviolent
action. Since I have already established that nonviolent action can temporally follow vi-
olent action within the same organization and alluded to the signicant mobilization and
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organization eorts as well as personal risks involved in using nonviolent action in a
civil war, this conception of nonviolent action as the “negative” of violent action is highly
misleading.
Viewing violent and nonviolent action as dierent only in the absence of violence
in the latter also masks key dierences in how the strategies operate and achieve their
aims. Not only must our conception of the rebel use of nonviolent action acknowledge the
signicant organizational requirements and challenges inherent in the strategy, it must
also account for the unique way in which it exerts pressure on opponents. Inching closer
to this goal, Sharp (1999) denes nonviolent resistance as “a technique of socio-political
action for applying power in a conict without the use of violence” (567). But what kind
of power is applied, by whom, and how?
Nonviolent action derives a large part of its power from widespread popular participa-
tion, which is both disruptive and demonstrates the government’s utter loss of legitimacy
(see for example Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) or Nepstad (2015); to be discussed in more
detail in the next chapter); a few thugs holding up pro-rebel signs on the side of the road
do not qualify here. The centrality of people for the power and inuence of nonviolent
action is apparent in the terminology: “popular” is often inserted into the term describing
the action – “popular nonviolence” or “mass-based direct action” are prominent examples
– thereby directly associating nonviolent action with people power. According to Stephan
(2006), nonviolent struggle is “popular” because it involves widespread civilian participa-
tion; it is “nonviolent” in that it uses nonviolent methods such as protests, demonstrations,
boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience, and noncooperation Stephan (2006). Tarrow (2011)
further explains the popular or collective nature of nonviolent action. Nonviolent action
as used here is crucially also a collective, purposive form of political action, as opposed
to individual forms or acts of political dissent (such as a sprayer of pro-anarchist grati).
It is the fact that a large mass of people was mobilized to participate in a public event all
at the same time without reverting into a riotous mob that gives nonviolent action a lot
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of its power. Tarrow (2011, 7) sums this up in the following way:
The irreducible act that lies at the base of all social movements, protests, re-
bellions, riots, strike waves, and revolutions is contentious collective action.
. . .Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack
regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or
unacceptable claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge
others or authorities.
There are several ways for a committed mass of people to actively exert pressure on
a government. Sharp (1990) oers a typology of nonviolent weapons or action types that
is based on how the action is supposed to eect its overall goal:
1. Protest and persuasion: Includes demonstrations, pickets, vigils, petitions, synchro-
nized moments of silence or noise. These are mainly symbolic acts that are designed
to communicate citizens’ grievances, outrage, and readiness to mobilize. Also aids
further mobilization through visibility.
2. Noncooperation: Refusal to participate in an activity or practice, which can be social,
political, economic, religious, military, or cultural. This can include an unwilling-
ness to y a ag, go to work, or participate in elections that are deemed illegitimate.
Gandhi’s famous hunger strikes are an example.
3. Intervention: Intervention can either by psychological or physical, such as sit-ins or
the blocking of military tanks.
What types of action are considered “nonviolent action”? In a widely cited study,
Sharp (1973) identies 198 dierent forms of nonviolent action.5 This is far too broad;
5Nonviolent protest includes parades, vigils, picketing, posters, teach-ins, and protest meetings. These
are mainly symbolic forms of opposition or of attempted persuasion that move beyond rhetoric but stop
short of non-cooperation or nonviolent intervention. Non-cooperation with the opponent comprises the
largest category of methods and involves discontinuing, withholding, or defying certain existing social,
economic, or political relationships. Sharp sub-divides the methods of non-cooperation into three groups:
methods of social non-cooperation (social boycotts), economic cooperation (economic boycotts and strikes),
and political non-cooperation (political boycotts) Nonviolent intervention , the third class of nonviolent
weapons, are used to intervene directly in a situation in order to disrupt it or change it in some funda-
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especially in a conict context, not all forms of nonviolent action will make enough of
a splash for the rebel organization to derive noticeable benets. Within the context of
civil war, the range of visible nonviolent action is a lot more narrow, as everyday routines
and the economy are disrupted and chaos already reigns supreme (the disruption of daily
economic life is generally one of the main mechanisms through which nonviolent action
is hypothesized to achieve success). In the context of civil war, only certain types of
nonviolent action will garner signicant attention and eects. These are “harder” or more
active forms of nonviolent resistance - protest marches are the most obvious and visible
example, though strikes may also be possible if the economy is still functioning in a war-
torn country. While boycotts are possible in the context of elections, some countries in
civil wars do not hold elections, and many of those elections that do take place are not
free or fair.
I follow Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) in their focus on the participation of indi-
viduals in collective action, i.e. the active and observable engagement of civilians in an
organized, mass-based event with a clear political message. This means I only include
individuals who make their participation clearly observable. Some forms of nonviolent
action may fall through the cracks: Even widespread instances of passive non-cooperation
may be a lot harder to observe than a mass protest with a few hundred participants. On the
other hand, this is also a “harder” requirement for identifying nonviolent action in a civil
war, since protest marches with visible participation engender more danger to personal
safety. Therefore, this approach biases towards undercounting rather than overcounting
instances of nonviolent action in a context of organized violence.
Therefore, in operationalizing nonviolent action, I purposely deviate from Chenoweth
and Stephan (2011)’s approach. They classify nonviolent campaigns as existing in a given
year if events garner at least 1,000 participants in a given year, and a year as having a
mental way. Fasts, sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, the establishment of new social patterns, stay-in strikes,
alternative economic institutions, seeking imprisonment, and establishing a parallel government are exam-
ples of this most advanced, and often the most risky, form of nonviolent struggle (Sharp 1973).
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violent campaign if it reaches at least 1,000 battle deaths. Both of these numbers are
misleading in trying to identify transitions from violent to nonviolent strategies or their
concurrent use: First, strategic change is more likely if the previous method has proven
unsuccessful, so that it is unlikely that 1,000 battle deaths should have been reached in
recent memory. I use the more frequently used number of 25 battle deaths. Second, 1,000
protest participants is a very high number in the kind of heavily repressive environment
of a civil war. I set the bar at an estimated 1000, thereby excluding small, spontaneous
gatherings or protest events, though it may be that an organization starts with smaller
events. I crucially require these to have campaign character. The relatively rare nature of
the rebel use of nonviolent action and the qualitative approach of this dissertation allows
me to clearly trace these requirements in each case.
To be recognized as a strategy in a civil war, nonviolent action must take on a cam-
paign character. One-time use is very dicult to link to a rebel organization, and is more
likely to have been accidental, or spur of the moment, and can therefore not constitute an
overall strategic approach. Rather, there must be a number of events of similar character,
identical goals, and comparable planning patterns. According to Ackerman et al. (1994,
10f.), a campaign consists of a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a con-
stant, clearly stated political objective. A campaign can last anywhere from days to years
but crucially includes more than one event. Campaigns also have discernible leaderships,
which distinguish them from random riots, or random mass acts. In the case of rebel use
of nonviolent action, not only should there be discernible leadership, but observable co-
ordination mechanisms between violent and nonviolent leaderships, so that the two are
a part of the same organizational structure, at least broadly speaking, i.e. we can clearly
identify the chain of command. Therefore, here we also require that there be a series of
observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a constant, clearly stated political objective. What
exactly these tactics are and who carries them out will be discussed in the next section.
Thus, nonviolent direct action requires popular and potentially mass participation,
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that it be outside established politico-institutional channels, that it be political, and that
it has a disruptive, contentious but also nonviolent character. What does this mean in a
civil war context? In order to be identied as of nonviolent direct action in a civil war,
the requirements summarized in the table below must be fullled.
Table 2.1: Operationalizing nonviolent action
1. Mass popular participation (a thousand participants or more in at least one of
the events). “Popular” implies that civilians march on behalf of the organization,
not just rebels, though often, rebels participate as well.
2. Types of action that have a disruptive eect: Boycotts, strikes, protests, demon-
strations.
3. Campaign character
Rebel use of nonviolent action
What does it mean for a rebel group to use nonviolent action? A complete denition of
rebel use of nonviolent action must incorporate its strategic, purposive, and unilateral
nature, and clearly link to the rebel leadership. Nonviolent action can have a strong ethi-
cal connotation; an activist group may choose nonviolent action because of a principled
commitment not to use violence against people. By contrast, if rebels use nonviolent ac-
tion, they have already demonstrated both the capability and willingness to use violent
strategies. There is something decisively dierent, then, about the rebel use of nonviolent
action than if it is used by nonviolent activist without ties to violence.
One obvious reason why it is easier to identify rebel groups’ use of violent than non-
violent action is that it is carried out by militants themselves, or rather, carried out by
individuals commonly associated with a rebel organization, who sometimes even wear
uniforms. While the secretive element of guerrilla warfare poses an obstacle to attribu-
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tion, the link to the rebel organization is still direct and immediate. Nonviolent action
subverts this expectation. Nonviolent action is largely carried out by civilians who have
never carried weapons. Therefore, as is true for some forms of terrorism, nonviolent ac-
tion can be carried out by agents without obvious ties to the movement. In fact, the mass
mobilization of civilians as agents is a key characteristic of the rebel use of nonviolent ac-
tion. While it is possible that rebels participate in marches, we cannot conclude from the
identity of the individual actors that the action is carried out at the behest of and on behalf
of the rebel organization. The analysis of rebel use of nonviolent action therefore requires
us to expand our conception of conict actors, and to specify an attribution strategy.
The most obvious way to link a nonviolent event to a rebel organization is if protesters
carry insignias or chant in unison paroles that show their support for the rebel group. Yet,
this alone only indicates that the rebel organization has civilian supporters, not that the
rebel organization has consciously made the strategic decision to use nonviolent action.
Conversely, a rebel organization can declare its support for nonviolent action even if it
was not involved in the planning, and is simply trying to take credit for something it did
not contribute to. Rather, the rebel use of nonviolent action represents a two-way street:
The rebel organization has to be involved in the planning of events, and the nonviolent
protesters have to be cognizant that their nonviolent activities imply support for the rebel
organization. How can we condently say that a rebel organization uses nonviolent action
if we cannot directly conclude from observing a protest march that it is clearly linked to
a rebel organization?
In addition to a clearly visible link to the nonviolent events (in the form of slogans,
ags, demands, etc.), it is necessary for the rebel leadership to be involved in planning the
event in at least one of the following ways:
– The leadership planned the nonviolent events from mobilization of participants to
organizing the actual event;
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– The leadership was notied of a planned nonviolent event and given input/veto
power over proceedings;
– The leadership signicantly altered its violent strategies as a clear consequence of
its publicly voiced support for nonviolent events.
Thus, even though rebels usually rely at least in part on civilians for actually carry-
ing out nonviolent events, we can clearly identify actions taken by the rebel leadership
towards actualizing a nonviolent strategy.6 In other words, we can identify rebel complic-
ity in the organization of nonviolent events, either in the form of hands-on planning or
approval/veto of plans. Because we are only concerned with nonviolent campaigns, the
rebel-activist link should be institutionalized in some way; there must be a formal organi-
zational link. The easiest way to identify such a link is through identical aims, slogans, or
ags, although there are other forms of formal coordination as well (such as military sup-
port or protection or evidence of clear coordinating communication). An example that
would not pass this test is the Free Papua Movement. While there is an intermittently
active nonviolent movement on the island, thus far, the rebel group(s) have not adjusted
their own strategies and have avoided collusion. In fact, according to MacLeod (2007), the
coordination attempts by the nonviolent leadership had such poor results that the nonvi-
olent eort would cease whenever violence broke out anew, out of fear for retribution.
– The violent and nonviolent leadership arms must t into one organizational hier-
archical structure.
– The aims and demands of the violent and nonviolent activists are identical.
It is crucial that the use of nonviolent action is purposive, that is, it is a strategic choice
intended to get the group closer to its main goal. This means that the move towards non-
violent action is unilateral, meaning that it cannot be directly prompted by government
6This likely means that we will undercount rather than over-estimate the number of relevant cases,
since rebel leaderships may be involved in the planning of events without leaving any evidence thereof.
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demands or conditions (i.e. the move towards nonviolence is not a direct condition for
negotiations); there are, of course, many instances of nonviolent action as a consequence
of negotiations. If the cessation of violence is a part of a negotiated settlement, we can-
not dierentiate between a strategic, deliberate choice on the part of the rebel leadership
and government coercion.7 The ANC’s move to nonviolence exemplies how important
it was for the group to be seen as using nonviolent action on their own accord. While
the ANC did use widespread nonviolent strategies in tandem with violent ones, in 1985,
South African President Pieter Willem Botha announced in Parliament that he was will-
ing to release Nelson Mandela from prison, but only if Mandela “unconditionally rejected
violence as a political instrument” (Maharaj 2008, 17). Mandela rejected any conditions
for negotiation: He was categorical that “the renunciation of violence . . . should not be a
pre-condition to, but a result of, negotiation.”
2.2 The universe of cases
How frequent is the use of nonviolent action by rebel organizations, and what observa-
tions can we make about these organizations? The above denitions and operationaliza-
tions allow us to identify the relevant universe of cases. I use Cunningham, Salehyan and
Gleditsch (2013)’s Non-State Actor Dataset (NSA) as a base to identify all rebel organiza-
tions active from 1945 to 2011. NSA data extends the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset
(ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallensteen 2014). In order for a conict to be
coded as an internal armed conict in ACD, it must meet ve general criteria: The conict
must (1) involve the government of the state, (2) take place primarily within the state, (3)
involve organized opposition forces, (4) be fought over either control of the government
or territory and (5) generate 25 battle deaths in a calendar year. NSA identies 443 rebel
organizations.
7Importantly, this does not preclude the use of nonviolent action following some ceaseres; ceaseres
are not always tied to conditional demands but rather allow for the care and protection of civilians.
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Table 2.2: Operationalizing rebel use of nonviolent action
1. At least one must hold:
• The rebel leadership planned the nonviolent campaign from mobilization
to execution
• The rebel leadership was notied and given input/veto power over
planned events
• The rebel leadership altered their violent strategies as a consequence
of their support for nonviolent events.
2. The violent and nonviolent leadership arms must t into one organizational
hierarchical structure
3. The violent and nonviolent activists have identical aims and demands.
4. The protesters express support for the violent group.
5. The move to nonviolence must be a unilateral
6. The use of nonviolent action has to take on a campaign character.
From this list, I identied cases of rebel use of nonviolent action. Several avenues
were pursued to compile a viable list of cases. I relied on qualitative narratives of related
phenomena. Dudouet (2009, 2013, 2015) explores the broader concept of conict transfor-
mation and thus provides a useful starting point. While not all of her cases are instances
of rebel organizations utilizing nonviolent action, some of them do t into this typology.
The Berghof Foundation, a non-governmental organization that supports eorts to pre-
vent political and social violence and to achieve sustainable peace through conict trans-
formation, has published a policy-focused series on conict transformation (see below),
which includes cases tting my phenomenon. I also benetted from qualitative work by
Parkinson (2013), Pearlman and Cunningham (2011) and Stephan (2006).
Second, I used the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset cov-
ering the Middle East and North Africa from 1980 to 2004 (Wilkenfeld, Asal and Pate
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2008).8 This dataset chronicles political organizations in the region and codes for both
the degree of insurgent activity and the degree of organizations’ nonviolent activity. In
this way, I was able to identify multiple additional organizations. Finally, I conducted tar-
geted searches on LexisNexis to identify additional cases and then conducted case-specic
research.
Both the stringent inclusion requirements and the nature of the phenomenon mean
that the universe of cases presented here likely does not capture all relevant cases. For
example, the Gorkha National Liberation Front, which pursued both violent and nonvi-
olent strategies but does not meet the NSA criteria, is not included in this list, though it
ts all the other criteria. Two more problems contribute to undercounting. First, we can
only identify instances of nonviolent direct action in civil wars if they are captured by
the international media. That is, only if the organization successfully mobilized and was
lucky (or possibly strong) enough to capture international attention, would we be able to
identify nonviolent action. This is complicated further because governments often im-
pose military rule during civil wars, severely restricting media access. Further, even if the
media does cover the event, database searches may not pick up on them. One signicant
problem in identifying organizations in this way is that there are many culture-specic
terms that describe activities we subsume under “rebel use of nonviolent action”; an ex-
ample is the Hindi “bandh”, meaning protest. 9
In sum, the universe of cases is a set of positive cases, starting with all UCDP civil
conicts, that therefore conceivably could use nonviolent action. The cases listed here
are all positive on the dependent variable, i.e. the rebel use of nonviolent action.
8In contrast, the NAVCO dataset compiled by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) (as well as the updated
version by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013)) was not useful for this undertaking: First, the unit of analysis of
“movement” rather than “organization” was too broad. Second, because this dataset identies movements
as exclusively violent or nonviolent, it only captures two instances of rebel use of nonviolent action (ANC
and Polisario).
9An extension of MAROB covering the former USSR and eastern Europe is due to be released soon,
which might allow us to capture a few more cases.
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Table 2.3: The universe of cases
1. African National Congress (ANC), South Africa
2. Basque Country and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA), Spain
3. Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M/UPF), Nepal
4. Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia, Hamas), Is-
rael
5. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), India
6. Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Iran
7. Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), Turkey
8. National Council for Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional da Resistência
Maubere, CNRM), Indonesia
9. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel10
10. Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), Israel
11. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Yekêtiy Niştîmaniy Kurdistan, PUK), Iraq
12. People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA), India
13. Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamara and Rio de Oro (POLIS-
ARIO), Morocco
14. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Northern Ireland
15. Sandinista National Liberation Front (SNLF), Nicaragua
16. Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional,
EZLN), Mexico
2.3 Research design
In this dissertation, I address why some rebel organizations use nonviolent action, whereas
others do not. Therefore, the outcome of interest or dependent variable is whether or not
rebel organizations strategically use nonviolent mass-based action. The successful use of
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nonviolent action in a civil war is a complex, multi-causal process that in part depends on
fortuitous circumstances (activist population, ability to garner the attention of the interna-
tional press, urban areas to serve as a “stage” for protest events, a favorable international
and possibly national climate) and trigger events associated with them.11 This study was
designed to demonstrate how these background conditions alone are insucient; rather,
structural and organizational features determining capacity and innovation potential are
necessary for rebel groups to use nonviolent action. In the proposed theoretical frame-
work, there are two necessary conditions within the rebel organizational structure for
the successful use of nonviolent action: Centralized communication networks (“hubs and
spokes”) and separate political and military decision-making structures.
I am interested in why and how rebels use nonviolent action rather than with how
much certain variables aect the outcome of interest. As put by Goertz and Mahoney
(2012), qualitative scholars “tend to be far less concerned with average eects and to fo-
cus centrally on the causes that produce outcomes in specic cases” (42). In identifying
and testing necessary conditions, I employ a qualitative research design. The qualita-
tive research design allows for a high level of conceptual validity, meaning that I can be
assured that what I identify as rebel use of nonviolent action is in fact just that. This
is especially important in analyzing an under-examined phenomenon, where concept-
and theory-building are paramount. Cases were structured and selected in order to both
identify and begin to test these necessary conditions while “controlling for” fortuitous cir-
cumstances and trigger moments as best as possible. The qualitative analysis is roughly
divided into three parts: One theory-building pathway case, one longer and one shorter
in-depth longitudinal case study, and one case study that seems to contradict my theory.
There is a considerable focus on theory construction throughout this research project.
This is crucial, as no one has treated this topic in a systematic manner. I employ two
11“Successful” when used here and in most places throughout the dissertation, unless stated otherwise,
refers to the successful mobilization and coordination of nonviolent events by the rebel organization and
not to the organization’s attainment of its ultimate goals.
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qualitative research designs simultaneously: I use Goertz and Mahoney (2012)’s ideal or
pathway case approach to identify causal mechanisms and necessary conditions. By us-
ing Goertz and Mahoney (2012)’s conception of causal mechanism, “we can understand
causal mechanisms to mean the intervening processes through which causes exert their
eects.” Goertz and Mahoney (2012, 100) In other words, I focus on the processes that link
the independent and dependent variables, and to identify the conditions under which this
link happens. To do this, I use process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005), which “involves
an intensive analysis of the development of a sequence of events over time, is particu-
larly well-suited to the task of uncovering intervening causal mechanisms and exploring
reciprocal causation and endogeneity eects” (Levy 2008, 8).
Second, I use the comparative method to probe the generalizability and scope of my
organizational theory and to test the operation of causal mechanisms. Roughly, I am mod-
eling my research for this part on Petersen (2001), who summarizes his research approach
as follows: “The sequence of mechanisms . . . provides a base line for comparison. Cases
are . . . sought that control certain factors and vary others. In a rough sense, the compar-
isons proceed from most similar to most dierent design” (27). In the comparative section,
I pay signicantly more attention to cases where the variable in question (the rebel use of
nonviolent action) occurs; this is in part due to the theory-building nature of this research,
and in part due to the rarity of the event. Though there are of course quantitative research
methods that account for rare events (see for example King and Zeng (2001)), in qualita-
tive research, the positive cases of interest are generally rare occurrences (Mahoney 2006).
I explore two additional cases where rebels used nonviolent action, but where the scope
conditions were very dierent: The Kashmiri Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and
the Nepali Maoists. Finally, I explore a case that seems to contradict my theory (rebels
did use nonviolent action but did not exhibit the necessary organizational conditions) in
the form of the El-Salvadoran FMLN.
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Pathway Case Study: Theory Construction and Causal
Mechanisms
The purpose of the pathway case study is two-fold: First, it deductively contributes to
theory renement, and second, it serves to probe causal mechanisms through process-
tracing. Referred to by Gerring (2007) as an extreme-case method, I have selected a case
with an extreme value on the dependent variable of interest (the rebel use of nonviolent
action).12 Timor-Leste is a particularly strong instance of rebels using nonviolent action
because the concurrent use of violent tactics ceased almost entirely, and I was able to
trace the organization of the nonviolent campaign directly back to the violent leadership
so that attribution errors could be minimized. As such, Timor-Leste was not chosen for
reasons of representativeness, but rather because it is such an ideal case of rebels using
nonviolence: Any theory on the shift to nonviolence in civil war must be able to explain
Timor-Leste’s transition. Further, in a case where the variables take on the most extreme
variables, causality should be clearest (Levy 2008), which is particularly helpful when
rening theory and hypotheses.
Timor-Leste not only is an ideal instance of the dependent variable, it also conformed
to the initial iteration of my theory, in which I posited that quasi-democratic institu-
tions are necessary for the use of nonviolent action. Fretilin/CNRM exhibited particularly
strong quasi-democratic institutions even though there was no history of self government
in the former colony. While I rened the causal mechanisms and processes signicantly,
the structural features that allow for widespread popular mobilization in a civil war are
similar to these quasi-democratic institutions, and the hypotheses were revised signi-
cantly. However, because the structural features still hold, Timor-Leste fortuitously also
possesses extreme values on the independent variables.
12Note that Gerring later referred to this type of case as an outcome case as well (Gerring and Cojocaru
2016). The possible “outcomes” include extreme, rare, or polar; there are multiple terminologies for this
type of case study.
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Fretilin/CNRM and Timor-Leste also exhibit features that make it particularly advan-
tageous for process-tracing. The potential confounding variables in Timor-Leste are such
that we can observe the causal mechanisms with minimal interference. According to Ger-
ring (2007) and Weller and Barnes (2014), a good hypothesis-generating case is one where
not only the apparent impact of the independent on the dependent variable conforms to
theoretical expectations and is strong in magnitude, but background conditions are also
held constant or exert a “conservative” bias. In other words, the potential confounding
variables are such that they exert minimum eects on the dependent variable, which al-
lows for the observation of the hypothesized causal mechanisms in a setting as close to
an experiment as possible. According to Gerring and McDermott (2007), to determine the
ability of a qualitative case study to serve a role in causal inference, we should consider
the degree to which the chosen case exhibits experimental qualities. The more poten-
tial confounders can interfere in the operation of causal mechanisms, the less we can say
about how the independent variable really aects the dependent variable. In those terms,
CNRM’s nonviolent transformation is relatively “clean” and allows for causal inference
via process-tracing.
What are these potential confounding variables?
1. No history of nonviolent action: Prior to 1989, Timor-Leste had no history of nonvi-
olent direct action whatsoever. Therefore, I can conclude that any networks and
channels used to organize nonviolent action during the civil war were directly
linked to the resistance movement and were not created by repurposing pre-existing
means of grass-roots organizing unconnected to the violent resistance eorts.
2. No competition with rival rebel groups: Fretilin (later CNRM) was the dominant rebel
organization throughout the Timorese civil war. As such, the use of nonviolent
action was not linked to the desire to gain an edge over a stronger rival or to the
inability to compete militarily with a rival.
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3. Minimal free-riding opportunities: Although there would later be cooperation and
collaboration between the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia at large, this
movement was in its infancy in 1989 (rst nonviolent event in Timor-Leste), so
that the Timorese resistance movement was left to its own organizational devices.
4. Minimal external ties and communication: During the civil war, Timor-Leste was
almost completely cut o from the outside world, so that imitation of other move-
ments and outside inputs were minimal. This allows us to isolate the impact of the
rebel organization on the organization of nonviolence.13
As an essentially unexplored phenomenon, it was particularly important to under-
stand how rebels use nonviolent action. While I was able to gauge from secondary sources
that there were protest marches over a decade in the tail end of the Timorese war of in-
dependence, these sources could not tell me how exactly these events were connected to
the violent leadership, as this angle has never been explored. To what extent were these
marches coordinated with the violent leadership? How were individual marches planned?
Did leaders on either the violent or nonviolent side have ideas about the strategic impli-
cations of nonviolent action on their cause? By teasing out the mechanics of nonviolent
action in a civil war, I gained a clear sense of what kinds of narratives and indicators to
look for in my comparative case studies. In all interviews, I would spend the rst part
of the interview focused on how dierent events were planned, who knew about it, etc.,
before moving on to questions of why, as we cannot draw causal inferences without rst
understanding how a process works.
In order to understand the process that led from a violent to a largely nonviolent re-
sistance organization in Timor-Leste, I used interviews for the most important purpose
13By contrast, the West Sahrawi Polisario communicated with Fretilin prior to organizing their rst
nonviolent event, and they remodeled their resistance after the Timorese example. The Polisario is therefore
not one of the main case studies. (Information from Polisario leader and then-ambassador of the West
Sahrawi Republic to Timor-Leste Mohammad Badi Slama, interview in Dili with the author, December 14,
2014.)
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attributed to them as a research tool by Mosley, namely as a “distinct means of under-
standing contemporary political actions and outcomes”; interviews can “serve to identify
causal mechanisms that are not evident in other forms of data” (5). Interviews are partic-
ularly useful for this purpose as they allow for a deep set of responses, and, with certain
question design strategies, also allow for open-ended responses and follow-up questions
into unexpected or even contradictory answers. As argued by Mosley (2013), while the
purpose of in-depth interviews is rarely generalization, within a single case, it can gen-
erate “more points of inferential leverage” (6). This makes interviewing a particularly
appropriate tool for conducting a pathway case study.
Specically, I conducted in-person, one-on-one interviews with former violent and
nonviolent activists and leaders, all the way up to former military governor Mário Car-
rascalão and former head of the CNRM Diplomatic Front (and Nobel Peace Prize winner)
José Ramos-Horta, as well as about thirty former activists, both violent and nonviolent.
It was particularly useful to talk both to Carrascalão and Ramos-Horta, as they were —
on paper — on opposite sides of the conict, which allowed for me to have a high degree
of validity. As both of them had held high oces within their respective organizations,
they could give me particularly valuable insight into what was going on inside the or-
ganizations. Interviews took place over two visits totaling about six weeks. While some
interviews only lasted half an hour, many interviews would go on for hours, and in some
cases I was able to meet with interviewees twice to ask follow-up questions. The length of
interviews was very helpful, as it allowed me to gauge details of the internal mechanisms
and how individuals were connected to the movement as a whole, and in particular, what
motivated them personally to play the role they did.
All of the interviews were semi-structured, so that I could ask follow-up questions
that might not have been in my script if the interview took an unexpected direction. It
was important to me both that these interviews be conducted in-person as well as one
on one. On the one hand, this is because of the highly sensitive nature of the subject
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matter, as Timor-Leste experienced one of the worst genocides in the Twentieth Century,
which has left deep psychological and physical scars in the small country. Second, old
Fretilin party members and resistance activists still regularly get together and talk about
the “old days”. This brings the risk of a coordinated narrative with a political propaganda
undertone intended to portray the resistance struggle in a particularly attering light. I
was more likely to detect such canned responses by interviewing activists individually by
observing tone, diction, body language, and precise wording (metadata). In almost all of
my interviews with former nonviolent activists, I was struck by the sense of nostalgia;
the deep, continued connectedness
To identify interviewees, I relied on a non-random sampling strategy. If the goal is
to develop causal explanation or develop theory, interviewees should “be chosen because
of the insights they provide regarding the causal circumstances that generate particular
outcomes” (Mosley 2013, 19). I used a “purposive” or “quota” sampling sampling strategy,
whereby interviewees are chosen based on certain characteristics allowing for particular
insight. In this way, the interview data is more likely to take the form of “causal process
observations”, which Brady and Collier (2004) dene as “an insight or piece of data that
provides information about context, process or mechanism, and that contributes distinc-
tive leverage in causal inference” (277-278). In this way, I rely on non-random participant
samples in order to generate credible causal process observations.
By asking interviewees to refer me to other activists who may have valuable infor-
mation, I also obtained important “metadata”. As argued by Lynch (2013), a snowballing
sampling strategy can also yield important metadata: How widely was a specic piece of
information or a particular person known? How were dierent players connected? Did
there appear to be political bias in who dierent interviewees referred me to? In this way,
the snowballing process itself provided me with valuable information about the social
network I was trying to access. Because the type of organizational structure as well as
the connection between organization and population makes up an important part of my
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theoretical approach, this was particularly useful and gave me an important sense of the
social and organizational network structure.
In terms of analytical period and scope, the Timorese case study briey explores colo-
nial and precolonial socio-political structures and provides an in-depth overview over
Fretilin/CNRM’s pre-war organizational development. As a theory-building case study, it
is problematic to assume that all of the relevant organizational factors for the use of non-
violent action are determined during the conict itself. This follows the key assumption
that many tracks for organizational development and popular relationships are laid prior
to the conict.
As with any other type of organizations, in rebel groups, “the dierent starting points
of organizations create distinct pathways of likely change that reect the initial strengths
and weaknesses of groups” (Staniland 2014, 34). These organizational origins create pat-
terns of path dependency that create certain institutional trajectories; actors will adjust
their strategies and choices to t these constraints (Thelen 1999; Weber 1946).
The organizational origins of rebel groups may even be more important than those
of other organization types. Civil wars are highly disruptive in several ways. They bring
with them signicant transformation to the political demographics both in terms of who
lives where as conicts can create refugees, but also in terms of who rules where. It is
also likely that existing infrastructure in terms of both communication and transportation
will be disruptive. This can make it particularly dicult to fully build new organizational
structures, especially over short periods of time; during wartime, “while political mean-
ings are not locked in place, they also cannot be easily transformed” in a war. This means
that an exploration of the organizational and social dynamics relevant to wartime nonvi-
olent action must consider pre-war dynamics as well.
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Comparative case selection: Testing causal mechanisms and
exploring scope
The selection strategy for a case to compare to Timor-Leste’s CNRM followed the logic
of a most-dierent case study approach. The case is selected to conrm or disconrm (or
possibly rene) the causal hypotheses derived through the pathway case, and therefore
serves a diagnostic function. Second, this comparative case study method “promises to
shed light on a larger population of cases” and therefore should allow for inferences with
regards to scope (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016, 3). This should not be confused with gener-
alization, which is not the purpose of this dissertation or its research design. To sum up,
the comparative case study serves two key purposes:
1. To further test the hypothesized causal mechanisms for further cases
2. To explore the explanatory scope of the theory
To test hypotheses about necessary conditions, I selected the comparative case on the
dependent variable (Levy 2008). In doing so, I follow the most dierent systems design as
proposed by Przeworski and Teune (1982), in which I identify and study cases that have
similar values on the dependent variable but have dierent values on as many relevant
confounding variables as possible, except for the main independent variables.14. Eckstein
(1975) also emphasizes the usefulness of crucial cases argues that most-least-likely re-
search designs are particularly suited for qualitative hypothesis testing if they are based
on a most/least likely case design.
CPN-M: A most dierent case
The main theory-testing case study has been chosen because it diers from the Timorese
case in terms of signicant confounding variables, especially with regards to the alter-
14This research design corresponds to Mill (1872)’s method of agreement
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native hypotheses developed in Chapter 5. The Nepalese Maoists fought for control of
the central government rather than independence, they possessed a highly capable mili-
tary apparatus, they fought in a very dierent type of territory that was also signicantly
larger than Timor-Leste, and they controlled signicant parts of the countryside.
The FMLN: A “negative” case
How can we falsify necessary conditions? Levy argues that “the only observations that
can falsify the hypotheses in question are those in which a particular outcome of the
dependent variable occurs despite the absence of hypothesized necessary condition” (Levy
2008, 9). This further conrms the appropriateness of a research design with little to no
variance on the dependent variable.
The case best tting this bill is the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN). In the late 1980s, the FMLN repeatedly organized nonviolent events with
several hundred participants. All the same, until 1984, the organization did not have a
well-organized political front, and the group’s hierarchy clearly prioritized the military.
Further, communication between town and country was tenuous at best. As such, my
theory would not expect the use of nonviolent action, since neither of the two necessary
conditions were entrenched in the organization. However, delving more deeply into the
actual nonviolent campaign as well as the organizational development of the FMLN be-
tween 1984 and 1986, a more nuanced picture emerges: First of all, between 1984 and 1986,
the FMLN did try to reform itself precisely by focusing more on political mobilization and
strengthen its clandestine communication network between population and rebels. In
this way, while these features were by no means consolidated, they likely did exert some
inuence.
The FMLN also serves as a cautionary note in identifying rebel use of nonviolent ac-
tion. While a few hundred protest participants in Timor-Leste was a notable, unexpected
feat, in El Salvador, a protest event with a few hundred people was a disappointment, if
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not failure. The background conditions in El Salvador would indicate that large-scale pop-
ular mobilization should have been comparatively easy. In many ways, the FMLN would
seem like an ideal case for the use of nonviolent action, if we consider surface facts: It
was Latin America’s most prolic non-state militant force; during its heyday, there was
one FMLN ghter per 500 El Salvadorans. By contrast, in Colombia, this number was 1
ghter per 3000 Colombians (Alvarez 2009, 7). This means that the FMLN’s reach into the
population was broad and deep, which should have favored popular mobilization. Fur-
ther, the organization’s commitment to violence was not absolute, as the end of the civil
war and its aftermath demonstrate. Even though the organization was not defeated mil-
itarily, it decided to negotiate and disarm and later became the country’s most popular
opposition party. (Alvarez 2009, 10) Therefore, the very limited nonviolent action cannot
be considered a fully successful instance of the rebel use of nonviolent action. According
to Alvarez (2009, 20), the planned popular direct action movement did not materialize, to
the great disappointment of the organization.
The FMLN also serves to test the alternative hypothesis that broad popular support is
sucient for rebel use of nonviolent action.
Two mini cases to test alternative hypotheses: The Free Aceh Movement and the
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
Finally, Chapter 7 also presents two very short cases to disprove two alternative hypothe-
ses.
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is used to demonstrate that a signicant opportunity
for mass-based nonviolent action alone is not sucient for a rebel group to use nonviolent
action. Even though the Indonesian pro-democracy movement and country-wide nonvi-
olent demonstrations coincided with a pro-secessionist Acehnese population, GAM did
not manage to organize a nonviolent action campaign supporting its specic platform. In
this way, I rely Mahoney and Goertz (2004)’s possibility principle in selecting a negative
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case:
The Possibility Principle holds that only cases where the outcome of interest
is possible should be included in the set of negative cases; cases where the
outcome is impossible should be relegated to a set of uninformative and hence
irrelevant observations. (653)
GAM is a particularly useful case for disproving the opportunity argument because it
confronted the same government opponent (Indonesia) and had the same opportunity to
mobilize a motivated population and reach an international audience as Timor-Leste.
The example of the JKLF is presented to show how a populist socialist ideology is not
necessary for either the adoption of a nonviolent strategy nor for the existence of the
underlying necessary organizational structures.
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Table 2.4: Case selection overview
Organization Opponent Gov. Dependent Variable Case Type Purpose
CNRM Indonesia Yes Pathway Hypothesis generating, tracing causal mechanisms
CPN-M Nepal Yes Most Dierent Testing, exploring scope
FMLN El Salvador Incomplete Most Likely Falsication
JKLF India Yes Most Dierent Testing alternative hypothesis
GAM Indonesia No Most Similar Testing alternative hypothesis
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3. Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action:
A Strategy
“Non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal ofmankind. It is mightier than themightiest
weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man.”
– Mahatma Gandhi
3.1 The strategic nature of nonviolent action
In order to assess why and how some rebel organizations use nonviolent action, we must
rst establish what they can tactically and strategically gain from such a move. What is
the strategic value of nonviolent action, and what are the potential risks and drawbacks?
One reason why violent and nonviolent action have been studied separately for such
a long time, with the latter not considered a viable civil war strategy in its own right, is
the close association of nonviolence with pacism, which precludes thinking about non-
violent action in strategic bargaining terms. Nonviolent action has long been associated
with or even equated to pacism, mostly due to Mohandas Gandhi, one of the most fa-
mous nonviolent leaders. Nonviolent activism in the image of Gandhi is one where the
activist aims to reach her goals through conversion, persuading the opponent to accept
her views through altering his deeply held beliefs and convictions. In order for nonvio-
lent action to be successful in a Gandhian approach, there is a moral and spiritual aspect
to satyagraha where the enemy has to discover a deeper ”truth force” that is personally
transformative.
Yet, while nonviolent activists may privately hold pacist beliefs, it is important not
to equate a strategy with the potential underlying motivation of actors. In his seminal
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book, Sharp (1973) dispels the Gandhian notion that a principled commitment to nonvi-
olence is necessary to achieve success, and argues that nonviolent action is a pragmatic
approach that can be applied by a wide array of actors. Nepstad (2015) denes pragmatic
nonviolence as ”a strategic choice to employ nonviolence because they believe it is more
eective than violence” (4). In contrast to principled nonviolence, pragmatic nonviolence
does not aim to convert or persuade the opponent, merely to get them to do something,
or stop doing something, no matter the motivation for this behavioral change.1
Accordingly, Bond (1994, 61) argues that nonviolent direct action is “revealed more in
the dynamics and consequences of behavior than in the motivating beliefs in principled
nonviolence that drives some of it.” From a practical point of view, only by acknowledging
that nonviolent action does not necessarily go hand in hand with pacist beliefs can we
analyze its use by rebel groups, who have already demonstrated that they are not commit-
ted to pacism. Focusing on dynamics, behavior and eects rather than motivations also
helps us not to compare nonviolent and violent action in terms of ethics, thereby avoiding
bias when considering the validity of dierent organization’s causes. In the same vein of
avoiding implicit bias, Stephan (2006) argues that we can think of nonviolent action as a
method for prosecuting conict rather than a lifestyle or world view, thereby not making
nonviolent action sound implicitly “better” than violent action.
Thinking about violent and nonviolent action as alternative means of prosecuting con-
ict points to the inherent comparability of violent and nonviolent action, which can be
done along several dimensions. Explicitly acknowledging that violent and nonviolent ac-
tion are both forms of mass-based strategic political action, McAdam and Tarrow (2000)
identify three potential dimensions along which political actors make decisions: Legal
versus illegal, institutionalized versus non-institutionalized, and violent versus nonvio-
lent. With both, there is an underlying assumption that the use of institutionalized polit-
1Nepstad (2015) presents an in-depth comparison of the goals and strategies of principled and pragmatic
nonviolence in chapter 1 of her book. See p. 5 for a helpful summary.
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ical channels to settle disputes or disagreements is either explicitly or implicitly closed to
the population the active group purports to represent. In their non-institutional nature,
violent and nonviolent action are two sides of the same coin, and they both bypass the
political ”rules of the game”.
Along these lines, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) describe nonviolent direct action as
“a type of political activity that deliberately or necessarily circumvents normal political
channels and employs non-institutional (and often illegal) forms of action against an op-
ponent” (12). In that they are not a part of the everyday political process, both violent and
nonviolent action also involve risks to participants. Schock (2003, 705) argues that vio-
lent and nonviolent action remain outside the bounds of institutionalized politics either
by choice or necessity:
Although institutional methods of political action often accompany nonvio-
lent struggles, nonviolent action occurs outside the bounds of institutional
political channels. Contrary to regular and institutionalized political activity,
there is always an element of risk involved for those implementing nonviolent
action since it presents a direct challenge to authorities.
Acting outside of what is accepted or expected is part of how violent and nonviolent
strategies attain their goals. Therefore, both approaches belong to the greater universe of
contentious or disruptive politics, in that they both violate or bypass routine conict res-
olution procedures of a political system or social custom (Bond et al. 1997; Tilly 2003). In
this way, both nonviolent and violent action subvert other actors’ expectations, which are
heavily inuenced by institutions and established practice. Moving outside of this frame-
work is both surprising (catching the opponent on the wrong foot) and extreme, thereby
signaling the depth of motivating underlying grievances. After all, with both types of
contentious action, the aim is to protest some grievance, rectify a perceived wrong, and
work towards a political aim.
Not only do nonviolent and violent action share their non-institutional nature, they
also both operate via coercion. In his introduction to Sharp (1973)’s seminal work on
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nonviolent action, Thomas Schelling characterized the key similarity between violent and
nonviolent action: “The dierence is not like the dierence between prayer and dynamite.
Political violence, like political nonviolence, usually has as its purpose making someone
do something or not do something or stop doing something” Schelling (1973). Therefore,
at their core, both violent and nonviolent strategies in civil wars are coercive in nature,
trying to change the behavior of the opponent against their a priori interests one way or
another.
Violent action in civil wars
A detailed explanation of how violence in civil wars works is far beyond the scope of
this dissertation. As Kalyvas (2006, 7) put it, “wars, and their violence, display enormous
variation — both across and within countries and time,” and this violence ”appears bewil-
deringly complex and polysemic” (7). Still, political theorists have attempted to boil down
the role of violence. In this way, Howes (2009) in his conceptualization of how violence
works neatly sums up how violent actors coerce: “By adapting and modifying Clause-
witz’s theory of war [. . . ] physical violence is the use of destruction of another’s body in
order to subdue or destroy their will” (5).
Through physical destruction, violent action directly targets the adversary’s capac-
ity to resist. This can happen either through directly targeting military capabilities and
forces, or through destroying or damaging infrastructure, threatening populations, dis-
rupting the ow of goods, disrupting commerce and the economy, and halt essential ad-
ministrative responsibilities. In this way, the other side is weakened militarily, but it
is also hindered in carrying out other essential functions, such as social service provi-
sion or economic production. This both physically weakens the government and demon-
strates the government’s inability to govern eectively, thereby questioning its legitimacy.
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) sum up the eect of violent resistance: “Violent campaigns
physically coerce their adversaries, which may signicantly disrupt the status quo.” (42)
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There are important dierences between how most state and non-state actors use vi-
olence to advance their goals. At the risk of oversimplying, we can characterize strategic
violence in a civil war into strong-actor and weak-actor strategies, according to a typol-
ogy developed by Arreguin-Toft (2001), leaving aside for now terrorism. In a civil war,
militarily strong actors are most likely to utilize direct attack strategies, which refers to
the use of the military to capture or eliminate the adversary’s forces, thereby gaining con-
trol of their values and resources. A war is won by destroying the opponent’s capacity to
resist using armed forces. In essence, then, one military directly targets the opponent’s
military, trying to diminish or eliminate one another. In contrast, strong actors target
large swaths of civilians in order to destroy the adversary’s will to ght.
An alternative typology is developed by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), who disaggregate
civil wars based on the technology of rebellion, that is, the joint military technologies of
states and rebels engaged in armed conict. The combination of military technologies
on both sides determines the type of war that emerges. Conventional warfare emerges
when rebels are able to militarily confront states, using heavy weaponry such as armor
or eld artillery. Military confrontation is likely to be direct, often across well-dened
front lines; ghting often takes on the form of set-piece battles (Balcells 2010). Oen-
sive and defensive strategies and tactics are clearly distinguishable (Lockyear 2008, 62).
Civil wars that t into this category include the American Civil War or the Spanish Civil
War. However, there are also much more recent examples: During the Angolan Civil
War, the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987, fought by the pro-Soviet Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and South African-backed National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels, entailed clashes between heavily armored
columns and has been called the largest conventional land battle in Africa since World
War II (Chester 1996). The Croatian and Bosnian wars are another example. This kind of
war is won in a direct clash of forces on an identiable battleeld, where the militarily
stronger side usually wins; territory can be gained and held through occupation. In this
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kind of war, power really does imply victory, as has been stated since Thucydides, and the
war progresses in how described by Von Clausewitz (2008, 226): “Fighting is the central
military act. . . . Engagements mean ghting. The object of ghting is the destruction or
defeat of the enemy.”
There are also conicts where government and rebels are matched where both sides
have very low technological capabilities. These tend to take place in the context of ex-
tremely weak or collapsed states. An example is the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville from
1993 to 1997. However, so-called symmetric nonconventional conicts provide unlikely
ground for nonviolent action: There is no organized state against which to protest and to
show o as illegitimate. These wars also rarely involve battles over hearts and minds of
the people.
In a civil war, non-state forces in a civil war are usually the ”underdog” (there are
exceptions, such as the LTTE, the militant group known as Islamic State or at times the
Nepalese Maoists), and therefore they often rely on indirect strategies such as guerrilla
warfare. What, then, is irregular or guerrilla warfare, and how does it work? According
to Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75), “irregular or guerrilla warfare is a technology of rebellion
whereby the rebels privilege small, lightly armed bands operating in rural areas.” It is
an expression of the relative asymmetry between states and rebels; while rebels have the
capacity to challenge and harass the state, they lack the capacity to head-on confront
force with direct force. Rather, rebels tend to “hover just below the military horizon”,
hiding, relying on harassment and the element of surprise (Simons 1999). Mao’s ideal was
that rebels aim at launching a major conventional attack after the state’s strength has
been sapped. However, guerilla wars often turn into wars of attrition where rebels aim to
slowly grind down the governments’ superior resources and resolve.
To understand guerrilla warfare, we have to consider the society in which it takes
place, as the population plays a key role. Arreguin-Toft (2001, 103) takes this into account
as he conceives of guerrilla warfare as “the organization of a portion of society for the
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purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to avoid direct
confrontation. These costs include the loss of soldiers, supplies, infrastructure, peace of
mind, and most important, time.” Yet, while this kind of strategy does primarily target
opposing armed forces and their support structures, its ultimate aim is to destroy not
the capacity (which it is unlikely to be able to do conclusively) but rather the will of the
attacker in a war of attrition (Arreguin-Toft 2001, 103) (note that conventional wars can
also be wars of attrition).
How can this be done? Mao (1961, 46) describes guerilla warfare in the following way:
In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and
attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw;
deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a
stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops;
strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla
strategy, the enemy’s rear, anks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital
points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and
annihilated.”
Rebels often have a home-court advantage that facilitates this kind of approach: Ac-
cording to Mao (1961, 42), guerrilla ghters (supported by the local population) enjoy the
advantage of knowing the conditions of the terrain, climate, and society much better than
the oppressor or invader, which will slow the progress of the latter and can be turned to
advantage by the former.
In civil wars, a guerrilla strategy is dependent upon being almost invisible to the en-
emy, so that the enemy will never be certain where you are going to attack from. The
line between civilians and combatants blur only inasmuch as anyone might be a rebel at
night, hide rebels, inform rebels on enemy movements. Civilians provide information,
cover, sustenance, resources, logistic support, and sometimes are trained as soldiers.
Although guerrilla warfare is most commonly associated with Mao Tse-Tung or the
Viet Cong, it is in fact a centuries-old practice; in the 18th and 19th centuries, we can
nd numerous analyses of the approach (see Laqueur (1976) for a review of the history of
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guerrilla warfare). For Mao, civilians constituted the sine-qua-non of successful rebellion.
It was during the liberation struggles during the second half of the Cold War that “people’s
war" became mainstreamed; in 1975, all but two ongoing civil wars were waged through
guerrilla warfare (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, 415).
3.2 Nonviolent action in civil wars
Like rebels, nonviolent activists also want the government to do something (or stop do-
ing something) they would not otherwise do on their own. Nonviolent action is coercive
in that it threatens to or or actually does impose negative social, economic, political or
physical sanctions for non-compliance (Bond et al. 1997). A protest march might be fol-
lowed by more widespread social unrest and disruption, for example, if the group’s de-
mands are not met. Disruption, which raises the political, economic, and military cost
for the adversary (DeNardo 1985). As costs multiply, the target regime may accommo-
date some of the activists’ demands, or even force them to give up power completely. If
the government clamps down on protesters with violence or repression, this will make
the government look bad to both domestic and international audiences. A protest march
might be followed by more wide-spread social unrest and disruption, for example, if the
group’s demands are not met; and if the government clamps down on protesters with
violence or repression, this will make the government look bad to both domestic and in-
ternational audiences. The most obvious dierence between how violent and nonviolent
actors coerce is in the kind of weapons they use, and who uses them. Sharp and Jenkins
(1990) characterized nonviolent action as a political technique that is similar to armed
combat in that it requires sound strategy, numerous “weapons” as well as courageous,
well-disciplined (but nonviolent) soldiers. In nonviolence, both the weapons and the sol-
diers come directly from the population, and disappear into it again when a given event
is over. In contrast, rebels usually have specialized training, clearly t into a hierarchical
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command-and-control organization, often wear uniforms, and devote all day, every day
to their activism.
Therefore, nonviolent action actively involves the population at large, putting them
front and center as the main agents. Nonviolent action publicly displays the opposition
of a mass of people against the government. At the most basic level, this demonstrates
that the population has withdrawn its consent from the government, the very basis of any
citizen-government relationship. The importance of this type of consent is exemplied by
the Preamble to the US constitution: “To secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it.” At the most basic level, nonviolent action attempts to sever power
from authorities by demonstrating that rulers can no longer rely on the support of the
population, and might even have their outright opposition. This is in line with Henry
David Thoreau’s call upon people to publicly oppose the Mexican-American War: “Let
your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine. What I have come to see, at any rate,
that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn” (Thoreau 2008)2.
In the words of Sharp (1990), nonviolent action operates through the unique power
sources that citizens possess:
When people refuse their cooperation, withhold help, and persist in their dis-
obedience and deance, they are denying their opponent the basic human
assistance and cooperation that any government or hierarchical system re-
quires . . .Workers may halt work, which may paralyze the economy . . . If peo-
ple and institutions do this in sucient numbers and for long enough, that
government or hierarchical system will no longer have power. . . . Its power
has dissolved. (9)
While nonviolent action can try to cripple the government’s eectiveness by halting
the economy, clogging the streets, and making it dicult to demonstrate quiet and or-
der, it also gains eectiveness through a ripple eect as the widespread public popular
2Originally published in 1849
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discontent activates other players to put pressure on the government: the media, the ed-
ucational sector, businesses, factories, production and economic elites, religious leaders,
nongovernmental organizations, the military, and others. On the domestic level, Sharp
and Paulson (2005) refers to this as targeting the government’s main pillars of support.
While the movement can try to coerce the government into submission by preventing
these pillars from functioning, thereby signicantly decreasing the government’s eec-
tiveness, command of resources and reputation, nonviolent protest also aims to persuade
these pillars to shift support over to the protesters.
Nonviolent activists also play to an international audience. Masses of people taking
to the streets makes for a powerful image that will sell papers and spread through social
media like wildre if cards are played right; only consider the Arab Spring. While violent
strategies can have some eects on gaining an international audience, Chenoweth and
Stephan (2011) argue that this eect is likely to be much smaller for violent than nonvio-
lent campaigns. Seeing large numbers of resistance participants engaging in nonviolent
activism will be taken as a sign of the movement’s legitimacy and viability and actively
demonstrate their commitment and adherence to international democratic norms. This
can motivate foreign governments and nongovernmental and international organizations
(as well as other players) to powerfully lobby on behalf of the movement. This is such a
powerful tool that there are even consulting rms specializing in the international mar-
keting of norms-conforming resistance movements.3
Governmental overreactions against civilian activists will further turn international
support away from the regime. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 53) condently conclude
that “the international community is more likely to contribute diplomatic support to non-
violent campaigns than to violent ones.” It is important here to dierentiate between in-
ternational attention (which can be done eectively through the use of violent action) and
support, which is more likely to follow nonviolent action. In this way, rather than apply-
3Carne Ross’s Independent Diplomat is an example.
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ing pressure on the opponent’s military capacity (by attacking military bases, troops, or
sources of supply), seizing and maintaining control of territory, nonviolent action aims to
generate domestic and international pressure on the government to agree to a resolution.
Paradoxically, both in targeting an international audience and provocation, nonviolent
action and terrorism can operate in a civil war through some of the same mechanisms
(see Fortna (2015) for a discussion of the strategy of terrorism in civil wars).
3.3 What can rebels gain from using nonviolent
action?
The very fact that few would associate nonviolent action with rebel groups points to its
key strategic pay-o: It is unexpected by both the enemy government and the interna-
tional audience, and thus unanticipated by any counterinsurgency doctrine and disrupting
an ongoing narrative. After all, the expectation of violence in a civil war is absolute, as
explained by Howes (2009, 2):
If we are willing to use enough of [violence], so the thinking goes, violence
is reliable. Violence compels and destroys without requiring consent. Physi-
cally manipulating and attacking others frees us from dependence upon their
opinions, reactions, responses, and desires. If others respond to violence with
violence, one’s material and moral capacities may be exhausted. However,
even in that case, violence prevails. When violence confronts vio-
lence, violence produces thewinner. Setting aside legal, social, and ethical
qualms allows us to make the world we desire. It seems as though the mate-
rial quality of violence ensures that violence always works for those who are
willing to use a sucient degree of it. (Emphasis added for clarity.)
Howes’ characterization of violence dovetails with the conict literature’s assumption
that violence is the natural outcome of an inescapable conict escalation spiral, where the
use of violence implies a high degree of conict intensity and dire underlying grievances.
This does not mean that violence is preferred by all actors; in general, violence is not
morally desirable and considered a measure of last resort by most. Violence, so the argu-
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ment goes, might be indispensable even to those who would not otherwise choose to use
it, if their grievances are dire enough. As Howes (2009) puts it, “one of the most tragic,
strange, and undeniable [paradoxes], so it would seem, is the necessity of using violence
when one does not want to in order to stop those who insist upon it” (3). If the commonly
held assumption is that violence persists until victory or painstakingly negotiated settle-
ment, the unilateral abrogation of violence by a main conict actor – or at least the partial
substitution through nonviolent action – will both shock and awe.
The example of the First Palestinian Intifada exemplies how mass-based (almost)
nonviolent action can catch an opposing army unawares, making them pause, unsure
how to act or even virtually unable to. In the Israeli case, an opposing army that had been
engaged in counterinsurgency was ummoxed by the new challenge of demonstrating
people. Stephan (2006, 120) convincingly argues that the Israeli army had no training in
riot control, and had no modus operandi or established practice protocol on hand to face
protesters in the street, so that the were rendered as good as useless. Schi and Ya’ari
(1989) describe this so-called “third front” and the reaction:
By their rebellion, the Palestinians opened a third front of mass, unarmed
civilian violence — a new kind of warfare for which Israel had no eective
response. Since the standard tools of military might are not designed to han-
dle deance of this sort, the IDF was wholly unprepared for the uprising in
terms of its deployment, its combat doctrine, and even its store of the most
basic equipment. The result was that overnight Israel was exposed in all its
weakness, which was perhaps the real import of the surprise. (31)
What was the weakness exposed by the third front? The intifada showed in stark colors
just how little headway the Israeli occupiers had made in winning Palestinian hearts and
minds; it showed o the depth of despair within the population for all to see. Further, any
“traditional” high-tech, heavy military response would have appeared blunt, brutal and
overreactive next to the publicly suering, unarmed population.
There are two key tactical advantages that can be gained through nonviolent action.
First, it can render established counterinsurgency and military practices and processes
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ineective at least in the short term, duping the government’s likely superior military
machine. In addition to duping the opponent’s superior counterinsurgency machinery,
the use of nonviolent action can also draw attention away from the violent element of
the resistance, buying time for a scrambling or failing militant organization to recuperate
and regroup.
The most important benets for rebels using nonviolent action are strategic. There
are four key advantages to the rebel use of nonviolence: It demonstrates and deepens
popular support, exemplies movement resilience and support, signals the organization’s
adherence to democratic and other key international norms, and it attracts and solidies
international attention.
Table 3.1: Rebel benets of nonviolent action
1. Demonstration and mobilization of popular support
2. Exemplication of movement resilience and control
3. Costly signal of norms adherence
4. Increase and solidication of international support
Demonstrating and deepening popular support
Since civilian activists are the heart of nonviolent action, at its core this strategy can show
o the breadth and depth of the rebel’s popular support base. The sheer number of people
in the streets shows how wide this support network really is; the population’s willingness
to put themselves at real physical risk of retribution by the armed forces shows the depth
of their commitment.
Comparing violent and nonviolent action side by side, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011)
argue that nonviolent resistance enjoys a participation advantage over violent resistance.
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Nonviolent direct action requires much less physical prowess, strength, or training. As
Gandhi famously said, “in nonviolence the masses have a weapon which enables a child,
a woman, or even a decrepit old man to resist the mightiest government successfully.” In
practical terms, it is therefore possible for many more people to participate in nonviolent
than violent action.
Participation is also important for violent resistance campaigns, where the population
plays an important role in sustenance, support, recruits, information, and administrative
or political tasks.4 However, when comparing exclusively violent or nonviolent cam-
paigns, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue it is easier to recruit people to nonviolent
campaigns:
The physical risks and costs of participation in a violent resistance campaign
may be prohibitively high for many potential members. Actively joining a
violent campaign may require physical skills such as agility and endurance,
willingness to train, ability to handle and use weapons, and often isolation
from society at large . . . [T]he typical guerilla regimen may appeal only to a
small portion of any given population. (34-35)
Not only does nonviolent action have much lower physical barriers to participation,
but the psychological and ethical barriers are lower as well. As DeNardo (1985) puts it,
“violent methods raise troublesome questions about whether the ends justify the means,
and generally force people who use them to take substantial risks” (58). People might
have moral or ethical concerns with using violence against other human beings no matter
the movement goals, and might be neither willing to carry out violence themselves nor
to condone violence through direct association or support. DeNardo also points out that
nonviolent activism is less risky than violent activism on several dierent levels. We often
hear the logic that carrying a gun increases the risk of being killed by a gun, and while
this is a debated point in US public policy, carrying a gun as a rebel is much more likely
4The quantity and quality of popular support is hypothesized to signicantly contribute to the success
of all types of resistance campaigns (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1994; Weinstein 2007; Wickham-Crowley
1992).
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to make you a target by opposing government forces. However, the risks are not only
to life and limb; as put by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), “participants in nonviolent
campaigns can often return to their jobs, daily lives, and families with lower risk than a
participant in a violent campaign” (38). Consequently, Chenoweth and Stephan nd that
the average nonviolent movement has about 150,000 more participants than the average
violent movement, although they fail to unpack the potential underlying selection eect
(33).
How, then, does the role and eect of popular participation change for nonviolent
action if it is used by a rebel organization, associated with rebel goals, and used against
the backdrop of a civil war? First of all, nonviolent campaigns allow for mass participation
from a broad swath of society, which “can erode or remove a regime’s main sources of
power” as outlined in the previous section (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 30). This adds
the direct pressure of the population to the government, magnifying the pressure of the
resistance campaign .
However, Schock (2003) argues that there are instances where nonviolent action has
been eective in brutally repressive contexts and ineective in democracies. One mech-
anism that contributes to increased success in repressive environments is that repressive
regimes may respond to nonviolent action with violent crackdowns, which may backre,
leading to loyalty shifts towards the nonviolent campaign and against the regime Martin
(2007, 3). By Martin’s logic, it is easier to justify draconian measures in response to armed
insurgency. However, whether there is an armed insurgency or not, the image of civilians
in the street being brutally mowed down by the regime will allow a violent organization
to benet from this kind of sympathy boost, too.
Nonviolent action provides armed groups with many of the same benets as it does
purely nonviolent movements: It demonstrates the breadth of popular support to the
government and can trigger further popular mobilization and loyalty shifts. It is important
to be aware of the dierent categories of civilians, as identied by Fortna (2015): There
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are civilians already supporting the rebel group, civilians supporting the government,
and fence-sitters who are neither members of the directly aggrieved group nor active
supporters of the state policies. The use of nonviolent action largely targets the rst and
third categories: Silent rebel supporters are encouraged to show their support as part of
a protesting, protective mass, and fence-sitters are to be won over by demonstrating the
degree of support already enjoyed by the movement.
However, the use of nonviolent action by rebel groups can also demonstrate the breadth
and depth of popular commitment in a way that is not possible in purely nonviolent move-
ments: in nonviolent backdrops, it is easier to mobilize the population precisely because of
the lower moral barriers to participation and the decreased risks to life, limb, and liveli-
hood. However, this is not the case in the context of a civil war: The government has
already demonstrated its willingness to resort to violence during its civil war; by associ-
ating with the rebel organization openly, protesters identify themselves as an extension
of the enemy, making reprisals more likely. Further, mobilization is more dicult because
infrastructure is likely to be destroyed. Therefore, if nonviolent protest does occur in a
civil war on behalf of the rebel group, it necessarily indicates a deep popular commitment
to the rebel cause. Further, violent actors often abuse or exploit the population; if the
population is willing to stand up publicly for the rebel group, this is a signal that they
have a positive, supportive relationship with the population.
Exemplifying Movement Resilience and Control
The use of nonviolent action can demonstrate the continued resilience of a movement
and its cause, as well as the degree of control exerted by the leadership and the breadth
and depth of their organizational network – how many people can it reach, and where?
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) nd that violent campaigns are most likely to succeed if
they have mass support. The use of nonviolent action makes this popular support visible,
which can otherwise be dicult to gauge, especially since the traditional roles played by
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civilians are relatively invisible.
While it is a great testament to popular support, nonviolent events are very dicult
to organize in a civil war. Freedom of information, the press and freedom of assembly
are likely heavily restricted and known activists will likely already be under surveillance
or already in jail. Further, communication infrastructure (phones, internet, mail or even
just roads) will likely be watched and/or destroyed. While Chenoweth and Stephan (2011)
claim that part of nonviolent action’s participation advantage over violent action comes
from being easier to organize, this advantage almost completely evaporates in a civil war.
However, it is precisely because of these increased diculties in information and mo-
bilization that nonviolent action can be such a powerful tool in the context of a civil
war if done right: Because popular mobilization is so dicult and communication is so
dicult, a rebel organization can demonstrate just how capable it is and how broad its
support base. This means that the traditional strategic advantages from nonviolent action
are multiplied in the context of insurgency, and it acts as a particularly costly signal for
popular support.
In practice, nonviolent action is used most often (though not exclusively!) when the
violent resistance is stagnant, or even failing. At that moment, it is crucial for the resis-
tance to demonstrate continued activity and relevance, thereby proving resilience. In this
way, nonviolent action as a rebel strategy can serve an important role in demonstrating
the continued relevance of a campaign, especially if the armed resistance has ground to
a lasting halt and most of the rebels are in hiding and no longer possess the capacity for
publicity stunts.
Costly Signal of Norms Adherence
Nonviolent action can be a critical way for a rebel organization to reframe their cause
and their publicly perceived identity, portraying themselves as a capable political entity
adhering to critical international norms. Rebel use of nonviolent action is a costly (and
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dicult to organize) but potentially very eective way to signal adherence to internation-
ally held norms. This can lead resistance movements to be seen as desperately ghting
for a legitimate cause, rather than as radical extremists wreaking havoc. In turn, this can
have positive eects for both the organization and its cause. How does this work?
The perceived close link between nonviolent action and pacism runs deep; one only
need consider dierent religious doctrines to nd evidence. For example, in Buddhism,
Jainism, and Hinduism, the concept of ahimsa refers to the denunciation of the will to
harm others, or non-injury. In Christianity, the Sermon of the Mount (Matthew 5:38-41,
43-44) is translated in the King James Bible to read:
But I say to you, do not resist one who is evil. But if anyone strikes you on
the right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if anyone would sue you and
take your coat . . . Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you.
Although this has been frequently interpreted to advocate passivity and non-engagement,
the theologian Walter Wink argues that this text, using the correct translation of the Greek
antistenai, actually reads “do not strike back at evil in kind . . .Do not retaliate against
violence with violence” (Wink 1996). Nonviolent action and its value is at the very heart
of dierent religious traditions.
This is not to say that holy and just war are not also important religious doctrines,
but rather that society’s tendency to associate nonviolent action with moral high ground
is deeply rooted. This means that the use of nonviolent action, if used convincingly, can
serve as a costly signal for rebels’ willingness to adhere to commonly held norms. In
comparing violent and nonviolent movements, Howes (2009) argues that groups that de-
liberately adopt nonviolent tactics are commonly understood to be doing so for moral,
principled reasons. This is dierent from associating nonviolent action entirely with
pacism; rather, the association between nonviolent action and holding the moral high
ground can be exploited strategically. Precisely because nonviolent action is unexpected
in a violent context, it strengthens rebel organizations’ normative claims by demonstrat-
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ing their broad, quasi-democratic appeal if nonviolent activists publicly advocate for the
rebel cause.
Not only does the inherent association between nonviolent action and pacism evoke
norms conformity, but the mobilization of broad swatches of the population also echo
democratic principles and popular consent for the rebel leadership to lead by the resis-
tance movement. There are other examples for rebel organizations signaling norms ad-
herence. ? argues that violent secessionist groups have an interest in adhering to the
laws of war in order to appear both capable (of restraining members from committing
certain types of violence) and legitimate. Accordingly, Stanton (2016) nds that rebel
organizations that signal international norms compliance by refraining from targeting
civilians fare better in civil wars because they will garner more international support.
Similarly, rebel organizations that demonstrate large popular support also signicantly
increase their perceived legitimacy in representing and governing the population, as well
as their willingness and capacity to do so.
The use of nonviolence not only sends a positive signal about a rebel group’s current
norms adherence, but also about their capacity to govern. In this vein, Nepstad (2015),
building on a logic famously advocated and exemplied by Gandhi, argues that nonvio-
lence may in fact be more conducive to a stable post-war society. She states that “[one]
reason for choosing nonviolent methods is that they are compatible with the goal of cre-
ating a nonviolent civil society” (13), a concept which is known as “pregurative politics”.
By using civil forms of resistance, movement activists and participants can gain experi-
ence in strategic political action and interaction and nonviolent means of expressing a
political point of view. If the goal is to run an independent state, “the methods advance
the goal, even before the end goal is fully attained” (Nepstad 2015, 13).
This might also have very pragmatic pay-os. By demonstrating the depth of popu-
lar support, capacity to shift strategy without chaos and factionalization, and norms ad-
herence pointing to a stable post-conict government, rebel groups who use nonviolent
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action might also become good investments for both governments and foreign business
elites. In a Serbian educational guide on nonviolence in practice, this point about present-
ing a good investment is made explicit, though talking about economic elites in particular:
“Their main interest is prot, so they are quite pragmatic and often view support for a non-
violent movement or a government as an investment. [Nonviolent activists’] challenge
is to convince this community that supporting your vision . . . is a wiser investment than
supporting your opponent” (Popovic et al. 2007). Foreign governments are much more
likely to support rebel organizations who appear stable, reliable, and norms-conforming.
Garnering an International Audience
The previous paragraph indicates how nonviolent action can have signicant benets for
a rebel organization’s international standing and reputation. International attention and
support is not bestowed on movements randomly; many organizations purposefully cam-
paign to attract this kind of publicity. In his book, Bob (2005) writes about how rebellions
market themselves internationally, competing for the attention of media outlets, donors,
and sympathetic governments. He outlines the mechanism whereby international sup-
port can be crucial to resistance groups’ goal attainment:
At stake is more than a global popularity contest. For many challengers, out-
side aid is literally a matter of life and death. NGOs can raise awareness about
little-known conicts, mobilize resources for beleaguered movements, and
pressure repressive governments. External involvement can deter state vio-
lence and force policy change. It can bestow legitimacy on challengers who
might otherwise have meager recognition. And it can strengthen challengers,
not only materially, through infusions of money, equipment, and knowledge,
but also psychologically, by demonstrating that a movement is not alone, that
the world cares, and that an arduous conict may not be fruitless. (4)
The role and inuence of international supporters can make a crucial dierence. For
example, for many self-determination movements, international support can mean the
dierence between independence and failure. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Cog-
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gins (2011) shows that independence is often attained without the consent of the cen-
tral government if there is signicant international support. In fact, only half of all new
states since 1945 had the consent of their national government prior to secession (Coggins
2011). Had the United Nations Security Council not intervened to ensure Timor-Leste’s
plebiscite and defend its autonomy, it is unlikely that the Indonesian government would
have upheld its independence. In order to gain the approval of the international commu-
nity of states, though, it is crucial to be considered a legitimate player, with legitimate
grievances. As argued in the previous section, one of the main eects of nonviolent ac-
tion is the signaling of norms adherence and consolidated control over the movement, and
through this, increased legitimacy. This is an important factor both to bolster domestic
popular and international support.
Rebel organizations are keenly aware of the importance of international audiences
can be seen in how many of them have diplomatic fronts, organizational arms entirely
devoted to coordinating a foreign strategy, and foreign oces and diaspora organizations
championing their cause around the world. Yet, violent action might not be the best way
to attract international attention. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) maintain that nonvio-
lent campaigns are more likely to attract international attention than violent campaigns;
they “believe that the international community is more likely to contribute diplomatic
support to nonviolent campaigns than to violent ones” (53). The main logic underlying
their argument is that large numbers of popular supporters are a sign of a movement’s
legitimacy and viability. Accordingly, their (problematic) data analysis nds that a nonvi-
olent campaign is 70% more likely to receive diplomatic support in the form of sanctions
targeting central governments than a violent campaign.
Therefore, rather than directly targeting the government, weakening its will through
attrition or directly hurting its military capabilities, rebels aim at reaching an audience
greater than just the opposing government by using nonviolent action. Paradoxically,
this is similar to how some rebel organizations use terrorism as a strategy. According
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to Merari (1993), terrorism lacks the direct material goals often associated with guerrilla
warfare, such as obtaining resources, controlling specic territory, and governing. While
terrorist rebel groups have as their ultimate aim to coerce the government into making
concessions, the immediate aim of terrorism is to inuence a wider audience. There are a
host of possible audiences: The government, the population that the rebel group is trying
to get on their side, other states’ governments, or the international community at large
(the media, NGOs, international organizations, etc.).
Just like terrorists, nonviolent activists aim to widely advertise their cause, creating
awareness, thereby trying to put their grievances on political agendas (“propaganda by
the deed”). The two uses of terrorism that most adequately parallel nonviolent action
if used in a civil war are “advertising the cause” or “propaganda by the deed”, whereby
terrorism publicizes grievances and thereby puts the cause on the political agenda (Cren-
shaw 2011). A mass protest makes for good press, and has the added advantage of being
unexpected in the civil war context, thereby eerily recalling the “shock and awe” eect
of large-scale terrorist attacks. By using nonviolent action, rebel groups can hope to mo-
bilize international players to pressure the central government through publicly support,
aid, or even boots on the ground.
Similar to terrorism, nonviolent action can also benet from government overreac-
tion, which can also make signicant international waves. Accordingly, Kydd and Walter
(2006) identify provocation as a terrorist mechanism: Through provoking the government
into retaliating against the population in order to clamp down on terrorism, both the pop-
ulation and the international community should increasingly consider the government as
evil and untrustworthy. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) characterize how nonviolent ac-
tion works in very similar terms: “The international repercussions of a violent crackdown
against civilians who have made their commitment to nonviolent action known may be
more severe than against those that could be credibly labeled as terrorists” (53). This
can be particularly valuable to rebel organizations, which are characterized by violence
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per denition, but the eective use of nonviolence can paint them in a righteous light in
contrast to a brutal, untrustworthy government.
Finally, their public demonstration of norms adherence and mobilization and coordi-
nation capacity, rebel organizations also demonstrate that they are a trustworthy invest-
ment for the future. The international community of states is inherently conservative,
fearing for stability of the system. According to Coggins (2011), “the Great Powers ought
to prefer coordinated recognition to maintain their social standing and security; to main-
tain international stability; and to reproduce the state-centric international order” (48). By
demonstrating popular appeal and capacity, especially in contrast to an untrustworthy
government, resistance organizations can demonstrate that they are worthy, legitimate
future states.
3.4 Rebel risks of using nonviolent action
If the rebel use of nonviolent action has in the past proven very eective and can bring
signicant strategic benets, why is it such a rare event? Rebel use of nonviolent ac-
tion is not only very dicult to organize and implement, it also comes with signicant
risks and drawbacks, especially if not done right. I argue that there are three signicant
risks that come with rebel use of nonviolent action: First, mass-based nonviolent action
can jeopardize military eectiveness either by making planning more dicult or diluting
the message. Second, if leaders within the organization have attained their power posi-
tion because of their violent “expertise”, they might be resistant to a shift away from this
approach for fear of empowering rival actors within the organization. Third, the rebel
organization might lose control over control of the narrative and message of the move-
ment as well as their purported representative function for the movement as a whole as
nonviolent action can empower rival organizations.
Conversely, nonviolent action may hold little strategic promise for some rebel groups.
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This is likely to be the case for organizations relying on extensive civilian targeting,
groups heavily relying on local resource extraction, or groups with strong foreign spon-
sors pressing for a military victory. Organizations dierentiating themselves from rival
organizations via their skilled use of violence would also likely see little strategic benets
from using nonviolent action.
Table 3.2: Rebel risks and drawbacks of nonviolent action
1. Jeopardize military eectiveness
2. Empower rival leaders
3. Loss of control over agents and movement
Jeopardize military eectiveness
Just as the unexpected element of rebels using nonviolent action can bring signicant ben-
ets, a departure from the status quo can jeopardize the organization’s main focus: Violent
action. This can happen in two dierent ways. The public, centralized, large-scale nature
of nonviolent action can make it more dicult to meticulously plan and execute insurgent
strategies. According to Mao (1961), “in guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to
come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; at-
tack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision” (46). In other words,
eective military planning requires secrecy, and depends on the element of surprise. In-
ternal debates within the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) when the question of a
nonviolent shift was up for debate exemplify the dilemma of military eectiveness versus
continued political relevance of the organization.
At the time of ETA’s ocial formation in 1958, the clandestine organization had de-
cided that violence was the only possible response to the Spanish occupation, and that
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there was no space for other forms of resistance. In their rst assembly in 1962, the
organization leadership proclaimed: “Violence is necessary. A contagious violence, de-
structive, which would help our struggle, the good struggle, the struggle that the Israelis,
Congolese and Algerians have taught us” (Garmendia (1980) quoted by Aiartza and Za-
balo (2010, 13)). By 1972, the year of their fth formal assembly, violence had achieved far
less than anyone had hoped, and some within the organization advocated reverting to an
at least partly mass-based strategy. The plan was to reorganize the organization accord-
ing to Truong Chinh’s handbook on resistance models, “The Resistance to Win”, where
the Vietnamese strategist proposed the ideal structure of a resistance organization into
four fronts: Military, cultural, political, and worker. Activating the masses was an impor-
tant part of this reorganization as they played the crucial roles in three out of four fronts.
Yet, within the organization, there was signicant opposition to this plan: The main ar-
gument was that while working with the masses was necessary for the political-cultural
and workers’ fronts, the military front needed secrecy and security of a kind where any
kind of mass involvement was simply non-feasible. Tactical and strategic decisions could
not take into account politico-cultural preferences and requirements, or the violent eort
would lose its edge. Some members of the leadership argued that the organization had to
be just military, and that the workers’, political, and cultural movements should organize
themselves completely separately. Eventually, the ETA split into two in part because of
this largely unresolved dispute (Aiartza and Zabalo 2010). Internal disputes between mil-
itary and political factions within the organization will be discussed in more detail as part
of the Timor-Leste and Nepalese case studies.
Second, organizations that have hitherto pursued their objective through violence
might fear that a public turn to nonviolence, even if only partial, might make them ap-
pear weak in the eyes of the opponent and thus weakening their chance of prevailing. As
outlined in the previous section, violent action plays the leading role in a civil war, where
it is thought that (military) power always prevails. Voluntarily de-emphasizing the use of
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violence might therefore be seen as an signal of military weakness, inciting the opponent
to increase the aggressiveness of attacks to take advantage of this momentary weakness.
Whether or not this is how nonviolent shifts are in fact perceived by opponents, it is
reasonable that some militant rebel leaders might think so.
Empowering rival leaders
A second signicant risk is that the use of nonviolent action can signicantly aect the
balance of power within within the organization and within the movement as a whole.
Machiavelli stated that “the reformer has enemies in all those who prot by the old order,
and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would prot by the new order” (Machiavelli
1984, 331). This succinctly captures why organizations are inherently conservative: The
institutional order comes with entrenched power structures and interests, whereas orga-
nizational changes bring the specter of uncertainty and the possibility of power shifts. If
individual leaders have built their careers and prestige on the strategic use of violence,
which often requires considerable expertise, they may be weary of shifting the emphasis
away from violent action, because they might lose their position of power and inuence
within the organization. Horowitz (2006) argues that innovation is likely to give indi-
vidual leaders a tactical or strategic edge over competitor. This means that nonviolent
action would be considered much riskier in organizations with leaders who have staked
signicant reputation on the use of specic strategies. Further, this would aect organi-
zations more who have relatively unpredictable internal hierarchical power structure, so
that the eect of de-emphasizing violent action could have unforeseen consequences and
destabilize the organization.
This eect will be particularly strong in militaries, where the organizational raison
d’être is inextricably tied to military eectiveness, so that a move away from violent ac-
tion not only implies a loss of personal power but also a perceived loss of organizational
clout over the movement. Geddes (1999, 126) sums up the consensus in research on mil-
78
itary regimes that “most professional soldiers place a higher value on the survival and
ecacy of the military itself than on anything else.”5 Tying this insight back to strate-
gic innovation, Horowitz (2006) argues that the military leadership is wary of signicant
strategic shifts because it might have adverse eects for the position of the military as a
whole.
In the case of using nonviolent action, though, the violent leadership not only risks
losing power in relation to other arms of their own organization, but they also risk em-
powering actors outside their organization. Since nonviolent action requires a dierent
class of actors (protesters in central locations) that are not easily accessible to the rebel
leadership, so-called nonviolent entrepreneurs act as connectors between the urban pop-
ulation and the rebels in the periphery. Often, these are student or union leaders who did
not previously play signicant roles in the resistance. These actors will have signicant
clout within the movement, and may with time contest the rebel organization’s claim of
legitimate representation of the movement.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the benets from nonviolent action for rebel groups are signicant even
when weighed against the risks. This makes it even more puzzling why rebel use of
nonviolent action is such a rare event. In the next chapter, I explore just why the use of
mass-based nonviolent action is so dicult for rebel groups — and what might explain
why some groups are able to use it after all — by presenting an in-depth case study of the
Timorese independence movement.
5See Janowitz (1964, 1977); Finer and Stanley (2002); Bienen (1980); Decalo (1976); Kennedy (1975)
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4. Louder than Bombs: Timor-Leste’s
Violent Nonviolent Independence
“The development of a phenomenon in movement, whatever its external appearance, depends
mainly on its internal characteristics.”
– Amílcar Cabral1
The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin, later National Coun-
cil for Maubere Resistance or CNRM) embarked on a widespread, purposive nonviolent
campaign after fourteen years of brutal civil war and occupation while simultaneously
ghting in the hills — and won independence.2 The conict trajectory of Timor-Leste’s
independence struggle demonstrates how organizational structures and institutionalized
processes determine and constrain a rebel organization’s ability to use nonviolent action
as a conict strategy. The intricate web of ties linking the population in occupied urban
areas with party elite and guerrillas in the periphery not only survived the shock of In-
donesian invasion, but developed new organizational tentacles extending its reach during
the conict. The strong political leadership that had developed prior to war likewise con-
tinued to hold sway over the military hardliners in Fretilin and CNRM after the invasion,
which would allow the rebel group to think outside of the strictly military box. Both of
these wartime characteristics grew out of a highly diversied pre-war organization that
had its roots in a long history of indigenous socio-political networks that had been barely
altered during colonization, making the relevant organizational features robust enough
1From “A Weapon of Theory,” address delivered to the rst Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of
Asia, Africa and Latin America held in Havana in January, 1966
2The organization’s name was changed several times in its history: Timorese Social Democratic Asso-
ciation or ASDT, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor or Fretilin, and National Council for
Maubere Resistance or CNRM all refer to roughly the same organization.
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to be repurposed during the war. When John-Paul II’s visit to previously sequestered
Timor brought foreign journalists to the island, these organizational conditions allowed
the organized resistance to turn the conict “nonviolent”.
This case is particularly well suited as a pathway case for theory development: First,
Timor-Leste’s centuries-long isolation without any meaningful experience in political or-
ganization makes process-tracing particularly eective, as we can trace most relevant gov-
ernance structures back to Fretilin and minimize attribution errors. Even more poignant,
Fretilin’s political and administrative structures were all formed and honed over a pe-
riod of only 1.5 years after the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon suddenly brought on the
prospect of decolonization; this provides us with a particularly clear picture of Fretilin’s
ideological, political, and strategic incentives and structures. Timor’s isolation both dur-
ing colonization and after invasion also minimizes interference by potential confounding
variables.
Prior to conducting eldwork and in-depth research on Timor-Leste, the theoretical
exploration of “rebel use of nonviolent action,” its strategic value, and its organizational
requirements led to a set of preliminary assumptions and ideas. First, I assumed that the
rebel organization must have an outstanding apparatus for popular mobilization and en-
joy signicant popular support. Second, it seemed likely that democratic decision-making
structures within the organization would facilitate both innovation capacity and mobiliza-
tion. These assumptions, underlying the otherwise largely inductive case study, narrowed
the analytical focus of this chapter on moments of internal organizational change and ex-
ternal shock throughout the resistance organization’s history to gauge the innovation
and mobilization tools that would be available to later organize nonviolent action. Ex-
ternal shocks are particularly useful for exploring key organizational features and their
operation; for example, Thelen (1999) argues that “in moments of crisis, the elements that
previously held a system together come into full relief” (399).
I examine the distinct organizational development stages undergone by Fretilin/CNRM
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with a special focus on who was making the key decisions on strategic innovation and
who was opposed to them.3 In addition, I pay particular attention to how the organiza-
tion adjusted to three key external “shocks”: Full-scale Indonesian invasion on December
7, 1975, the destruction of the rebel mountain regime symbolized by the death of then
Fretilin leader Nicolau Lobato on December 31, 1978 at Mount Matebian, and the limited
opening of Timor to foreign visitors, symbolized by the visit of Pope John Paul II on Oc-
tober 12, 1989. Organizational features and links to the population that survived these
shocks can be considered particularly resilient, and the way the organization was able
to “come back” from these challenging moments in its history provide key insights into
strategic innovation potential. However, before exploring these three key moments, I rst
examine Timor’s socio-political history in precolonial and colonial times, as this deter-
mines the popular mobilization potential and thus constrains Fretilin’s strategic choices.
In order to trace the presence and operation of the hypothesized causal mechanisms
and to streamline and structure the analysis, a set of general questions underlie both
the pathway case and the following two shorter case studies. Following the method of
structured and focused comparison developed by George and Bennett (2005), formulating
a set of general questions is “necessary to ensure the acquisition of comparable data in
comparative studies” (69). However, given the pathway nature of this case, these questions
will be revisited and concretized at the end of the chapter to shape the shorter theory-
testing case studies.
1. What historically entrenched social patterns and institutions had the potential to
ex-ante inuence the shape and direction of prewar and wartime political organiz-
3Due to a signicant scarcity of sources for the period, there are considerable historiographical incon-
sistencies on the period between 1981 and 1985. No foreigners were able to enter the island during this
period and the two Timorese scholars on the resistance to whose accounts this dissertation generally defers
in questions of inconsistency, Nuño Rodrigues Tchailoro and Antero Benedito da Silva, have not written
about this period, so that Xanana Gusmão’s likely at least partially biased rst-person account remains the
only source. The account provided on this period in this chapter represents my best eort at resolving these




2. How did the prewar organization mobilize the population, and how did translate
into the wartime relationship between rebels and population? How inclusive (in
terms of geography and social classes) was mobilization?
3. How were decisions made within the organizational leadership? Who had de-facto
or formal veto power?
4. What circumstances or event triggered the rst instance of nonviolent action, and
how was the rebel group involved?
5. Which organizational mechanisms were utilized or repurposed in planning individ-
ual events, and how did nonviolent action t into the organization’s strategy?
4.1 Timor-Leste’s colonial and pre-colonial
socio-political roots
Pre-colonization Timor was organized into small kingdoms ruled by liurai (a hereditary
position) and a few autonomous domains.4 A kingdom could contain several chiefdoms
(sucos), and chiefdoms would consist of villages (povacaos, comparable to clans and ruled
by elected chief elders) and hamlets or households (enuas). Some chiefdoms were inde-
pendent of any kingdom, so that we cannot think of them as unied or centrifugal in the
sense of European kingdoms. In spite of linguistic diversity across the island, this basic
social structure was found throughout the island (see gure). (Traube 1986)
Power was measured in how much tribute a ruler commanded and his strategic po-
sition in the kinship exchange system (Taylor 1999, 7). Rulers (both local and regional)
4The term liurai underwent a transformation over the centuries. While it traditionally was a title for
kings, the Portuguese used it to denote chieftains, as well as other Timorese men of political inuence
generally, which corresponds to the term’s current use.
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Figure 4.1: Timor-Leste’s precolonial social structure
granted land use to tenants in exchange for labor and a cut of agricultural products. Be-
tween villages and princedoms, men and women were exchanged in marriage in exchange
for a price in goods; this exchange practice was used to form key kinship alliances, which
were brokered by tribal elders who could elevate their own status based on the value they
could receive in such exchanges.
According to Taylor (1999), political power and status in Timor-Leste was intimately
tied to the means of production (land) and reproduction (the creation of new family units),
so that an intricate web of family and trade ties (which could be one and the same) criss-
crossed the whole island. This centuries-old practice might explain why ethnicity and
race never emerged as a prominent political dividing line, even though there was sig-
nicant linguistic diversity on the island (see Figure 5.2). Most Timorese were of Aus-
tronesian origin, with some inux of dierent Indonesian and Malay groups. While there
exist many languages and dialects in Timor-Leste, there are often few speakers of one dis-
tinct language, so that ethnicity was never a strong marker (see map of main languages).
Likely catalyzed by marital exchange and alliances across the island, Tetum, a grammati-
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cally and phonetically simple hybrid language most rmly based on a relatively pervasive
tribal language, gained traction about 1000 years ago and facilitated communication be-
tween dierent kingdoms, princedoms, and clans, though peasants would rarely speak
it.
In most ways, Timor-Leste is an unlikely candidate for the degree of international
attention it garnered towards the end of the 20th Century. Even its name implies its geo-
graphically isolated location – “Timor-Leste” literally means “East of East”, and it is small,
approximately half the size of Switzerland. Timor-Leste is the eastern part of a tropical
island located at the southern end of Maritime Southeast Asia, one of the Lesser Sunda
islands north of Australia and surrounded by Indonesian islands. The local origin myth
holds that the island of Timor used to be a crocodile; accordingly, its shape is oblong
and curved with a rugged mountainous backbone, interspersed with fertile valleys for-
merly covered in lush jungle. Its vegetation and topology only allow for limited land use,
though the sea surrounding the island is rich in oil and gas deposits and its woods rife
with sandalwood. Most Timorese are of Austronesian origin with some inux of dierent
Indonesian and Malay groups; through centuries-long trade relations, there is also a small
Chinese minority in Dili.
Portugal’s colonization of Timor-Leste was hands-o and left indigenous ties and
structures largely intact. When the rst Portuguese ship reached the beaches of Timor in
1511, they found a complex political structure of kingdoms and chiefdoms, intertwined
through a convoluted network of marriage and kinship alliances which they barely at-
tempted to penetrate until the last century of their rule. As late as 1860, the Governor
of Dili, Aonso de Castro, described Portuguese colonialism in Timor as merely a thin
veneer: “Our empire on this island is nothing but a ction” (quoted in Fox (2000, 18)).
Especially as Portugal allowed for next to no politicization among the Timorese popu-
lation, traditional socio-political structures retained relevance not only throughout colo-
nization, but also provided an important political reference point as Fretilin prepared for
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self-governance when decolonization loomed in 1974 and 1975 as well as during Indone-
sian occupation.
When Portuguese explorers reached Timor in 1511, this was likely the rst direct con-
tact of the island with the western world. They cited the abundance of sandalwood and the
important trade in beeswax, honey, slaves and silver that Timor had already been trading
internationally with China and India via the Java and Sulawesi islands (Yoder Meitzner
2011). Sandalwood was the chief economic attraction of the island, though: In Chinese
documents published in the Ming dynasty about the Chinese trade with Timor, the is-
land is described as one in which “the mountains are covered with sandal trees, and the
country produces nothing else” (Groeneveldt (1960, 116) quoted in Taylor (1999, 1)). It
is hard to overstate the economic value the Portuguese saw in Timor; when Gerelamo
de Verrazano drew world maps in 1529, Timor was included, whereas Java (where there
was a Portuguese trading post) was not, despite its vastly bigger size and much more
strategically important position (Taylor 1999).
The sandalwood trade did not require signicant Portuguese presence in Timor proper,
especially as Timor did not serve as a strategic connection to other colonial holdings, as
did for example Goa or Macao. The Portuguese could forego building signicant infras-
tructure, by tapping into the existing trade network on the island, which had after all
already traded sandalwood and had mechanisms and instruments in place that did not
necessitate roads. This was particularly fortuitous given the distance between Lisbon and
Timor-Leste of 14,438 kilometers. After arriving in Timor-Leste in an ocial capacity in
1515, the Portuguese maintained a base in a Dominican fortress on the Solor Island, north
of Timor (Taylor 1999, 3-5), and made annual trips to the main island to collect sandal-
wood (Taylor 1999, 3-5). With the Dutch threat of the protable Portuguese sandalwood
repository, the Portuguese invaded the island forcefully in 1642 under the pretense of
protecting the newly Christianized kings and chieftains of the coastal regions (Molnar
2009, 28). After military clashes with the Dutch, a status quo of Portuguese control of
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East Timor and Dutch control of West Timor emerged.
Until the mid-19th Century, the Portuguese were represented by the governor in Oe-
cussi (an enclave technically in Dutch Timor). The Portuguese presence was felt most in
the form of the Catholic Church; the Dominican friar António Taveira had arrived on the
island in 1556 and commenced a semi-systematic missionizing eort, initially restricted
to the north and south coastal chiefdoms during a period when there was no colonial
Portuguese administration, trading posts, or military garrisons on the island. The church
represented the only contact many Timorese had with the Portuguese. Because of the
specic type of animist beliefs in Timor, many Timorese accepted Catholicism without
renouncing their traditional beliefs, instead weaving the two together, practicing their
own form of syncretism. As the Portuguese tightened their rule starting in 1834, the
Portuguese government’s association with the Catholic Church in Timor was weakened
concurrently as anti-clerical sentiments grew in Lisbon. In consequence, there was a sense
of solidarity between the Timorese and the Catholic Church in opposition to Portugal and
Catholicism began to be seen as quintessentially Timorese (Davidson 1994, 36).
Lisbon favored an indirect administration style. Until the mid-19th Century, Portugal
administered Timor through a system that relied on the pre-existing indigenous system
of liurai and suku (local chieftains), rather than replacing them with Portuguese local ad-
ministrators, thereby inserting themselves comparatively unobtrusively into pre-existing
structures. Molnar (2009) describes the comparatively benign relationship between Tim-
orese rulers and Portuguese colonizers: “According to local interpretations, resistance to
the Portuguese failed, as a consequence of the Portuguese possessing greater spiritual
potency, since these foreigners did not only have a larger army, but also had their own
powerful sacred men with luli (spiritual potency) in the form of Catholic priests.” (16)
During colonization, the legitimacy of local rulers was enhanced as it was seen that the
Portuguese ag and a ruling “sta” given to liurai by Portuguese emissaries (mimick-
ing traditional Timorese sacred objects), learning the language of the colonial dominant
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power, receiving additional education, and enhancing spiritual power through aliation
with the Catholic Church, actually strengthened the local authority of the liurai in the
eyes of many of their subjects (Molnar 2009, 16).
In addition to using local leaders to govern and administer, Portugal also exploited
rivalries between liurai to “buy” themselves a Timorese militia, oering select Timorese
elites Portuguese military titles (Colonel Regulo), conferring increased local authority on
these local leaders and privileging them in comparison with rival liurai (Davidson 1994,
60).5 These militias supported Portugal both against rebellious Timorese and against
Topasses, mixed-origin elites with signicant informal power, who engaged in illicit trade
with the Chinese and Dutch (Davidson 1994). Because of their strategic location, this
strategy empowered mostly coastal kingdoms, which were also easier to control and were
important partners in the sandalwood trade. Growing increasingly concerned about un-
sanctioned Timorese trade with the Netherlands and Chinese in the 17th Century, the
colonizers embarked on a purposive divide-and-rule strategy, with the goal of undermin-
ing the larger kingdoms and strengthening princedoms and chiefdoms and thereby in-
creasing the number of political units and decreasing liurais’ political power. The defeat
of the Wehale kingdom in the middle of the century was the culmination of this strategy.
From this point on, “once established, the co-existence of external control with indigenous
structural reproduction continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”,
although there was periodic resistance and Portuguese military presence nally became
stronger in the 19th Century (Taylor 1999, 9).
The loss of the Brazilian crown colony in 1822 (and concurrent losses in Africa) freed
signicant Portuguese attention and manpower up for Timor, and in fact more than sixty
armed Portuguese expeditions are recorded between 1847 and 1913 (Molnar 2009, 31).
Lisbon set up a system of thirteen regional conselhos (corresponding to today’s districts)
that would oversee sucos to administer the colony more directly. However, even after
5These indigenous militias were known as moradores and arraias
88
Lisbon tightened control in the 18th and 19th Century, their presence had little eect
on the entrenched indigenous power structures. Accounts from travelers and researchers
who visited Timor towards the end of the 19th Century overwhelmingly conrm this. The
English traveller Wallace spent several months in Timor-Leste during his travels through
the Malay archipelagos at the end of the 1850s, and made the following observation after
witnessing one such attack: “Timor will for many years to come remain in its present
state of chronic insurrection and mis-government” (Wallace 1964, 153). H.O. Forbes, a
naturalist, travelled through Timor in 1882, and made the following observations about
the true balance of power in “Portuguese” Timor: “[The country] is apportioned out under
certain chiefs called Rajahs or Leoreis (liurais), each of whom is independent in is own
kingdom” (Forbes 1883, 404). Forbes further asserted that even though the Portuguese
had nominally abolished kingdoms, it seemed clear that some liurais still enjoyed much
elevated positions compared to others, closely mimicking the relationship between king
or prince and liurai.
In fact, the way Forbes describes the Timorese governance structure during his travels
is identical to how historians describe the pre-colonial structure:
At present there are forty-seven of these [liurais]; but many of them possess
a far greater amount of inuence than, and exercise a sort of vassalage over,
the others. These kingdoms are divided into districts, each of which is called a
Suku, over which a Dato rules [(clan chieftain)] rules, who receives his orders
from the Leorei by a special ocer appointed for that purpose. The Dato has
under him two other ocials, a Cabo and a Tenente, who assist him in the
regulation of the Suku. (404f.)
Forbes never encountered any Portuguese outside of “Dilly” on his travels. In 1882, the
Portuguese governor of Timor acknowledged the unabated operation of indigenous and
family ties in the following way, also pointing to the continued relevance of traditional
exchange and alliance systems linking dierent clans and princedoms:
Marital exchange is our Governor’s major enemy because it produces ... an
innity of kin relations which comprise leagues of reaction against the orders
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of the Governors and the dominion of our laws. There has not yet been a
single rebellion against the Portuguese ag which is not based in the alliances
which result from marital exchange. (Forman (1978) quoted in Taylor (1999,
11)).
Externally, Portugal was able to solidify its control of Timor-Leste when they signed
a border agreement with the Dutch in 1915, dividing the island roughly into halves, only
retaining Oecussi in West Timor. After Antònio Salazar’s military coup in 1926 and the
emergence of a fascist government in Portugal, Timor was included in the general Por-
tuguese centralization eort, which included an eort to assimilate the Timorese popu-
lation to the Portuguese and treat them (more) like citizens than colonial subjects; this
was the rst and only exposure of Timor to conscious nationalization eorts. Timorese
were divided into two political groups: Indigenes and assimilados. Assimilados were given
Portuguese citizenship and the right to vote in elections for the Portuguese National As-
sembly and the local legislative council, which met twice a year and included the local
administration, the church, Portuguese plantation owners, and the army. To achieve as-
similado status, a Timorese had to speak Portuguese, be economically protable enough
to comfortably support his family (and, presumably, be of use to Portugal economically),
and show a positive attitude towards Portugal. The Salazar government also solidied
and formalized the role of the Catholic Church, which had previously unocially run
most schools and hospitals. After 1941, education was ocially put in the hands of the
Catholic Church, following an agreement between Portugal and the Vatican, with the
administration providing the following justication: “Portuguese Catholic missions are
considered to be of imperial usefulness; they have eminently civilizing inuence” Hill
(2001, 22). However, the hardships of World War II and depression as experienced by
(neutral) Portugal prevented the centralization campaign from taking root in Timor, and
the colony fell into neglect apart from one limited program of road construction (Taylor
1999).
The Pacic War brought the rst experience of large-scale invasion to Timor and can
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explain in part the swift guerrilla mobilization in response to Indonesian invasion in 1975.
When the Dutch and Australian allies perceived a Japanese invasion of Timor as inevitable
and imminent following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, they landed 400 commandos
on the island against the express wishes of the Portuguese governor.6 This action, in turn,
piqued Japanese attention and Japan became convinced that the Allied forces planned to
use Timor as a forward military base; they sent 20,000 troops to take the island. What
followed was recorded in history books as a gallant two-year guerrilla war carried out
by 400 Allied troops, inicting 1500 casualties on the Japanese (Taylor 1999, 13). Records
show that the Timorese population provided crucial support to the Allied troops. As one
Australian Commander observed:
We relied on the natives to act more or less as a buer between us and the
Japanese; they more or less protected us by letting us know when the Japanese
were moving about and where the Japanese were going . . . part of my job was
to collect food to send away to our headquarters that lived in an area where
there was no population. I would go around with the local chief and we’d
collect the food. On occasions when the food was scarce the chefe would
order the households to give us food which they had ready to eat that night
— they would have to go without because the chefe said we had to be strong
to ght their enemy, the Japanese. (Morris (1977, 14) quoted in Taylor (1999,
14)).
After the Allied forces left, the Japanese exerted a heavy toll on the Timorese popu-
lation to punish them for their support of the Allied troops. Forced labor was a common
practice; villages were burned; families were executed. According to Dunn (1983, 26), the
1947 census shows that the population of Timor fell from 472,221 in 1930 to 433,412 in
1947, which indicates that about 13% of the population perished during the Pacic War.
Following World War II, Portugal was isolated internationally because of her support
of Franco, the weak post-war economic climate that impeded trade and its conservative
stance on decolonization, which clashed with the quickening anti-colonial movement.
Portugal returned to Timor as if nothing had happened, and re-exerted control with re-
6Portugal pursued a policy of neutrality in the Second World War.
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newed vigor to make up for losses they were experiencing elsewhere. The island economic
infrastructure was rebuilt using forced labor with a particular focus on roads and ports.
Yet, the Portuguese still did not penetrate the local power structure, which “continued to
reproduce itself intact during the post-war period,“ and attempts at colonial transforma-
tion remained fruitless during these nal decades of Portuguese colonialism.
Catholic schools taught a curriculum exclusively focused on Portuguese language,
history, and culture at the expense of Timorese subjects. Helen Hill, who had conducted
interviews with former Timorese students in 1974 for her Master’s thesis, observes: “Even
in the remotest villages children were required to commit to memory the rivers, railways
and cities of Portugal. Timorese culture and traditions were not mentioned in the class-
room and neighbouring [sic] Asian countries rarely mentioned” Hill (2001, 41)7
Secondary education was only available in the urban centers of Dili, Maubisse, Lospa-
los, and Baucau; before 1970, only two students per year attended university, mostly in
Lisbon (Taylor 1999, 17). Timorese educated in this manner were then integrated into
leadership positions within the colonial administration, serving as a bridge between colo-
nizer and colonized. This is in stark contrast to how the Dutch had left West Timor: While
their presence was also hands-o, they never trained Timorese to ll administrative or
military roles, and rather “imported” Javanese to ll these posts (Nilsson 1964). This saw
the slow development of a small Timorese urban elites of assimilados and mestizos. In the
decade or so before decolonization, the Timorese elite became increasingly diversied;
according to the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, in
late colonial Portuguese Timor, being privileged or part of the elite could stem from the
following circumstances: A liurai background, mixed-race (mestizo) background, a family
with landholdings, or secondary education in church or state schools. The urban elites
were often connected to rural elites through kinship and family ties and knew each other
7Hill later embarked on an academic career and is now considered one of the foremost experts on mod-
ern Timorese history. Her 1974 interviews provide unique insights into Timorese decolonization politics,
as most other reports are based on second-hand knowledge or politically colored.
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from their education (CAVR 2006).
In the decade leading up to the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon - which would trigger
decolonization almost immediately - no one considered the prospect of decolonization at
all likely. A Portuguese ocial told the journalist Ken Nilsson that “Portugal would no
more give up Timor than America would give up Hawaii”. From this and many more
interviews, in a detailed report for the Strait Times Nilsson characterized Portugal as
“apparently intent upon preserving its half of Timor as a sleepy dependency fragrant
with sandalwood” (Nilsson 1964).8
In part because decolonization seemed so out of question, there was almost no politi-
cization or political organizing among Timorese against Portuguese rule, which in turn
made the prospect of resistance-driven decolonization very unlikely. The historian Willard
Hanna visited Portuguese Timor in the 1960s, where he was puzzled by the lack of any or-
ganized struggle against Portuguese rule, especially when compared to Portuguese hold-
ings in Africa, to which there was no Timorese connection. He describes the political
situation he found on the island:
In the course of my brief stay in Timor I was never able to get any information
with regard to emerging leaders or movements of a distinctly nationalistic
or revolutionary type. Various persons assured me categorically that there
were none and that there was no signicant overt or covert opposition to
Portuguese rule. I found such statements dicult to credit but I never found
anyone, not even an Indonesian, who would admit to knowing anything spe-
cic to indicate present or impending unrest. (Hanna 1966, 114)
Before the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (AFM) overthrew the Caetano regime
in favor of democracy in Lisbon in April 1974, the only form of party politics permitted to
8All of this does not mean that there were never any instances of resistance against the Portuguese,
though they were all minor. At a speech in front of the UN in 1976, José Ramos-Horta points out the
following instances: “The war of Cova Lima in 1719, Cova Cotubaba in 1868-1869 and Manufahi in 1912
are chapters in the history of our people in their constant struggle for the right to self determination”
UN Documents on the Situation in East Timor after the Indonesian Invasion (1997). The 1912 rebellion was
both the most recent and the most widespread – from Oecusse over Baucau to Quelicai – covering most
of central Timor under the leadership of liurai Dom Boaventura. In particular, the rebellion of 1912 in
Manufahi (now Same) was referenced by Fretilin in 1974 when they were trying to build a following for
their pro-independence party, using it as a historical precedent to build a sense of nationalist history.
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assimilados was to join the Caetonist Acção Nacional Popular (ANP).9 In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the closest thing to a Timorese “party” was a clandestine group of students
and administrators meeting in Dili to discuss decolonization and circulate their ideas in
minor Catholic newspapers such as A Provincia de Timor and Seara. In order to avoid
suspicion by the PIDE (International and State Defense Police, essentially Estado Novo
Portugal’s secret police), the group met in the park outside the Governor’s oce in broad
daylight (Hill 2001, 59). The group was founded by a handful of Timorese newly returned
from attending university in Lisbon, where they were inuenced by the socialist pro-
democracy movement as well as African liberation movements. Leonel Sales de Andrade,
who attended university in Portugal in 1968/1969 and was involved with setting up the
Dili student group in 1970, describes his experience:
The rst among us who went to Lisbon immediately came into contact with
revolutionary theories and developed joint actions with patriots from other
colonies and with anti-fascist Portuguese patriots. From that moment on we
were no longer isolated. We could understand the just struggle of the peoples
for national independence for we had assimilated the thinking of the great
revolutionary leaders. (Sales de Andrade (1977, 27) quoted in Hill (2001, 59)).
Andrade further explained that it was only in the mid to late sixties that anyone in
Timor learned of colonial independence movements in Africa or anti-fascist streams in
Portugal - such was the isolation of Timor. Apart from the ANP and the student group,
some Timorese landowners and other rural elites were represented in the Portuguese
Legislative Assembly in Timor, where they had some input.
The continued relevance of traditional political practices is also exemplied in local
reactions to the news of the coup in Portugal; there, little disturbance was felt, and there
were simply instances of renewed allegiance to the liurai (most liurais continued exert-
ing power even though their positions had ocially been abolished by the Portuguese).
9Prof. Marcello Caetano had taken over the post of Prime Minster from Salazar in 1968 upon the latter’s
ill health. Caetano had promised upon his appointment to continue Salazar’s opposition to decolonization
(Hill 2001, 32).
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The US anthropologist Shepard Forman was conducting ethnographic eldwork in the
Makassae-speaking area of Vemasse during the time of the coup in Portugal. At a hearing
in front of the US Congress concerning US involvement in the Indonesian invasion, he
gave the following description of the local events that followed the news of the Lisbon
coup:
On July 15, 1974, just three months after the Portuguese revolution and be-
fore any organized political activity in East Timor had reached beyond the
coastal towns, 475 our of a total of 500 household heads in the villages in-
volved trekked from their mountain homes down to the administrative post
at Quelicai to record with signatures when possible or the mark of X their
deliberate and reasoned choice on a petition which this time simply declared
the autonomy of the suku [suco] of Letemumo [which had lost suco status
under Portuguese rule]. In a matter of only ve days, 95% of the relevant
population had been mobilized to freely express their political will” (quoted
in Hill (2001, 63))
In conclusion, even though Portuguese presence in Timor-Leste spanned 459 years, it
is remarkable how little imprint it had left on traditional governance structures. Serious
attempts at consolidation and assimilitation lasted only a few decades and were disrupted
by the Pacic War. During World War II, the Allied Powers utilized indigenous networks
for communication and resources, thereby reinforcing their salience and use for guerrilla
warfare. Taylor (1999, 15) sums up: When the Portuguese left, “all the basic elements
ensuring the reproduction of indigenous society were still rmly in place — kinship sys-
tems, a self-sustaining subsistence economy and a culture based on notions of reciprocity
and exchange.” Liurai and suco chiefs, especially those with royal status (which had been
“abolished” by Portugal) retained their positions of local power, both within the kinship
system and the colonial administration. Thus, on the eve of decolonization, the island
was criss-crossed indigenous inter-community ties in the form of marriage and kinship
alliances; there were no clear ethnic divisions among Timorese ripe for outside politi-
cal exploitation and activation. Apart from last-ditch eorts at road construction in the
decades before decolonization, infrastructure in the form of roads, phone lines, or mail
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routes never reached far into the island, so that “modern” modes of communication had
not come to de-emphasize the importance of traditional modes of communication, which
are much better suited for adaptation to guerrilla warfare conditions. The unabated rel-
evance of kinship networks and the almost complete lack of politicization provided a
unique base for decolonization and resistance to occupation, namely one almost com-
pletely devoid of westernized political ideals and models.
4.2 Fretilin’s prewar rural-urban political network
Decolonization and party formation
When decolonization suddenly loomed large following the Lisbon coup, Timor’s tiny elite,
largely ignorant of the simmering pro-democracy movement in Portugal, was not ready.
Both in the communication between the Portuguese mainland and the Portuguese colo-
nial administrators and between administrators and the colonial population, uncertainty
reigned supreme, as no one quite knew what this would mean for Timor’s political status.
While the government in Lisbon promised the formation of parties in the colonies and
reforming the colonial administration, ANP-supporting governor Alves Aldeia made no
move to implement such changes and did not even publicly acknowledge the coup. Party
formation began in earnest in May of 1974, when two missives from mainland Portugal -
nally arrived on the island, promising a referendum on decolonization and independence
within a year, though remaining vague about particulars with Governor Aldeia still nom-
inally in charge in Timor. Throughout the summer and fall of 1974, newly hatched par-
ties proposed their plans for partial or full independence or incorporation into neighbor-
ing Indonesia and initiated policy programs and political mobilization of the population.
This period represents the rst instance of unguided and relatively free political activity
in Timor, and is as such essential to understanding the political networks upon which
wartime mobilization and communication would build.
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The two most prominent parties were roughly based on land-owning Timorese elites
who had participated in the Legislative Assembly on the one hand and the clandestine
urban student-administrator group on the other. Members of the former group formed
the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), which planned on “proceeding in the shadow
of the Portuguese ag” and at least in the medium future remaining a province of Por-
tugal, but with equal rights (UDT 1974). Its founders represent the kind of support the
party attracted: Mario Carrascalão was of half Portuguese origin (therefore enjoying a
high social status) and a coee-plantation owner and a Lisbon-educated forestry engi-
neer, whereas Lopez da Cruz and Domingos d’Oliveira were customs ocials. The party
attracted the entrenched Timorese administrative elite and leading plantation owners,
and enjoyed support from a range of liurais, particularly in the coastal regions. The liu-
rais used their kinship networks to attract lower-ranking supporters for the UDT in their
areas (Taylor 1999, 26).
The second party, founded on May 20, 1974, was the Timorese Social Democratic
Association (ASDT, soon renamed Frente Revolucionària de Timor-Leste Independente or
Fretilin)10, founded by young urban elites, and “combined the interests of urbanized with
rural-based elites” (Taylor 1999, 27). ASDT immediately grew out of the Committee for the
Defense of Labor, an impromptu group spearheaded by José Ramos-Horta, who wanted
to capitalize on the coup to attain higher wages for laborers in Dili. This impromptu
group also organized the rst public demonstration in Timorese history (Evans 1975b).
Ramos-Horta explains:
Immediately after the coup the rst thing we did was to organize a strike
of the laborers who were getting only $10 per month. The strike was called
because some of the workers were asking for an increase of salary and were
sacked. They came to see me and we organized a meeting. The company
complained to the government and called me a reactionary against the coup.
(Quoted in Hill (2001, 68))
10“Fretilin” and all of its subsidiary and successor organizations are written without capitalization, as is
common in Timorese writers’ accounts
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The founders of Fretilin had many commonalities: All of them were young (the average
age of the founding committee was 27, the oldest committee member was 37), straight out
of secondary school or university, and all of the founders lived and worked for the Por-
tuguese administration in Dili. The organization also had ties to the Catholic Church, as
several founding members had been trained in the Jesuit seminary of Dare near Dili.11 A
third, tiny pro-Indonesian party - Assoçião Popular Democratica Timorense or APODETI
— was also formed during this time. Though these parties would later experience sig-
nicant clashes, at the outset, they were close-knit. The Secretary General of UDT at
the time, Domingos Oliveria, told the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation that he
had a close friendship with Fretilin’s vice-president, Nicolau Lobato, and how he often
discussed politics with his cousin José Osorio Soares, the secretary general of APODETI
(CAVR 2006, 165).
Fretilin’s pre-war organizational development
The nalization of Fretilin’s formal political program coincided with the arrival of the new
MFA governor, Lemos Pires, on the island in November 1974. As such, the development
of Fretilin’s ideology can be seen as relatively independent from Portuguese guidance
or pressures and thus indicative of the party’s deeply held beliefs. Until August 1975,
Fretilin operated as a political party (or “front”) that was preparing for decolonization,
rst without and then with Portuguese guidance. Following an attempted UDT coup and
11It should be noted that this did not indicate that they were particularly religious; it was simply for a
long time the only form of secondary education available in Timor. The bishop of Dili noted: “Until the
founding of the liceu the seminaries were responsible for whatever advanced schooling there was. They
had educated not only for the Church but for the government as well. Of the seminarians, no more than
about 10% actually took holy orders; the other generally took jobs in the administration” (Hanna 1966).
However, Catholic teachings did make it into Fretilin’s ideology, in particular with regards to social policy.
One of the founding members of Fretilin (and its rst president), Xavier do Amaral, was inspired by the
populist nature of Catholic social teachings (though rejected an ocial role for the Church in government),
and frequently told visitors about Fretilin: “We work as Jesus did, amongst the people” (Hill 2001, 71). This
close association with the Catholic church and the very limited education opportunities available in Timor-
Leste meant that there existed strong ties between the founders of UDT and Fretilin, as many of them had
studied together and some were even related (Evans 1975b).
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short period of violence in August 1975 that resulted in the departure of the Portuguese
governor, Fretilin acted as the de-facto government of Timor-Leste while preparing for
imminent Indonesian invasion. The political ideology developed by a group of young, in-
experienced, ideological and passionate young Timorese in Dili in the summer and fall of
1974 thus represents the only period of political development in Timor without signicant
outside pressures. It was during these seven or so months that Fretilin laid the foundation
for its popular support base and its political mobilization mechanisms, solidifying a party
link between the rural and urban populations. By the time Indonesia invaded, Fretilin’s
communication network was robust and resilient, based on a political ideology, reinforced
by practical political incentives, and battle-tested by a small-scale conict.
At the time of its foundation in May 1974, ASDT was committed to “socialism and
democracy” and “the rejection of colonialism” (Ramos-Horta 1984). These ideological
leanings were likely derived from the very limited exposure of some party leaders to par-
allel anti-colonial movements. For example, Mari Atakiri had met some members of the
MPLA on a work excursion to Angola (Hill 2001, 72). Similarly, José Ramos-Horta, who
was exiled to Mozambique by the Portuguese for his involvement with the clandestine
student group in the early 1970s, was exposed to the political ideology of FRELIMO and
claims that this is where he received his political education (Hill 2001, 73). The inuence
of anti-colonial liberation philosophy was streamlined by the return of a group of seven
Timorese students who had studied in Lisbon returned to Dili and joined the ranks of
ASDT.
The party’s structure, ideology, and program were claried when it held its September
1974 conference in Dili, where the party’s name change from ASDT to Fretilin was also
nalized. While ASDT had previously supported the idea of gradual independence, in-
creased awareness of events in Lisbon, where international pressure for quick decoloniza-
tion made Portugal a less dependable entity, as well as information about independence
movements in Mozambique and Angola gleaned from the Timorese students returning
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from Lisbon now pushed the party towards preparing Timor-Leste for independence as
soon as possible.12 One of its founding members described this dierence between Fretilin
and ASDT in the following way: “ASDT was formed to defend the idea of the right to in-
dependence; Fretilin was formed to ght for independence” (Taylor 1999, 33).
Fretilin styled itself as a “front” rather than a party, claiming to represent the interests
of all Timorese, even to be the “sole legitimate representative” of the Timorese people
(CAVR 2006, 168).13 This is an important distinction, as it likely inuenced how Fretilin
organized its internal structure. As argued in the September 1974 program:
It is called a Front because it calls for the unity of all Timorese patriots . . .At
the moment East Timor is a colony and as a colony the immediate and only
objective is the struggle for national Independence and Liberation of the Peo-
ple . . . It is Revolutionary because it seeks to modify, transform and revolu-
tionize the old structures which were inherited from 500 years of colonialism
. . . Independence is the only way towards Progress and real Development of the
People of East Timor. (Quoted in Evans (1975b, 75))
Because they saw decolonization and managing the transition towards independence as
the most immediate challenge, Fretilin’s self-identication as a front rather than a party
had political, ideological, and practical reasons. On the practical side, decolonization and
independence suddenly loomed large, and partisanship could wait until this transition was
weathered. The sense of urgency came both from political developments in Portugal and
the intensifying threat of Indonesia: Indonesia’s support for pro-integration APODETI
outlined their interest in annexation of East Timor from the earliest period of decoloniza-
tion. The fact that West Timor was Indonesian made the Indonesian shadow loom over
the island at all times. Remembering this period in Timorese history, Fretilin founding
member Geraldo da Cruz testied to the growing awareness among Fretilin‘s cadre of In-
12Opinions are divided on whether or not these students radicalized Fretilin or actually calmed some
of its more fringe ideological elements by providing a more pragmatic interpretation of unfolding events
in Portugal, but the Casa dos Timores students (as they were called, by the building they had inhabited in
Lisbon) clearly played a role in ideologically sharpening the organization.
13Throughout, I refer to Fretilin as a party, as indicated by its organizational structure, despite their
self-identication as a front.
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donesia’s neo-colonial ambitions and the belief that a broad national front (especially one
with military support) was best suited to counter a potential invasion (CAVR 2006, 168).
Fretilin in no way resembled the traditional denition of a front, which Grenier (1991, 51)
denes as “a coalition of various organizations, united for a specic goal and in which
each retains its own identity.” It is more likely that the term “front” was adopted because
it conformed to the terminology used by many revolutionary groups at the time.
Its stylization as a “front” rather than a “party” was grounded in the ideological convic-
tions of Fretilin’s founders. While not resembling either a typical western or liberation-era
party in terms of ideology or policy priorities, the “blank slate” of political organizing they
confronted in Timor-Leste of 1974 actually provides an ideal setting for experimentation
with party organizing. Fretilin’s inuences and its execution of their ideas were unen-
cumbered from outside pressure for six months before the arrival of the MFA governor,
which allows us to trace party structure, ideology, and popular ties with minimal interfer-
ence. Fretilin’s leaders were exposed to only a small number of political theorists through
limited contact abroad with parallel decolonization movements and Timorese students
returned from Lisbon; it was through these channels that they were familiar with some
writings by Amílcar Cabral and Paolo Freire. Due to the Fretilin founders’ limited po-
litical inexperience and narrow exposure to political thought, Cabral and Freire’s ideas
served as a sort of blueprint for the party’s aims and its organizational focus. Fretilin’s
philosophical inuencers thus serve as a necessary starting point to understanding the
structure and resilience of Fretilin’s organizational network.
Fretilin’s early philosophy is best summed up by the following quote from Cabral from
the same year as the party’s foundation:
A people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free cultur-
ally only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance
of positive accretions from oppressor and other cultures, they return to the
upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by the living reality of
its environment, and which negates both harmful inuences and any kind of
subjection to foreign culture. (Cabral 1974)
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Cabral’s emphasis on the necessity of an indigenous, bottom-up sense of nation heav-
ily inuenced Fretilin’s founders, though there were also pragmatic incentives for nation
building in Timor. There were no pre-existing channels for political organizing or politi-
cal mobilization, which were critical preconditions for a functioning postcolonial political
process. By contrast, western parties in the 1970s were able to build on centuries of po-
litical history and nationalism. In Portugal’s (former) colonies, this was not the case, and
in remote, tiny, remote Timor, least of all.
In accordance with Cabral and Freire, Fretilin’s ideology conceived of nationalization,
popular education, and decolonization as intricately intertwined, and this insight guided
all of their early activities. Cabral and Freire strongly emphasized that popular education
rather than simple political mobilization on behalf of a party was more thorough and
more sustainable in accordance with Paulo Freire’s concept of conscientização.14 Fretilin’s
young, inexperienced cadre wanted not only to politically mobilize the population on
their behalf, they wanted people to achieve an in-depth understanding of both their own
Timorese culture and heritage and the undesirability of colonialism (Benedito da Silva
2012, 77). Likewise, as urban elites with few roots to their own heritage, they needed to
learn from the population at large so that a sense of being “Timorese” could be developed
together. As summarized by Cabral (1966):
National liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities; they
are, and increasingly so every day, the outcome of local and national elabo-
ration, more or less inuenced by external factors (be they favorable or un-
favorable) but essentially determined and formed by the historical reality of
each people, and carried to success by the overcoming or correct solution
of the internal contradictions between the various categories characterising
[sic] this reality.
Amílcar Cabral, the founder of PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea
and Cape Verde) in Guinea Bissau (also a Portuguese colony) outlines the crucial role of
nationalism-building in independence movements: “The liberation struggle is, above all, a
14Roughly translates as critical consciousness
102
struggle both for the preservation and survival of the cultural values of the people and for
the harmonization and development of these values within a national framework” (Cabral
1974, 48).
Thus, personal and cultural decolonization had to come before political and legal de-
colonization. Alarico Fernandes, a founding member of Fretilin and former Minister of
Information and Internal Security in post-war Timor-Leste, explains how Fretilin under-
stood the role of popular education: “Popular education means getting people to under-
stand the revolutionary theories in order to struggle for liberation” (quoted in Benedito
da Silva (2012, 78). The policy program derived from this philosophical framework was
subsumed under trabalho de base, which sums up Fretilin’s immediate pivot towards the
countryside in the summer of 1974, as this was where about 90% of the population still
lived. From this starting point, Fretilin developed what Benedito da Silva (2012) terms
a Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution, with the basic premise that urban elite and rural
peasants needed to be engaged in dialogue and mutual teaching.15
As a basis for cultural decolonization and nationalization, Fretilin founders reclaimed
a new term to denote Timorese citizens, spreading the term “Maubere” to be synonymous
with “Timorese”. In the Mambai language, the word was used to denote illiterate, ignorant,
impoverished hill people under Portuguese rule (Hill 2001). However, the term was not
only chosen because it denoted a Timorese identity with no connection to Portugal, but
also because it harked back to indigenous political practices. As explained by Ramos-
Horta:
The poorest peasants are known in Timor as “Maubere”, but before the Por-
tuguese conquest the Maubere people were proud people, who farmed collec-
tively and shared their crops. They elected their chiefs and the chief would
call an assembly of villagers to make decisions. He would carry them out. It
was a system of socialism and democracy. We speak of “Mauberism” and that
15Antero Benedito da Silva is a Timorese political scientist, President of the National University of Timor-
Leste, and was himself a student activist leader during the resistance. For his eorts as leader of the East
Timor Students’ Solidarity Council, he was awarded the 1999 Students’ Peace Prize.
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is why we call our party social democratic — not in the European sense, but
in the tradition of Mauberism. (Quoted in Freney (1975))
While some Fretilin members felt that this sounded too similar to Marxism and Fretilin
has frequently been associated with Marxism-Leninism, nothing more than a tame ver-
sion of socialism was ever ocially advocated, though some individual leaders might
have preferred that. Yet, when testifying to CAVR, Ramos-Horta also acknowledged that
there was a strong political motivation in choosing Maubere as part of Fretilin’s central
message. He explains:
When we began ASDT, in a meeting of ASDT/Fretilin I explained that all
political parties needed an image. That if we wanted to convince the elctorate
we could not do this with complicated philosophy . . . So I said it would be good
if we could identify Fretilin with maubere like a slogan, a symbol of Fretilin’s
identity. It is clear that 90% of Timorese are barefoot, no papers, but they all
called themselves maubere. (Quoted in CAVR (2006, 169))
The rst step, then, was to work from the grassroots up and understand what it ac-
tually meant to be a Maubere, and to simultaneously politically engage and mobilize the
rural population. Nationalism, culture and politics were interwoven with the literacy and
education programs. All of Fretilin’s main teaching tools were about Timorese culture
and nationalism, starting with the idea that “Timor is our land” (Hill 2001, 129). Because a
basic level of literacy was necessary for administrative purposes and the vast majority of
the rural population was illiterate, Fretilin placed particular emphasis on basic education.
Their idealistic outlook, strong reliance on the writings of Cabral, Freire, or Fanon,
collective young age and lack of experience, and atypical (even for a liberation political
party) emphasis on culture and education, made many observers not take Fretilin seri-
ously, especially during these times of strong anti-colonial sentiments. For example, a
UN document on the Timor-Leste situation composed in 1977 describes pre-war Fretilin
as “a self-important party of Dili intellectuals that was formed only after General Spinola’s
coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974 and busily acquired a FRELIMO-type image [Mozambique
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Liberation Front] through a vague collectivist ideology, a ag and an anthem” (UN Docu-
ments on the Situation in East Timor after the Indonesian Invasion 1997, 73).
Fretilin’s prewar popular mobilization strategy
On January 25, 1975, Fretilin’s President Francisco Xavier do Amaral delivered a speech
in which he explained the centrality of the popular base:
The Revolutionary Front of East Timor appeared. It was a popular explosion.
It was the beginning of the revolution of Maubere. It was necessary to take
a more radical line so that it would be possible to destroy all the colonialist
structures and introduce a new form of life [that would be] truly democratic.
Of the people, with the people and for the people for a better East Timor . . . It
was the start of the great revolutionary march (quoted by Nicol (2002, 168)).
Given the ideology outlined in the previous section, the centrality of popular mobiliza-
tion is not surprising. However, apart from the ideological bent, ASDT/Fretilin had strong
political and strategic incentives that reinforced its populist leanings. One of the founders
of ASDT, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, described Fretilin’s popular support strategy in the
following way:
The ASDT party had this method. We could see that the rst party to form
was UDT, and I saw their tactics. UDT campaigned focussing [sic] on the
Administrators, and went down to the Sub-district Administrators and the
traditional kings (liurai). They did not go directly to the people. So I thought,
we need the people, I don’t need the liurai, they are with the Portuguese. I
need the people. So they would go from the top down, and I would start at
the bottom. I would start at the grassroots and go up. We would sometimes
meet in the middle. (Quoted in CAVR (2006, 166).
Thus, even in its earliest iteration in the spring of 1974, ASDT/Fretilin realized that pop-
ular support was crucial.
Given the almost complete lack of political experience and political education both
among the population and Fretilin’s leaders themselves, the speed at which Fretilin rallied
the population in the rst months of the party’s existence is remarkable. There were
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no formal elections in the rst year of the party’s existence that could actually back up
Fretilin’s claim that they really did represent the majority of the population (CAVR 2006).
However, after it was founded in May of 1974 and reorganized in September of the same
year, two Portuguese administrators sought to formulate an interim advisory parliament
for the period of transition (this was never actualized and therefore receives no more
attention): Voting was held in a few provinces, and even though they were not contested
on party lines, 90% of those elected were Fretilin members (Nichertlein 1977, 491). This
demonstrates the swift countrywide sweep of Fretilin’s mobilization strategy even before
Portugal incentivized popular mobilization through the parties. How was this achieved?
Since they hoped to “nationalize” the Timorese and claimed to represent all Timorese,
Fretilin needed to reach out to the rural population. Because of their prioritization of
“nationalization” or “Timorization” à la Cabral, the mobilization of the population was a
crucial rst step to decolonization and as such became the party’s rst priority. Beginning
in the summer of 1974, Fretilin cadre members would travel to the countryside on week-
ends (when they did not have to work) to initiate cultural and economic programs and
recruit the rural population for party membership. In 1974, these trips were restricted to
areas that could be reached from Dili on foot, on mule, or on motorbike, as Fretilin only
acquired a four-wheel drive car in December 1974 through a donation, which allowed
them to widen their reach considerably (Hill 2001, 120).
On these weekend visits, Fretilin leaders would convene meetings at public places,
such as Sunday market, where they would give speeches (often using translators) and
invite discussion.16 They would appoint a local secretary (usually with at least limited
writing skills) and issue new members with membership cards, requiring them to turn in
UDT or APODETI membership cards if they already had one (Hill 2001, 122).17
16By March 1975, Fretilin was in possession of three vehicles, which signicantly aected their geo-
graphic reach and their ability to respond to demands and crisis in remote locations. (Hill 2001, 122)
17According to rst-hand observations made by Grant Evans, Fretilin’s rural organization remained in-
ferior to its urban network, as “most of its . . . representatives in the villages were appointed on the spot
following Fretilin political meetings, and so usually have a very limited understanding of the political ques-
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Early rural outreach projects were executed in towns where a Fretilin leader had fam-
ily ties. For example, Nicolau Lobato left his job in the administration in August 1974
(three months after the party’s foundation, while it was still ASDT) to establish coopera-
tives at Bazar-tete, 30 km from Dili (a considerable distance in Timor), where he was from
(Hill 2001). Cooperatives were a key point in their political program, but few of them
would actually be implemented before the war.18
Lobato described his work in the following way:
The people are still suspicious of the idea [of a co-operative]. They have been
drawn in to similar collective projects before by either the Portuguese or the
Japanese only to nd themselves dispossessed. We have started o with a
small number so that we can work out the problems that arise easily, and
when it has shown itself to be successful then others will follow quickly. It
demands a great deal of trust amongst the members and that all decisions
taken by the co-operative be taken democratically. (Evans 1975a, 9)
Similarly, in the summer of 1974, Vicent Sahe19 travelled back to his home village,
where he set up groups to informally discuss the new political situation, agricultural co-
operatives, groups to keep alive the local culture through singing and dancing, a women’s
group, and a youth group (Hill 2001, 76). Francisco Borja da Costa and Abilio Araujo wrote
down traditional songs and poems and distributed them widely, using them as a part of
tions surrounding independence” (Evans 1975b, 75). This is a likely reason for why functional regional
subcommittees were rare.
18Fretilin’s goal of economic reorientation had the two-fold aims of lowering Timor’s dependence on
Portuguese exports (i.e. farming for self-suciency) and strengthening local cooperation and solidarity,
thereby empowering rural peasants at the grassroots level. In Fretilin’s program for “Economic Recon-
struction”, the "creation of co-operatives” is listed as the second point, and "elimination of the excessive
dependency on foreign countries” comes third (Fretilin (1974) quoted in Hill (2001, 96f.)). The list also in-
cluded items such as the expropriation of large farms and their redistribution to the co-operatives, which
cost Fretilin dearly in elite support. In its program, Fretilin also stated that “local industry, including native
handicrafts and weaving, will be encouraged.” However, even though the program appeared relatively de-
tailed, no one in the young, inexperienced Fretilin leadership had any idea of how to implement it, which
was described by the party as follows: “We are a country of peasants and farmers, but our people are hun-
gry” - knowledge of farming and agriculture had been long lost under Portuguese inuence) (Fretilin (1974)
quoted in Hill (2001, 97)). The need for local reconnaissance to implement policies necessary for any sem-
blance of nominal economic independence was a further incentive to turn to the countryside immediately.
19Like many politically engaged Timorese in the 70s, Vicent abandoned his Portuguese family name -
Dos Reis - and took up the family’s pre-colonial last name.
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their literacy program.20 As Fretilin leaders visited villages, they would hold weekly gath-
erings to learn more about the local culture and spread the ideology of Mauberism. Many
people’s rst contact with ASDT was through evenings of traditional song and dance,
which did not require literacy to participate (Hill 2001, 87). However, these gatherings
were also used for the purpose of political mobilization. In his autobiographical account
of his role in the resistance, Pinto, who was living with his family in Remexio at the time,
describes these weekly “parties” organized by Fretilin at the local level:
I . . .went to Fretilin parties, which we called convivios. These were not only
times for people to get to know one another and build trust and condence
within the party, but also opportunities for Fretilin to propagate its political
ideology and to recruit new members. Even though I was very young, I knew
the names of some of the Fretilin leaders such as Nicolau and Rogerio Lobato,
José Ramos Horta, Hamis Hatta, Alarico Fernandes, Rosa Bonaparte, Mari
Alkatiri, and Guido Valadares. (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 39)
In this way, Fretilin’s cultural and political activities were intimately intertwined, rein-
forcing one another. It is impossible to understand the strong relationship Fretilin forged
with the population without understanding its cultural work.
These early rural outreach programs usually followed patterns of personal and familial
ties. Programs initiated in the summer of 1974 also had a distinct experimental character;
due to the lack of political or leadership experience, the party needed to gauge what policy
and mobilization approaches were even feasible, and what and who the population would
support.
In individual villages, popular support for one party or another often followed family
allegiances and geographic factors. For example, Pinto explains in his autobiography how
his family became part of ASDT/Fretilin:
My father and mother immediately joined the ASDT . . . in May 1974. They
joined the ASDT because the party defended independence for East Timor
20The most widely known song in Timor-Leste was written by da Costa and Araujo during this time,
foho Ramelau about Timor’s highest mountain. It became the hymn of the resistance, akin in popularity in
Timor to the Marseillaise in France.
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and because Xavier do Amaral, one of the founders of ASDT, is related to our
family. Xavier do Amaral was married to one of my father’s aunts. My father
and Xavier spent their childhood together in Aileu. (Pinto and Jardine 1997,
35)
Mario Carrascalão also emphasizes how family allegiance and geographic and practical
factors determined party allegiance in 1974 and early 1975. He describes: “People in
Maubisse, because they were close to the Portuguese soldiers, all of Maubisse was UDT.
Virtually all of Maubisse was UDT. But if you looked at Uatolari, everyone was Fretilin,
and in Uato Carbau everyone was Apodeti” (CAVR 2006, 166). UDT was particularly
strong in coastal regions where liurai had proted from their trade association with the
Portuguese, whereas the rural Timorese heartland was dominated by Fretilin.
Three features about Fretilin’s prewar mobilization strategy jump out: First, from the
beginning, there was a concerted eort bolstered by both ideological and political con-
siderations to forge strong ties between Fretilin’s young, educated, urban elite and the
impoverished, uneducated, rural population, which ensured signicant diversity in mem-
bership and support within the party. Second, the description of Fretilin’s early leaders
sounds eerily similar to the description of “nonviolent entrepreneurs” during the discus-
sion of nonviolent strategic action in Chapter 2, though in this case, the strategic use of
nonviolent action was still 15 years in the future. Third, mobilization eorts were inu-
enced by indigenous socio-political ties: Fretilin leaders rst returned to their ancestral
villages to implement policies, and people often voted for Fretilin over UDT because their
friends and family were voting for Fretilin.
Fretilin’s pre-war organizational structure
Fretilin leaders formally set up the front’s organizational structure at the September 1974
meeting. Although there were some adjustments made when Fretilin became Timor-
Leste’s de-facto government after the August 1975, the basic framework remained in place
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until invasion in December 1975 (see diagram 4.2 for an organizational chart of Fretilin
in the fall of 1975).21
The Central Committee was Fretilin’s main governing body and contained the founders
of ASDT and the Casa dos Timores student leaders.22 The full Central Commission can be
considered the chief legislative body of pre-war Fretilin. Its executive leadership consisted
of 15 members who met several times a week and are akin to Fretilin’s executive branch.
The 15 members included a President, Vice-President, Secretary General, and Vice Sec-
retary General, as well as representatives from the popular organizations, Falintil, and
some regional commissions (Benedito da Silva 2012).23 There were also 13 issue-specic
departments (for economics, education, etc.), and later a number of administrative com-
missions that were either a part of the Central Committee or were subordinate to the
Central Committee, though it is unclear how formally these were organized.
Fretilin established a Regional Committee in each of the twelve districts of Timor-
Leste as established by Portugal. Each Committee consisted of a Secretary, two or more
Vice-Secretaries, a representative each of the Timorese Women’s Organization (OPM), the
Popular Organization of Workers of Timor (OPTT), the Popular Organization of Youth of
Timor (OPJT), an activist delegate (usually a student representative from the Timorese
21Research and historiography on pre-war politics in Timor-Leste are limited at best; the three most
reliable sources I was able to nd are Benedito da Silva (2012), which relies in part on personal recollec-
tions of the early days of the war; Hill (2001), relying on interviews conducted at the time and interpreted
through an academic lens; and CAVR (2006), relying on post-war interviews, in part about this early period.
While there is agreement on the basic story arch and organizational picture painted in these three sources,
terminology (especially when translated) and sequence of events is sometimes out of sync. These instances
are indicated in the text. With regards to nomenclature, I have tried to stay as true as possible to the
organizational structure and adopted the terms for organizational elements that facilitate comprehension.
22The Central Committee consisted of 50 members prior to invasion and 68 members after invasion
(Hill 2002, 131). While some have attempted to identify factions within the organization, Benedito da Silva
(2012), who knew many leaders personally, argues that fully edged ideological dividing lines cannot be
identied before 1978 even though there were many dierent ideological preferences within a self-declared
broad front of nationalist forces.
23Note that in some sources, the term “Central Commission” only denotes the executive leadership,
whereas the legislative branch is translated as “General Assembly”. After signicant research, I have con-
cluded that while the translations do not match, the dierent sources describe the same organizational
structure. Since an all-encompassing understanding of the Central Commission is more common, I have
followed this interpretation.
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Students’ Association, UNETIM, that was not formally associated with Fretilin), and a
militia commander and a soldier from Falintil after Falintil was founded in August 1975.
While the representatives were selected by their respective organizations, the committee
leadership was democratically elected following political education headed by a Central
Committee member who lead discussions on Fretilin’s political goals and structures as
well as liberation philosophy and the literacy campaign. In addition, there were also sub-
committees planned at the sub-district level, though not many had been established by
the time Indonesia invaded.
The new MFA governor brought with him clarity that full decolonization was in Por-
tugal’s best interest. A group of Portuguese Majors was to assist him in administering
Timor’s decolonization. From the beginning, this group of Portuguese administrators
made clear their goal of a smooth and expeditious decolonization process. Policy analyst
(and later professor) Stephen Hoadley conducted interviews with the Portuguese MFA
administrators in December 1974, and sums up their main interests as follows: “ As time
passed and the leadership of the Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon passed from General
Spinola to General de Costa Gomes, and decolonization was speeded up in Africa, the
Portuguese became inclined to support any Timorese political party that has substantial
public support, with the end in view of handing power as smoothly and expeditiously
as possible” (Hoadley 1975, 12). Portugal set up an Advisory Council with representa-
tives from Fretilin, UDT, and APODETI, as a rst step towards a transitional government;
it failed due to irreconcilable political dierences between Fretilin and UDT on one and
APODETI on the other (Hill 2001). Pires then set up a broader Decolonization Commis-
sion consisting of committees that focused on the step-by-step decolonization of indi-
vidual policy and governance areas, such as education, the administration, the economy,
public health and social welfare. As such, this plan was considerably less political. Due to
its own internal structure and its successful popular mobilization in the countryside for
the previous six months, Fretilin was best prepared to participate in these sub-committees
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immediately; they set up their own parallel committees to look at the same areas as the
MFA’s committees so that they could determine a unied party line towards each issue
and appointed representatives to all of the Decolonization Commissions committees (Hill
2001, 114). In parallel, Fretilin continued to pursue their own policy initiatives, such as the
literacy campaign that they had already embarked on. In conclusion, the decolonization
process reinforced Fretilin’s popular mobilization approach and strengthened its rural
representation.
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Figure 4.2: Fretilin’s prewar structure
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From coup to violence to de facto government
During the rst part of 1975, UDT and Fretilin formed a coalition in preparation for a
transitional government. After this coalition broke down in the summer of 1975, the UDT
leadership attempted a coup to seize power from Portuguese authorities on August 11,
1975 and Fretilin called for an armed popular uprising four days later (Benedito da Silva
2012, 100). How did it come to this?
According to James Dunn, who had served as Australian consul to Portuguese Timor
from 1962 to 1965 and provided testimony to the US Congress in 1977, this took place
as follows:24 A functioning UDT-Fretilin collaboration was an important prerequisite to
a peaceful transition, as, between them, UDT and Fretilin enjoyed the support of 95% of
the population. By summer 1975, UDT had also come out in favor of independence rather
than continued association with Portugal, and the two parties formed a united front for
independence, planning to govern the territory together throughout decolonization and
in its aftermath, realizing that the extreme degree of uncertainty caused by the coup in
Portugal and hurried decolonization plans could did not allow for domestic political unrest
as well. An alliance between UDT and Fretilin capable of spearheading a post-colonial
transition process was not in Indonesia’s interest at all.
According to Dunn (1977), both the coup and subsequent short conict were provoked
by Indonesia, already planning the incorporation of East Timor. In fact, Dunn states un-
equivocally: “I nd it impossible to avoid the conclusion that it was Indonesia’s eorts
to subvert the decolonization process that led to the civil war of August 1975” (28). Ac-
cording to UDT co-founder Domingos de Oliveira, Suharto’s Indonesia sought to sow
dissent between UDT and Fretilin in several ways: After the breakdown of the Fretilin-
UDT coalition in the summer of 1975 due to irreconcilable ideological dierences, UDT
24Dunn also served on a 1974 fact-nding mission organized by the Australian government to gauge
the political consequences of the Portuguese coup in Timor; Australia was keenly interested in political
development, as they had deals for the use of oshore oil and gas in place with Portugal. Dunn also was
part of a humanitarian delegation from November to December 1975.
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representatives traveled to Indonesia to assess the position of Indonesia and “to destroy
all Indonesian pretexts for invading Timor” (CAVR 2006, 183). The leaders were told that
if UDT removed the spectre of communism (in the form of Fretilin) from Timor, Indone-
sia would have no reason to intervene. Via their West Timor radio station, the Indone-
sian government beamed propaganda at Timor that characterized Fretilin as “Maoist” and
“Communist”, impressing on UDT leaders that the international community would not ac-
cept a communist government in Timor-Leste at the height of the Cold War (Dunn 1977,
28). According to Niner (2001, 18), following the coup, Indonesian troops in Apodeti and
UDT garb crossed the border from West Timor, provoking Fretilin into violent action in
an escalatory spiral.
Fretilin called for a popular armed uprising against UDT on 15 August 1975 (4 days
after the coup) and established its rst military base (Centro de Insurreiçao do Comando
Territorial Independente de Timor) as well as its own army (Forças Armadas da Libertação
Nacional, commonly known as Falintil) during the following days (Benedito da Silva (2012,
100f) citing De Almeida (1997, 7)). Organizationally, Falintil was rmly subordinate to the
Central Committee in the party’s hierarchy in accordance with the principle of a política
comanda fuzil (politics commands the gun) CAVR (2006, 421), which was enshrined in
Fretilin’s party program.
UDT and Fretilin were plunged into a ve-week civil war that resulted in 1,500-3,000
casualties according to International Red Cross estimates (CAVR 2006, 186). Weapons
were readily available from Portuguese army repositories. Fretilin came away as the
winner in large parts because of its support by 3,000 Timorese who had served in the
Portuguese Army (Dunn 1977, 28).25
This was in direct contradiction to the political neutrality - apartidarismo - expected
of them as soldiers in the Portuguese army, in order to prevent the creation of a militar-
25The key points of contention were Fretilin’s claim to represent all Timorese as a front, and UDT’s
categorical opposition to Fretilin’s socialist, commune-based economic policies.
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ily viable internal challenger to Portuguese rule. It is a testament to how insignicant
Portugal’s presence was at this point that soldiers’ political partisanship did not even
cause a stir. The Portuguese authorities ed to the nearby island of Ataúro while violence
broke out between UDT and Fretilin that lasted approximately ve weeks. When Fretilin
emerged victorious, Fretilin’s leaders repeatedly called on the Portuguese to return to
complete the formal decolonization process, but were ignored in their demands just as
Indonesia intensied illicit armed incursions into East Timor from West Timor; Fretilin
became the de-facto government of Timor-Leste, governing in heightening anticipation
of imminent Indonesian invasion (Jollie 1978; Benedito da Silva 2012)
Between September 1975 and November 1975, Fretilin was in de-facto control of Timor’s
administration while still appealing to the Portuguese to return from Ataúro and formally
conclude the decolonization process.26 While the previous year serves as a helpful guide
to trace Fretilin’s ideological ideals, especially with regards to the rural population, this
period allows us to see the operation of these ideals in action in a moment of political
crisis. The three-month period provides a window into how a future rebel group governs
without a full-on war. Even though we do not have formal Fretilin documents on this pe-
riod, non-governmental organizations were present in Timor during this time, so that we
can corroborate representations of this time period from Fretilin members. During this
period, Fretilin redoubled eorts to complete the organizational structure from September
1974 and added new elements to it.
As the Portuguese had eectively left the island and most UDT and APODETI forces
and leaders ed across the border to West Timor, Fretilin found itself in the position of
de-facto government of Timor. Fretilin barely had any funds, lacked administrative expe-
rience, and still dealt with the aftermath of the armed confrontation with UDT, including
a large number of political prisoners. Fretilin made several strong public gestures to en-
26As a matter of fact, 80% of the 3000 or so Portuguese formerly administering the colony took the
opportunity to return to Lisbon during the ve-week conict, indicating that the intent for returning was
low (CAVR 2006, 193).
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courage a Portuguese return: They issued public statements, calling on Portugal to return
for negotiations; they kept the Portuguese ag ying in front of the governor’s oce
(which they left empty) and other administrative buildings; and they put armed guards in
front of the Portuguese-owned bank, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (CAVR 2006, 189).
Why was the Portuguese return so important? Indonesia had started elding open
armed incursions into Timor-Leste from the West Timorese border. The presence of Por-
tugal administering an orderly decolonization process might have held o Indonesia, and
it would certainly have strengthened Timor’s claim for independence vis-à-vis the inter-
national community. To this end, Fretilin even attempted to involve Indonesia in a public
negotiation process; on September 16, following an Indonesian incursion as far as Atsabe
(almost half-way between Dili and the border between East and West Timor), Fretilin
called for a conference attended by representatives of Portugal, Australia, Indonesia, and
Timor-Leste to “clear rumours and misunderstandings” (CAVR 2006, 190). Fretilin also
took pains to allow international organizations such as the ICRC access to its political
prisons, further signaling its intention to be seen as a legitimate government. Fretilin’s
pleas for Portugal’s return alone strongly indicate that Indonesian invasion at this point
was a foregone conclusion.
Yet, Indonesian movements within Timor-Leste intensied between September and
November, though the Indonesian government blamed any attacks on UDT and APODETI,
which somewhat limited the ability of Indoensia to maneuver. On October 15, the Indone-
sian National Armed Forces (ABRI) 2nd Infantry Brigade launched an attack on the town
of Balibó, killing ve foreign journalists in the process. It is speculated that they were
killed because they had witnessed the true scale of Indonesian incursions into Timor-
Leste and were able to link the attack directly to ABRI, as this attack was carried out
exclusively by Indonesian soldiers rather than Timorese partisans. Indonesia soon con-
trolled Balibó and neighboring Maliana, where ABRI also used warships to bomb Fretilin’s
positions in Maliana, located only a 1.5 hour drive on bad roads away from Dili. It was
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during these early incursions that it became clear that the might of the Indonesian military
in the form of naval artillery enjoyed much greater advantages in coastal regions, while
they struggled against Falintil in the jungle and mountain regions. Albino do Carmo, a
Falintil commander, describes Indonesian attempts at taking the border town of Lebos:
It was about the middle of October. There were many people, they red with
mortars. They had machine guns, two of them. We saw many people from
afar. There was information [they] were from Menpur. Over 100 [people].
We couldn’t see behind [them]. They couldn’t . . . advance because we shot
at them. We also had machine guns and mortars. I had about 20 men at the
time. (CAVR 2006, 196)
Albino do Carmo’s characterization of Falintil’s potency in the fall of 1975 makes Fal-
intil seem more eective than it really was. Falintil’s military eectiveness was hampered
by insucient arms and a lack of coordination mechanisms with Fretilin’s leadership, as
military ocers had only joined the ranks of Fretilin a month and a half before and no
one in Fretilin’s cadre had any military experience. Falintil leaders had few insights into
Fretilin’s political organization due to Portugal’s policy of apartidarismo for Timorese
colonial army members had left professional Timorese soldiers even out of the limited
political activities permitted to Timorese under colonialism. In this way, we can see how
both Portugal’s policy of apartidarismo and Fretilin’s policy of a política comanda fuzil had
signicant eects on Falintil’s ability to perform on the battleeld, as Fretilin’s leadership
made strategic decisions that aected military tactics without taking into consideration
the realities of the Timorese territory or the balance of forces between the Indonesian
military and Falintil.
Weldemichael (2008), who provides an in-depth historical analysis of grand strategy
in the Timorese civil war, concludes from in-depth interviews how Falintil’s exclusive
use of positional warfare — as instructed by the Central Committee - in the early con-
frontations in these eastern border towns caused them to be torn asunder quickly. When
Atabae fell in late November, Falintil’s organized, positional approach gave way to small-
scale, scattered engagements that actually managed to briey drive back the Indonesian
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forces (Weldemichael 2008, 221). It was only then that Fretilin’s directives regarding tac-
tics began to change, though they continued to be based on a highly centralized command
system. The strong eect of apartidarismo on Fretilin’s professional soldiers can also be
observed in the contrast between Falintil’s modus operandi and that of the armed civilians
who were defending towns and could be activated at short notice. Due to their lack of
professionalized training, they operated in a manner more closely resembling guerrilla
warfare from the beginning, eschewing direct confrontation due to a lack of weaponry
and skill. An example is the Special Forces unit headed by Paulino Gama — known by the
resistance name Mauk Muruk27 - inaugurated at the same time as Falintil (August 1975),
which was only answerable to Secretary General and later Prime Minister Nicolau Lobato
(Weldemichael 2008, 220). The Special Forces unit was originally intended as a gloried
group of bodyguards, but had grown to several dozen members carrying out stealth mis-
sions by the time of full invasion.28 In contrast to the professional military members,
Mauk Muruk had read widely on African liberation movements and deeply admired the
Viet Minh commander Vo Nguyen Giap, and implemented the tactic of lightning attacks
from scattered directions (Weldemichael 2008, 223).
Whatever steps towards administration Fretilin took in the fall of 1975 were taken in
the expectation of an impending full-scale invasion, so that we can assume that all impor-
tant administrative decisions were taken with this specter in mind. By early September,
Fretilin controlled all of Timor-Leste with the exception of Batugade (already occupied
by ABRI on the border with Indonesia). Two Australian parliamentarians, who had been
invited Fretilin to visit and report on the Timorese situation, made the following observa-
tions: “Our visit around the country conrmed Fretilin’s claim that the situation is under
27Most former Falintil, Clandestine Front and Renetil activists are still known by their resistance code
name, which they now wear as something of a badge of honor.
28For example, one of the unit’s earliest tasks was to accompany and protect the group of ve foreign
journalists tasked with chronicling the early days of resistance. When the journalists were executed by
ABRI when Balibo fell on October 16, 1975, the special forces unit managed to secure the tape of their
execution.
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control. In the regions we visited ourselves, we received information from aid workers
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that the shared the same view”
(CAVR 2006, 193).
The expectation of full-scale civil war shifted some of Fretilin’s organizational prior-
ities. For example, prior to August 1975, education had been carried out by Fretilin at
the primary school level in most rural areas, and by the Catholic Church and the Por-
tuguese administration in urban areas. Many Catholic nuns and teachers who had run
the schools departed during the August 1975 conict, leading Xavier do Amaral to com-
ment: “It is deeply regrettable that ‘the shepherds’ leave just at a time when the “lambs”
need their guidance” (CAVR 2006, 194). Timorese teachers (either in rural, Fretilin-run
schools or urban, colonial schools) were redeployed, as their skills were either needed as
Falintil soldiers or as administrators (Hill 2002, 194). On the other hand, hospitals were
kept open and medical supplies were rationed, as these would also play a pivotal role
during an armed conict. Thus, Fretilin began preparing rural towns and villages for in-
vasion. The rst step was to move supplies and ammunition into remote locations in the
countryside. Through October and November, on the civilian support side, Revolutionary
Brigades were moving from town to town, hurriedly teaching war-relevant skills to civil-
ians. On the military side, Falintil began establishing and training ad-hoc local militias
(Milicia Popular de Libertação Nacional or Miplin). (CAVR 2006, 198)
Fretilin was also dealing with an acute economic crisis in the urban areas not surviv-
ing on subsistence farming, which was still the main economic model in most rural areas.
As an emergency measure, Fretilin redistributed food stores in larger towns (Pinto and
Jardine 1997, 37). The departure of Portugal had left Fretilin with no means to import food.
Among a number of specialized commissions that Fretilin established to administer the
island, one of the most important ones was the Economic Management and Supervisory
Commission established on October 11, chaired by Dr. José Gonçalves, the only trained
economist on the island. The Commission coordinated with regional committees as well
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as international NGOs to distribute emergency food aid. In carrying out these functions,
Gonçalves repurposed the infrastructure of the colonial governmental business and logis-
tics enterprise SAPT (Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho). Once BNU also closed, there
was no way to have access to cash, so that the island returned to in-good trading for a
few weeks.
As there was no time to rebuild administrative infrastructure, Fretilin would often
repurpose Portuguese institutions on the island. For example, Pinto remembers how
“Fretilin took over the oce of the head of the sub-district of Remexio and began to or-
ganize the town” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 38). Instead, consultative bodies were kept as
established a year earlier, but they did also take over the administrative oces and build-
ings at all levels vacated by the Portuguese.
At the center, Fretilin expanded the membership of the Central Committee to include
more regional representatives (facilitating greater geographic representation) and to give
Falintil a formal seat at the table. The mise-en-place of Regional Committees, formally
established in September 1974, was accelerated and the committees ocially put in charge
of regional administration, as opposed to the dialogue-based regional outreach pursued
previously. Regional committees directly collaborated with some of the key commissions
set up, most importantly the Economic Management and Supervisory Commission (CAVR
2006, 193). In Same, elections for the Regional Committee were held as late as November
17, 1975, and in Suai on November 9.
An impromptu declaration of independence
On 28 November 1975 at 5.55 pm, Rosa Muki Bonaparte, Secretary of the Organization of
Timorese Women, lowered the Portuguese ag and raised the new ag of the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste, hastily sewn that very afternoon. Following a 21-gun salute to
commemorate those who had already fallen in the previous months, Xavier do Amaral
proclaimed the independence of the RDTL:
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Expressing the highest aspirations of the people of East Timor and to safe-
guard the most legitimate interests of national sovereignty, the central Com-
mittee of Fretilin decrees by proclamation, unilaterally, the independence of
East Timor, from 00.00 hours today, declaring the state of the Democratic
Republic of East Timor, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. (Quoted in Hill
(2001, 201, 202))
The ceremony was only attended by about 2,000 people, as it had been moved up at the
last moment and most Falintil troops were away as well. Originally, the declaration had
been planned for December 1, the anniversary of the agreement signed between Portugal
and Spain in 1762 that ended Spanish occupation of Portugal. However, the risk of Indone-
sian full-scale invasion pre-empting the declaration was deemed too great. In 2004, Mari
Alkatiri recalled Nicolau Lobato’s on November 28: “The Indonesian army have already
entered Atabae . . .They have occupied Atabae! If we wait until 1 Devember we might not
have time to declare independence in Dili. So we’d better proclaim independence today”
(CAVR 2006, 199).29
There were several reasons to declare independence before invasion. One reason was
Portugal’s continued refusal to return to Dili from Ataúro and continue the formal de-
colonization process. As argued in front of CAVR by RDTL’s rst President, Xavier do
Amaral:
From Fretilin’s point of view, its policy of continuing to recognize Portuguese
sovereignty in the absence of any sign from Portugal that it was willing to
exercise that authority was a dangerous course to follow. Despite being the de
facto ruler, Fretilin had no international legitimacy as a ruling power. Fretilin
was not an elected government and its fear was that the political vacuum
would give Indonesia a pretext to launch a full-scale invasion of Timor-Leste.
(Quoted in CAVR (2006, 197))
Even more worrying, Portugal had held talks with Indonesia in Rome. While Indonesia
agreed not to interfere in Timorese aairs, Portugal armed that it would not return to
29The decision to declare independence on November 28 was not unanimous. Xanana Gusmão (at this
point occupying a low rank politically) and Jose Ramos-Horta both were not in favor of a pre-invasion
declaration, the latter because the United Nations was unlikely to support it, and the former because it
would cement a politically immature movement where the radical left was growing too strong (Selders
2008, 38).
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Timor as long as there was violence. Thus, holding o declaring independence to entice
Portugal’s return to Timor now seemed futile.
Preparation went into a frenzy following the declaration of independence both locally
and internationally. Minister of Defense Rogério Lobato issued the following statement
once the ICRC was pulled back to the island of AtaĲro as the international community
had now realized Indonesia’s immediate intentions and their unwillingness to recognize
the organization’s neutrality:
Based on information from Fretilin intelligence sources, we suspect a full-
scale attack on Timor-Leste, especially to the capital city Dili, will take place
. . .We urge the world to stop this criminal aggression, as it will be the cause
of an endless bloodbath. The people of Timor-Leste will resist. (CAVR 2006,
203)
One day later (December 4, 1975), an international delegation left Dili to lobby for inter-
national support and procure arms (comprised of the Minister of Economic and Political
Aairs Mari Alkatiri, Minister of Foreign Relations and Information, José Ramos-Horta,
and Rogério Lobato).30
The last remaining foreign journalist on the island, Roger East — who would be exe-
cuted by Indonesian soldiers mere days later — observed the local preparations for inva-
sion in Dili:
With the deterioration of the security situation, people started quietly to leave
for the hills. Tonight Dili is quiet and almost empty, abandoned by its people.
A curfew was applied on the fourth day and armed soldiers guarded the beach
and the streets. (Quoted in Hill (2001, 179))
Militarily, Fretilin controlled 2,500 East Timorese soldiers who had been trained in the
Portuguese army, and 7,000 trained civilian volunteers, and were equipped with Mauser
ries and ammunition from Portuguese NATO stocks. Anticipating that they would be
3025 countries promised recognition if Timor-Leste declared independence, among them China, the
USSR, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Cape Verde, São Tome and Principe, North
Korea, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Romania, the Netherlands, East Germany, Sweden, Algeria,
Cuba, Norway and Brazil. Many rescinded recognition again later (CAVR 2006, 198).
123
unable to parry a full-edged Indonesian attack on Dili, based on their experience from
smaller ABRI incursions in the fall, Falintil never fortied Dili for a serious defense. They
ensured that there were enough troops to ascertain at least some escape routes out of
Dili, but Falintil built its rst true stance in the foothills behind Dili (Weldemichael 2008,
224). Thus, on the day of the attack, only a few dozen Falintil ghters remained in Dili to
defend the capital, and a mere 21 Falintil soldiers were detailed to protect Comoro Airbase.
Likewise, Falintil had moved its limited pieces of artillery into the hills behind Dili near
Balibar where Fretilin’s command center was located (Jollie 1978). As Dunn put it, the
ght “in the streets of Dili was little more than a delaying tactic” on the part of Falintil
(Dunn 1983, 258).
The December 7 invasion was a major military oensive involving both sea and air
support. The full-scale attack was three-pronged: By that time, Indonesian troops had full
control of the border towns of Balibó and Atsabe, where 3,200 Indonesian troops (both
marine and army infantry battalions with a submarine and two air force transport planes)
were already stationed and could assist. Indonesia’s military technology was state of the
art, as it enjoyed military aid from the US both in the form of hardware (aircraft, ships
and landing craft) and training of its elite troops. The US had been informed about the
impending attack and had acquiesced, which becomes clear from the following telegram
exchange between Gerald Ford and Suharto:
[Suharto:] We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid
or drastic action.
[Ford:] We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We under-
stand the problem you have and the intentions you have. (CAVR 2006, 205)
By December 17, Dili and the northern coast were secured to the point that Indonesia
could install a provisional government mostly made up of members of Apodeti and UDT,
the Provisional Government of East Timor (Pemerintah Sementara Timor Timur or PSTT).
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4.3 Fretilin’s civil war
By December 7, a large proportion of Dili’s 28,000 residents had already ed into the
mountains south towards Aileu with the Fretilin leadership — overall, up to 300,000 civil-
ians would be displaced by ABRI (CAVR 2006, 215). Many of the civilians who stayed
behind in Dili were indiscriminately killed, and remaining members of the Fretilin lead-
ership were executed. The ight of tens of thousands of people – and the organizational
challenges this would pose – is best understood through eye witness accounts. As one
survivor recalled in an interview with Dunn:
At 2:00 p.m. [on December 7, 1975,] 59 men, both Chinese and Timorese, were
brought onto the wharf . . .These men were shot one by one, again with the
crowd . . . being ordered to count. The victims ordered to stand on the edge of
the pier facing the sea, so that when they were shot their bodies fell into the
water. Indonesian soldiers stood by and red at the bodies in the water in the
event that there was any further sign of life.31 (Dunn 1980, 33-35)
While certain provisions had been made for an evacuation of Dili, on the day of, it
was relatively chaotic. Falintil Special Forces commander Mauk Muruk recounts:
In the face of these Indonesian atrocities and shocked by the sheer scale of in-
vasion, the surviving population and the Falintil units made a strategic with-
drawal to the mountains in order to regroup and reorganize a more eective
resistance. (Gama 1995, 98)
The retreating Falintil ghters tried to hold on to the villages of Taibessi and Lahane at
the base of Dili’s southern foothills and the hills south of Fatuhada to provide a secure
escape route for as long as possible. (CAVR 2006, 207) As Fretilin and a large part of the
Timorese population retreated further south, they conducted several mass executions of
UDT prisoners still kept from August (CAVR 2006, 214). Fretilin retreated from Aileu to
Maubisse on December 31, and from there further south towards the coast. Civilians who
had remained in Dili were detained and tortured by ABRI forces.
31Because of centuries of trade between Timor and China, Dili had a small Chinese minority population.
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Gusmão recalls in his autobiography how he observed the ow refugees from the
Fretilin command center in Balibar above Dili:
An interminable line of people streamed upwards. I saw no fear in their ex-
haustion, I saw resignation in their eyes, and anguish that must have been
torturing their souls, but they knew to smile, as if somehow it would relieve
their suering. (Gusmão 2000, 226)
Constancio Pinto and his family were eeing from Remexio, near Dili, when ABRI
reached the town on December 25. He describes his family’s experience:
When we left Remexio, we didn’t know where we were going. We didn’t even
know the names of the villages where we went. . . . There were no guerrillas
with us because they stayed near Remexio trying to prevent the Indonesians
from advancing beyond the town. . . . It was a big change for us to be in such
a small village with people we didn’t know, but everyone there was really
helpful. When we arrived [in Bereliurai, 25 miles south of Remexio], they
gave us food to eat and mats to sleep on and then oered us a modest house
made of bamboo with a roof of thatched grass in a knua on the outskirts of
the village. (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 42.)
Thus, the rural population played a crucial role in aiding the resistance, gradually orga-
nized by Fretilin under a formal rebel governance system.
Fretilin controlled the island through so-called Basos de Apoio (support bases) where
the population was supportive of Fretilin, and continued eorts of securing the support
of civilians in more ambivalent areas (Weldemichael 2008). The set-up of the basos at this
point appears to have resembled that of Fretilin’s regional and subregional committees
where local cadres more or less spontaneously organized their hamlets, villages or dis-
tricts according to Fretilin’s regional administrative structures as designed in 1974 (the
only available blueprint for local governance) (CAVR 2006, 420). According to Eduardo
de Jesus Barreto, a Fretilin cadre member from Ermera, the situation in the unoccupied
zones was as follows:
Up until early 1976 there was no strong formal structure at the base, but
Fretilin militants in bases managed to organize people although not formally
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. . . People individually or in groups also performed farming activities like grow-
ing corn, tubers, and other edible plants.” (Quoted in CAVR (2006, 420))
Coordination in these rst six months was dicult, and Falintil command was decen-
tralized, as Lobato let the subordinate Falintil leaders “choose their own direction” but
without an ability for them to coordinate (Gusmão 2000, 40). Communication between
dierent units had not been streamlined, so that information could often not be trusted,
as it might have been spread for political or propaganda purposes. For example, Gus-
mão recalls how when he was stationed in Manatuto with fewer than a dozen arms, he
heard about a capture of weapons in Baucau, but when he undertook the perilous trip to
Baucau to claim some of the bounty, he was told that it had only been a rumor to boost
morale (Gusmão 2000, 41f.). In addition, the political inexperience made holding course
in unconnected districts dicult. Gusmão observes in his autobiography about the period
following December 1975 that “the situation of the war demanded a strong grip of com-
mand . . . [that] the majority of us, the members of the CCF, were unpoliticized . . . [and]
were too inexperienced” to act fully independently (Gusmão 2000, 39-43).
Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, a company commander32 in Liquiçá immediately following
invasion, testied to the initial lack of military coordination:
So in one zona . . . there was one zona commander. The zona commander had
one to three companies under his command. In Liquiçá, for example, there
were three companies with one zona commander. But each only took the
initiative in their own sub-districts [zona] . . . Some sub-districts had plenty
of weapons, while others didn’t have any weapons at all. (Quoted in (CAVR
2006, 422)
By mid-1976, Fretilin (outnumbered 15:1) was scattered throughout the eastern interior
of the island with poor coordination mechanisms connecting dierent zonas. Within six
months or so, the resistance-controlled areas were whittled down to the three districts
of Baucau, Viqueque and Lospalos in the east of the island, with pockets throughout the
32In terms of hierarchy, one level below the zona commander
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island’s interior.The Indonesian army controlled the major towns, the north coastal road
from west to east and the central corridor running from north to south, but had not yet
made signicant progress into the interior of the island (CAVR 2006, 420). This was in
part because while ABRI had prepared for the invasion of Dili, its commanders had un-
derestimated the terrain of Timor, once described by a World War II Allied brieng as
“one lunatic contorted tangle of mountains. There is no main system of ranges, for the
mountains run in all directions and fold upon one another in crazy fashion” (quoted in
Jollie (1978, 46)). An illustrative example for what this meant in practice is how it took
the Indonesian army a full two weeks to even advance 20 km south of Dili to Remexio;
once there, they could not stay there because the town was deep inside a valley with only
two narrow roads in and out (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 44). This led to a lull in ghting in
late spring of 1976 so ABRI could regroup, mistakenly interpreted by some of Fretilin’s
leadership as a retreat signaling that the two sides were more closely matched than they
were in reality (Weldemichael 2008, 244).
The Soibada Conference
The Fretilin leadership took this opportunity to call on the Central Committee (techni-
cally the RDTL’s Cabinet) to meet in Soibada (Manatuto) between May 15 and June 2.
They mapped out a new strategy to repel the invading Indonesian forces that was mod-
eled on the observed experiences of guerrillas in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau,
and Vietnam (Weldemichael 2008, 244). The session outlined “three Maubere Revolution
guidance principles”: People’s war, protracted war, and self-reliance. The chosen strat-
egy was deeply steeped in ideology; Weldemichael analyzes that “on top of the fact that
excessive ideological zeal arrested [the Fretilin leaders’] capacity to objectively appraise
the situation, the resistance leaders’ fascination with and their wholesale borrowing from
other successful experiences blinded them to how far Indonesia was prepared to go to
annihilate them” (244).
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Who was responsible for choosing and implementing the new “Maubere Revolution
guidance principles”? According to Gusmão’s testimony, RDTL’s formal departments
were no longer functional; all decision-making had reverted back to Fretilin’s Central
Committee (CAVR 2006, 421). In accordance with a política comanda fuzil, military com-
manders were also not present at the key meetings of Soibada with the exception of the
Chief of Sta and two deputy defense ministers who were also members of the Fretilin
Central Committee (CAVR 2006, 421)33 This arrangement during a meeting where key
military innovation questions were decided shows clearly that the military was not only
formally subordinate to the political leadership, but also in practice; in fact, the almost
complete lack of military input at this point is striking.
In Soibada, the relationship between the refugee population in the mountains, Fretilin,
and the Timorese resistance was formalized. As explained earlier, in the early years of
the party’s history, many Fretilin leaders held the view that a social revolution needed to
accompany armed resistance to eradicate exploração do homem pelo homem (“exploitation
of man by man”) so that post-war Timor would be completely without oppression. As part
of this, individuals with remaining wealth (plantations, monetary, etc.) were to relinquish
their holdings to benet all, in line with Cabral’s dictum of “class suicide” (Weldemichael
2008, 246). The quasi-abolition of private property was one major ideological shift to
come out of Soibada.
At Soibada, the remaining unoccupied territory was divided into sectors, which were
in turn divided into further, smaller units: Region (regia o), zone (zona), village (suco)
and sub-village (aldeia), terminology borrowed from the Portuguese administration that
Fretilin had physically taken over after August 1975. Militarily, there was now a com-
mander appointed each at the sector, region, and zone level (commandos da sector, com-
mandos da regi ao, commando da zona). In addition, each settlement (baso de apoio) had a
33Falintil leaders were instead camped right around the meeting grounds to guarantee security and were
thus kept up to date with decisions taken.
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self-defense force (Força Auto Defesa), comprised of local civilians with (very) basic mili-
tary training.34 However, a política comanda fuzil was mirrored in the regional command
structure: The six sectors of the zonas libertadas were at once political administrative unit
and military zone, and each sector was led by a political commissar (comissário política), a
member of Fretilin’s Central Committee who had supreme command over both political
and military matters. Each commissar was assisted by a number of assistant commis-
sars (assistente commissáriado) each responsible for a particular area: Health, agriculture,
education, women’s issues (carried out by a representative of OPTM) and political pro-
paganda. At each regional level, the Falintil leader was subordinated to his equivalent
political leader. This went down all the way to the suco level; writing about his time as a
refugee in Bereliurai, Pinto recalls that there was both a Fretilin secretary and a Falintil
commander (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 46).
In essence, this would severely curtail Falintil’s ability to adjust tactics as necessitated
by the changing conditions on the eld, and did not provide for an independent coordi-
nation mechanism for Falintil across sector lines and thus made no attempt at xing the
probably biggest tactical problem faced by the resistance: The positional warfare strategy
necessitated by the bases de apoio. This new structure was also not adopted by Falintil
without resistance. For example, José da Silva, who was Falintil’s Deputy Chief of Sta
(second highest position) and commander of the North Central Sector, refused to imple-
ment the restructuring in his sector according to the directives of the Sector Commissar,
and was not only removed from his post but also executed. In fact, over half of the in-
cumbent sector commanders protested the proposed changes, and several were executed
and replaced with more pliable men (Weldemichael 2008, 252).
Already before Soibada, people were organized around programs of agriculture, health,
education, culture and women’s liberation in the bases de apoio in order to support the
34Pinto (1997) recalls that during his training, which he started at age thirteen, he was never allowed to
shoot an actual gun because ammunition was so scarce.
130
armed resistance both logistically and politically. Gusmão describes the role of the popu-
lation: “We had just begun the war and the people were with us [in the interior] . . .bases
de apoio were implemented as a mechanism to organize people so they could continue to
ght in the war [by providing] logistical and political support, which we could describe
as revolution” (Gusmão 2000, 9). Weldemichael (2008) concludes from primary accounts
that this heavy reliance on the population was based on second-hand insights from other
resistance movements that nonconventional war could only succeed by relying on civil-
ian populations, and that they could only rely on the civilian population if the population
was physically present (in stark contrast to later mobilization approaches).
Yet, caring for a refugee population numbering in the hundred thousands would sig-
nicantly curtail Falintil’s ability to engage ABRI as necessary. Therefore, several Falintil
commanders were strongly opposed to the bases. Given their signicant disadvantages
in terms of both manpower and repower, Falintil ghters needed to be highly mobile to
take full advantage of their superior knowledge of Timor’s interior terrain, which they
could not do if they needed to protect civilian settlements in the liberated zones. Instead,
the presence of civilians forced them into a strategy of protection rather than oense that
did not favor the kind of covert operations carried out by small troops that would have
made the most of Falintil’s few comparative advantages.
Disagreement with the bases was not contained to Falintil. President Xavier do Ama-
ral, who was from a plantation-owning family, was not only ideologically opposed to the
Soibada Conference’s ideological innovations, but also voiced strong reservations about
the civilian support system in the mountains. In an interview with Weldemichael (2008,
250), do Amaral recalls suggesting that civilians gradually return to their previous lives,
where they might actually be an additional source of support to the resistance from be-
hind enemy lines. Lobato called him “an imperialist lackey” attempting to “undermine
the unity of Fretilin Central Committee”; do Amaral was imprisoned and then exiled in
the following year (Weldemichael 2008, 251).
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Through the establishment of the bases, governance structures set up by Fretilin re-
mained active, and the RDTL continued in the periphery, governing up to 300,000 people
(CAVR 2006, 241) with an attention to detail that does not call to mind a rebel organization
engaged in an active civil war. In Bereliurai, which Pinto describes as “very pro-Fretilin”,
Fretilin ran communal gardens (hortas communais); the food was given to people who
were unable to grow food such as newly arrived refugees and to the guerrillas (Pinto and
Jardine 1997, 46). In Bereliurai, there was an administrative building (sede), that was used
to teach people to read and write and learn about Timorese culture, political engagement,
history, and Catholicism. However, instruction also included more pragmatic concerns:
How to support guerrilla ghters on the front, how to build shelters to protect himself or
herself from bombing or shooting, as well as use of weapons. (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 47)
As before the invasion, there were weekly meetings (convivios) to discuss politics and the
state of the war. Fretilin also organized medical care, mostly using whatever the refugees
had brought from the towns and natural remedies (Constancio Pinto’s father worked as a
nurse).
The armed resistance falls
After Indonesia redoubled their eorts in early 1977 and made signicant territorial gains
against which Falintil seemed almost completely powerless, Fretilin’s leadership con-
vened another important conference in Laline (Viqueque district). It was only now that
Fretilin’s leadership recognized the need for inproved coordination mechanisms for Fal-
intil commanders; militarily, the resistance was reorganized to have sector-level military
commands that allowed for coordination between dierent areas. In addition, a so-called
“Shock Brigade” (under the command of Mauk Muruk) was created that was not bound
by sector delineations but rather assisted where there was need. Politically, Fretilin cre-
ated a new Conselho Superior da Luta or Supreme Resistance Council that included the
President, VP, Deputy Minister of Defense and Minister of Information and National Se-
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curity, which led to greater centralization and a higher degree of military inclusion in
decision-making. However, ideologically, it was during this conference that Fretilin o-
cially adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology, at least on paper, thus making the resistance
more extremist in its political leanings. Fretilin formally upheld its declaration of inde-
pendence and demanded its universal recognition.
Within the rst six months of 1977, Fretilin still controlled some interior areas in the
south of the island. However, Indonesia was employing two parallel strategies: “Encir-
clement and annhilation” and “killing the sh by draining the sea,” both instituted under
the leadership of General Muhammad Yusuf, fresh from his command of the successful
South Sulawesi counterinsurgency. Frederic Durand produced a cartographic reproduc-
tion of enrirclement and annihilation between 1977 and 1979 that shows the strategy’s
success: Falintil and Fretilin, hampered by the population trailing in their wake, were
encircled by ABRI and pushed back into three self-contained enclaves, cut o from the
rest of the resistance, one concentrated in Maliana, one surrounding a handful of villages
at the geographic center of Timor, and one at Mount Mantebean (Durand 2006, 73). At
the same time, ABRI concentrated on cutting o the bases de apoio in the three target
areas o from supplies (weapons, food, and water). By early 1979, most Falintil ghters
were pinned down in inaccessible caves dotted throughout the mountain ranges above
the bases, and they were cut o from receiving supplies from other bases. Mauk Mu-
ruk recounts: “It was rare for crops to reach maturity because they were systematically
destroyed by Indonesian bombardments and sabotage attacks. Springs and wells were
poisoned on a number of occasions, which greatly aected the availability of clean water
and caused the death of many people” (Gama 1995). In other instances, gasoline was used
to burn the o forest and arable land (literal scorched earth), often burning civilians alive
in the process (CAVR 2006, 225). A key to both strategic approaches was the heavy use
of Napalm, repurposed from US operations in Vietnam, against both civilian areas and
Falintil holdouts (Gama 1995, 100).
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Yet, it was only in December 1978 that Fretilin leaders started to allow some civilians
to surrender and return to the now-occupied areas.35 Over the next weeks, the bases
de apoio emptied as civilians were interned by ABRI into so-called resettlement camps.
Operationally, internment was deemed necessary to defeat the guerrillas by separating
them from the people and purging Fretilin ideological inuences by indoctrinating them
with Indonesia propaganda (Weldemichael 2008, 260). Prohibited in the early period of the
internment camps from cultivating their own food or foraging in the bush and provided
with insucient supplies, malnutrition, consequent diseases, and outright famine was
a frequent occurrence and no relief was provided from the rough conditions of the last
months in the mountains.
It is hard to overstate the hopelessness of Fretilin’s situation by the end of the decade.
By 1979, Encirclement and Annihilation had resulted in the near complete destruction
of the East Timorese resistance, leaving 79% of the Supreme Command (Fretilin Central
Committee and Falintil leadership) dead. Support bases had been not only defeated but
rather reduced to smatterings of soldiers and civilians through the bush and mountains.
According to all dierent narratives, the near-annihilation of the Timorese resistance by
early 1979 was cemented with the death of Fretilin President Nicolau Lobato on 31 De-
cember 1978 (see for example Gama (1995, 101)). Only three members of the Central
Committee, Fernando Txay, Mahugo and Xanana Gusmao, had survived and were still at
large; they were based on the eastern tip of the island, where Fretilin had a very tenuous
hold (Niner 2004, 56). Further, whatever was left of the resistance had lost any ability
to communicate with the outside world as Alarico Fernandes, when surrendering to the
Indonesian forces, gave up Radio Maubere (Weldemichael 2008, 261).
35CAVR (2006) provides some accounts of Fretilin leaders not allowing civilians to return to Dili even if
they wanted to, believing popular support in the mountains to be vital for the continuation of the resistance.
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Gusmao’s rise to power and third reorganization
In March 1979, the remaining Fretilin leadership and other highly ranked party or military
ocials held a meeting on the eastern tip — Ponta Leste - of the island. Ponta Leste, which
was not yet controlled by ABRI, was where the surviving cadre members, who had man-
aged to break out of the siege, had ed to in the knowledge that they would not be shown
mercy by the Indonesian troops, should they surrender. The Legumau mountain range
east of Baguia was both dicult to access and of no strategic importance, thus providing
a relatively save haven for the remnants of Fretilin and Falintil. In Ponta Leste, the surviv-
ing leaders reorganized the resistance’s structure and chose Xanana Gusmão as the new
leader, as the former sector commissar was the highest-ranking surviving Fretilin Cen-
tral Committee member.36 The continuing eect of a política comanda fuzil even in the
resistance’s state of near-complete annihilation clearly shows here: There were surviv-
ing military leaders such as Mauk Muruk who held signicantly higher positions within
the military leadership than Gusmão in the political hierarchy, but the latter was chosen
nonetheless (and with little apparent opposition).
The decision on Gusmão as leader was provisional, as it as of yet lacked popular ap-
proval. Further, it was unclear whether enough resistance members had actually survived
to even continue ghting. It was thus decided to embark on a reconnaissance mission to
learn who of the resistance apparatus had actually survived, re-establish contacts with
the population, assess their willingness to continue to support the resistance, and gain a
better sense of the Indonesian military disposition Gusmão (2000, 57-59). It is signicant
how important the population’s approval was deemed at this moment; Fretilin’s populist
identity seems to have had deep roots.
36The full list of surviving Fretilin/Falintil cadres was so short that it could be counted on two hands:
On the political side, it consisted of Xanana Gusmão, Ma’Huno, Mau Hodu, Bere Malay Laka, and Taxy. On
the military side, it was Mauk Muruk, Kilik Wae Gae, Olo Gari, Nelo, and Freddy. Note that few of these
names have even appeared in the narrative up to now — this signals their relative low ranks. (Gama 1995,
101).
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To get a fuller sense of the state of the resistance, both Falintil and Fretilin members
shed their uniforms and hid their weapons so as to slip through Indonesian controls unde-
tected, signaling a rst tentative move towards guerrilla warfare.37 In his CAVR testimony,
Gusmão recalls:
We went straight [from Matebian] to Ponta Leste. When we got there, we
started building a strategy and each of us learned what guerrilla [warfare]
was about. Because I already had contacts with the underground [from] when
[we were in the] bases de apoio, I went straight to Mehara on 7 December
[1979] . . .We searched [for resistance members]. From Dili they [clandestine
members] told us that there’s a small number of [Falintil] troops but they
couldn’t contact them, many had surrendered. I sent two groups to Centro
[central region] [but] they said they didn’t nd any troops and didn’t meet
any civilians there. (CAVR 2006, 242)
There are several noteworthy points in this short testimony. For one, even without
lling in the term “clandestine members” given the source of Gusmão’s information, there
was clearly a civilian underground that had its origins in the bases de apoio, many of
whom now likely lived in Indonesian occupied zones, feeding information to Fretilin. In
fact, civilians who had not ed Dili had been providing information to family members
in the mountains from the beginning of the occupation Bexley and Tchailoro (2013, 407).
Second, with the loss of the bases de apoio and most of the more ideological leadership,
military innovation (guerrilla warfare) was fast and pragmatic, indicating that innovation
in the Timorese resistance at least was much swifter with fewer veto players. Third, most
of the surviving leadership appears relatively untrained, as they needed to rst learn about
the tenets of guerrilla warfare before carrying them out in practice.
The recon campaign was led by Ologari Asuwain, Gusmão, and Mauk Muruk, who
focused on the three broad areas of Dili-Same-Suai-Batugade-Dili, Dili-Same-Viqueque-
Baucau, and Viqueque-Lospalos respectively. During almost 1.5 years of travels through
37It was customary for both Falintil and Fretilin leaders to wear uniforms as to distinguish themselves
clearly from the civilian population. However, this had had little to no eect on the Indonesian treatment
of civilians.
136
the bush, Gusmão and his remaining associates located a few additional pockets of Fal-
intil ghters. Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo,” who in 1980 was hiding somewhere in the
central mountains with a small ghting unit, describes how “when we heard that our
older brother Xanana Gusmão had come we felt our hearts at ease” (CAVR 2006, 243).
Signicantly, the non-uniformed guerrillas often managed to slip through Indonesian
fortications and establish links to clandestine groups within occupied territories now
that ABRI felt secure in victory and positional warfare had been abandoned (CAVR 2006,
243). A delegation of guerrillas even covertly entered Dili to announce their survival to
the population by participating in the symbolic attack of the Maubara radio station (Wel-
demichael 2008, 292). Not only did this recon mission allow the remaining leaders to
plan ahead, the surviving ghters likewise gained valuable information about the contin-
ued popular support for the resistance. Further, there now existed personal and direct-
if tenuous - links between Fretilin and the population in the occupied territories, which,
together with the personal links between family members, would slowly be formalized
over the next decade. It is important that Gusmão’s March 1981 reorganization was un-
dertaken with the awareness that a reliable information network existed. On the other
hand, one big blow of the reconnaissance campaign was the realization that there were
no other surviving Central Committee members, which likely also informed the strategic
decisions taken in 1981.
Gusmão called a national meeting in Lacluta, Viqueque District, to reorganize the
resistance according to the information gathered in the previous year and a half. Af-
ter studying guerrilla warfare in 1979 in Ponta Leste, the remaining leaders determined
that, given the dismal state of the resistance, full-blown guerrilla warfare — as waged
in Vietnam or Cuba, apparently the main two sources of inspiration — would not work
in Timor. Rather, then, in 1981, the remaining cadres under the unanimously appointed
leader Xanana Gusmão reorganized the resistance according to an avowedly pragmatic
approach that prioritized attaining independence, putting the internal revolution on the
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back burner. In practice, this led to the following organization of military activities: Small
troops of Falintil ghters were thinly spread out across the country (at this point, only
a few hundred trained troops). Locally, these small, mobile units would be supported by
cells of the Clandestine Front. At the district level, the Clandestine Front was represented
by “Resistance Centers” (cernak) and at the village level through smaller cells at the vil-
lage level (nurep) (CAVR 2006). Thus, the Clandestine Front, though not yet centralized
or streamlined, now took on important information and communication tasks.
According to Gusmão, the goal in 1981 was to do “what we could do with small guer-
rilla [groups], to plan political activities, military activities, and how the two related to
each other” (CAVR 2006, 244). This leads to two conclusions: First, the military focus did
not disappear, but rather took on a more pragmatic bent, made possible by the deaths of
most military hardliners who had been trained in conventional warfare in the Portuguese
colonial army. Second, the prospect of nonmilitary “political activities” on behalf of the
resistance was broached as early as 1981, if Gusmão’s recollections are credible, though
they are not explicitly mass-based at this point.
Politically, the overall new approach was to construct an umbrella forum theoreti-
cally able to accomodate all nationalists. While many ex-post accounts claim that the
creation of the CRRN actually represented the rst instance of a pro-unity approach, this
is not true. Rather, the CRRN was an organization to “unite all nationalists” and did thus
not allow for UDT or APODETI members to join, according to Kammen’s translation of
the CRRN resolutions from Lacluta (Kammen 2009, 79). That CRRN was not (yet) an
umbrella organization can be seen in its structure: The leadership was still exclusively
Fretilin, Falintil retied its direct link to Fretilin (or, at least, it was not ocially severed),
Fretilin continued as an ocial arm of the organizational structure, and open anti-UDT
rhetoric continued. Also, Fretilin still advocated Marxism-Leninism (Kammen 2009, 79).
CRRN’s leadership was synonymous with Fretilin’s Central Commission, so that the term
“Fretilin” is still used to denote the resistance organization. In his letter to Fretilin’s Del-
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egation of External Services from October 13, 1982 (as a matter of fact also the rst time
a missive was sent directly from Timor to the External Delegation after blockade had
made this impossible (Weldemichael 2008, 379)), Gusmão reported of the reorganization
only that “here the nation was reorganized, the liberation forces restructured, and a new
leadership appointed” (Gusmão 2000, 72).
Structurally, CRRN was headed by a President Xanana Gusmao, who presided over
a Central Committee with both members within Timor and (largely symbolically at this
point) members from abroad such as José Ramos-Horta. Xanana Gusmão was also the
National Political Commissar of Fretilin and Commander-in-Chief of Falintil, which was
still ocially the armed wing of Fretilin, further showing that CRRN and Fretilin at this
point are essentially synonymous. Importantly, the appointment of a political leader as
“Commander in Chief” of Falintil indicates the continued commitment to and functioning
of a política comanda fuzil.
Ceasere and rst communication links
The resistance organization’s eventual real pro-unity character started to be injected into
CRRN in large parts due to pressure by Catholic clergy on Gusmão. Father Martinho
da Costa Lopes testied that in the rst meeting with Xanana Gusmao in 1982, he made
clear that the only hope for the resistance lay in a united UDT-Fretilin front and a much
more denitive organizational distancing from Maoism and Leninism; in fact, Lopes made
CRRN’s formal departure from Fretilin’s leftist orientation and the embrace of UDT mem-
bers a condition for both covert and overt collaboration between the Catholic Church in
Timor and Gusmão (CAVR 2006, 246).38 This was not an empty threat, as the Church,
widely trusted and supported even by Indonesia, could play an important role in facili-
tating communication and lending legitimacy to the movement. After his meeting with
Father Martinho in 1982, Xanana resigned from his post as National Political Commissar
38Lopes da Costa was forcefully exiled in 1982 for aiding the resistance and replaced by Ximenes Belo.
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of Fretilin as a signal that the unity organization needed to come rst. In 1983, CRRN
ocially adopted “national unity” as its new principle, Fretilin agreed to a ceasere with
Indonesia, which they had previously staunchly opposed.
The ceasere was also necessary for diplomatic purposes: CRRN documented the sign-
ing ceremony of the ceasere agreement between Xanana Gusmao and Colonel Purwanto,
Indonesia’s sub-regional military commander in East Timor, shaking hands under Fretilin
and Indonesian ags. In the freedom accorded by the ceasere, Gusmao sent this photo
to the External Delegation abroad. While the photo legitimized Fretilin internationally,
showing that the resistance was still alive and kicking, the agreement backred for In-
donesia, as it implicitly acknowledged that the war was still in full swing and not pacied,
as had been ABRI’s ocial position. (Weldemichael 2008, 344) In fact, by this point, it was
policy for ABRI to refer to Falintil guerrillas as gerombolan pengacau keamanan, literally
translated “band of security disturbers” (Kammen 2009, 73). In fact, in January 1983, Pur-
wanto had told journalists that “the band of [security] disturbers in East Timor, who are
the remnants of Fretilin forces, have no more than one hundred weapons and ve hundred
members” (Kammen 2009, 73).
Why did Indonesia agree to the ceasere? Kammen (2009) identies two main reasons:
March 1983 reprsents a period of political turnover, so that the outgoing guard (including
Yusuf, Indonesia’s outgoing sector commander in Timor) felt that they had nothing to lose
and everything to gain by trying a new approach. Second, Indonesia hoped that it would
be able to schedule diplomatic visits during the period of the ceasere, most importantly
by Australia, with whom they needed to negotiate a treaty on the use of Timor’s oshore
natural resources (Timor and Australia share a maritime border).
The ceasere was in part possible due to the eorts of Timorese military governor,
UDT founder Mario Carrascalão. In 1982, the Indonesian leadership deemed the new
province suciently under control to appoint a Timorese governor, following “elections”
that overwhelmingly favored Indonesia’s shadow government. Very carefully, Carras-
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calão started supporting the resistance from within. Once he had Suharto’s full trust,
he would push policies benecial to Timor and the resistance. Before this, he played a
key role in facilitating communication between Falintil and the Clandestine Front and
provided information about the Indonesian intentions.
From the beginning of his tenure as government, Carrascalão kept his Fridays open
to receive Timorese civilians to have walk-in meetings with him. Sometimes, up to one
hundred people would wait outside the governor’s residence to see him. Because most
Timorese did not yet speak Bahasa, Carrascalão would hold these meetings in Tetum;
because the ABRI ocers guarding the residence did not speak Tetum, Carrascalão could
receive important information about Falintil through farmers who had traveled to Dili and
could pass on information to them in turn. In their indirect communication prior to the
ceasere agreement, Gusmao communicated to Carrascalão that he needed three months
to reorganize his forces, and asked Carrascalão to try and convince ABRI to agree to a
ceasere. Carrascalão recollects the message as follows: “From Xanana I heard, “that’s
what I need: I need three months to reconstruct my army, my guerrilla army. You have
been benetting from the Indonesians, now you have to help us. I take care of the war, and
you take care of the population.””39 The ceasere, then, served specic strategic purposes
and was meticulously planned.
Before the end of the ceasere, there was an ocial meeting between Carrascalão and
Xanana Gusmão organized by Carrascalão at Gusmao’s urging, on May 28, 1983, which
was recorded on an Indonesian transcript of the meeting was recovered in 2009, in the
oce of a provincial Indonesian police commander. The 1983 meeting shows how early
signs of unity between Fretilin and UDT started to emerge, and give signicant credence
to both Carrascalão’s and Gusmão’s recollections.40 While there are obviously no outright
39Interview with Mario Carrascalão, Dili, November 28, 2014
40The post-war relationship between Gusmão and Carrascalão also speaks to the considerable trust and
understanding that must have connected the men. Carrascalão publicly (and eusively) endorsed Gusmao
for Prime Minister in 2002, and Gusmao invited Carrascalão and his Social Democratic Party into an al-
liance in 2006 Kammen (2009, 80). In post-war Timor, it was customary to reward resistance heroes with
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statements of mutual support given the ocial nature of the meeting and the presence
of Indonesian observers, the conciliatory language is remarkable. Carrascalão states at
the very beginning of his opening speech (the recording indicates blocks of speeches
rather than a back-and-forth dialogue) that “unity needs to be created because if the East
Timorese people are divided they will ‘devour’ one another” Kammen (2009, 81). In the
following speech, phrased almost as a response, Gusmão asks: “If there is UDT and there
is Fretilin, if there is a possibility of a Coalition, then why can’t there be an understanding
between us?” Kammen (2009, 87)
Kammen hypothesizes that behind the purposefully vague language, the two men
were actually coordinating their collaboration that would stay in place throughout Car-
rascalão’s governorship in the 1980s. Gusmão says of Carrascalão and his role in the resis-
tance: “He is someone who is of value to our homeland and people. If we reach a common
vision, that is, a desire to resolve this situation in a good way, then this can be used as
a bridge to cross into new territory. . . . that was not our attitude towards previous Gov-
ernors” (Kammen 2009). Finally, Carrascalão openly states his position as interlocutor:
“If I am given the task of intermediary I always want to give perfect expression to what
one party has to say to the other party” Kammen (2009, 94). Carrascalão nally concludes
that “as for the support that you just mentioned, I admit that there is [such support],”
which considers a signal of assent to Gusmao’s call for “national unity,” i.e. Governor
Carrascalão doing what he can to support the resistance.41 At some point towards the
end, Carrascalão actually overtly describes the process of delivering secret letters back
and forth between himself and Gusmão: “I can arrange so that secrecy is kept. For ex-
ample: when José Conceição came to Dili to deliver your letter to me, no one knew. The
rst anyone knew of it was the next day when I gave him my letter for you.” (Kammen
ministerial posts (which is how Timor, with a population of less than one million at the time, ended up with
a cabinet with 57 ministers).
41According to Kammen, this could also refer to international support; the wording is purposefully vague
to hide the true meaning Kammen (2009, 98).
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2009, 100) The most important message was this from Gusmão to Carrascalão: “You are
responsible for the people in the occupied towns and villages, and I am in charge of the
people in the jungle” (quoted in Pinto and Jardine (1997, 93)).
Apart from the apparent coordination eorts and slow movement towards a unity
organization, the meeting transcript also indicates how Gusmao was moving away from
Marxism-Leninism: “If during this war Fretilin has directed certain individuals toward a
particular ideology, that does not mean that all followers of Fretilin are Marxists . . . Fretilin
must mobilize people who think that East Timor can become an Independent Country”
Kammen (2009, 87). He goes on later to say that “it would not be realistic — or as Senhor
[Carrascalão] said, it would be to behave like sheep — were I to force myself, to impose my
ideology on everyone else” (Kammen 2009, 92). This shows the extraordinary position of
inuence Gusmao had attained by this point, and the clear shift towards a more pragmatic
set of goals for the resistance.
Gusmão’s unilateral termination of the ceasere in August of 1983 similarly demon-
strates his position of power over the military leaders in the resistance organization. The
leaders most opposed to ending the ceasere were Mauk Muruk (commander of the Red
Brigades, a highly mobile elite unit that operated throughout the territory) and Kilik Wae
Gae, Falintil’s Chief of Sta (CAVR 2006, 246). Mauk Muruk told Weldemichael that he
and several other high-ranking Falintil leaders opposed the termination at this point for
strategic reasons (not explained further), but there was really no way for them to stop
Gusmão. Mauk Muruk still blames Gusmão for the Kraras Massacre, perpetrated by ABRI
against a village of Timorese civilians likely as retaliation for Fretilin’s unilateral termi-
nation of the agreement (Weldemichael 2008, 345).42
In 1984, Gusmão further demonstrated his hold on power when he changed Fretilin’s
ideological program. After they had already opposed the unilateral abrogation of the
42General Benny Moerdani, ABRI Commander, had explicitly only gave Purwanto and Carrascalão three
months to make the ceasere work (so, until early July), indicating that Gusmão may simply have taken
advantage of the publicity to be gained from being the rst to resume attacks (Kammen 2009, 76).
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ceasere, Kilik Wae Gae, Mauk Muruk and his deputy Ologari Asuwain were vocally op-
posed to the formal 1984 reorganization, which was supported by most of the Central
Committee. Apart from the change in party ideology, Falintil was formally severed from
Fretilin and put it under the command of the CRRN, thereby making Falintil into an apo-
litical entity. This would have further removed Falintil leaders from key political decisions
taken at the top of the organization. Taur Matan Ruak, at the time on the Falintil General
Sta and a staunch supporter of Gusmão’s, characterized the dissent between the three
Falintil leaders and Gusmão: “Nothing [that Gusmão did] was ever right, what did they
want?” (CAVR 2006, 455). Despite the internal opposition, Gusmão easily restructured
Falintil and demoted all three of the oppositional Falintil commanders. He explains the
1984 Falintil personnel reorganization: “I carried out a reorganization. . . . Because of this
they called me a traitor, that I was no longer a Marxist. They held on to the ideology,
making it into a problem. But the [real] problem was the military reshue” (CAVR 2006,
454). It appears generally accepted that Mauk Muruk’s surrender to Indonesia was out of
fear for meeting his own death as part of the resistance (see for example Weldemichael
(2008)). With the death or surrender of Kilik Wae Gae, Mauk Muruk, and Ologari Asuwain,
the three most powerful Falintil leaders — who had all been with the resistance from the
beginning — were gone, leaving Xanana Gusmao with signicantly enhanced powers.
One year later in 1985, Fretilin and UDT representatives in Portugal (where UDT was
represented by João Carrascalão, Mario Carrascalão’s brother) jointly announced “Na-
tional Convergence” (collaboration), support for the guerilla-led resistance, and their in-
tention to work together both in Timor and in the diplomatic eld to bring about their
mutual goals and interests. Fretilin and UDT (1986) This solidied CRRN’s unity charac-
ter.
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4.4 The Clandestine Front and nonviolent action
Meanwhile, a formidable if delicate underground communication network had formed
and become more formalized inside of the occupied territories, particularly the towns and
cities. The Clandestine Front, Timor’s underground information and supplies network,
became an important player in the resistance especially once the civilian population left
the bases for Indonesian-occupied areas. Constancio Pinto, who would go on to become
the leader of the Clandestine Front once rmly incorporated in the resistance organiza-
tion, describes the functions of the Clandestine Front from roughly the mid-1980s on:
[The Clandestine Front’s] members worked to send messages about East Timor
to family members and friends in Portugal and Australia and tried to support
the resistance in the jungle. They would send the guerrillas food and supplies.
The assistance sometimes included ammunition or money, but information
was the most important resource for the guerrillas. We provided information
on all sorts of matters, most typically on Indonesian military activities in the
towns and throughout the territory, human rights violations, and develop-
ments on the diplomatic front regarding East Timor. We would get the infor-
mation from shortwave radio and from people within the Catholic Church.
Psychologically, the information that we provided was very important for the
guerrillas. It let them know that they were not alone, that the world had not
forgotten about East Timor. (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 98)
How did a fully-edged information network emerge in occupied Timor-Leste, and how
did it survive and evolve? How did it work? And nally, how did the Clandestine Front
nally begin to organize nonviolent protest events, and how was it able to coordinate its
activities with the rebel leadership?
In the rst few years, those civilians who had not taken refuge in the mountains with
Fretilin and Falintil still provided support and communicated with family members ght-
ing in the mountain (CAVR 2006). While these clandestine activities were undertaken in a
largely spontaneous manner following personal and family ties to the population ghting
or residing under the mountain regime, there were quickly also more streamlined local
clandestine groups. For example, in eastern Mehara, people formally coordinated their
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clandestine activities as early as 1976 (Bexley and Tchailoro 2013, 407). Nuño Rodriguez
Tchailoro, who returned with his family from the mountains to Dili during this period ex-
plains how these initial connections between rebels in the periphery and the towns and
cities were made:
It really started from families. Before Indonesia destroyed the whole liber-
ated zones, in the jungle, during three years, families would be together [in
the bases de apoio]. So, after the destruction of liberated zones, because of the
people’s political education, the political system already [was] there, and peo-
ple, on their own initiative, started to make a link [to rebel-held territories]
by their own self. The families that surrendered, or were captured by the In-
donesian military, they f[ou]nd ways to meet with their family members who
were still in the mountains [ghting].43
In other words, family ties across Indonesian lines existed throughout the brutal early
years of the civil war, and once the bases were eradicated, connections to the jungle were
strengthened as civilians with keen knowledge of the rebel situation in the mountain
returned to occupied towns, knowledge which facilitated the continued exchange of in-
formation across enemy lines. During the 1979 to 1981 reconnaissance mission, the resis-
tance leadership was able to substantiate the extent of the clandestine networks spanning
Timor and incorporate this new-found knowledge into their strategic calculations moving
forward.
In urban areas (Dili and Baucau), the formalization of the clandestine network fullled
the dual role of information and supply source of information and a way to channel the
increasingly riotous attitudes of young Timorese. Living under Indonesian martial rule,
young Timorese had no access to secondary education or university and little perspec-
tive in life, causing aggression and restlessness; many bands of youth carried out small,
uncoordinated raids and acts of vandalism Bexley and Tchailoro (2013). For example, Elis-
ario Ferreira, the founder of one such gang, recalls: “In its beginnings, FITUN was just
a gang with the objective of bashing and getting rid of new transmigrant arrivals from
43Interview with Nuño Rodriguez Tchailoro, Dili, November 27, 2014. Tchailoro was a student activist
in Indonesia and nally became the rst and only Timorese historian of resistance history.
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Indonesia" (quoted in Bexley and Tchailoro (2013, 408)). These gangs, acting on their own
initiative, provoked the Indonesian army without Falintil having the ability to coordinate
and made the resistance look disorganized and tattered; the leadership in the mountains
grew concerned but quickly realized the gangs’ untapped potential in terms of manpower.
Via the Clandestine Front, the resistance leadership encouraged the formation their own
youth organizations that subsumed the gangs in the cities, which led to groups such as
Sagrada Familia and OPJLATIL, specically tasked with carrying out logistical and tacti-
cal commands from Falintil (Bexley and Tchailoro 2013). Thus, the population in the cities
was safer from reprisals against unsanctioned gang violence and the resistance had a new
small army of messengers, called estafetas.
The 1983 ceasere played an important, dual role in the development of a resilient
underground information network. Kammen (2009) also notes that the resistance was
keenly aware that it needed to broaden its civilian points of contact, and that this was
one of the reasons Fretilin agreed the ceasere. Pinto, at this time a student in occupied
Dili, describes how the ceasere allowed to move more freely and make personal contact
with the mountain resistance: “Many people traveled from Dili, Baucau, and other towns
and villages went to meet with the guerrillas” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 93). This led both
to improved coordination between towns and cities, and the further strengthening of
people’s personal ties to the Falintil ghters in the mountains. Second, the two brutal
ABRI massacres of hundreds of civilians in Kraras and Viqueque as a consequence for
Falintil’s abrogation of the ceasere had a motivating eect on many civilians to play a
more active part in the resistance, as they realized the extent of ABRI’s untrustworthiness
and brutality. For Pinto, for example, it was the massacres that made him actively seek
to join a clandestine cell in Dili. Understanding how it was possible for an individual
to become a link in the Clandestine network allows for a deeper understanding of the
underground network’s internal organization and working.
In Pinto’s school, the Catholic Externato in Dili, he was already cognizant that sev-
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eral of the other students were involved in the underground, but he was not yet a trusted
enough friend to be initiated; gaining the trust of already-initiated members was key, as
ABRI often attempted to plant spies in the Clandestine Front. Once again, then, the suc-
cessful operation of Timor’s resistance network depended on personal ties rather than
sophisticated technology. For his part, Pinto noticed that several of the students he sus-
pected of being involved in the Clandestine Front were also members of the Catholic
Scouts, an organization that was public and could be joined by anyone and was thus open
to him. Pinto soon became a leader of the Balide Church troop in Dili, and it was only
after months of holding the position that two underground members, José Manuel Fer-
nandes and Donaciano Gomes, invited him to a meeting of their underground cell. Most
local Clandestine cells had links to “legal” organizations or networks; while Pinto’s was
linked to the Scouts, others were connected to indigenous spiritual houses (Umas Lulik)
or martial arts groups (such as Colimau 2000) Weldemichael (2008, 390).
Through the Clandestine cell network, Pinto became indirectly connected to Falintil.
At one of the Dili meetings of the Scouts Clandestine cell, he was introduced to Toko,
who had been a Falintil ghter in the jungle, but had been captured and now worked
from Dili through another Clandestine Front cell. At rst, Pinto’s Scout cell channeled
supplies for Falintil through Toko’s connections, but after a few months, they had proven
trustworthy enough to put in more direct contact with Falintil through Commander Alex
Daitula. Daitula, in turn, was in a position to connect the cell to Mau Hudo, who had
become Fretilin Chairman after Gusmão’s resignation from the post in 1984 and Taur
Matan Ruak, Falintil General Sta member (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 98).
Toko warned Pinto about the quintessentially frail nature of the Clandestine Front’s
structure: “The underground movement is something that is very delicate. You have to
be determined and responsible for your own actions” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 95). Self-
suciency of both individual members and individual cells was indeed key to the survival
of the clandestine front, and coordination was very dicult. It was paramount that if one
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clandestine member were discovered by ABRI, they would not be able to give up informa-
tion about many other members, so that each cell would maintain their own direct line
to a Falintil commander without direct knowledge of other cells. According to Pinto, dif-
ferent population groups (students, civil servants, merchants, “churchpeople”, women’s
groups, or, as in Pinto’s case, scouts) worked discreetly and separately, making coordina-
tion across cells virtually impossible, as cells were largely only connected via their Falintil
contacts (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 93).
In a bid to improve the coordination of Clandestine Front activities, Pinto and several
members of their original cell founded a new cell, 007, in 1985, and then individually
went on to establish further cells, whose members in turn also systematically founded
new cells. 007 had seven members, and each member founded a secondary cell with six
more people, many of whom went on to found new cells in turn. In this manner, slow
but direct communication and coordination between cells became possible: One person
in the cell would know about one other cell, and that cell had its own person-to-person
contacts to yet dierent cells (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 97). If captured, a Clandestine Front
member would still only be able to give up a small handful of people and a maximum of
two cells. In addition, with the approval of Alex Daitula, Pinto and the Scouts carefully
began linking up existing cells through personal contacts across Timor, weaving them
into a network resembling a tangled spider’s web.44
About two years after its foundation, 007 had established a rm link to Xanana Gus-
mao, and with his approval, formed a new leadership organ called Orgão Oito in 1987
(Pinto and Jardine 1997, 97-98). Orgão Oito included leaders from all of the 007 ospring
cells as well as several leaders of similar cellular structures across the country identied
through careful reconnaissance over the span of several years. Through secret shortwave
44As Pinto had not been a Falintil ghter, he had relative freedom of movement and could leave Dili
with approval from ABRI. As he was a teacher and involved with the Church, approval was relatively easy
for him to obtain, though he was not able to travel with larger quantities of food than needed by one family
and could not smuggle weapons in this way.
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radios and Timorese double agents working within the Indonesian ranks, cells could gain
information about what was going on in the outside world (information was tightly con-
trolled and even being caught with a radio was punishable by torture) and sometimes even
about ABRI’s internal workings and plans. A cell would channel the relevant information
intended for the guerrillas to their Falintil contact, who would then in turn send it on
to the appropriate nal recipient (and the other way around). Orgão Oito maintained an
extensive network of messengers (estafetas) that relayed messages between dierent cells
or between cells and the armed resistance. Many former gang members were employed
as estafetas (Bexley and Tchailoro 2013). Often, the estafetas actually crossing ABRI lines
were women. According to Tchailoro, who is currently conducting research on the role
of women in the Timorese resistance, explains: “The Indonesian military, with their con-
cept of a very patriarchal society, they th[ought] that . . .women are really weak. . . .When
the Indonesians controlled the whole island, they didn’t allow any men to cross the lines,
so that was the main role of women. They could go and pass freely to other places, and
the Indonesians didn’t discover that they were doing clandestine activities. They didn’t
discover that inside women’s weakness there is also a strength.”45
In addition to messages, estafetas would also provide Falintil with supplies and, rarely,
ammunition. Before 1984, leaving Dili required a travel document (surat jalan), so that
supplies could only be moved under the guise of sending food to family in another town,
which made the movement of supplies exceedingly slow. After 1984, Indonesia allowed
free movement out of Dili into other occupied zones, although there were still military
checkpoints throughout the country. If caught, Indonesian soldiers could often be bribed
with small sums of money or a pack of cigarettes (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 100). A common
practice was to use several estafetas to transport goods: The rst messenger would drop
o the message or goods at a designated location, and the bundle would be picked up by
a second estafeta either the rest of the way or to an additional relay point. This ensured
45Interview with Nuño Rodriguez Tchailoro, Dili, November 27, 2014
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that ABRI could only glean minimal information from one captured messenger.
The 1987 reorganization
In the December 1987 anniversary of the Indonesian invasion twelve years prior, Xanana
Gusmao announced in a speech that was internationally disseminated via the External
Delegation the formation of a true “national unity” organization and a decisive shift in
both strategy and ideology. At this point, the unity character of the resistance was es-
tablished fact, and communication within Timor through the Clandestine Front and out-
side Timor with the External Delegation allowed signicant intra-resistance coordina-
tion. Gusmão announced that he had undertaken a “signicant change of position” that
“arm[ed] that we are becoming, nally, more realistic!” He critically assessed the re-
sistance’s experience with Marxism-Leninism, dismissing it as “political infantilism that
tried to defy the world, obsessed with our non-existent capacities.” In particular, he re-
nounced “doctrines that promote suppression of democratic freedoms in East Timor” and
that incited “senseless radicalism [that] paid no attention to our concrete conditions and
limitations” (Gusmão 2000, 129-136).
In the self-same speech, Gusmão outline the new objectives of the resistance: Decreas-
ing Indonesian capacity, increasing Timorese resilience, and, most importantly, achiev-
ing the international recognition of the Timorese right to self-determination. In order
to achieve this, he withdrew from Fretilin to become a non-partisan leader of all pro-
independence Timorese within the framework of the newly created National Council of
Maubere Resistance (CNRM), with Falintil as a neutral military apparatus of the resistance
movement. The umbrella organization was purposefully structured so as to maximize
coordination mechanisms between the armed resistance, the Clandestine Front within
Timor and within Indonesia, and the renamed Diplomatic Front abroad in full recogni-
tion that the resistance could probably not overcome Indonesia militarily.
Fretilin was now but one party within the CNRM. While the erstwhile author of
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Fretilin’s party program Abilio de Araújo — still in exile in Lisbon — strongly opposed
these changes, there was little he could do, and while a few others joined him in dis-
sent, opposition to Gusmão’s most sweeping structural and political changes to date was
largely limited to exiled Fretilin members (Weldemichael 2008, 385). Since Ramos-Horta
had never accepted Fretilin’s Marxist-Leninist turn in the rst place, he now became the
de-facto leader of the External Delegation, which was ocially incorporated into the or-
ganizational structure of CNRM as the Diplomatic Front (Weldemichael 2008, 386). Gus-
mao expressed his condence in Ramos-Horta both vocally and in practice, giving him
complete freedom to direct the Diplomatic Front’s actions, structures, and strategies, an-
swerable only to Gusmao himself. He explained in a letter how this was part of his greater
objective of centralizing and streamlining the resistance now that it was no longer bound
to a party:
The regulation of institutional functioning should be the most basic, not los-
ing oneself in the confusion of capitals, articles and paragraphs with no end,
that only reect a “necessity” to satisfy all of the components of structure, as
if it were the primary objective . . . It is in this sentiment that we advocate a
simple, but functional ‘structure of war,’ in which the sentiment of duty will
prevail more than a description of rules of a “democratic” game. (Quoted in
(Weldemichael 2008, 385)
Gusmão had now surrounded himself with trusted long-time political friends and al-
lies and rmly integrated erstwhile moderate rivals (UDT) into his organizational frame-
work. Potential challengers to the left had either died in the rst years of the resistance,
killed in action later, or pushed to surrender to Indonesia. His position within the or-
ganization was so comfortable that he was able to give younger civilian leaders within
the Clandestine Front or old allies such as Ramos-Horta considerable freedom to act rela-
tively autonomously, reserving only veto right for their actions. This is in stark contrast
to Fretilin in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Falintil was given little to no strategic or
even tactical leeway to adjust their strategies to changing circumstances on the ground.
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The strategic shift towards nonviolent action
In November 1988, Suharto visited Timor for the rst time and determined that the coun-
try would be opened to foreign visitors in a limited fashion on the strong urging of Mario
Carrascalão. It was then that he announced the visit from Pope John Paul II, planned
for October 1989, clearly hoping that the visit of the Pope would confer legitimacy onto
Indonesia’s annexation, if not lead to outright recognition of Indonesia’s claims by the
Vatican. Pinto, then part of Orgão Oito’s leadership, recalls his cell’s reactions to the an-
nounced visit: “Although we were worried that the Pope’s visit might constitute a form
of recognition of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor, we immediately began thinking
of how we might take advantage of the Pope’s visit. We saw the Pope’s visit as one of the
most important opportunities in the history of our struggle to inuence international pub-
lic opinion” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 107). This is the rst moment I could identify when
the idea of nonviolent strategy was explicitly considered as a possibility; clearly, the an-
nouncement of the Pope’s visit quickly triggered considerations about how it might be
exploited strategically. As phrased by Tchailoro: “ In Tacitolo, when the Pope visited East
Timor for the rst time, . . . they tried to use that momentum, to show that there is still a
big resistance against Indonesian occupation.”46
Via estafeta, Orgão Oito began conferring with Falintil leader David Alex; both sides
agreed that a demonstration would be the most eective way to embarrass Indonesia
internationally, as dozens of reporters from all over the world would attend the Pope’s
mass in Tacitolo, a walled open-air forum in Dili with only two entrances that could
be easily patrolled by ABRI. A demonstration seemed like a good, practical approach.
While “none of us [Timorese], since the time of the invasion, had ever participated in any
sort of demonstration, . . .we knew about the potential eectiveness of demonstrations
through what we learned from international shortwave radio and even Indonesian public
46Interview with Nuno Rodrigues Tchailoro, Dili, November 27, 2014
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television about struggles in places such as South Korea, Israeli-occupied Palestine, and
Europe” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 108). Once more, political mobilization and organizing
in Timor-Leste took on a quasi-experimental character.
This rst demonstration was not, as is often assumed, a spontaneous expression of
discontent, nor was it an initiative solely planned by Orgão Oito (also recall that Orgão
Oito, as the Clandestine Front’s leadership at the time, was formally a part of CNRM).
Rather, CNRM’s leadership approved of the plan in its very early stages. Through David
Alex, who was in the company of Xanana Gusmão, Orgão Oito was able to communicate
with Xanana Gusmão about the planned demonstration; according to Donaciano Gomes,
Pinto’s close friend and also in the leadership of O.O., Gusmão “through a clandestine
message . . . approve[d] our plan to carry out a demonstration after the high mass was
celebrated by the Pope at Taci-Tolu [sic] on 12 October” (Gomes 1995, 107). This meant
that planning commenced almost immediately upon hearing of the Pope’s planned visit,
as communication via estafetas was slow and cumbersome. Importantly, we can see here
that the impetus for innovation came from the one of CNRM’s organizational arms (the
Clandestine Front) rather than directly from Gusmão, which provides valuable insights
into the nature of innovation within the Timorese Resistance under Gusmão. It appears
that Gusmão’s position within the organization was established enough that strategic
adjustments could be proposed by younger leaders, as long as he was apprised of plans.
The plan for the Papal visit demonstration was for Constancio Pinto to be in charge
of communication with other cells, while José Manuel, Donaciano, Francisco Lelan, and
a few others would lead the protest.47 Of their discussions of the meticulous planning
required for the day of this rst demonstration, Pinto recalls that both Orgão Oito and
their correspondents in the mountains were “concerned . . . that it would be dicult to
hold a demonstration because people were not yet brave enough to speak out publicly
47Presumably because Pinto was at this point embedded in so many dierent cells and had so many
contacts, he was both too valuable to potentially lose and also had too much information that could be
given up under torture.
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against the occupation and the repression” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 107). While they
were able to mobilize members of the Clandestine Front cells independently, they could
not reach everyone who would be at the demonstration, and whether people were willing
to put themselves at risk was a big question mark in the planning process.
The details of the event were left entirely in the hands of Orgão Oito, as communi-
cation via David Alex became impossible about three months prior to the Pope’s visit.
ABRI tightened security measures and engaged Falintil in the periphery as “the military
tried to push the guerrillas far away from the villages and towns to keep them busy in
the jungle,” likely to subdue the resistance as much as possible prior to the Pope’s visit
and avoid Falintil presence in Dili on the day of (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 108). Thus, on
the days leading up to the mass, Dili was congested with soldiers (and the whole area of
Tacitolo was blocked o), military vehicles, and even tanks. This shows the sheer level
of unpreparedness on the part of ABRI for nonviolent protest, against which tanks would
have little eect.
The plan for the mass was to have the 400 Catholic Scouts, who had been formally
invited to attend the mass, smuggle banners into Tacitolo, which they managed to do this
despite being searched for weapons. Banners at this rst nonviolent event were adorned
with a wide variety of slogans raning from “Welcome John Paul II” over “Long Live East
Timor” and “Free East Timor” to “Indonesia Get Out,” whereas the message in subsequent
demonstrations was more nely tuned and focused on demands for a UN-administered
referendum. The Scouts stood at the front of the room close to the Pope; they waited
until he had given his nal blessing, and then a signicant portion of them ripped o
their uniforms, unfurled their banners, and began shouting pro-independence slogans.
Chaos ensued; according to Pinto, who was among the Scout leaders but was not partici-
pating in the protest as per agreement, describes how some people in the church chimed
in with the Scouts: “People in the choir who were singing Cristus V[i]ncit continued to
sing, but some of them simultaneously shouted out slogans. Other people in the crowd
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started shouting out slogans as well . . . The Indonesian military immediately grabbed the
Pope and took him away. . . .The intelligence agents couldn’t tell which people had been
demonstrating. How could you stop hundreds of people running in the same direction?”
(Pinto and Jardine 1997, 110)
The demonstration had been a mixed success. The demonstration did not lead to im-
mediate, widespread popular participation in the demonstration. Orgão Oito planners
had “thought that when we [they] took this action, everybody would participate in the
demonstration. But when it happened, only a few hundred people, just a small group in
the center of the crowd, largely individuals from the Catholic scouts and from various
underground organizations, took part. The people in the periphery, for the most part,
were afraid and ran away” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 111). Yet, Pinto describes that the rst
demonstration led to a surge in civilians wanting to join the Clandestine Front, and “the
demonstration greatly excited the people in East Timor” (111). Following the demonstra-
tion, while there were reprisals, arrests, and torture following the demonstration, only a
handful of instigators was caught, as many of the leaders had sought refuge in Bishop
Carlos Ximenes’ residence, though eventually both Donaciano Gomes and José Manuel
were arrested. Furthermore, the rst demonstration also indicated the international ef-
fect of nonviolent action, as almost all of the international media coverage of the Pope’s
visit prominently featured the demonstrators, and many published photos of ABRI troops
beating civilians with metal chairs (Robinson 2011, 81).
Xanana Gusmão was impressed with the eects of the demonstration and formally
endorsed plans for further direct, nonviolent action aimed at an international audience
(Robinson 2011, 82). With Falintil and the CNRM leadership on board, David Alex reached
out to Pinto and O.O.’s leadership for an in-person meeting outside of Baucau, which was
risky and thus had never happened before. That the rst demonstration was considered
promising enough to warrant in-person contact is another clear indication for the resis-
tance leadership’s enthusiasm about nonviolent action as a strategy with great potential.
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The meeting between Orgão Oito representatives and David Alex was focused on plan-
ning on a second, improved demonstration on the occasion of a planned visit to Timor by
John Monjo, US Ambassador to Indonesia, which was to take place at the Hotel Turismo
in Dili. They also “discussed the tactics and strategy of the underground, the mechanisms
of the organization, and how to maintain and improve our communications with Falintil
and abroad” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 114).
Back in Dili, based on notes received through David Alex, Orgão Oito reached out
to groups not yet formally within their network to invite them to participate in the Tur-
ismo demonstration. While the number of demonstrators eventually present at the Tur-
ismo was similar to the group at Tacitolo, the demonstrators’ organizational make-up
was more diverse, and their demands were now precisely in line with those of CNRM as
evidenced by the list of demands presented to Monjo by the demonstrators. The demon-
strators demanded for the US to support negotiations with Indonesia, the withdrawal of
the Indonesian military from the island, and the holding of a referendum on Timorese
independence in accordance with UN decolonization guidelines Pinto and Jardine (1997,
116). This shows the nature of the relationship between the Clandestine Front nonviolent
activist leaders and CNRM’s leadership; the former immediately implemented changes to
their approach as desired by the overall resistance leadership.
After the Turismo demonstration, demonstration events in Timor quickly multiplied.
Through a contact at the governor’s oce (with Carrascalão no longer in oce), the Clan-
destine Front was appraised of planned visitors from abroad well ahead of time (foreign
visits had to be scheduled well in advance so that ABRI could prepare). In my inter-
views, several nonviolent organizers described the process of planning such an event in
an identical fashion: The most common method of informing the leadership or alerting
dierent clandestine cells of planned demonstration events was either through the dis-
semination of photocopied messages that detailed the plan for the day or through tapes.
While many Clandestine Front cells had access to photocopiers through members who
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worked undercover in the administration, these would often be under close observation
by the Indonesian intelligence. Therefore, it was more common for plans to be recorded
on tapes, which would then be duplicated and passed on by cells that were in possession
of contraband tape recorders. While there were some instances where the message about
intended demonstrations did not reach the resistance leadership in time for approval, this
was the norm; it was a clear expectation that demonstrations remain nonviolent, and that
demands not deviate from CNRM’s. Overall, this planning process, due to the slowness
of the estafeta-based communication system, never took less than three months.48
By the time of the rst nonviolent protest in 1989, the Timorese resistance had read-
ied itself organizationally and structurally for the eective use of its strategybon three
dierent fronts: Through the buildup of the Clandestine Front within Timor, through the
placement of Timorese students in Indonesia, and through an international network of
its own diplomats and sympathetic international community members. The Diplomatic
Front had become skilled at instrumentalizing the foreign press. In 1990, the Diplomatic
Front, the Clandestine Front, and Falintil collaborated in smuggling a foreign journal-
ist, Robert Domm, into the jungle to meet directly with Xanana Gusmão; the interview
would cause international uproar. This interview really proves the eective functioning
of CNRM’s carefully constructed coordination mechanisms, as it took several hundred
resistance members to get Domm from Dili to Gusmão’s base in the mountains (Kolo
2015).
Expansion of nonviolent arm in Indonesia through Renetil
In the mid-1980s, Mario Carrascalão convinced Suharto to grant Timorese students the
right to secondary education in Indonesia. He argued that this would keep young Timo-
rese away from riotous activities, prevent their recruitment by the resistance, and would
cultivate an Indonesian-indoctrinated future Timorese elite. In 1986, Jakarta initiated a
48interview with Alex Tilman, November 25, 2014; interview with Ozorio, Dili, December 15, 2014;
interview with Carlito, December 19, 2014; interview with José Pereira, Dili, July 22, 2015.
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program of competitive scholarships for Timorese students. The Timorese students in
Bali and Java quickly realized the disparities in development and freedoms between Timor
and Indonesia, and this realization coincided with their study of political philosophy and
theories of nationalism. Further, the arrival of the Timorese students in Indonesia al-
most perfectly coincided with the emergence of an Indonesian student-led pro-democracy
movement, which was building a network of student organizations across the country and
linking up to NGOs. The Timorese students and the Indonesian students began exchang-
ing ideas and slowly linking up their aims and purpose (Robinson 2011, 80).
In an interview by Weldemichael, one of the former students, Saky, draws a parallel
between the Timorese resistence and the growth of Indonesian nationalism through edu-
cation in the Netherlands: “Young Indonesians who studied in Indonesia and in Holland
started challenging Dutch colonialism and so we put our heads together to see what we
can benet from our studying in Indonesia so that we can advance our cause for indepen-
dence and we found a lot” (quoted in Weldemichael (2008, 417)). Similarly, in his reec-
tions from 1995, Donaciano Gomes draws a direct line between the Timorese resistance
and the Indonesian anti-colonial struggle fty years earlier: “The Indonesian military and
the people of Indonesia should both remember their own arduous struggle against Dutch
colonialism in the late 1940s. They should remember that we . . . have the same rights as
they do” (Gomes 1995, 108). Rather than furthering Timorese integration, the scholarship
program provided both new information and new allies to the Timorese resistance.
In 1988, about two years after the initiation of the scholarship program, ten Timo-
rese students founded the ResistŘncia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste (National
Resistance of East Timorese Students or Renetil). Renetil was established by students;
as put by one of its founding members, Fernando de Araújo (“Lasama”), the idea of a
student organization came from the students themselves rather than from the older gen-
eration of leaders: “We considered Xanana Gusmão our leader, but Renetil was our idea.
He later gave his approval” (as told by de Araújo to Robinson (2011, 81)). The organiza-
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tion pledged allegiance to Xanana Gusmao, even before being formally incorporated into
CNRM’s structure in 1990. Allegiance to Gusmão Gusmão was absolute; as explained by
former Renetil activist Lucas da Costa Lopes in a conversation with Stephan: “We were
called Xananists because we swore an oath of loyalty to Gusmão and the CNRM and fol-
lowed [his] orders without disobeying” (quoted in Stephan (2005, 71)).
While the overarching aims of Renetil were identical to CNRM’s, they set themselves
intermediary goals that could help CNRM’s mission overall:
1. Insulate Timorese students in Indonesia and prevent them from being absorbed into
the Indonesian integrationist scheme;
2. Expose (to Indonesia and the international community) the crimes perpetrated by
ABRI and the Indonesian government;
3. Prepare a corps of educated East Timorese for peacetime national reconstruction.
The third point in particular was seen as very important. After observing the stark dis-
parities in development between Timor and Indonesia, the students realized that Timor
was not in fact ready for self-government, as both the requisite infrastructure and requi-
site governing skills were lacking. Timorese students were encouraged to choose subjects
with practical value, such as economics, engineering, agriculture, or law.49
Renetil was able to grow relatively quickly and safely thanks to Carrascalão‘s foresight
in establishing an ocial East Timorese Student Organization (Ikatan Mahasiswa dan Pla-
jar Timor Timur or IMPETTU) that was approved by Suharto himself. The underlying
rationale was to foster forging a Timorese identity within the Indonesian framework and
to control their activities. Edmundo Viegas, who was the leader of IMPETTU Yogyakarta
and is now a dean at the Timorese National University, explained that the Indonesian ra-
tionale for IMPETTU was to grow a Timorese identity within Indonesia among students
who were cut o from their homeland; it was supposed to help Timorese students realize
49Interview with Edmundo Viegas, Dili, December 12, 2014
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that “Timorese” and “Indonesian” were not incompatible identities. According to Vie-
gas, IMPETTU was instrumental in establishing connections between Timorese students
studying in dierent universities (most students were either in Denpasar (Bali), Jakarta,
or Yogyakarta).50
After the foundation of Renetil, IMPETTU continued to play key roles. As an IM-
PETTU chapter leader, Viegas would organize travel for Timorese students to other cities
under the guise of athletic or religious events; these events were a pretense for Renetil
coordination meetings or even allowed students to legally travel to protest locations.51
IMPETTU would continue to oer the pro-independence students a convenient camou-
age for the activities of Renetil; all of IMPETTU’s leaders were also Renetil members.
The legal mantle of IMPETTU allowed for ocial contact between the Timorese pro-
independence students and Indonesian pro-democracy student groups, which built the
base for the later alliance between the two movements. When Indonesia started to crack
down on IMPETTU, a legally sanctioned Indonesian organization, Renetil members used
the open forum of courtrooms to eloquently plead for the Timorese case using perfectly
crafted legal arguments.(Weldemichael 2008, 423)
The foundation of Renetil immediately extended CNRM’s tentacles into Indonesia as
newly minted students could legally move between Bali, Jakarta, and Dili. In his rst letter
to Renetil in December 1988, Gusmão advised Renetil’s founders to remain autonomously
aliated with CNRM rather than attaching themselves to Fretilin, and to accept all Timo-
rese students into their ranks regardless of their political background. Communication be-
tween the leadership of Renetil (Lasama became Secretary) and CNRM was done through
letters delivered by estafetas once they reached Timor. (Weldemichael 2008, 418) Just as
the adoption of nonviolent action in mainland Timor originated from Orgão Oito rather
than CNRM’s highest echelons, the foundation of a student organization and network in
50Interview with Edmundo Viegas, Dili, December 12, 2014
51Interview with Edmundo Viegas, Dili, December 12, 2014
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Indonesia proceeded from the bottom up. Thus, the founding story of Renetil provides
strong indication for the strength of Gusmão’s position in CNRM; as long as the new or-
ganization t CNRM’s aims and goals, he appeared not to have felt threatened by strategic
change and growth of the organization.
Just as nonviolent demonstrations organized by the Clandestine Front aimed to reach a
wider global audience to witness its struggle and increase pressure on Indonesia, Renetil’s
focus was on publicizing Timor’s plight internationally. This was considerably easier
to do in Indonesia than in Timor, as there was a considerable presence of international
press outlets, foreign representatives, and sympathetic organizations. Thus, the types
of activist events organized by Renetil in Indonesia was broader than those organized
in Timor, and entirely focused on internationalization and the exchange of information:
Demonstrations, sit-ins, groups of students symbolically seeking asylum in carefully se-
lected foreign embassies, and publicized legal defenses in courtrooms following arrests.
In addition, Renetil played a key role in gathering information and sharing it with the
rest of the resistance. Georey Robinson, who was working for Amnesty International in
Jakarta at the time and had many Timorese contacts himself, describes Renetil’s crucial
role in providing information: “From his small student room in Denpasar, Bali, . . . Lasama
sent carefully drafted messages about recent human rights and political developments
inside East Timor to a wide range of international contacts, including Amnesty Interna-
tional and the ICRC. And when new information arrived from abroad, he would send
it by Renetil courier back to East Timor for further distribution within the resistance.”52
(Robinson 2011, 81)
With internationally aimed activism events by both Renetil and the Clandestine Front,
the internationalization of the resistance strategy became inevitable and is mirrored in
the content of Gusmão’s missives to Renetil, the Diplomatic Front, and the Clandestine
52With students visiting their families in East Timor, it was relatively easy for Renetil to move informa-
tion in and out of Timor.
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Front. Virgilio Guterres, then a student in Indonesia, describes the tapes they received
from prison during this period: Gusmão now dened war as “the art of living side-by-side
with the enemy,” implying that Gusmão no longer believed that the Timorese resistance
struggle would be won on the battle eld. The Timorese students in Indonesia, now well-
versed in philosophy, economics, history, and political science, then “tried to apply Gus-
mao’s messages to our own context” (Guterres quoted by Stephan (2005, 75)). In this vein,
Sarmento Alves, another Renetil member, expands: “We began to study Bahasa Indonesia
along with the Indonesian constitution and state ideology, known as the Pancasila. We
emphasized learning Bahasa in the same way the the Indonesians learned Dutch in the
Netherlands as part of their anti-colonial struggle.” (Both quoted by Stephan (2005, 75-76))
Many Renetil members were now actively joining Indonesian pro-democracy groups and
actively forging personal connections with Indonesian students.
In 1989, Renetil debuted a new type of nonviolent event when they coordinated large
groups of students to simultaneously seek asylum at three embassies with close ties to In-
donesia and signicant international clout — Austria, the Vatican, and Japan — providing
them with detailed accounts of Indonesian human rights abuses in Timor. Although they
were ejected from the embassies at the behest of the Indonesian government, the stunt
caught the attention of Indonesian pro-democracy organizations. Weldemichael (2008)
has unearthed a note from 1991, in which a Renetil leader passes on information received
directly from CNRM through a brainstorming session he attended during a visit home,
during which CNRM, Renetil, and Clandestine Front leaders coordinated events for the
upcoming visit of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation to Timor in 1991. The note
emphasizes the crucial importance of secrecy regarding the plans for the Portuguese Par-
liamentary Delegation visit, and urges Renetil to mobilize its members and network of
strategically placed friends to maximize coverage of events surrounding the Portuguese
visit. This shows how a Renetil-originated idea for new resistance activism was taken
up by the leadership and made more eective by coordination between all arms. By this
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time, Renetil had curated personal and institutionalized connections with human rights
advocates in Indonesia, journalists, and ocials at foreign embassies, to whom they were
funneling information about unfolding events and the human rights situation on the half
island. The embassy publicity stunts helped training the international spotlight on Timor-
Leste, so that coverage of the subsequent Santa Cruz Massacre (see below) internationally
was maximized, as the cause was now already widely known.
After the successful coordination of activism between dierent organizational arms
of CNRM on the occasion of the Portuguese visit, this same focusing strategy was repli-
cated whenever there was an event (such as a foreign visit to Timor or an international
event that t into the resistance’s narrative), and the methods of courting international
attention became more sophisticated. On the occasion of the UN Human Rights Summit
in Vienna in June 1993, Renetil organized another wave of asylum seeking event, this
time at the Swedish and Finish embassies in Jakarta. In step with the mass asylum appli-
cations, Renetil released a letter to their advocacy contacts in Indonesia. The letter and
asylum events drew wide and sustained attention in Europe, especially as Renetil had co-
ordinated with Amnesty International in Jakarta to release an ocial press release within
24 hours. The amnesty event at the Swedish and Finnish embassies was planned in direct
collaboration with Xanana Gusmão, who had been using his status as a political prisoner
in Jakarta to communicate with the world more directly, thereby now fully committing
to the international strategy (Robinson 2011, 89). Gusmão communicated from prison
through a young Australian activist, Kirsty Sword, who had gained unparalleled access
due to her gender and white skin; with international attention trained on Gusmão and the
Timorese resistance, Indonesia could not simply let the independence leader “disappear”.
On the event of the 1993 asylum activism, Gusmão made a personal appeal from prison
that was released at the same time as personal background proles on the asylum seekers,
previously planted with international news outlets, and both designed to personalize the
Timorese struggle and increase international sympathy by allowing people to put faces
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and names with the Timorese cause (Robinson 2011, 90).
Like the Clandestine Front, Renetil was given considerable autonomy in planning and
carrying out its events and even sometimes initiated innovative new forms of activism.
Carlito, a former Renetil activist, explained that strategic guidelines were provided di-
rectly by Xanana Gusmão, but the execution was left up to the student groups.53 Yet,
as with the Clandestine Front, every single planned event was communicated to CNRM
in advance and approved, usually sent through a student who was visiting home (each
student was able to visit home once a year), in a process that could take months.54 If or-
ganizers failed to do so, they were often severely reprimanded by Gusmão (Weldemichael
2008, 418). When the Clandestine Front organized a demonstration at the occasion of
a visit of Timor by the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Renetil planned a parallel
demonstration in Jakarta, but their letter did not reach Gusmão in time. Gusmão furi-
ously wrote to the Renetil leadership: “If the resistance’s chain of command cannot be
strictly respected in its current state, then the command may as well be transferred to
Renetil HQ.” (Letter quoted in Weldemichael (2008, 419)).
This indicates that it was crucial to maintaining a functioning, resilient organization
under Xanana Gusmão’s leadership that Gusmão was able to trust that he was receiving
all of the relevant information. Thus, for the maintenance of order and unity, it was not
enough for there to be a tightly spun network to mobilize dierent arms of the resistance,
but that information could travel back towards the top of the organization. The demon-
stration of control over this sprawling movement was key to Gusmão according to an
anecdote by Colonel Monana, a senior Falintil commander who was taken prisoner in the
late 1980s and spent most of the 1990s in prison in Jakarta and was a close associate of
Gusmão’s. When a homemade bomb detonated at one of the student-let protest marches
in Jakarta (clearly in the face of directives to stay nonviolent at all costs at such events),
53Interview with Carlito (resistance name) in Dili, December 10, 2014
54Interview with Carlito in Dili, December 10, 2014 (similar process conrmed in several other inter-
views)
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Gusmão immediately released a statement claiming responsibility for the act of violence,
thus maintaining the external semblance of complete control even if it made him appear
less principled.55 While there was never an ocial doctrine on the use of nonviolence,
there was a clear directive to keep violent resistance and popular resistance separated.
A summary of CNRM’s basic organizational structure is provided in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: CNRM’s Structure in 1990
Santa Cruz and the subsequent nonviolent march to victory
In October 1991, a planned visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation, which had
brought signicant hope that Portugal might pressure Indonesia to allow for a formal de-
colonization process and referendum, was cancelled on Indonesia’s urging. A large-scale
protest march had already been planned through the Clandestine Front Central Com-
mittee, and turned into a medium-scale protest march denouncing the cancellation of
the visit (there were already foreign journalists in Dili who had planned on reporting
on the delegation visit); during this protest, ABRI forces killed a young protestor named
55Interview with Colonel Monana (Monana is a resistance moniker) in Dili, December 6, 2014
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SebastiŃo Gomes (Pinto and Jardine 1997). On 12 November, the Clandestine Front orga-
nized a peaceful march from Motael Church in Dili (where a memorial service had been
held for Gomes) to the site of his grave in Santa Cruz cemetery, about 15 minutes on foot;
many mourners from the service joined in the march, swelling it to about 200 participants
(Robinson 2011, 66). Marchers chanted pro-referendum slogans and waved Fretilin ags.56
When most of the marchers were inside the cemetery walls, trucks carrying Indonesian
soldiers armed with US-supplied MI-16s suddenly appeared. The soldiers got out of the
truck and started indiscriminately ring on the trapped crowd, even pursuing those who
ed. Estimates hold that around 300 Timorese civilians were killed at Santa Cruz. While
this is not the most deadly Timorese massacre, it is the only one that was witnessed and
documented by foreign journalists; Amy Goodman, Allan Nairn, and Max Stahl survived
the massacre and Stahl managed to bury and later retrieve lm footage.
Cristalis (2002, 49) sums up the eect of Santa Cruz:
It was not the rst or worst massacre in East Timor, nor would it be the last,
but [this] time the Indonesians could not totally deny what had happened,
the world could not close its eyes, and the politicians could not avert their
gaze from a simple truth: Indonesian soldiers had opened re, without any
warning, on a group of unarmed youngsters in school uniforms.
Many echo the pivotal role of Santa Cruz in the Timorese resistance. According to
Robinson, observing unfolding events at the time from Indonesia, “without question the
critical turning point in East Timor’s path to independence was the massacre at the Santa
Cruz cemetery in Dili, on November 12, 1991, in which as many as 270 young people
were killed by Indonesian troops” Robinson (2011, 66). When asked Octavianus Mote, the
coordinator of the West Papuan independence movement abroad, about the most impor-
tant factor that allowed the Timorese independence campaign to succeed, he answered
“Portugal and Santa Cruz, but mostly Santa Cruz. That was the most important factor.”57
56Even after the establishment of CNRM, the Fretilin ag was used to signal allegiance to the resistance,
not Fretilin in particular — the ag is now Timor’s national ag
57Interview with Octavianus Mote in Bern, Switzerland, 11 November 2014
167
Similarly, Mohamed Badi Slama, at the time West Sahara’s ambassador to Timor-Leste,
said it was dicult to overstate the importance of Santa Cruz.58 While this indicates that
the pure chance of a massacre being lmed changed the trajectory of the independence
movement, this is misleading. Santa Cruz was a focusing event, but its eect is in large
part due to the three years of organized nonviolent action and the establishment of strong
relationships with foreign media outlets and organizations.
The brutality of the Santa Cruz massacre also represents a key test of the resistance’s
commitment to nonviolent action and their ability to rein in riotous anti-Indonesian sen-
timents. In an interview from 2000, Pinto explains how it was most dicult after Santa
Cruz to maintain the peaceful character of the resistance movement: “The underground
movement was unarmed. We could have obtained weapons — we had some people in
the Indonesian armed forces, we had access to Falintil, and we could buy weapons from
Indonesia. But we thought it would be a mistake. For example, after the Santa Cruz mas-
sacre people were very angry about the massacre and wanted to revolt in response, but
we thought it would be a big mistake. If we did that they would just go from house to
house and wipe out everyone. We knew how the enemy behaved towards the population
. . . ” (quoted in Tanter, Selden and Shalom (2001, 36)).
When images of the Santa Cruz massacre were sent around the world, Indonesia was
forced to publicly address the charges and even take some actions. Indonesia justied the
harsh response (though claiming that only 19 “rioters” had been killed) in the following
way, taken from the ocial statement by the regional military commander of the time,
Major General Mantiri:
We don’t regret anything. What happened was quite proper . . .They were op-
posing us, demonstrating, even yelling things against the government. To me
that is identical with rebellion, so that is why we took rm action . . . [T]heir
theme was opposing the government. Long Live Fretilin. Long Live Xanana,
waving Fretilin ags. If they try that now, I will not tolerate it. I will order
58Interview with Mohamed Badi Slama in Dili, December 13, 2014
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strong action . . . I don’t think there’s anything strange in that. (Quoted in
Robinson (2011, 67))
However, testimonies such as this actually demonstrate the eect of Santa Cruz: because
of the irrefutable evidence of brutality against unarmed civilians, recorded and dissemi-
nated by foreign journalists, several governments actually suspended development assis-
tance to Indonesia contingent upon action against the perpetrators of Santa Cruz. Public
hearings were held, and two senior Indonesian army ocers were relieved of their posts
in Timor (Robinson 2011, 83).
Though the main focus of this chapter is the initial adoption of nonviolent action as a
strategy, I will briey outline the trajectory of the last few years of resistance. Santa Cruz
was a watershed moment for the resistance and there was a clear shift in focus and strat-
egy that prioritized nonviolent activism and diplomatic eorts. According to Pinto, after
the collapse of the armed struggle in 1979, the underground movement steadily gained
importance in relation to Falintil between 1981 and 1999, but 1991 marked the moment
where the coordination between the Clandestine Front, Renetil, and the Diplomatic Front
became the focus of the resistance (Gusmão’s imprisonment in Indonesia also contributed
to this balance shift). He explains: “ From 1991 to 1999, the activities of the underground
and the diplomatic front were complementary. The underground continued its peace-
ful activities and at the same time the diplomatic front made great advances, helping to
build support for the struggle worldwide” (quoted in Tanter, Selden and Shalom (2001,
36)). Importantly, though no military match for Indonesia, Falintil remained ghting in
the mountains as per CNRM’s ocial policy, as “their presence in the mountains forced
the international community to recognize that the resistance would not be extinguished
for many years and that the situation could only be resolved by negotiation, which meant
coming to terms with Falintil” (Pinto quoted by Tanter, Selden and Shalom (2001, 36)).
CNRM re-emphasized non-partisan unity identity. Both within Timor and in exile,
CNRM publicly reached out to Apodeti and UDT members who were not yet ocially
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a part of the organization to demonstrate the unity character of the movement. Santa
Cruz also had a catalyzing eect on the unity front within the Timorese resistance. Even
Mauk Muruk, who had once surrendered to the Indonesians because he could not agree
to Gusmão’s pro-unity approach, wrote from exile in favor of a nationalist, pro-unity
approach: “We members of the East Timorese resistance are not murderers as some people
have tried to depict us, but simply nationalist soldiers dedicated to the defence [sic] of our
country in the face of Indonesian invasion, occupation, and genocide. We are dedicated
to upholding the fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
(Gama 1995, 99).
The aftermath of Santa Cruz increasingly saw the resistance cloaking its resistance in
the language of human rights and using legal channels as often as possible. As summed up
by Robinson: “By casting its demands in the language of human rights, the East Timorese
resistance and its allies succeeded in reaching a far broader international audience than
it had done when the movement was seen as being engaged primarily in armed struggle”
(82). Strategically placed protest marches multiplied both in Indonesia and Timor-Leste;
Nuno Rodrigues Tchailoro, who now heads the Memorial Museum in Dili, has accounted
for over 500 individual nonviolent protest events in his preliminary archival research
project.59 In parallel, a network of solidarity organizations such as the American East
Timorese Action Network sprung up internationally and began organizing protests glob-
ally.
The Diplomatic Front, together with Renetil, embarked on a strategy of “Indonesian-
ization.” Beginning with the student groups formed in the late 1980s, there was now an
increasing number of Indonesian pro-democracy advocacy organizations. NGOs such as
Lemgaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute), Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat
(Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy), or Fortilos (Forum Solidaritas Untuk Rakyat
Timor Timur, Solidarity Forum for the People of East Timor) took up the Timorese cause
59Interview with Nuno Rodrigues Tchailoro, Dili, November 26, 2014
170
and linked it up with their own overarching goal of a democratic Indonesia. It is hard to
overstate the eect of Santa Cruz on Indonesian solidarity; as put by Clandestine Front
member Domingos Sarmento Alves, after the massacre, “we came to the understanding
that the East Timorese and Indonesians had the same enemy, which was the TNI (Indone-
sian military) . . . and the Suharto dictatorship. We needed to bring Indonesians into our
struggle because it was their struggle, too” (quoted by Stephan (2005, 75)).
Because the UN had never acknowledged Indonesian sovereignty and Portugal had
never formally conferred power onto either Indonesia’s or Timor-Leste’s provisional gov-
ernments, Timor remained on the agenda of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization,
which continued to hold regular hearings that provided a forum for critics of Indone-
sia’s Timorese policies, as did the UN Commission on Human Rights, whose resolutions
and human rights investigations put signicant diplomatic pressure on Indonesia. While
Timor was removed from the General Assembly’s agenda, the secretary-general kept his
promise to work towards a solution and organized a succession of tripartite meetings with
Indonesia and Portugal that served to keep the Timorese question in the spotlight (several
of these meetings were timed with nonviolent events).
Finally, the Catholic Church played a crucial role, providing a moral center to the re-
sistance (both Monsignor Martinho Costa da Lopes and Bishop Belo, heads of the Catholic
Church in Timor, played important roles as interlocutors and in providing save haven).
The Catholic Church’s importance to the Timorese is exemplied in the 90% of Timorese
that chose Catholicism when forced to choose one of the state’s ve recognized religions
in the 1980s (Robinson 2011, 86). One thing that made the Church particularly trustwor-
thy was that it was administered directly by the Vatican rather than by the Indonesian
Church, giving it a signicant measure of autonomy and thus legitimacy. The sense of
solidarity was strengthened by the decade-long sequestration of the island which also
aected the Church and had brought clergy and population very close together. Bishop
Belo wrote in an open letter to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar:
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The people of East Timor must be allowed to express their views on their
future through a plebiscite. Hitherto the people have not been consulted.
Others speak in the name of the people. Indonesia says that the people of
East Timor have already chosen integration, but the people of East Timor
themselves have never said this. Portugal wants time to solve the problem.
And we continue to die as a people and as a nation. (quoted in Robinson (2011,
86)
The work of Belo and Ramos-Horta was rewarded with the awarding of the 1996 Nobel
Peace Prize, also starkly showing the success of the international strategy.
After the 1998 democratic uprising in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led to
the resignation of Suharto, there was tremendous international pressure on newly elected
Indonesian President Habibie to deal with the East Timor issue. Habibie rst oered an
autonomy deal, but this provoked a student demonstration 30,000 strong on the occasion
of a visit by EU ambassadors to Dili on 28 June (Stephan 2005). The ousting of Suharto
was seen as a Timorese victory; Habibie and the democratic movement in Indonesia had
been seen as allies, and the threshold for participating in a demonstration against the new
regime would have been much lower, as it was not associated with the atrocities of the
civil war. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia, Portugal and the UN signed a tripartite agreement to
hold a UN-supervised “popular consultation” on East Timor’s nal status. ABRI launched
a nal intimidation campaign in the run-up to the referendum, killing 3000-5000 inde-
pendence supporters according to local Church estimates; in response, Gusmão called on
the population to “behave with discipline and civility” (Stephan 2005, 93). Timor-Leste
became the 191st member of the United Nations on September 27, 2002.
Evaluation and conclusion
Returning to the ve questions posed at the beginning of the chapter, what overall insights
can we gain from Fretilin/CNRM’s use of nonviolent action? I provide brief summary
answers to each of the ve questions posed at the beginning of the chapter.
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What historically entrenched social patterns and institutions had the potential to ex-
ante inuence the shape and direction of prewar and wartime political organizing?
In Timor-Leste, personal and family ties criss-crossed across the island. When Fretilin’s
founders conducted their rst rural outreach programs, they would often return rst to
villages where they had personal ties. Early party alliances also followed personal ties.
How did the prewar organization mobilize the population, and how did translate into
the wartime relationship between rebels and population? How inclusive (in terms of ge-
ography and social classes) was mobilization?
Before the war, Fretilin’s ideology as well as political incentives made the organization
prioritize rural mobilization even though the founders were all part of the young, intellec-
tual elite of Dili. This led to a geographically broad popular support pattern prior to the
war. Because of the very hands-o governance approach under the Portuguese, Fretilin
was able to gain governance experience prior to the conict, which further deepened their
popular support. Thus, when Indonesia invaded, both ideology and experience led to the
decision to establish bases de apoio in the mountains and administer governance. While
this had negative consequences in terms of military eectiveness and strategic trajectory,
it meant that when the population returned to Dili, most people had some personal con-
nection to the Falintil ghters who were still in the mountain, which must have facilitated
communication and coordination.
How were decisions made within the organizational leadership? Who had de-facto or
formal veto power?
Before the war, decision-making in Fretilin was very democratic. In the rst years of the
war, only political leaders were included in strategic decision-making, whereas Falintil
commanders were largely left out (as at the Soibada Conference). After Fretilin’s near-
annihilation, another political leader came to power in the person of Xanana Gusmão,
whose power and inuence in the organization grew over the next decade. When Orgão
Oito proposed a nonviolent demonstration in 1989, Gusmão was consulted in the planning
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process, a pattern that was maintained throughout the nonviolent campaign lasting over
the next ten years.
What circumstances or event triggered the rst instance of nonviolent action, and
how was the rebel group involved?
The rst foreign visitor to Timor-Leste — Pope John Paul II — occasioned the rst non-
violent demonstration in 1989. In order to coordinate the planned event, Orgão Oito and
Gusmão coordinated and communicated via Clandestine Front supply and information
networks that connected Dili with the mobile command in the mountains.
Which organizational mechanisms were utilized or repurposed in planning individual
events, and how did nonviolent action t into the organization’s strategy?
As nonviolent events expanded to Indonesia via Renetil, the organizational focus shifted
towards appealing to the international community. While the violent struggle continued
nominally in Timor-Leste proper, it was not the focus of the struggle.
From these insights as well as connections made throughout the chapter, I inductively
build a organizational process theory proposing three necessary organizational features
necessary for rebel use of nonviolent action,
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5. Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action:
An Organizational Process Theory
“There exist at all times a multiplicity of forms of struggle that a movement exploits as part of
its arsenal of weapons. Any form of struggle, including the armed struggle, can only emerge
to dominance over time and as a result of consistent eort.”
– Walter Sisulu1
Mario Carrascalão said to me about the Santa Cruz demonstration and massacre:
“Without Santa Cruz, I believe this would be a forgotten war.”2 Likewise, José Ramos-
Horta was adamant that eective rebel diplomacy would not have been possible without
Santa Cruz, as it allowed for an international focus and momentum not otherwise pos-
sible.3 The lm footage of heavily armed Indonesian soldiers jumping out of tanks to
mercilessly chase and gun down hundreds of nonviolent civilian protesters in a cemetery
reverberated through the world. The thousands-strong demonstration at Santa Cruz and
its bloody ending not only demonstrates the potentially explosive eect of nonviolent
action in a civil war (bought dearly and tragically, in this case), but also epitomizes the
puzzle of CNRM’s ability to use nonviolent action. A near-extinct rebel group was able to
overcome the signicant organizational challenges of mobilizing civilians to participate
in large nonviolent events. The leadership was able to do this across long distances to
have demonstrations in Indonesian-occupied Dili in the face of a highly repressive occu-
pation regime, and they won independence in 2002 against all military odds. This was
1Walter Sisulu was a South African anti-apartheid activist and former Secretary General of the African
National Congress (ANC) (Sisulu 2001, 84)
2Interview with Mario Carrascalão in Dili, November 28, 2014
3Interview with José Ramos-Horta in Dili, July 15, 2015
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accomplished even though Timorese activists had at best 1.5 years of pre-war political
organizing experience. In the following, I analyze the organizational processes apparent
in the CNRM’s move towards nonviolent action to inductively build a theory of rebel use
of nonviolent action.
In tracing CNRM’s shift towards nonviolent action, three key (rebel) organizational
obstacles or hurdles become apparent. First, the opportunity and feasibility of mass non-
violent action must be recognized and realized; second, the urban population must be
mobilized; and third, this must be done while maintaining control over both movement
and organization. All of this was particularly challenging because it required coordination
across considerable geographic distance between a rebel leadership hiding in the remote,
impassable Timorese mountains and an urban population living under Indonesian occu-
pation.
The initial impetus for using nonviolent action came from Orgão Oito, a Clandes-
tine Front cell in Dili. Through Clandestine Front estafetas, commonly used to exchange
strategically important information and send supplies to Falintil, Orgão Oito made con-
tact with Xanana Gusmão in Falintil’s mobile command in the deep jungle. Donaciano
Gomes explains how they “wanted to try to meet the Commander-in-Chief of the resis-
tance, Xanana Gusmão, in order to plan a demonstration. But the Indonesian military
campaigns against the resistance were so widespread that it proved impossible to meet
him in person . . . [so that nally] through a clandestine message, . . . he approve[d] our
plan to carry out a demonstration after the high mass was celebrated by the Pope at Taci-
Tolu on 12 October [sic]” (Gomes 1995, 107). By repurposing Clandestine Front cells and
information networks, the urban population could slowly be mobilized to participate in
nonviolent events. Yet, Gusmão rmly retained control over the movement, as every sin-
gle planned nonviolent event was approved by him, and his leadership position was in
no way weakened by empowering new organizational arms and leaders to organize and
coordinate nonviolent action. As Renetil activist Lucas da Costa Lopes highlighted, in
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organizing large-scale nonviolent events in Indonesia, “we were [. . . ] Xananists because
we swore an oath of loyalty to Xanana and the CNRM and followed [his] orders without
disobeying” (quoted in Stephan (2005, 71)). The Timorese resistance’s shift towards utiliz-
ing nonviolence heavily relied on socially embedded organizational networks that could
be repurposed for organizing urban demonstrations without threatening the established
organizational hierarchy.
In a nutshell, my theory on rebel use of nonviolent action consists of three interrelated
parts. First, I explore the internal decision-making structures and dynamics that deter-
mine whether a rebel organization will recognize the need and opportunity for innovation
and whether it has the organizational capacity to carry it out. The key organizational fea-
ture for rebel organizations to recognize the need and opportunity for nonviolent action
(or other forms of signicant innovation) is a strong, centralized political leadership. Sim-
ilarly, strong civilian oversight is often seen as conducive to military innovation. Political
leaders in a rebel organization are likely to have greater exibility in their strategic think-
ing (and can think outside of the strictly military “box”), and their power position is less
likely tied to the continued use of a particular violent strategy. “Centralized political au-
thority” an “overall, dominant structure” (to borrow a term from the business literature),
which is “the structure that best describes the whole organization” (Fredrickson 1986,
281). To identify centralized political authority in a rebel organization, it is not enough to
look at the group structure on paper, but it is necessary to trace organizational processes
over time to determine which person or faction holds signicant sway.
Second, I explore the practical requirements for a rebel organization in a civil war
context to carry out mass-based nonviolent action. The key diculty is for a peripher-
ally based leadership to mobilize a geographically distant urban population into active
civil war participation, all while retaining control over both the organization and move-
ment. This requires the collaboration and coordination of many dierent actors in dif-
ferent locations. To pull this o, the rebel group needs to rely on so-called ”non-violent
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entrepreneurs” to organize nonviolent action in urban centers and coordinate with the
violent leadership, which represents a loss of control for the rebel leaders as well as po-
tential rivals.
As a strategy that derives its power from mass participation, nonviolent action re-
quires low nancial investment but signicant organizational changes and personal risks.4
What drives a war-weary, decimated population to actively support the armed resistance
at signicant personal risk? I argue that the mobilization of civilian masses for activist
conict participation requires strong institutionalized networks linking the rebel leader-
ship with the urban population.5. Because nonviolent action is a new contentious strat-
egy, these pre-existing communication links must be explored carefully, as their form and
function will be dierent when an organization pursues a violent strategy. The credible
organizational structures linking rebel leaders in the periphery to the population in urban
areas constitute the second necessary condition.
The third part of the theory focuses on how these two necessary conditions are in-
terrelated and mutually reinforce each other. A rebel organization with a consolidated
political authority is likely going to be willing and capable to “project” their reach into
urban areas. Rebel leaders can only risk empowering new actors if they are certain of their
own power position in the organization, thereby ensuring organizational unity. In turn,
strong, credible communication networks will give the far-away organizational leader-
ship condence in their control over the movement and further strengthen the organiza-
tion by demonstrating the depth of its popular support and its adherence to democratic
norms. The two organizational features also share an important trait in common: Both
are intrinsically connected to functional task dierentiation in an organization. Func-
tional task dierentiation is used as an analytical lens. Taken together, these necessary
processes and underlying mechanisms can be summarized in the following diagram:
4See Horowitz (2010) for an in-depth discussion of nancial and organizational barriers to innovation.
5This argument builds on the literature on the processes and relationships that sustain rebellion over
time (Petersen 2001; Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014)
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Figure 5.1: Summary of the organizational process theory
Organizational processes and complexity
The Timorese case starkly highlights how organizational structures and processes drive
the rebels’ shift towards nonviolent action. While many other features also played a role,
the structural features of Fretilin/CNRM set in motion processes, delimited strategic op-
tions determined outcomes, thus directly aecting the organization’s ability to use non-
violent action. 6 Structure is not only the rigid underlying blueprint of an organization,
but rather consists of a complex pattern of relationships, authority, and communication
6This conception of process is borrowed from the business literature: “In the broadest sense, [processes]
can be dened as collections of tasks and activities that together — and only together — transform inputs
into outputs” (Garvin 1998)
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(Thompson 2003). An organization engaged in clandestine, dangerous work that requires
the cooperation and coordination of many dierent actors cannot change how it operates
at will; rather, decision-making and operational processes are developed and ne-tuned
over years, if not decades. In illicit groups or organizations, it is both particularly impor-
tant and particularly tricky to explore internal relationships and patterns of authority, as
they are less likely formalized and less easily observed in action.
A focus on organizational processes is very similar to conceptions of institutions. In
state-centric conceptions of polities, “institutional structures have an impact as they fa-
cilitate or limit the actions of groups and individuals — which means that institutions are
never oered as a complete explanation of policy outcomes” (Ikenberry 1994, 2). Yet, if,
as put by Ikenberry (1994, 3) “polities have structures that mediate political struggle and
that limit the realm of the possible,” who or what represents the “polity” and “institutional
structures” in rebel organizations?
In a rebel group, it is dicult to dierentiate combatants and civilians. It is impossible
to dierentiate if we consider civilians as conict actors in their own right, which is neces-
sary if considering nonviolent action as a rebel strategy. By recognizing nonviolent direct
action as a rebel strategy in a civil war, I also directly acknowledge that “civilians” can
directly participate in contentious — albeit nonviolent — action, and thus should be con-
sidered conict actors in their own right. The population therefore needs to be considered
part of the formal and informal internal structure and processes of the rebel organization.
I build on a budding literature that recognizes and analyzes the social processes and rela-
tionships that underlie rebellion (Parkinson 2013; Petersen 2001; Staniland 2014), which
increasingly recognizes the diverse, active role of civilians in shaping conict dynamics
(see also Mampilly (2011) and Wood (2003)). Thus, if civilians can be considered conict
actors, the formal and informal relationships tying them to or into the organization must
be analyzed closely in order to understand the “structures that mediate political struggle”
in a civil war (Parkinson 2013, 419). This approach heeds Parkinson’s call to be highly
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cognizant of “the nuanced relationship between social structure, militant organizations,
and sustained rebellion” while analyzing conict processes and outcomes (ibid).
Given the many actors and groups that can be a part of a rebel group’s organizational
structure, it is clear that the use of nonviolent action does not follow a neatly linear pro-
cess. It is simply not possible to succinctly identify one structural variable that points
straight to a decision or outcome in any given organization that includes thousands of
actors and multiple actor categories simultaneously working through an organization’s
structures, thereby also continuously changing them. This interactive process builds on
social and political norms and institutions that most of the time exist in some shape or
form prior to the onset of the civil war. As Staniland (2014, 22-23) puts it: “While po-
litical meanings are not locked in place, they also cannot be easily transformed.” This is
especially important in the context of a civil war, where a high degree of external un-
certainty hampers (though in no way prevents) the construction of organizational ties
and social structures. My aim is to understand the structures and processes that incen-
tivize and constrain behavior of all of the relevant actors in a rebel organization and draw
meaningful conclusions about guiding organizational characteristics. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to study organizational processes and transformations over time rather than from
a momentary “snapshot” in the organization’s existence. Hence, to assess whether the
necessary organizational conditions for the use of nonviolent action are present in a rebel
organization, we must analyze the evolution of the rebel organization, including its po-
tential “civilian” component, over time, which has signicant implications for how such
a theory can be tested in the future.
All three parts of the theory indicate that a rebel organization that successfully initi-
ates and utilizes nonviolent action possesses a high degree of organizational complexity.
In discussing organizational structure, Hall (1982) suggests three sources of complexity:
horizontal (number of distinct functions and tasks carried out by the organization) and
vertical dierentiation (number of hierarchical levels) as well as spatial dispersion. As be-
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comes clear from the theory summary above, the use of nonviolent action requires that the
rebel group possess a high degree of complexity in all three of these categories without
sacricing the strength and reach of its leadership, as a high level of complexity natu-
rally makes it dicult to coordinate and control decision activities (Lawrence and Lorsch
1967). It is thus impossible to explain the rebel use of nonviolent action without taking
into account the complexity of both the requisite process and the requisite underlying
organization.
5.1 The necessity of centralized political authority in
rebel organizations
In order to use nonviolent action as a contentious strategy, the leadership of a rebel group
must recognize that there is a valuable opportunity for mass-based action, and it must shift
the organization as a whole in this new direction. I argue that this is most likely in a rebel
group with a centralized political authority as a dominant organizational structure. One
key assumption underlying this argument is that a nonviolent shift in a rebel organization
can be analyzed akin to military innovation in a state apparatus.7. “Political authority” in
a rebel organization is considered as vaguely equivalent to civilian oversight over mili-
taries, with the same two key underlying mechanisms determining signicant innovation:
First, a pure military view on the organization’s strategy and task focus does not allow for
the kind of “thinking outside the box” that is required to signicantly change the organi-
zation’s overall approach. Second, if the leadership bases its own prestige and thus hold
on power on the use of (particular) military strategy, innovation will not be implemented,
as it will pose a direct threat on the leadership’s hold on power. Using insights from the
Timor-Leste case study and insights from the organizational structure of rms, I propose
7The terms military, state military and national military are utilized interchangeably throughout to
refer to the formal violent arms of states.
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a conceptualization of political authority as a dominant organizational structure in a rebel
organization in the sense of Fredrickson (1986), namely as the structural feature that best
describes the organization as a whole when considering its structures at various levels,
processes, and decisions/outcomes.
Rebel use of nonviolent action as military innovation
Before it is possible to fully construct the organizational process theory, it is necessary
to demonstrate that theories of military innovation can be applied to the study of rebel
use of nonviolent action. With the notable exceptions of Horowitz (2010) and Staniland
(2014), there exist few approaches to studying innovation in rebel organizations. Stani-
land’s explanation of strategic evolution and change in rebel organizations is too broad
to account for a specic type of signicant innovation such as nonviolent action, and
Horowitz’s theory of disruptive innovation in terrorist groups is too narrow in its focus
on innovation as purely focused on violent strategies. While both of these approaches
contribute to my theory as building blocks, it is theories of military innovation with a
focus on civic-military relations that provide the crucial explanatory mechanisms under-
lying a rebel leadership’s capacity for nonviolent innovation. To apply nuanced theories
of innovation in one type of organization and apply it to another, I rst demonstrate that
nonviolent action can indeed be considered an instance of military innovation, and then
briey outline to what extent we can directly compare rebel organizations with national
militaries.
Military innovation and nonviolent action
The Timorese case demonstrates that the use of nonviolent action necessitates “inno-
vation” in three distinct ways: First, the rebel group must change its operational task
focus and modus operandi. As observable in CNRM, the focus shifted from military at-
tacks by small, mobile guerrilla units to large-scale urban protests. This also entailed
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a repurposing of organizational structures previously utilized for violent action to now
serve a dierent purpose, which is the second key organizational change. In the case of
CNRM, during the violent period, the Clandestine Front had received information and
supplies from the occupied areas and relegated them through estafetas to Falintil in the
mountains. The same Clandestine Front messenger network was also used to organize
nonviolent events, but the estafetas now moved key information and messages between
nonviolent entrepreneurs and violent leaders as a direct coordination mechanism. Third,
CNRM shifted its conception of how it could win the war. As it was impossible to win
against Indonesia by engaging ABRI directly with military means, nonviolent events were
clearly targeting an international audience. This conceptual shift was also observable in
the signicant bolstering of the diplomatic front both in Indonesia and internationally.
Pinto stresses how, after 1991, “the underground continued its peaceful activities and at
the same time the diplomatic front made great advances, helping to build support for the
struggle worldwide” (quoted in Tanter, Selden and Shalom (2001, 36)). In other words,
there was a conceptual shift in how means related to ends.
This characterization indicates that we can consider mass-based nonviolent action as
used by a rebel organization as an instance of innovation. According to conceptions of
military innovation, a change in operational practice is crucial to identifying innovation.
According to Grissom (2006), while “authors in the eld [of military studies] have pro-
posed a tangle of orthogonal, even contradictory, denitions” of military innovation, the
one common denominator in all of these denitions is that innovation changes the man-
ner in which military formations operate in the eld (906).8 A focus on operations in the
eld is also problematic for analytical extrapolation to rebel organizations in general. In-
novation in rebel organizations as in militaries will involve a change in how they operate
in the “eld”. Rebel organizations often do not operate in a clearly delineated eld, but
8Here as in Grissom (2006, 906), “eld formation” refers to units that directly conduct military opera-
tions.
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employ a range of strategies that may take place in a variety of locales. According to
Mao Tse-Tung, “in guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east
and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver
a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision” (Mao 1961, 46). Guerrilla warfare therefore
distinguishes itself from other strategies precisely by completely evading the demarca-
tion of a “eld,” and rebel use of nonviolent action stretches this conceptualization even
further, as nonviolent action often takes place in urban areas not touched by war as much
as rural areas. Therefore, not only does nonviolent action in a civil war call for a broader
conceptualization of contentious action and actors, but it also requires an open mind with
regards to conict theater or locale.
Another red thread identied by Grissom is more problematic, namely that eective-
ness is a crucial part of innovation. However, building eectiveness into the denition is
problematic, since we would then only consider instances of clearly measurable successful
innovation. Similar to Grissom, Horowitz (2006, 37) stresses the importance of impact and
eectiveness, but takes into account intent and not only result: Accordingly, “major mili-
tary innovations are major changes in the conduct of warfare relevant to leading military
organizations designed to increase the eciency with which capabilities are converted to
power.” If a move was designed to increase eciency, it should be considered an innova-
tion, whether successful or not. This means that in order to consider nonviolent action
as an innovation, it needs to be demonstrated that it was a purposive move on the part of
the organization. Further, Grissom’s focus assumes that innovation in a militant organi-
zation can only take place within the universe of violent strategies, which may close o
our analytical attention from the full range of strategies available to rebel organizations,
including nonviolent action or terrorism.
Organizational approaches to the study of militaries highlight structural and proce-
dural shifts as crucial elements of military innovation, thus accounting for the second big
shift necessary when rebel organizations use nonviolent action. For example, Evange-
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lista (1988, 12) includes “major restructuring of military organizations” as an important
part of military innovation. Horowitz observes that the character of warfare is shifted by
innovation not only because of how attacks are carried out, but also by the way organi-
zations plan these attacks (2010). Rosen (1988, 143) likewise elaborates on the structural
structural process changes within the organization as a part of innovation. He oers the
following:
A “major innovation”, as I use the term here, is a change that forces one of
the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and
its relation to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional
missions. Such innovations involve a new way of war, with new ideas of how
the components of the organization relate to each other and to the enemy, and
new operational procedures conforming to those ideas. They involve changes
in the critical military tasks, the tasks around which war plans revolve.
Rosen’s analysis elaborates on the structural changes within the organization that are
necessary. A shift in an organization’s core competencies causes a shift in how dier-
ent functional arms of the organization relate to one another (in terms of who works
together and how), and in how plans are formed and decisions are made. Rosen also
points to hierarchical changes necessitated by major innovation: As traditional missions
are downgraded, the organizational arm specializing in said mission will likely lose im-
portance within the organization and shift its functions. I will elaborate on the point of
hierarchical changes and innovation in section 5.2.
“A new way of war” describes the rebel use of nonviolent action perfectly. Nonvio-
lent innovation requires a radical departure from established conceptions of how wars
are won, both in terms of means (violent versus nonviolent action) and target (military or
civilian targets versus a larger international audience). According to Avant (1993, 410f.),
doctrinal shifts “encompasses the broader set of issues about how one wages war, in-
cluding ideas about how to best ght the enemy and assumptions about what part of the
enemy is most important.”9 While insurgency strategies target key military targets and
9See Alger (1985) for a thorough discussion of denitions of doctrine.
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makes it impossible for the enemy to directly hold territory through eorts of coercion
and attrition, nonviolent direct action directly involves the international public as a key
actor, aiming to increase outside pressure on the enemy. This indicates a shift in the con-
ception of how means relate to end, which Avant (1993) describes as new ideas about
how to best ght the enemy, which in turn also allow for an actor that is both political
and violent. Accordingly, Zisk (1993, 4) maintains that military innovation involves shifts
in how actors conceptualize war, which is crucial in studying the rebel use of nonviolent
action, which requires a shift in how we dene and identify contentious strategies.
From this brief exploration of military innovation, I conclude that rebel use of non-
violent action can be considered a particular instance of signicant military innovation.
Figure 5.2 succinctly sums up the three key aspects of innovation that must be explained.
Figure 5.2: Rebel nonviolent action as an instance of military innovation
Are rebel groups and militaries comparable organizations?
While militaries and rebel groups are inherently comparable in their violent task focus,
the comparison is more strained when we consider them as organizational structures.
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While militaries are but one organizational arm of a larger state structure, rebel groups
are not part of a larger organizations; rather, the term denotes all equivalent structures,
which may dier vastly in scope, form and function from one group to another. I briey
outline how theories that explain military actions may apply to rebel groups, but that it
important to note that this requires a shift in the level of analysis.
Both rebel groups and militaries use violence to bring about a certain outcome, in line
with Horowitz (2006, 35), who conceives of military power as “the way that states gener-
ate organized violence for use either on the battleeld or as part of coercive strategies.”
In both cases, violence is generated through the combination of the hardware necessary
for ghting (technology such as ries, artillery, and bombers) and the organizational pro-
cesses (“software”) used to plan the use of and actually employ the hardware. At a min-
imum, like state militaries, rebel groups rely on the use of organized violence at least in
part to attain their goals; their public image, and in some cases their identity, is closely
associated with the strategic use of violence.
However, while militaries wield legitimate violence on behalf of a government, the or-
ganizational form and function of rebel groups is less clearcut. While some rebel organiza-
tions have purely violent origins, others evolve into rebel organizations from groups with
an entirely dierent form, function and focus, such as political parties or religious associ-
ations.10 For example Fretilin originated as an informal discussion group of anti-colonial
philosophy and strategies, then morphed into a fully edged political party. Even as a
rebel organization, its party origins were reected in its organizational structures, which
in part even persisted when Fretilin morphed into CNRM.
Some rebel groups develop extensive bureaucratic and governance systems. Wickham-
Crowley (1989) likens rebel governance systems to state systems by stating that rebel sys-
tems can become “subject to the [same] social-contractual obligations of all governments”
in a sort of “implicit social contract” (477-478). CNRM had several features that make it
10See Staniland (2014) for an in-depth discussion of dierent origin trajectories of rebel organizations.
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resemble a state system. In the late 1980s, CNRM had a central decision-making organ
resembling an executive with ten members, an Armed Front, a Diplomatic Front, and the
Clandestine Front. Before it was morphed into an (at least nominal) umbrella organiza-
tion, Fretilin’s Central Commission even took on a quasi-legislative function; in the early
years of the war, Fretilin oversaw institutions related to health, agriculture, and education
in the bases de apoio.11
In analyzing militaries and rebel groups as organizations, it is important to dieren-
tiate the relevant level of analysis. Militaries are but one functional arm of a larger state
apparatus, whereas rebel groups can be purely violent groups but may also comprise both
military and political wings, where the latter can take on state-like functions. In using
civilian control of militaries as a lens for explaining innovation in rebel organizations, it
is key to be aware of this organizational distinction.
From civilian control of militaries to political authority in rebel
organizations
Rebel use of nonviolent action is an instance of signicant innovation that involves a
change in operational focus, a structural shift in how dierent parts of the organization
relate to one another, and a shift in how the group conceives of war. How does the impetus
for such a signicant departure from the organizational status quo emerge, and what deter-
mines that the organization will be able to implement it? The Timor-Leste case provides
answers to both of these questions. The initial impetus for nonviolent action emerged in
Orgão Oito, an umbrella group connecting various Dili-based clandestine cells — usually
tied to legitimate social, religious, or athletic groups — to the rebel leadership in the pe-
riphery. Xanana Gusmão, a political leader, approved the proposal for the rst nonviolent
11The Sri Lankan LTTE also oversaw several ministries, including those for nance, justice, protection
(police), economic development, health, and education, each headed by a secretary or porupalar (Neeran
(1996) paraphrased by Mampilly (2011)). Rwenzururu rebels in Uganda in the early 1960s organized a com-
plex governmental bureaucracy composed of eleven ministries headed by a cabinet (Mampilly 2011, 1).
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protest in October 1989. By this time, Gusmão’s leadership position was consolidated to
a point where there was no opposition to such a move within Falintil, and pre-existing
Clandestine Front messenger networks were repurposed to coordinate events; when nec-
essary, Falintil moved closer to urban areas to guarantee the safety of protesters, or en-
gaged ABRI in skirmishes to draw them away from Dili during times when demonstra-
tions were planned.
There are two key factors that link strong, consolidated political authority in a rebel
organization with the use of nonviolent action:
1. Rebel command structures that prioritize military authority and military concerns
are structurally less likely to undergo signicant innovation because such a new
approach is too far outside of the organization’s modus operandi;
2. If personal power and prestige in a rebel organization is tied to a (particular) violent
operational focus, individual leaders will have an incentive to obstruct signicant
innovation, in particular towards nonviolent action.
I explain the underlying mechanisms by building on “civilian control” approaches to ex-
plaining innovation in militaries. In what follows, I rst explain why and how civilian
control is key to signicant military innovation both in terms of the initial impetus for
innovation and its actual execution.
Civilian control, political authority and the impetus for innovation
The impetus for signicant strategic innovation such as nonviolent action is unlikely to
be given if the military or military faction has signicant control over strategic decision-
making. The aphorism “where you sit is where you stand” aptly captures how mili-
taries and civilian governments bring dierent attitudes, interests, and capabilities to the
decision-making table, and how military leaders are not likely to think outside of the
“military box”. In other words, an organization purely focused on military concerns is
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unlikely to recognize the need or opportunity for a non-military approach when viewing
problems strictly through its violence-trained lens.12.
Nonviolent action also brings with it a signicant increase in the complexity of orga-
nizational actors and processes as nonviolent leaders in cities organize nonviolent events
on the ground. According to Etheredge (1985, 143), organizational learning often involves
a shift from simple generalizations to “complex, integrated understandings grounded in
realistic attention to detail.” It is not only unlikely that military actors — deeply mired
in the execution of violence for political ends — would recognize the potential of a non-
violent strategy, but it is also unlikely that they would recognize organizational changes
either in terms of process or structure. For example, in Timor-Leste, the use of nonvio-
lent action led to the repurposing of Clandestine Front estafetas in the short term, but a
restructuring of CNRM as a whole in the medium term with the creation of the Clandes-
tine Front Executive Committee in 1990 and the reorientation of the Diplomatic Front to
focus on Indonesian pro-democracy organizations. If strategic decision-making is con-
trolled by the military faction deeply grounded in the extant violent modus operandi, it is
unlikely that the opportunity for nonviolent action would lead to the necessary strategic
innovation.
How does this argument derive from theories on civilian control of the military?
Strong political leadership in a rebel organization is (imperfectly) comparable to civilian
control over militaries in government apparatuses. Maintaining control over its military
arm is a crucial and dicult task in any government. The realist paradigm of international
relations holds that physical security is the paramount concern of any state. Accordingly,
neorealists maintain the dictum that “each state must always be concerned to ensure its
own survival” (Mearsheimer 1990, 44). Machiavelli even equated eective state leadership
exclusively with warfare for state security:
12Note that there is a close relationship between this approach to innovation and organizational learning,
as both require the use of new knowledge to redene the content of organizational interests (Nye 1987)
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A prince must have no other objective, no other thought, nor take up any
profession but that of war, its methods and its discipline, for that is the only
art expected of a ruler. And it is of such great value that it not only keeps
hereditary princes in power, but often raises men of lowly condition to that
rank. (The Prince, Chapter XIV)
Because security is of such importance, the actor tasked with its maintenance may assume
disproportionate power within the government, crowding out other socially desirable and
necessary government duties. Thus, in the words of Huntington (1957, 2), the central
tension in civil-military relations is “to develop a system of civil-military relations which
will maximize military security at the least sacrice of other social values . . . [and this]
involves a complex balancing of power and attitudes among civilian and military groups.”
The “civil-military approach” to explaining military innovation was rst coined by
Posen (1984), who posits that major innovation is only likely if civilian statesmen inter-
vene in military service doctrinal development.13 This requires a civilian government
with a certain degree of independence from the military in its decision-making and some
power over the armed leadership to impose their decisions. There are several dierent ap-
proaches to explaining mechanisms underlying why and how civilian oversights makes
the impetus for innovation more likely.
One key explanatory approach credits the bureaucratic rigidity of militaries’ decision-
making and execution for their inability to initiate innovation. Comparing dierent in-
terwar doctrinal developments in Britain, France and Germany, Posen himself argues that
because military bureaucracies operate on a routine basis, if there is no outside input, their
procedures will result in rigid, sub-optimal strategies. Military organizations build up or-
ganizational expertise in a specic eld over time, so that an organization will be predis-
posed to consider the range of possible strategies within these connes. Because militaries
are so specialized, they will likely not consider strategic options outside of the current set
of operational and strategic approaches. On the other hand, the much broader range of
13See also Beard (1976), Zisk (1993)
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activities in a civilian government makes signicant innovation much more likely. Ac-
cording to Posen, only balance-of-power crises will invoke the top civilian leadership’s
attention and trigger an updating of strategies. Therefore, militaries would usually fa-
vor oensive approaches, whereas the civilian leadership should be more attuned to the
demands of the international system, and intervene if the military does not appear to be
able to respond to such crises.
This explanation oversimplies how military and government actors dene their in-
terests. Avant (1993) points out that it is unrealistic that two dierent bureaucracies within
the same state apparatus will function according to such vastly disparate logics. Fur-
ther, the political leadership will not only have balance-of-power concerns vis-a-vis other
states, but also must consider domestic political and economic costs precisely because
their only concern is not just security. Thus, according to Horowitz (2006), while the gov-
ernment may be more exible in considering alternative strategies and approaches, their
decision-making will be driven by the political and economic costs and benets of adopt-
ing the innovation. A failed attempt at innovation will make a government look weak -
failed both in terms of the military publicly balking at the idea or the innovation actually
lessening military eectiveness.
It is not only important that a civilian authority oversee strategic decision-making,
but the nature of the relationship between the civilian and military organs also matters.
Strategic decision-making that aects the military cannot be done wholly without mili-
tary input. This imbalance of input and interests was clearly observable during the years
of Fretilin’s wartime mountain regime. Because the Soibada conference excluded Falin-
til commanders from the discussions about strategy, Fretilin continued to prioritize po-
sitional warfare and the protection of stationary civilian settlements, which made both
coordination within Falintil impossible and doomed the rst phase of the conict. This
risk of complete civilian dominance is also mirrored in civilian-military analyses of in-
novation. For example, Huntington (1957) terms this subjective civilian control, which
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exists when one elite group or faction of civilians has amassed so much power that they
dominate both other civilian groups and the military; this can happen if power is maxi-
mized within particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, or particular
constitutional forms.14
A continuous dialogue and coordination of civilian and military arms is also important
for the practical implementation of a particular innovation. While it makes intuitive sense
for civilian leaders to propose signicant innovation due to their non-military perspec-
tive, power considerations within the military determine whether innovation proposals
will actually be implemented. In states as in rebel groups, high-ranking military ocers
control a sizable bureaucracy, and there are many ways to block or retard innovation that
has been directed top-down by civilian leadership. Rosen (1988) argues that in several
prominent cases of military innovation, the role of the civilian leadership was overstated.
Rather, the initiative for reform must enjoy signicant support from within the military
and cannot emerge wholly outside of the military realm; further, successful major inno-
vation must bring with it a signicant eort to change the intellectual way the military
organization conceives of its main tasks (Rosen 1988, 137).
Hypothesis: The primacy of political control
How do these insights translate into a testable hypothesis? From the above, I conclude
that if strategic decision-making is dominated by the military, it is unlikely that innovation
will be either initiated or executed. In a state military, the power dynamic in question is
between the military and the civilian government. In a rebel organization, this translates
to the political versus military wing and who ultimately controls strategic decisions. This
leads to the following hypothesis (note that all hypotheses that follow assume that there
14One frequent argument is that democracies will have a higher degree of stable civilian control over
the military. In democracies, political outcomes are achieved via persuasion and compromise, whereas
totalitarian or absolutist countries will be dominated force, coercion, or the threat thereof; since the mili-
tary controls the most powerful instruments of violence, they will be more powerful under totalitarian or
absolutist forms of government. See Kohn (1997) for an overview over this strain of literature.
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is an opportunity for using nonviolent action unless noted otherwise):
Hypothesis 1a: A politically controlled strategic decision-making process in a
rebel organization is necessary for nonviolent innovation.
In practice, a “politically controlled strategic decision-making process” can mean sev-
eral things, and several structural and procedural features contribute to it. First, one key
indicator is the formal organizational structure, specically the relative positions within
the organizational hierarchy of military and political wings; political authority is more
likely to persist in an organization if it clearly delineated military and political decision-
making structures where the latter is not subjugated to the former. These can dier sig-
nicantly: For example, in Fretilin, the key political organ was superior to Falintil, the
military wing. Furthermore, no Falintil eld commanders were a part of the Central Com-
mittee of the party, and even in the dierent zonas, political commissars outranked Falintil
commanders responsible for the same territory. The LTTE is a good counterexample, as
the military leadership oversaw both the strategic planning and political planning units
of the organization — which would allow for political decision-making only as long as it
did not run counter to military interests and goals (Chalk 1999).
However, this purely structural approach to determining military versus political con-
trol in rebel organizations has limits; only consider CNRM. In CNRM, both Falintil’s Ex-
ecutive Council of the Struggle/Armed Resistance and the Clandestine Front Executive
Committee made up the key deliberative body of CNRM together, but were both subject
to the leadership of Xanana Gusmão. In this case, it is impossible to determine whether
political or military voices rang louder in decision-making, and it is key to better under-
stand Xanana Gusmão’s leadership style and background. In this case, Xanana’s ascent
to power was from the starting point of a political functionary; in fact, he was chosen to
lead Fretilin in 1980 precisely because he was the highest ranked political cadre survivor,
and assumed the position of power over Falintil commanders that outranked him, such
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as Mauk Muruk. It may also matter how the organization identies itself: Is its identity
predominantly that of a political party or that of a military organization?
Conrming or disconrming this hypothesis thus requires that all of these factors be
considered, which is only possible by longitudinally tracing the development of the rebel
organization, its organizational and hierarchical structure, its processes, and the resulting
strategic outcomes.
Internal power dynamics and nonviolent innovation
Organizational power considerations can also greatly aect the adoption and implementa-
tion of nonviolent innovation. This mechanism does not emerge as clearly in the Timorese
case as it does in the case of Nepal (Chapter 6), but even in Fretilin/CNRM, we can see the
opposition of military leaders to moderating strategic shifts. When Falintil commanders
and ideological hardliners Kilik Wae Gae, Mauk Muruk and Ologari Asuwain opposed the
ideological and strategic reorientation of Fretilin in 1984, they quickly disappeared from
the organization through death or surrender. Afterwards, Gusm ao was able to announce
CRRM’s adoption of a policy of National Convergence, ocially collaborating with UDT,
an erstwhile military opponent. By the time of the rst nonviolent event in 1989, Xanana
Gusm ao’s position of power within the organization was uncontested, and throughout
the 1990s, he was synonymous with the resistance both within Timor and internationally.
There are two notable conclusions that can be drawn here: First, if the military faction had
had more power in the organization, their mere opposition or at least the threat of a split
from the main organization could have prevented the step towards political moderation
that would naturally dilute the position of Falintil relative to the rest of the organization.
Second, Xanana Gusmão’s position within the organization was not diminished but rather
strengthened, his powerful status solidied.
How do power sources and organizational leadership determine an organization’s
ability to adopt and implement signicant innovation, in particular, nonviolent action?
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Gusmão’s authority in the organization was not tied to the use of a particular strategy. If
a rebel organization is dominated by its military faction, it is likely that internal hierarchy
and resulting power dynamics are closely tied to the maintenance of a particular strategic
approach. I will briey show how this conclusion is supported by conceptions of military
and civilian leadership.
With regards to individual military leaders’ interest in the maintenance of an estab-
lished strategic approach, Machiavelli once more provides a perfect starting point by sum-
ming up the central problem with innovation, as signicant change of an old order will
threaten those who beneted from said old order:
It must be considered that there is nothing more dicult to carry out nor
more doubtful of success nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new
order of things; for the reformer has enemies in all those who prot by the old
order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would prot by the new
order; this lukewarmness arising partly from the incredulity of mankind who
does not truly believe in anything new until they actually have experience of
it. (Machiavelli 1984, 331)
What does this mean? Consider the conception of military rule as entailing “governance
by men who specialize in armed force and maintaining order rather than in political af-
fairs” (Geddes, Frantz and Wright 2014, 148). A ruler who specializes in the use of violence
and has amassed power and prestige within the organization doing so will be much more
secure in her position if military strategy, possibly even a particular type of military strat-
egy, remains vital in attaining key organizational goals. Such a ruler has a personal stake
in the military strategy staying its course, and nonviolent innovation represents a clear
threat to the ruler’s position.
Similarly, within a rebel group, being an expert at carrying out a particular operational
tactic or approach can give you an air of indispensability, but also tie power within the or-
ganization to that particular strategy. In writing about terrorist groups, Horowitz argues
that if a particular strategic approach (or “idea”) fails, this can lead to a signicant loss in
prestige and reputation for individual leaders. And, as “just like businesses and military
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organization, terrorist groups develop expertise at particular tasks” (Horowitz 2010, 39),
which they have in turn staked some of their reputation on, they may be unwilling to
relinquish the operational primacy of this approach for fear of losing power within the
movement. According to Horowitz (2010), this is particularly likely if a group’s broad
strategy and the means of implementing that strategy separate.15 If a group’s broad strat-
egy is tied to particular means, this will increase the prestige of those leaders within the
organization who possess expertise at carrying out said task. If broad strategy is dened
predominantly by the military leadership, this scenario is much more likely to arise.
How is this conation of rebel leaders’ personal prestige and strategic approach best
prevented? Huntington (1957) argues that a system of objective civilian control over a
professional military can render the military “politically sterile and neutral” (Hunting-
ton 1957, 84). A professionalized military will have predened avenues for promotion, a
clear task focus, and a solid military hierarchy. While it is clearly not possible to “pro-
fessionalize” guerrilla ghters in a rebel organization, a unifying political ideology and a
clearly established dierentiation of tasks among dierent organizational arms can also
help to keep military prowess and organizational power dynamics separate. If militants
and political cadre are deeply committed to the same set of goals and are in agreement
about the division of labor making the attainment of these goals most likely, they will be
much less likely to abuse a civil-military tug-of-war to win an ideological struggle. This is
only possible if the internal hierarchy is clearly delineated and if the primacy of political
authority is well-consolidated.
If there are too many veto players in the civilian government that can inuence the
military realm, this can also cause confusion and problems. In this manner, Avant (1993)
points out that the structure of the civilian leadership may inhibit outright attempts at
intervention (and, therefore, major innovation), even if the dire need for innovation is
15See Wilson (1989) for a more technical explanation of the risks of conating a military’s critical task
with the mechanisms required to achieve said task.
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abundantly evident. Divided civilian institutions will both increase the likelihood of pol-
icy disagreements and encourage distrust among dierent branches of government over
the control of bureaucracy; anticipating that another veto player will intervene and pre-
vent a disruptive form of innovation, leaders might be deterred from proposing it publicly
in the rst place. What becomes very clear is that it is not enough to simply assess the
organizational structure and civil-military power balance; we also need to consider the
nature of their interaction and the processes that have led to a particular power cong-
uration. This is reminiscent of the precarious balance of power in Fretilin, where there
was a high degree of uncertainty about the power balance between Nicolau Lobato and
Xavier do Amaral, and where the insecure political leadership did not even allow mili-
tary commanders to participate in strategy discussions, resulting in the continuation of a
highly ineective strategy of positional warfare.
Hypothesis: Consolidated authority
Therefore, political authority within the rebel organization must be rmly established
and clearly dened; this “institutionalization” process takes time. If integrity is high and
authority structures clearly dened throughout the organization, there is both space for
more voices to contribute to strategic decision-making, and it is possible for leaders to
adopt innovation without risking their future authority (Avant 1993, 413). For example,
within CNRM, Orgão Oito leaders were able to suggest a new nonviolent strategies that
they would implement themselves, and the CNRM leadership under Xanana Gusmão was
able to seize on this opportunity without risking personal position or organizational unity
and cohesion. The example of Orgão Oito and Gusmão’s relationship also suggests that
centralization of leadership is important; even if organizational changes are suggested in
far-ung parts of the organization, it is crucial that the central leadership still be consulted
and given ultimate decision-making power (the issue of centralization will be picked up
again in the next section).
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This results in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: A centralized, consolidated authority structure with a widely
accepted leadership is necessary condition for a rebel group to use nonviolent
action.
As with Hypothesis 1a, one approach to conrming or falsifying this hypothesis is to
consider the organizational structure. Is there a clear organizational leadership? However,
here, too, time and process matter. Are there frequent leadership challenges or challenges
either to take over the central leadership or to split from the organization? If there were
splits, how was the organization able to recover? It is also important to assess over time
whether or not centrally made decisions are faithfully executed by dierent arms of the
organization, and whether they are apprised of important development.
Considering both Hypotheses 1a and 1b together, political authority emerges as a com-
mon theme, or dominant organizational structure. This will continue to weave through
the theory like a red thread.
5.2 Nonviolent action, mobilization and control
I argue that the rebel use of nonviolent action necessitates the repurposing of pre-existing
institutional links between urban rebel command areas and the urban population. This
builds on the observation that nonviolent direct action crucially requires the coordination
of two types of strategies that are fundamentally dierent in terms of approach, actors,
and locale. While rebel strongholds are often in peripheral areas, nonviolent action, to
have eect, is likely to take place in urban areas that are controlled by the central gov-
ernment or occupying power.
In Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão and Falintil were moving their command center around
in the mountain region while nonviolent events were carried out in Dili and later in var-
ious Indonesian university towns. This means that the resistance leadership needs to
somehow “project” its inuence across geographic distances to mobilize the population
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and control proceedings, usually done through local subsidiaries, here termed “nonvio-
lent entrepreneurs” (though in the Timorese case, after a few years of nonviolent action,
Xanana himself came to hide in Dili). In Timor-Leste, this new class of nonviolent en-
trepreneurs consisted of the urban intellectual elite (teachers, Church ocials, govern-
ment employees) and Timorese student leaders in dierent Indonesian university towns.
However, nonviolent entrepreneurs are not the only new actors: By participating in
nonviolent action, civilians become conict actors in their own right. As such, the for-
mal and informal ties and relationships between civilians and the resistance organization
make up a key part of the overall rebel organizational structure. Civilians play a wide
array of roles and perform a variety of services in conicts They can join the guerrilla
force or militia, form a part of the logistics and support apparatus, participate in illegal
activities that can nance a sustained rebellion such as smuggling or bank robbery, act as
messengers, intelligence operatives, diplomats, hold political ”oce”, or form a cog in the
bureaucracy that governs territory. The dynamics between rebels and population that un-
derlie the provision of dierent “services” vary signicantly: For example, while supplies,
transportation, or sometimes even recruits can be coerced relatively easily, it is much
more dicult to coerce the provision of high-quality intelligence (Wood 2003).16 In the
words of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2003, 34), mobilization is about ”how people who at
a given point in time are not making contentious claims start doing so.” To mobilize and
coordinate the urban population to become contentious nonviolent actors requires spe-
cic underlying organizational structures; sympathy with rebels and their cause alone is
not enough.
How can a rebel group with peripheral strongholds mobilize and coordinate the ur-
ban population to participate in nonviolent action? Delegating the coordination of con-
tentious action to new actors requires a high degree of control and trust on the part of
the organizational leadership: Nonviolent events must stay “on message” and reinforce
16See also Parkinson (2013) or Mampilly (2011) for in-depth discussions of civilian functions in conict.
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rebel aims and demands. Conversely, the rebel organization must mobilize the urban pop-
ulation to actively put themselves at direct risk; this only works if there is strong urban
support for the rebel organization and a high degree of trust that the violent division
will support rather than “spoil” nonviolent action. Because these urban-peripheral orga-
nizational links ll such a crucial role and because the information relayed needs to be
reliable, they cannot be built quickly when the opportunity for nonviolent action arises.
Therefore, the rebel organization needs to be connected to urban areas via reliable struc-
tural links prior to the onset of nonviolent action; these links will be repurposed to serve
bridging and coordinating functions between rebel leaders, nonviolent leaders, and the
would-be activist population.
To make this argument, I rst develop the unique problem of wartime nonviolent
mobilization. I then explain how spatially dispersed organizational structures are crucial
to overcoming this problem, and build a corresponding hypothesis.
Mobilizing urban masses for active civil war participation
Mobilizing the population for wartime nonviolent action is a logistical nightmare. To
grasp the scope of this issue, only consider how dicult it is to mobilize masses for any
kind of nonviolent direct action. In nonviolent direct action, citizens’ power stems from
their numbers, which means that a movement must mobilize a critical mass in order to
be eective (DeNardo 1985). According to Kuran (1991, 14), “the crucial insight of the
rational-choice school is that an individual opposed to the incumbent regime is unlikely
to participate in eorts to remove it, since the personal risk of joining a revolutionary
movement could outweigh the personal benet that would accrue were the movement a
success.” This means that it is not ex-ante rational to participate in public protest as the
risks are considerable and the potential personal pay-o uncertain. Further, a revolution
constitutes a “collective good”: Once a revolution is successful, citizens can benet from
the outcome whether they have directly contributed or not. This makes it dicult to
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mobilize participants for mass-based activism under most circumstances.
However, there is also safety in numbers. The risk to the individual is much lower and
success much more likely if a large mass of people show up to protest; therefore, individ-
uals are much more likely to engage in protest — of any kind — when they expect a large
number of people to also participate.17 Once a large-scale protest is under way, it will
be much easier to motivate people to join, or to organize subsequent marches, since par-
ticipants already know the depth of public support and others’ willingness to participate
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). According to critical-mass theories of collective action,
protesters base their perception of protest opportunities and costs on existing, observable
patterns of opposition activity (Kurzman 1996, 154). This is nicely demonstrated in the
contrast between the very rst Dili demonstration in 1989 and the Santa Cruz demon-
stration a few years later. At the rst demonstration, only a handful of people besides
the Scouts — who had been directly involved in the planning — joined in the protest; in
contrast, at Santa Cruz in 1991, thousands of women, men and children waving ags and
banners and shouting slogans participated (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 190).
Demonstration eects can overcome some of nonviolent mobilization’s inherent prob-
lems. Yet, this still makes it very dicult to organize the very rst protest event of a
movement. Even under conditions of freedom of speech and expression, without repres-
sion, mobilization for nonviolent direct action is very dicult: A nonviolent action event
requires the coordination of and communication between a large number of people. The
conict context adds obvious additional levels of diculty; while some people may be
able to directly observe a protest march or demonstration, there will not be open, unbi-
ased domestic or local media coverage prior to the event or afterwards. Protests may also
take place outside of the homeland, so information about upcoming, planned events will
have to be spread through private back channels. Before the planned demonstration for
17See Goldstone (1994); Granovetter (1978); Kuran (1991); Kurzman (1996, 2009); Oliver, Marwell and
Teixeira (1985); Oberschall (1994); Olson (1965); Rasler (1996); Schelling (1978); Tullock (1971) for more on
the underlying mechanisms that determine individual participation in protest.
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the Pope’s visit in 1989, Pinto remembers how “we were concerned . . . that it would be
dicult to hold a demonstration because people were not yet brave enough to speak out
publicly against the occupation and the repression” (Pinto and Jardine 1997, 107).
Governmental repression exacerbates the information problem: Organizing collective
action in a civil war context is akin to organizing protests in an authoritarian context,
where there is imperfect information about citizens’ true preferences and the size of the
potential opposition coalition (Kuran 1991; Kricheli, Livne and Magaloni 2011). Out of
fear, citizens are likely to publicly comply with the regime’s demands, in a process of
preference falsication: In public acts and statements, an individual is likely to support
the oppressive government, even if she may privately hold strong anti-regime sentiments
(Kuran 1991).18 Further, in this kind of repressive environment, a ruthless government
has little reason to provide the conditions for people to gather information about the true
degree of government opposition in the population — in other words, the government has
“an incentive to discourage independent polling and discredit surveys that reveal unat-
tering information” (Kuran 1991, 21). In a civil war, it is likely that many public methods
of communication (yers, assemblies) are no longer available; technology is likely only
available to a limited degree and to a limited audience, and may not be considered trust-
worthy.
While the civil war may indicate shared grievances, the mere fact of organized vio-
lence reveals little about the population’s willingness to take to the streets. According
to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), many forms of violent activism — including ones that
might be used in a civil war — reveal very little about troop strength and level of support.
For example, a terrorist attack may only involve a handful of activist participants, while
support sta behind the scenes remain concealed.19 Further, nonviolent mobilization taps
18In a civil war where the vast majority of the population has been personally negatively aected by
the government (killed family members, loss of independence, loss of rights, economic deprivation, etc.),
publicly supporting the government while privately holding strong opposing sentiments may constitute ”a
sacrice of personal integrity” Kuran (1991, 18), which would lower the psychological barrier for protest.
19Bueno de Mesquita (2010) disagrees with this analysis. He argues that the more violence rebels create,
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into a hitherto ”dormant” segment of society for a new type of activity; in urban areas,
where rebels’ military strength tends to be weak, information about support will be much
more dicult to procure.20 Also, while the civil war may indicate shared grievances, the
mere fact of organized violence reveals little about the population’s willingness to take to
the streets. The rebel group’s organizational links to urban areas must bridge this inherent
information problem.
Nonviolent direct action puts participants publicly in the line of enemy re, likely in
the very heart of enemy-controlled territory (cities, towns) that have symbolic value to
both sides. This makes nonviolent action risky and erodes the mobilization advantages
that nonviolent action can have over violent action. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 34)
argue that “the physical risks and costs of participation in a violent resistance campaign
may be prohibitively high for many potential members” whereas both personal risks and
costs are lower for nonviolent action. After years of conict, the population will be keenly
aware of the government’s willingness to violently repress opposition. Two factors will
mitigate this problem: First, if the population is highly supportive of the rebel group, they
will be more likely to participate in nonviolent action. Second, nonviolent action is more
likely if there exists a high level of trust between the population and the rebels, as the
military arm of the organization can support — or at least not spoil — nonviolent action.
Therefore, the organizational links between urban and rural areas must be exible and re-
liable enough to allow for detailed coordination of plans and strategies. West Papua pro-
vides a good example for the importance of coordination. According to MacLeod (2015),
the West Papuan nonviolent protest campaigns in coastal towns and cities would stop as
soon as violence ared up again in the periphery for fear of retribution. This last point
the more anti-regime sentiment citizens believe there to be in society, theoretically making them more
willing to join the rebellion. In other words, people will already be aware that their anti-government or
anti-occupation sentiments are widely shared in the population, which could increase their likelihood of
participating.
20See Barkey and Van Rossem (1997); Centola and Macy (2007); Gould (1993, 1995, 1996); McAdam (1986);
Petersen (2001) for other theoretical accounts on high-risk popular mobilization.
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is clearly exemplied in both the Nepal (where coordination was strong) and El Salvador
(where coordination was nearly non-existent) in Chapters 6 and 7.
If there exist reliable rural-urban links between population and rebels, it is likely that
the popular support for the rebel organization is relatively high, as reliable coordination
and mobilization links are often deeply embedded in quotidian and social relationships
(Parkinson 2013). Further, these links, if socially embedded, can provide information to
the rebel group about the depth of urban popular support; also, these links need to provide
information and reassurance to the population about the rebels’ willingness to materially
support and secure, as far as possible, nonviolent action. However, the relationship be-
tween urban-rural links and rebel support is to some extent mutually reinforcing, further
necessitating careful process tracing to observe how they operate.
Delegating control to nonviolent entrepreneurs
The use of nonviolent action includes the “activation” of thousands of new actors into op-
erations. This brings with it two key risks for the leadership and organization as a whole:
First, protesters can deviate from the stated rebel demands, thereby diluting the message
and making the movement appear disorganized. The danger of appearing undisciplined
is demonstrated in a message from Gusmão to the Clandestine Front as they were plan-
ning a demonstration for the expected visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture: “It’s
a good idea to have a demonstration, . . . but be careful and be disciplined” (Pinto and
Jardine (1997, 189), emphasis added).
The second danger is that nonviolent action can spin out of control or engender ex-
tremist splinter groups, making the leadership appear out of touch and out of control. A
second example from the Timorese resistance illustrates how important it was to Gusmão
that the resistance appear unied. In September 1997, a militant wing of the Timorese So-
cialist Association, “Brigada Negra”, attempted to make a small TNT bomb in Indonesia
to smuggle to Falintil inside East Timor. In the same month, one of the bombs went o ac-
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cidentally in the activists’ Central Java apartment, which led the Indonesian police to nd
11 bombs and bomb supplies, as well as a computer disk with organization names. Even
though the Brigada Negra was not formally connected to CNRM, Xanana Gusmão was
quoted in the Jakarta Post on November 19, 1997: “The bombs were made to strengthen
our resistance towards the [Indonesian] armed forces and I will take full responsibility
for their activities” (quoted in Stephan (2005, 85)).
I argue that if nonviolent entrepreneurs can be empowered and coordinated via strong
pre-existing organizational networks connecting city and periphery, the rebel group can
mitigate the dangers of disjointed action, radicalization, and facilitate popular mobiliza-
tion with minimal risk to established leadership patterns. However, this delegation of
power also brings inherent risks: the newly empowered party ocials, student leaders,
union leaders, or academics (to name just a few options) may prove dicult to control,
and may have or develop interests or ambitions of their own. This creates a principal-
agent problem: Miller and Moe (1986) argue in their book that the danger of delegating
signicant authority over portions of crucial policy to new actors and organizations em-
powers new agents that may develop interests of their own that are contrarian to the old
leadership’s. This succinctly sums up the rebel leadership’s central dilemma. How can
the rebel leadership organize nonviolent events on the ground without losing control of
the movement?
By adding an additional layer of leadership, there is a risk that the movement loses
in eciency and cohesion. The more complex the network of command and accountabil-
ity in an organization, the slower the organization will move. According to Burt (2005,
3), “matrix structures have people reporting to multiple superiors, which weakens the
authority of each reporting relationship. Eciencies gained by removing layers of bu-
reaucracy shift control from vertical chains of authority to horizontal peer pressure.” In-
deed, in Timor-Leste, the rst handful of nonviolent events were planned up to a year in
advance, just as soon as a foreign delegation visit or press tour suitable for nonviolent
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action displays was announced, as these required the coordination of so many dierent
key players through a cumbersome estafeta network.
Apart from the risk of losing power and inuence in the present, leaders may also have
an eye on a potential post-conict order: Those who dominate the movement during the
conict are likely to have a seat at the table in negotiations and after a conict. Therefore,
the rebel leadership runs the risk of losing its grip on the movement both at present
and down the road. The delegation problem is similar to that of the civil-military balance
outlined in the previous section, and in fact a civil-military balance serves as a mechanism
here as well: If there is a political authority that sits above the military side, the military
does not oversee political decisions, and there is a clear hierarchy with outlined promotion
pathways, empowering a new actor with a dierent area of expertise would be much less
threatening to the rebel leadership. This is a rst indication for how tightly linked the
dierent necessary conditions for nonviolent innovation really are.
The organizational complexity of urban-rural ties
Both the problems inherent in wartime nonviolent mobilization and the risks of power
delegation to nonviolent entrepreneurs can be mitigated if the wartime organizational
structure encompasses reliable rural-urban communication networks that can be repur-
posed for organizing and coordinating nonviolent action. These organizational structures
must enable the coordination and communication between the rebel leadership and non-
violent entrepreneurs. Informally, the urban population must support and put trust into
the rebel leadership in the periphery and identify with the cause. In urban areas, there
must be formal and informal mobilization pathways for organizing concrete nonviolent
events. This results in the following actors and links:
Therefore, the rebel use of nonviolent action necessitates two sets of organizational
ties: First, robust institutional ties connect rebel leaders and nonviolent entrepreneurs.
Second, the civilian population must be formally or informally embedded in the resis-
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Figure 5.3: Conict actors and their relationships
tance. However, these types of links are closely connected, as nonviolent action consid-
ers civilians as conict actors. Staniland (2010) argues that in robust rebel organizations,
“trust, political consensus, information ows, and norms among members are essential
in an environment in which secrecy is needed and risk is endemic” (35). If urban civil-
ians become active conict actors, they must be tied into the same robust organizational
environment. I will outline what each of these organizational links looks like, but their
intrinsic connectedness is important.
Hypotheses: Urban-rural organizational ties
Geographic dispersion
The organizational links repurposed by a rebel group for the coordination of nonviolent
action, usually via nonviolent entrepreneurs, must link urban and rural areas, as estab-
lished above. They must also be reliable conduits of information, which means that they
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are “institutionalized”. In Timor-Leste, the Clandestine Front network that was later used
for nonviolent coordination had its roots in personal links between Dili residents and
their families who had ed to the mountains with Fretilin (Bexley and Tchailoro 2013).
These individual, personal links were amalgamated during the surviving Fretilin cadres’
reconnaissance mission in 1980 and 1981, and from then on slowly instrumentalized for
the transmission of information and supplies. By the time Orgão Oito and Gusmão orga-
nized the rst nonviolent event, the underground transmission network was a well-oiled
machine consisting of thousands of individual links.
Accordingly, Staniland (2014) argues that eective strategic coordination between the
central rebel leadership and local commanders is most likely done through well-developed
bureaucracies for socialization and discipline. This describes the function of the Clandes-
tine Front by 1989 well. These types of links will allow for the reliable transmission of
information, and also aord the central leadership sucient control to empower new ur-
ban actors and trust them with the execution of events. Indeed, all nonviolent organizers
I interviewed (a dozen) told me that the central leadership was apprised of planned events
every single time.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: An institutionalized organizational structure linking urban and
rural areas is necessary for rebel use of nonviolent action.
There are many possible ways for a rebel organization to structurally link urban and
rural organs. In the Timorese case, the clandestine support network was key; the Nepalese
case will demonstrate another pathway via military capacity and territorial control.
Hypothesis: Popular mobilization through socially embedded resistance ties
Mass-based nonviolent action requires the mobilization and participation of civilians as
conict actors. This is only possible if civilians are either formally or informally con-
nected to the resistance organization. In Timor-Leste, social and formal organizational
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ties were often blurred. Many urban youths became involved in the resistance as estafetas
because of their personal ties to Falintil members in the periphery; their knowledge of the
terrain came from their experience living in the bases de apoio. Constancio Pinto and his
colleagues in 007 and later Orgão Oito all became linked to the Clandestine Front through
social groups, in their case the Scouts (though Church or martial arts groups were also
a common conduit).21 When organizing nonviolent events, resistance members would
recruit within their own social ties.
Thus, the exploration of the requisite ties linking potential urban activists into rebel
organizations requires what Parkinson (2013) terms “situat[ing] militants in their organi-
zational and social context” (418). The important organizational juncture for nonviolent
mobilization is in the overlap between formal organizational links and locally extending
social ties. In her analysis of Palestinian militant organizations’ startling remobilization in
the late 1980s, Parkinson argues that “patterns of overlap between formal militant hierar-
chies and quotidian social networks — that is, every day kinship, marriage, friendship, and
community-based relationships” determined the availability and nature of rebels’ later
mobilization pathways. Thus, the “formal” ties linking urban and rural rebel leaders di-
rectly connect to the social ties tying urban civilians to the resistance organization; when
considering nonviolent action as a contentious strategy, one type of link cannot be un-
derstood without considering the other.
Hypothesis 2b: Wartime nonviolent popular mobilization requires substantial
overlap between formal organizational ties and their social networks.
21Interestingly, the overlap of social ties and political-organizational ties was fostered by Fretilin from
the very beginning. Their 1974 campaign of “nationalization” through educational and cultural engagement
in villages and towns across Timor-Leste did not dierentiate between social and political spheres.
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5.3 Complex rebel organizations and functional
dierentiation
How do the two organizational features of political authority and geographic dispersion t
together? If both of these features are rmly institutionalized in a rebel organization, they
will be correlated and mutually reinforcing. Yet, it is rare for an organization to display
both of these features together, as their coexistence requires a high degree of organiza-
tional capacity and complexity. The capacity for task dierentiation is an important part
of this underlying complexity. Organizations that emphasize task dierentiation through-
out their organizational history are the most likely to have both consolidated political au-
thority and socially embedded structures linking urban and rural actors. Further, not only
is task dierentiation directly associated with both necessary organizational features, it
is also a useful analytical lens for tracing the hypothesized organizational features in a
given rebel group. The lens of observing functional dierentiation over time can therefore
serve as an analytical lens to identify the structures and processes that come together to
form a rebel organization’s dominant structure with the concomitant action outcomes.
The complex relationship between political authority and
urban-rural organization links
How do the two conditions reinforce one another? If political authority is well-consolidated,
a leader will likely feel more comfortable “projecting” authority into geographically dis-
tant areas by empowering intermediary actors. Conversely, the use of nonviolent organi-
zation further strengthens the non-military leadership of a group by de-emphasizing the
military arm’s raison d’être. Both a consolidated political leadership and broad and deep
popular ties are also more likely in organizations that embody and practice democratic
norms, and in organizations who support the population through governance apparatuses
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(further propping up the political side of the organization).
Yet, it is dicult to build and maintain an organizational structure that has a domi-
nant structure of consolidated political authority and an organizational structural reach
into central urban areas. In rms as in rebel groups, the coordination and control of de-
cision activities is best achieved through a high level of centralization, which “refers to
the degree to which the right to make decisions and evaluate activities is concentrated”
(Fredrickson 1986, 282). In a rebel group where political authority is so uncontested that a
nonviolent shift is possible as outlined in Section 5.2, authority is likely to be concentrated,
which directly compares to Fredrickson’s concept of centralization. At the same time, ac-
tually mobilizing for nonviolent action requires empowering nonviolent entrepreneurs in
far-ung locations, which can dilute the authority of the central rebel leader if the coordi-
nation and communication mechanisms are not strong enough. High levels of organiza-
tional spatial dispersion and an increase in the number of key actors will also make it more
dicult for a central leadership to oversee both the operation of tasks and the actions of
subordinates (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Compared to rms, this dilemma should be
heightened in rebel groups, which operate covertly and illegally, making oversight and
the ready availability of information necessary for controlling a complex organization
even trickier.
The development of the coordination of these two organizational features of central-
ized leadership and spatial dispersion thus requires time and practice. In what follows, I
argue that a rebel organization that has put emphasis on task dierentiation and devel-
oped the necessary mechanisms throughout its organizational history is likely to maintain
urban-rural organizational links and centralized political authority side by side.
Why and how task dierentiation in rebel groups matters
Before CNRM engaged in the vastly dierent tasks of violent and nonviolent contentious
action, Fretilin’s history reveals a deep adherence to task dierentiation throughout. At
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the time of the group’s foundation in 1974, their ideological adherence to Cabral as well
as political incentives on the ground made Fretilin’s leaders focus on the twin activities
of political mobilization and carrying out socialist policies on the ground. While they
registered members using voting cards, they implemented agricultural cooperatives, or-
ganized cultural events, and improved the rural schooling system. After UDT’s coup and
the development of Falintil, they militarily confronted the growing threat of Indonesia
and administered a quasi-state bureaucracy. In the bases de apoio, Fretilin continued to
prioritize local governance even at the detriment of military imperatives.
The shift towards nonviolent action built on these early instances of task dierentia-
tion. The Clandestine Front built on people’s social and ideological connections to Fretilin,
which made the underground structures particularly durable and widespread. The priori-
tization of political action likewise prevented military dominance in Fretilin and CNRM’s
leadership, sometimes at the cost of strategic eectiveness. While this indicates a close
connection between organizational task dierentiation and the two key organizational
features required for nonviolent action in a civil war, what is the underlying logic? I rst
briey explore the concept of task dierentiation and then theoretically link it to the key
organizational features of political authority and urban-rural organizational links.
The concept of task dierentiation in rebel organizations
Task dierentiation can happen both horizontally and vertically in an organization, where
horizontal dierentiation refers to the number of distinct tasks and vertical dierentia-
tion refers to the dierent organs in the organizational hierarchy distinctly responsible
for these tasks. Therefore, functional task dierentiation not only implies that an organi-
zation “does” several things at once, but also that there exist distinct organs for carrying
out the dierent tasks. Bennis (1966, 250) oers the following conceptualization of orga-
nizational bureaucracy that highlights the organizational complexity that can come with
functional task dierentiation:
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Most students of organizations would say that the anatomy of bureaucracy
consists of the following “organs”: a division of labor based on functional
specialization, a well-dened hierarchy of authority, a system of procedures
and rules for dealing with all contingencies relating to work activities, im-
personality of interpersonal relations, and promotion and selection based on
technical competence.
In a rebel organization, this means that the group purposefully pursues tasks function-
ally unrelated to violence even while waging war. The operation of these tasks should
be observable in distinct organizational processes, and be reected in the group’s for-
mal structure. Naturally, the development of fully functional task dierentiation in rebel
groups takes time. Task dierentiation in pre-war Fretilin was informal; throughout the
conict, it became formalized, until CNRM had four fully functional and meticulously co-
ordinated functional arms in the Clandestine Front, Renetil, Falintil, and the Diplomatic
Front, all represented in a central Executive Commitee chaired by Xanana Gusmão. How
does the development of task dierentiation relate to the organizational structures nec-
essary for rebel use of nonviolent action?
Task dierentiation and political authority
A focus on and development of functional task dierentiation throughout a rebel group’s
history makes it more likely that political authority can be maintained throughout the
war. Early task dierentiation in a rebel organization’s pre-war form allows for a slow
calibration of a balance of power with a chance to develop a distinct political culture
and identity within the group without an overtly dominant military arm. During a civil
war, the military arm of an organization will take on the most pressing task of any organ
within the rebel group. This means that the practice of task dierentiation must be deeply
embedded in the organizational fabric at the time of the civil war, which means that pre-
war organizations matter.
Just as Fretilin was a political party before it was a rebel group, all “insurgent groups
are built by mobilizing prewar politicized social networks,” so that ”pre-existing networks
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provide the underpinnings for new insurgent groups” (Staniland 2014, 9, 17). However,
the organizational histories and forms of these prewar launching organizations can dier
widely. They can be political parties, crime syndicates, religious fringe groups, social
organizations, terrorist groups, etc. All of these organizations vary widely not only in
terms of their functions, but also in their degree of task dierentiation. Therefore, the
rebel organizational origins of eective task dierentiation are likely to be found prior
to the conict. In a group that practiced several forms of activity, including political or
explicitly nonviolent ones, a nonviolent identity can take hold, which should strengthen
the political leadership vis-à-vis the military organ during the war.
Task dierentiation and urban-rural links
There are two key pathways through which task dierentiation aects the breadth of
popular mobilization possible during a civil war. First, an organization that carries out
multiple tasks will intrinsically reach into a more diverse segment of the population than
an organization catering towards only one interest and interest group. Second, this leads
to a multiplicity of potential mobilization pathways, which makes it more likely that ge-
ographic expansion during the chaos of civil war will be possible.
A wide pre-war mobilization base will practically make wartime mobilization easier.
According to McAdam (1986), prior activist histories, even if involvement in the past was
much more marginal in the form of low-cost, low-risk activism, will make it much more
likely that the “budding activist” will later be drawn into higher-risk forms of participa-
tion. In this way, ““safe” forays into activism may have longer-range consequences, [. . . ]
for they place the new recruit “at risk” of being drawn into more costly forms of partici-
pation through the cyclical process of integration and resocialisation [sic]” (69). Through
her prior participation, the activist will make new friends and contacts in the movement,
which will tie her more closely to the movement and increase her stake in the outcome.
Previous engagement will also increase ideological commitment. Therefore, people with
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an activist history of any type will be “structurally available” for high-risk mobilization
(McAdam 1986).
Reaching many segments before the war allows for the participation of dierent seg-
ments of society both in terms of social classes, age groups, and other cleavages. A trade
union only reaches union members, likely from an urban class. Conversely, a social-
ist party is likely to have members who are also associated with unions, but they also
sponsor youth groups and women’s groups. By reaching dierent social segments, the
organization opens up the possibility of mobilizing more people through the strength of
‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1978). According to Parkinson (2013), the overlap between or-
ganizational structures and militants’ quotidian relationships signicantly facilitates the
mobilization of new actors after a civil war is already under way, since mobilization tasks
can be carried out among family members, co-workers, friends, and so on.
An organization that reaches a wide range of people and groups before the war allows
organizational ties and social ties to reach deeply into the population. In this way, the
peacetime establishment of networks with dierent functions can provide a canvas onto
which communication channels and institutions can later be mapped, allowing for the
maintenance of geographically and socially diverse communication channels. In Timor-
Leste, Fretilin’s wide-ranging pre-war activities provided the organization with a wide-
ranging mobilization base that reached into many segments of the society. In the bases
de apoio, the Clandestine Front’s early communication networks were built from people’s
personal relationships to people who had remained in Dili. This provided Fretilin and
later CNRM with a vast potential mobilization base with a wide geographic distribution.
Social ties can also make formal organizational ties stronger, which is important if
these ties need to bridge long distances. According to Gould (1995, 22), ”an unintended
consequence of formal organizations [. . . ] is the creation of social ties that encourage the
recognition of commonalities on a scale considerably broader than would be expected on
the basis of social networks alone.” In the case of Pinto, it was the overlap of his social
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ties with organizational ties that linked him to the organization: Through the Scouts,
a shared interest, young educated Timorese would come into contact with Clandestine
Front members, who would then link them into Fretilin/CNRM’s organizational structure,
thus erasing the division between organizational and social structures. Once they were
members of the Clandestine Front, Pinto and his friends would form their own cells and
recruit further people, which now connected people in adjacent social circles in a formal
way and also would have strengthened their adherence to the resistance cause.22
In comparison, an narrow organization with a narrow focus and no functional dier-
entiation is likely to target only a small sliver of society for potential mobilization. After
all, “relations are more likely between people who share socially signicant attributes
such as income, education, age, gender, and so on (also familiar in the old saying “birds
of a feather ock together”)” (Burt 2005, 12). Such an organization would not be able to
mobilize great masses, since it lacks both direct ties to dierent population segments and
weak ties to the broad population.
Not only does functional dierentiation increase the scope and depth of a rebel group’s
mobilization base, but if an organization performs multiple tasks throughout its history,
this will also provide a wider range of structure and link types inherent to the organi-
zation. Since a nonviolent shift requires the repurposing of preexisting structures, these
structures need to be relatively exible, which is simply more likely if the group is already
practiced at carrying out multiple tasks and functions.
Hypothesis: Task dierentiation
To sum up, task dierentiation makes it likely that the group has organizational urban-
rural links that can be appropriated for nonviolent mass mobilization, and it makes it
more likely that there exists a distinct political voice among the rebel leadership that has
developed vis-à-vis the military. Further, functional task dierentiation that allows for
22See also Burt (2005) and Fuji (2009) for the bridging functions of social/quotidian ties to the organiza-
tional structures of militant organizations.
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the full function of both of these organizational features together requires the practice of
task dierentiation throughout the organization’s history.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Rebel use of nonviolent action is correlated with functional task
dierentiation throughout the organization’s history.
It should be noted that the relationship between task dierentiation and rebel political
authority and urban-rural organizational links is not a linear one; rather, these features
reinforce one another, so that causation runs in both directions. Task dierentiation also
provides a useful analytical lens to focus the exploration of further case studies. As both
necessary organizational features are closely related to task dierentiation, an exploration
of functional task dierentiation will likely yield insights into the processes and structures
underlying rebel use of nonviolent action.
5.4 Alternative explanations
What are the key alternative explanations for rebel use of nonviolent action? Chapters
2 and 3 yield two key alternative arguments, one related to the strategic interaction be-
tween rebel organization and government (or rebel organization with rival organizations
and government), one building on popular support, and one purely arguing based on
opportunity. I briey outline each explanatory approach and formulate alternative hy-
potheses.
Nonviolent action as a purely strategic move
The organizational process theory presented in this chapter is built on the assumption
that mass-based nonviolent action can be highly benecial to almost any rebel group;
however, even if a rebel group has the opportunity to do so, most rebel groups do not have
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the organizational structure and processes to either recognize the need for nonviolent
innovation or have the ability to implement it.
The main counterargument to this key assumption is that nonviolent action does not
in fact strategically benet most organizations; rather, the motivation to use it is much
stronger for rebel organizations who are militarily weak relative to the central govern-
ment. The key benets for rebels who use nonviolent action (explored in Chapter 3) are
the demonstration of popular support, exemplifying movement resilience and control, sig-
nalling norms adherence, and solidication of international support. While a militarily
strong rebel group could also benet from these, the cost of appearing weak by resorting
to nonviolent action would outweigh these benets and actually weaken their bargaining
position.
A rebel group losing the military struggle, on the other hand, can only gain from
demonstrating its capacity and support by using nonviolent action, and might have few
other options in attracting international attention. This should hold especially if the rebel
organization is also in competition with militarily stronger rebel organizations; utilizing
nonviolent action could then be used as a way to stand out by “in-bidding”. It should be
noted that this is more of a probabilistic than necessary condition.
This leads to the following alternative hypothesis:
Alternative Hypothesis 1: Nonviolent action is a strategy exclusively used by
militarily weak rebel groups confronting strong central governments and/or mil-
itarily stronger rival rebel groups.
Nonviolent action and popular support
The second alternative explanation holds that the organizational process theory overcom-
plicates the structural requirements for rebel use of nonviolent action. Rather, the key to
rebels using nonviolent action is in the support of the key actor for nonviolent events,
namely, civilians. Thus, a rebel organization with an opportunity for using nonviolent
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action that enjoys signicant popular support should be able to use nonviolent strategies.
What determines the level of popular support? One could argue that a rebel orga-
nization engaged in popular governance functions should have broad popular support.
Second, if the rebels’ aims are widely supported in the population, this could also deter-
mine the ability of rebels to use nonviolent action. The following hypothesis results from
this logic:
Alternative Hypothesis 2: High levels of popular support are a sucient condi-
tion for rebel use of nonviolent action.
Nonviolent action and opportunity
Finally, rebel use of nonviolent action is only a promising strategy if it is visible to an
international audience. In Timor-Leste, the rst instance of nonviolent action took place
at the occasion of the very rst international visit to Dili in 1989. While an international
audience is key to the success of nonviolent action, one might argue that the rare op-
portunity to use nonviolent action is sucient to determine the use of nonviolent action.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Alternative Hypothesis 3: The opportunity for nonviolent action via access to an
international audience is sucient to explain rebel use of nonviolent action.
Nonviolent action and ideology
The two in-depth positive case studies of successful rebel use of nonviolent action (Timor-
Leste’s CNRM and Nepal’s CPN-M) share a populist ideology deeply inuenced by Mao.
This could lead to the conclusion that a socialist populist ideology is key to nonviolent
action, either because it might predispose an organization for a mass-based strategy or
because it makes the underlying organizational structures particularly likely to emerge.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
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Alternative Hypothesis 4: A populist ideology is necessary for rebel use of non-
violent action.
In addition to probing the main explanatory hypotheses using the case of the Nepali
Maoists, I provide evidence against alternative hypotheses. The Nepalese case demon-
strates that nonviolent action is not a strategy exclusively for militarily weak rebel groups.
In addition to demonstrating how the absence of the key organizational features neces-
sary for nonviolent action made an attempt at urban mass action unsuccessful for the
Salvadoran FMLN, the case also indicates that popular support alone does not determine
a rebel group’s ability to use nonviolent action. In the concluding chapter, I present two
examples of rebel groups that provide some evidence against the other two alternative
hypotheses: The Acehnese GAM had a unique opportunity for nonviolent action (and a
population supporting GAM’s aims) but was not able to use nonviolent action. Finally,
the JKLF in Jammu and Kashmir did not have a populist ideology but still used nonviolent
action.
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Table 5.1: Summary of hypotheses
1. Political authority hypotheses:
• 1a: A politically controlled strategic decision-making process in a rebel
organization is necessary for nonviolent innovation.
• 1b: A centralized, consolidated authority structure with a widely accepted
leadership is necessary condition for a rebel group to use nonviolent ac-
tion.
2. Hypotheses about rural-urban organizational links:
• 2a: An institutionalized organizational structure linking urban and rural
areas is necessary for rebel use of nonviolent action.
• 2b: Wartime nonviolent popular mobilization requires substantial overlap
between formal organizational ties and their social networks.
3. Functional dierentiation hypothesis:
• 3: Rebel use of nonviolent action is correlated with functional task dier-
entiation throughout the organization’s history.
4. Alternative hypotheses:
• A1: Nonviolent action is a strategy exclusively used by militarily weak
rebel groups confronting strong central governments and/or militarily
stronger rival rebel groups.
• A2: High levels of popular support are a sucient condition for rebel use
of nonviolent action.
• A3: The opportunity for nonviolent action via access to an international
audience is sucient to explain rebel use of nonviolent action.
• A4: A populist ideology is necessary for rebel use of nonviolent action.
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6. Probing Plausibility: Nepal’s Capable
Maoists Turn Nonviolent
“The fundamental principles of this path are: To grasp rmly the fact that the people’s war
is the war of the masses . . . and not to permit at any cost to arise a situation where the gun
would control the party.”
— Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)1
By 2005, after nine years of insurgency, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-
M) controlled over 80% of Nepalese territory. As planned in 1996 by a small group of
Maoist Kathmandu intellectuals, they had followed Mao Tse-Tung’s blueprint: They had
moved from guerrilla warfare carried out by a few dozen ghters to replacing state gov-
ernance institutions with their own in their base areas, and nally moved on to positional
warfare, having attained at least military power parity with the Royal Army of Nepal
(Thapa 2015, 190). Despite their military prowess, the Maoists indicated a shift in fo-
cus towards nonviolent action in October 2005 and they nally collaborated with Nepal’s
more moderate parties in organizing a massive nineteen-day strike in April 2006 that
included a demonstration in Kathmandu with several hundred thousand participants.2
Maoist spokesperson Ananta announced on January 15, 2006 that the Maoists would now
exclusively focus on preparing an urban mass insurrection as a key step in establishing a
republic in Nepal (ICG 2006b, 9).
Even more striking, the Maoist wager on nonviolent action paid o: The state of Nepal
became a Federal Democratic Republic on 28 May 2008 after 240 years of almost uninter-
rupted monarchy following a ten-year insurgency by the CPN-M and a two-year interim
1Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal
2Throughout the chapter, I use “Maoists” and CPN-M interchangeably to denote the same organization.
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period of negotiations and elections; Prachanda (Pushba Kamal Dahal), the Maoist Chair-
man and Supreme Commander, became Prime Minister. Experts attribute the Maoists’
shift towards nonviolent action with the success of their campaign and their subsequent
hold on power in Nepal; according to Bhattacharya (2013), for example, “the rebels’ choice
of alternating between violent and nonviolent action ended the conict in the Maoists’
favor” (575).
Was the Timorese turn towards nonviolent action unique, or can the dominant or-
ganizational structures that allowed for the CNRM to strategically use mass-based non-
violent action explain analogous conict trajectories in other rebel organizations? The
easiest way to answer this question is to examine a case that is as dierent as possible
from Timor-Leste in terms of scale, scope, background conditions and strategic inter-
action with the central government. While CNRM’s nonviolent turn was puzzling be-
cause it demonstrated the ability of a nearly-defeated, peripheral rebel group to mobilize
civilian activists across Timor and eventually Indonesia, using an invisible control-and-
communication network, the Nepali case is puzzling for a very dierent reason: Here, a
militarily highly capable rebel organization that might also have achieved its goals mili-
tarily transformed and retooled its powerful military apparatus to focus on organizing an
urban nonviolent mass uprising. Not only is it rare for rebel groups to achieve most of
their ultimate aims, but there are few rebel organizations to achieve military parity with
a state army. The very dierent relative power balance in Nepal compared to Timor-Leste
is a strong argument against the alternative hypothesis presented in the previous chapter
that the rebel use of nonviolent action is a weapon of the weak useful only to militar-
ily weak groups vis-à-vis the government, as this approach cannot explain both of these
cases.
Not only do Timor-Leste’s CNRM and Nepal’s CPN-M dier vastly in terms of their
conict trajectory, their underlying political histories, aims, opponents, cultures, ethnici-
ties, etc. were as dierent as could be. In contrast to Timor-Leste, Nepal is a multi-ethnic,
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multi-lingual, multi-religious, landlocked country with a long history as a nation-state —
it was politically unied in the mid-eighteenth Century by the Shah dynasty — and with
no signicant history of colonization. Nepal’s history with Britain was conned to a war
in the early 19th Century when it lost a good amount of territory to British India after
the ambitious Nepali king Prithivi Narayan expanded his kingdom’s boundaries until he
created a conict with the British East India Company (Thapa 2015, 190). Ideologically,
while Fretilin at times identied as Marxist-Leninist (though in practice can really only
be called socialist), this identity was shed in the mid-1980s, whereas CPN-M explicitly
originated from a series of splinters in Nepal’s Communist parties that made the Maoists’
views extremist by almost any standard. Finally, both due to timing (seventeen years lie
between the start of the Timorese and Nepalese nonviolent campaigns) and infrastructure,
means of communication and propaganda dissemination were somewhat more advanced
in Nepal.
The way the two organizations used nonviolent action was also somewhat dierent.
While CNRM used nonviolent action over ten years, slowly increasing the scope of events,
CPN-M organized a much larger and much shorter nonviolent campaign with signicant
shock value. To do so, it collaborated with other, erstwhile rival parties (the Nepalese
Seven-Party Alliance or SPA). While Falintil also remained active as the nonviolent events
unfolded, CPN-M’s militant wing actively supported the nonviolent events by engaging
the Nepalese Royal Army (NRA) in the periphery and constructing elaborate blockades
around Kathmandu to prevent NRA crackdowns on protesters.
Despite these vastly dierent trajectories and scope conditions, the Maoists’ nonvi-
olent shift was determined by the same two key organizational structural features that
played a determinative role in Timor-Leste even though their outward appearance might
have looked dierent: Prachanda, a political leader, was rmly in control of a centralized
organizational structure. The shift towards nonviolence occurred once Prachanda had ce-
mented his position as Chairman of the CPN-M (and extremist military commanders had
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been jailed), allowing for the identication of consolidated political authority as a dom-
inant structure prior to the onset of nonviolent action. While Fretilin/CNRM achieved
organizational geographic dispersion via a clandestine network, CPN-M was able to for-
mally extend its population links step by step through military control with the exception
of Kathmandu, where a mobilization structure was established via organizational ali-
ates (though on the eve of the nonviolent campaign, CPN-M was also able to operate
within Kathmandu, providing an important control mechanism). Organizational spread
and control was so broad that CPN-M was even able to securely collaborate with rival
parties without compromising their own position within the movement. Just as in Timor-
Leste, spatial extension of communication and control and consolidated political authority
reinforced one another, but the Nepali case shows an alternative pathway towards this
dicult-to-establish organizational structure. At the same time, just as Fretilin/CNRM,
CPN-M maintained a strong political identity both before and throughout the war.
To eectively probe the plausibility of the proposed theory, the following key ques-
tions underlie the analysis of the CPN-M’s nonviolent strategic shift:
1. How much control did the political leader of the rebel organization have over grand-
strategy decisions?
2. How centralized and streamlined was the decision-making apparatus?
3. How far did the organization’s communication and mobilization network reach
when the us of nonviolent strategic action was initiated? How did this aect when,
why and how nonviolent action was used?
4. Did the organization pursue dierent functions throughout its history? How were
these incorporated into the organizational structure?
This chapter will proceed as follows: I will rst present a (short) overview of Nepal’s
political history and then outline the conict trajectory and nonviolent campaign with
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a special focus on the transition from the former to the latter. I will then explore intra-
organizational dynamics: How were strategic decisions, particularly with regards to sig-
nicant shifts, made? What other factors played a role? I then examine CPN-M’s decision-
making dynamics, especially as they related to strategic innovation, and the spread of
territorial control and mobilization structures, and draw conclusions about the organiza-
tion’s reach on the eve of the nonviolent campaign. Throughout, I keep in mind functional
dierentiation as an analytical focusing tool. I will conclude by briey discussing whether
or not the case study conrms or disconrms the proposed hypotheses, and what this tells
us about the scope of the theory.
6.1 The Maoist insurgency and its nonviolent nale
Political background
The histories of democracy and popular movements in Nepal is short. From 1959 to 1960,
King Mahendra briey introduced multi-party democracy but quickly abandoned the ex-
periment using his emergency powers. In 1985, the powerless Congress Party launched a
nonviolent protest campaign (satyagraha) against the prevalent panchayat system (Bas-
nett 2009, 18). Until the 1990s, the authoritarian rule of the royal class was blamed for
the country’s socio-economic ills and democracy hailed as a panacea (Thapa 2015, 190).
In 1990, a multi-party pro-democracy movement largely driven by education institutions,
students, and teachers launched a nonviolent people’s movement (Jan Andolan) against
the monarchy. King Birendra acceded to some of their demands and gave the country
a democratic constitution and a political system of multi-party constitutional monarchy.
This new “democratic” system resulted in three parliamentary and two local elections be-
tween 1991 and 2002, but failed to achieve stability, so that democracy was seen as mostly
proting dominant Brahmin and Chhetri upper castes (Thapa 2015, 191).
The new political system, led by a quick succession of Prime Minsters in conjunction
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with the king, saw little progress in either development or equality and many parts of
Nepal were still barely developed by 1996. For example, from the 1970s on, roads only
connected the tropical lowlands, with limited additional oshoots into the northern hill
country and south into India appearing in the 1990s; most of the country could still only
be reached via trails even in 2005. Similarly, by 2005, Nepal’s phone lines were only be-
ginning to expand from the center, and even then only into district capitals, though there
was at least a limited spread of radios (Marks and Palmer 2005, 93). Rampant structural
inequality and bad governance were the norm in the early 1990s, a time that saw ex-
plosion of identity movements among marginalized groups (class, ethnic, caste, religious,
regional, and gender). Against this backdrop, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was
formally established in 1995, perfectly placed to capitalize on the growing popular disen-
chantment with the prevailing power structure and launch a violent insurgency against
the parliamentary democracy and its ally, the king (Thapa 2015, 191).
Nepal’s civil war
CPN-M, led by Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai (the organi-
zation’s chief ideologue) formally announced the beginning of their violent insurgency
on Febrary 13, 1996, after the Nepali government rejected their ultimatum of 40 demands
they had handed to the government a few days earlier. The list contained demands related
to nationalism, full democracy, the livelihood of the Nepalese rural population, and the
abrogation of unequal treaties with foreign countries. Athough a Maoist-style “people’s
democracy” was the most ideologically charged demand, the key (and most consistent
throughout the war) demand concerned the election of a new constituent assembly and
the drafting of a new constitution, guaranteeing more equal political representation (Da-
hal 2005; Basnett 2009).
CPN-M’s ideology was inuenced by the ideological teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin,
and Mao; the plans for practical implementation of these fathers of communism was in-
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spired by the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shin-
ing Path) and the Naxalites in India (Marks and Palmer 2005, 102). Their envisioned strat-
egy was also based on these role models, according to their published theoretical premises
underlying their insurgency: “This plan of ours would be based on the lessons of Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism regarding revolutionary violence . . . that will unfold as protracted peo-
ple’s war based on the strategy of encircling the city from the countryside according to
the specicities of people’s war developed by Mao as the universal and invincible Marx-
ist theory of war” (CPN-M 1996b). This grand strategy of a Protracted People’s War had
the following rough components: To control the countryside fully and then encircle and
move on urban areas; to rely on guerrilla warfare and then move to positional warfare;
and to pass through the three distinct stages of strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and
strategic oense (Bhattacharya 2013; CPN-M 1996b). It should be noted that while the
CPN-M announced each of these stages formally and they did correspond to strategically
distinct phases (guerrilla warfare and building of bases, positional warfare and propa-
ganda/mobilization through fraternal organizations, large-scale military actions coordi-
nated with nonviolent movement), the interpretation of what Mao himself might have
meant when coining the three stages was very loose and heavily adjusted to changing
strategic circumstances.
The Maoists’ overall goal during the stage of strategic defense was the weakening of
enemy power, establishing power vacuums via sabotage and targeting and collect enemy
weapons. They would then establish rural bases, govern, and expand military power ac-
cording to the following motto: “Let us march ahead on the path of struggle towards estab-
lishing the people’s rule by wrecking the reactionary ruling system of the state” (CPN-M
quoted in Ogura (2008, 14)). Accordingly, the Maoist insurgency started in the the central,
rural and mountainous Rukum and Rolpa districts with attacks on three police posts, car-
ried out by small groups of ghters with locally available weapons: Knives, sticks, sickles,
homemade explosives and old-fashioned guns. While the Maoists started out with only
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a few dozen fully trained ghters, they were able to carry out over 6000 more or less co-
ordinated small-scale actions during the rst fteen days of struggle (Huang 2012; Ogura
2008). After six months, CPN-M formed its rst squad of ghters carrying out guerrilla
warfare, mostly committing raids aginst local feudals, police, rival political workers, gov-
ernment spies, moneylenders, rapists, wife-beaters, smugglers, and corrupt ocials. In
1999, the Maoists rst divided their activities into three parallel forms of struggle that
were employed strategically in dierent places across the country: In the “Guerilla Zone”,
they directly engaged Nepal’s security forces (rst the Armed Police Force or APF and
later the Royal Nepalese Army or RNA); in the “Propaganda Zone” they mobilized the
urban population through political education and issues-focused activism via associated
subsidiary student and professional organizations; and in the “Main Zone” they estab-
lished base areas and carried out local governance functions (Dahal 2005, 2).
The Nepalese government relied on its armed police force for counterinsurgency mea-
sures and failed to understand the quickly growing scope of the insurgency, in large parts
due to its highly centralized governance style that left entire districts largely unguarded
(Dahal 2005; Thapa 2015). In fact, the government actively withdrew its police and ad-
ministrative ocers (as well as service delivery agencies and institutions) from rural ar-
eas that were not deemed strategically important, thus allowing the Maoists considerable
room to expand and grow their base areas (Dahal 2005, 2). The government relied on
severely repressive counterinsurgency measures against the Maoists that included sig-
nicant civilian casualties (which CPN-M avoided wherever possible). This lumbering
ineptitude in containing the Maoists nally led to “intensied security mobilization” in
1998, which included Armed Police Ordinance 2057 which increased the powers of the
APF, and expanded the executive power for the king (Bhattacharya 2013, 576).
A ceasere from late 2000 to early 2001marked the beginning of the Maoists’ period of
“strategic stalemate”. The ceasere followed the assassination of King Birendra, who had
been relatively moderate, if weak, compared to his successor, hardliner younger brother
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Gyanendra, who many suspected of ordering the assassination himself. As the state con-
tinued its repressive measures through the APF, CPN-M unilaterally called o the cease-
re and engaged in further targeted attacks. The Nepalese government — at this point
still ruled jointly by king and prime minister with a weak parliament — declared CPN-M
a terrorist organization in the same year (it also appeared on the US State Department’s
Terrorist Watchlist). That year, 3,000 people were killed, most of them by the state (Bhat-
tacharya 2013, 576). Gyanendra reinforced the overwhelmed police force with 54,000
troops from the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and passed anti-terrorism legislation that
further increased the power of the palace relative to the civilian government (Marks and
Palmer 2005, 105). Gyanendra’s relationship with parliament was shaky at best from the
start; through failed negotiations and ceaseres in 2002 and 2003, he unseated the Prime
Minister twice (Bhattacharya 2013, 576).
By February 2001, the Maoists had acquired modern weapons such as mortars, rocket
launchers, machine guns, self-loading ries, and a variety of small, light weapons; its mili-
tary wing had grown to three divisions, nine brigades, 29 battalions in addition to people’s
militias (Dahal 2005, 2). At varying degrees of penetration, they now controlled the ma-
jority of Nepal’s rural territory. Through a combination of Maoist governance, publicity
campaigns and increasingly large-scale civilian targeting by the Nepalese government and
human rights abuses that received both national and international public condemnation,
civilian support for the Maoists increased steadily, and the narrative that Gyanendra was
to be blamed for failed negotiations became widely accepted (Bhattacharya 2013, 576).
The Maoists initiated the third stage of their struggle on August 31, 2004, as they
believed there to now be a “strategic equilibrium” where neither side could militarily
fully eliminate the other; the focus now was to “stand on the spine [of the enemy] to
strike the head”; the military focus was to be on peripheral military bases and to cut
o supply routes to Kathmandu, serving the simultaneous purposes of enabling strikes
on the Kathmandu area, demonstrate government incapacity, and increase Maoist mobi-
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lization in urban areas (ICG 2006a, 8). The most immediate aim of the strategy was to
disrupt the preparations for municipal elections called by the government and encourage
a widespread boycott (Chalmers 2012, 75).
In February 2, 2005, King Gyanendra lost patience, sacked the prime minister, dis-
missed parliament, and declared a full state of emergency, assuming all executive power
in an attempt to defeat the insurgency. In his ocial statement, he stated that “it would
not be right for the monarchy to just watch the country slide into chaos;” he blamed parti-
san inghting for the failed counterinsurgency, claiming that “even when the bloodshed,
violence and devastation has pushed the country to the brink of destruction, those en-
gaged in politics continued to shut their eyes to the people’s welfare” counterinsurgency
campaign on the parties (Bell 2005). It was this fatal strategic mistake on the part of the
king that gave the immediate impetus for the nonviolent campaign.
The nonviolent campaign
While the narrative around nonviolent action in Nepal’s civil war tends to focus solely
on the April 2006 nineteen-day strike that culminated in a protest march in Kathmandu
attended by several hundred thousand people, nonviolent action was nothing entirely new
for either the Maoists or the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA - Nepal’s seven main parties that
had been ousted from government and parliament by King Gyanendra).3 As part of their
“popular insurgency” campaign initiated in 2001, CPN-M organized countless small-scale
demonstrations and strikes through its subsidiary organizations coordinated under their
United Front (see below). However, most of these early events were aimed at mobilization
and propaganda and were not coordinated with strategic military action. For their part,
the SPA had launched a “second people’s movement” in May 2005 (after the Jan Andolan
3The Seven-Party Alliance consisted of the Nepali Congress, the Nepali Congress (Democratic), the
Communist Party of Nepal (Unied Marxist-Leninist), the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, the Nepal
Goodwill Party (Anandi Devi) and the United Left Front.
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of 2001), but did not manage to gather popular force until the early months of 2006 when
they had joined forces with the vastly better organized CPN-M (Thapa 2015, 195).
On September 3, 2005, CPN-M announced a three-month unilateral ceasere, and once
more publicly reiterated their demands, now bolstered by the king’s coup: the formation
of an interim regime and elections for a constituent assembly to solve the crisis facing
the country (Dahal 2005, 5). The King decried the ceasere as strategic maneuvering and
was not wrong, as CPN-M used the time period to plan its campaign on two fronts: Reor-
ganization of their own party and general approach, and forging an agreement with the
SPA, which had been unthinkable prior to Gyanendra’s emergency rule. In its two-week
expanded Central Committee meeting, the Maoists reorganized their command structure,
reinforced their military organization around Kathmandu, and decided on collaboration
with SPA and the prioritization of true multi-party democracy through a new constitu-
tion over Maoist ideology. After the CPN-M meeting, Prachanda announced: “The party
would utilize the truce with mass mobilization and struggle” to campaign for a democratic
republic (Dahal 2005, 6).
Meeting in New Delhi in November 2005, the SPA and the Maoists signed the “12-
Point Understanding” and committed to boycotting the municipal elections scheduled for
January 2006. In their agreement, the Maoists formally indicated their willingness to
participate in multi-party government, whereas the SPA conceded to Maoist demands to
bring an end to monarchy, create a republic, and hold a constituent assembly election to
draft a new constitution (Huang 2012, 158). The SPA and Maoists both explicitly stated
their intent to foment a nonviolent democratic movement (Thapa 2015, 195). Theirs was
not an easy alliance: Coordination at the start was dicult, so that untimely attacks by
the Maoists in the Kathmandu valley and across the country (after ending the ceasere on
January 2) provided justication for a government crackdown, stiing the rst proposed
mass rally on January 20, 2006, which led to the arrest of dozens of political leaders and
activists on January 19 (ICG 2006a, 1). The Maoists shifted to a strategy of very small
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military engagements and sabotage in Kathmandu to demonstrate the lack of govern-
ment capacity combined with mobilization eorts through the United Front associated
organizations (ICG 2006a, 9).
SPA and the Maoists also disagreed on the best type of nonviolent campaign, namely
a general strike or a series of large-scale demonstrations. Initially, it was deemed im-
possible to combine the two, as a strike would make the coordination of demonstrations
dicult due to lack of transportation and the potential shutdown of means of commu-
nication. In the end, they decided on a four-day strike starting on April 6, which would
be accompanied by smaller, decentralized demonstrations and a larger demonstration in
Kathmandu if possible. In the run-up to April, both SPA and the Maoists rearmed their
commitment to the November 2005 deal, but could not agree to issue a joint appeal to
the population to join their general strike, so that separate mobilizing appeals were sent
out by each ally (ICG 2006b, 2). On April 10, four days after the start of the strike, Nepali
Congress President G. P. Koirala and Maoist spokesman Krishna Bahadur Mahara had a
very public dispute on BBC’s Nepali radio over who controlled the nonviolent movement
(ICG 2006a, 3).
Despite the disagreements over strategic approach and movement control that compli-
cated planning, it is unimaginable for the nonviolent movement to have been successful
(or possible) without the Maoists (more details later). Prachanda himself in a radio ad-
dress detailed the CPN-M’s eorts in organizing the nonviolent movement, likely incens-
ing SPA’s leadership (ICG 2006b, 4). CPN-M positioned troops in Kathmandu, should the
government react with severe repression; they controlled all highways leading to Kath-
mandu by force and engaged the RNA in remote areas to draw them away from the city;
and the ferried in busloads of protesters from rural regions to participate in the April 19
demonstration. The four-day strike continued for nineteen days and participants came
from all segments of society, including professional associations, civil society groups, civil
service, business community, and even government (Ogura 2008). On April 24, the CPN-M
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also held a bold solo demonstration in Pathari Bazar (Morang) after the SPA had displayed
an inclination to compromise; Gyanendra capitulated on the same day, acceding to all of
the SPA-Maoist alliance’s demands (ICG 2006b, i).
6.2 Political authority and decision-making in CPN-M
There are several reasons why we might expect CPN-M to become more extremist in
their means over time — and possibly show signs of further splintering – rather than
move towards nonviolent action. The organization started out as an extremist splinter
from another party, and existing research often associates splintering with increasing
extremism.4 In contrast with Fretilin/CNRM, the Nepali Maoists also lacked even a short
history of political governance or conventional political organizing but favored a violent
strategy from the beginning.
Apart from the startling resort to nonviolent action in 2005/2006, there are other
notable features to the Nepali Maoists’ organizational trajectory over time. Despite its
factionalized origins, CPN-M showed a high degree of organizational cohesion under
Prachanda’s leadership even during wartime without further splintering, coming close
only once. While their funding ideology placed them at the far-left fringe of Nepalese
politics, the Maoists softened rather than hardened in their aims, adapting to political
and structural incentives and pragmatic considerations about widening their mobilization
base. While they originally called for a “dictatorship of the proletariat” (using the slogan
naulo janbad or “new people’s democracy”), they later emphasized the need to complete
Nepal’s “bourgeois democratic revolution” and a true multiparty democracy that allowed
for real popular representation, as stated by Prachanda in an ocial press statement on
May 10, 2005 (ICG 2005, 2). On the one hand, CPN-M remained steadfast and was ulti-
mately successful in demanding the abdication of the monarch, the election of a new con-
4See Bueno de Mesquita (2008) or Cunningham (2013)
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stituent assembly, and the drafting of a new constitution. On the other hand, they were
exible in terms of their main economic policy demands and adopted issues championed
by the middle class, such as high private school fees, in order to broaden their popular
appeal (ICG 2005, 4). They also proved adaptable in their military approach, moving from
guerrilla-inspired small-scale hit-and-run action to full-scale guerrilla mobilization and
nally positional warfare.
Many of these features, in particular the ability to shift an explicitly violent organi-
zation towards mass-based nonviolent action, is due to the leadership skills and style of
Prachanda. Shahi (2010) argues that “Prachanda’s abilities to maneuver through opposi-
tions and constraints led the CPN (Maoist) to power through instigating the insurgency,
but without achieving military victory over the state” (5). Benetting from an explicitly
political - rather than military - organizational identity with a highly centralized internal
structure, Prachanda was able to deepen and extend his hold on the Maoists as their mil-
itary successes multiplied. When the Maoists were at their military peak, he was able to
maintain his stature even while collaborating with the SPA, an erstwhile arch rival. His
ability to keep extremist internal rivals and ambitious external rivals in check, coupled
with a bit of luck where arrests and government mistakes were concerned, gave Prachanda
the authority to move CPN-M onto a nonviolent path in late 2005 and early 2006. I will
rst briey outline the organizational history and structure of CPN-M and then trace how
leadership determined the Maoists’ ability to shift towards nonviolent action.
The tumultuous creation of CPN-M
CPN-M was the result of several splintering events of communist Nepali parties since
1949, when the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was founded in Kolkata, India. Twelve
separate party splits and mergers stood between 1949 and the ocial creation of CPN-
Maoist (Shahi 2010). A major disagreement over strategy (peaceful within the political
process or violent) caused a split in 1974 and led to CPN (Fourth Convention), which aimed
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to end the monarchy through force; this and most other splits directly leading to CPN-M
moved the party further towards the extreme left and a concomitant belief in violence as
the only way out. In 1983, Mohan Bikram Singh split from CPN (Fourth Convention) to
found CPN (Masal). Only two years later, Mohan Vaidya (Comrade Kiran), an ideological
hardliner who wanted to accelerate the armed uprising, clashed with Singh and started
CPN (Mashal).5 Prachanda replaced Kiran as Chairman of CPN-Mashal in 1986, while
Bhattarai had become Chairman of CPN-Masal; both groups advocate the use of “People’s
War” (Shahi 2010, 10-11).footnoteAfter the war, Kiran would retain his strictly Maoist
ideology, continuing to advocate for a fully-edged People’s Republic without multi-party
elections (Shahi 2010, 10). Chandra Prasad Gajurel, a cadre member of CPN (Mashal) and
Central Committee member of CPN-M during the war, explained that neither group could
ever agree on concrete plans for carrying out armed insurgency, and lacked the requisite
knowledge to do so. Prachanda became Chairman of CPN (Unity Center) after a merger
in 1990, and then Chairman of CPN-M without serious challenges to his leadership role
(Ogura 2008, 9).
In 1984, CPN-Mashal became a founding member of the Revolutionary International
Movement (RIM), which aorded them exchange about strategies and theories with other
revolutionary leaders and movements. It was then that CPN-Mashal and its leaders were
formatively inuenced by other ongoing armed insurgencies with shared ideological un-
derpinnings. According to Gajurel, who then led CPN-Mashal, the organization received
direct guidance from Peru’s Sendero Luminoso and the Indian Naxalites:
After our participation in the rst convention of the Revolutionary Interna-
tional Movement in 1984, we received plenty of documents on beginning a
People’s War from the Peruvian Communist Party, the Shining Path, as they
too participated in this convention. We also had contacts with armed groups
in India, such as the Indian Naxalite group and the Maoist Communist Cen-
ter. By analyzing those documents and the examples available in India, we
also thought that although the ‘mass line’ was missing in Peru, the military
5Masal means “ame” in Nepali; Mashal dierentiated itself by simply adding an “h” to sound dierent,
but the word has no separate meaning (Shahi 2010, 9).
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plan and basic principles of the People’s War adopted by the Shining Path
nevertheless could be applicable in Nepal. (Ogura 2008, 9)
CPN-Mashal leaders also took more concrete steps to prepare for armed conict during
this period. For example, to familiarize himself with the realities and diculties of guer-
rilla warfare, Prachanda trained with ex-Gorkha soldiers in India and learned how to make
bombs from exiled Nepali revolutionary Ram Baja Prasad Singh (Roy 2008, 186).
In January 1990, seven outlawed communist party factions formed the United Left
Front with the aim of launching a popular movement against the Panchayat political sys-
tem. They cooperated with the Nepali Congress (Nepal’s oldest and largest outlawed
party) to launch the Jan Andolan, which lasted 50 days and ended with King Birendra a
multi-party political system. In opposition to this collaboration, CPN-Masal, CPN-Mashal,
and several other far-left communist parties merged into CPN-Unity Centre with an ideol-
ogy advocating for People’s War and Maoism as their ideology, with Prachanda as General
Secretary (Shahi 2010, 11). After 1990, the political wing - United National People’s Front
(UNPF) - managed to enter the House of Representatives led by Bhattarai, but even though
they had the third-most votes, they held only nine of 205 seats in parliament and quickly
became disillusioned (Ogura 2008, 10).
After the Nepali Congress Party (in power) used police force to suppress UNPF gath-
erings, CPN-Unity Center split into two over the question of whether or not the time was
ripe for an armed uprising, the larger splinter group formed CPN-Maoist in 1995, likewise
under the leadership of Prachanda (Thapa 2015, 194). From the point of its break-o, the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was committed to an armed strategy. While their 40-
point list of demands submitted to the Nepalese government was framed as an ultimatum
(indicating that violent action was only one option forward), the party was preparing for
war, engaging in extensive recruitment and propaganda campaigns in the Maoists’ mid-
western stronghold districts of Rukum and Rolpa, focusing on the disaected groups in
the region (Von Einsiedel 2012, 10). However, while CPN-M saw violence as the only way
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forward, the violent struggle was seen as crucially organized and restrained. As put by
Prachanda, “it should be strictly expressed in both our policy and practice that red terror
does not mean anarchy” (quoted in Bhattacharya (2013, 583)). Further, to Prachanda, it
was clear that to initiate a people’s war did not mean that the CPN-M was a militant or-
ganization; it was seen as integral “to establish the leadership of the party over the army
and not to permit at any cost to arise a situation where the gun would control the party”
(CPN-M 1995). Thus, the primacy of the political authority was emphasized even before
the war started in this party advocating violence as their means of struggle.
CPN-M’s organizational structure
In CPN-M, Prachanda’s leadership skills and the organization’s self-identication as a
party throughout the war are inextricably linked. Throughout, he had the authority to
take all immediate executive decisions, though the rest of the party leadership (Politburo,
Standing Committee, and occasionally Central Committee during plenum meetings) could
endorse, revise or, very occasionally, reject his decisions (ICG 2005, 7). Throughout the
conict, organizational control of both party and military remained rmly in the hands of
the Politburo’s Standing Committee, which was to say Prachanda. Serious challenges to
his position in 2004/2005 were dealt with swiftly. At the same time, the Maoists’ internal
decision-making structure resembled more that of a party with a strong leader than that
of a militant organization throughout. The International Crisis Group, following multiple
in-depth reports about CPN-M’s organizational development over the years and relying
on dozens of interviews with CPN-M leaders and members, concluded in 2005 - when the
Maoists were at their military peak - that “the Maoists are at heart a political party. They
have developed military capacity but it is subordinated to political control” (ICG 2005, i).6
This is remarkable: After all, CPN-M had no real history as a functioning political party.
6The organizational structure of CPN-M during the insurgency days is at times murky and there are
some inconsistencies across accounts. The most credible account comes from the Nepali branch of the
International Crisis Group, which bases its analyses on primary sources and extensive interviews.
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Even though CPN-M was founded and inuenced most profoundly by two high-caste
Brahmins from Kathmandu, strongly adhered to a populist political ideology Marks and
Palmer (2005, 102). The maintenance of this strong and enduring political identity in par-
allel to an astounding military apparatus can in no small part be attributed to Prachanda’s
second in command and close friend, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. The relationship between
Prachanda and Bhattarai, chief ideologue and academic, was such that Bhattarai moder-
ated Prachanda’s views but never threatened Prachanda’s authority.
Under the ideological stewartship of Bhattarai, CPN-M developed a carefully cali-
brated political authority structure that could t seamlessly with the prioritization of vi-
olent action as the key strategy. On the one hand, Bhattarai believed rmly that violent
struggle was imperative given Nepal’s situation and his own interpretation of Maoism, as
he wrote in the theoretical foundations of CPN-M’s predecessor party in 1991: “It is evi-
dent that in such a revolution the role of the Communist Party and the people’s war would
be primary and that of the mass and class organizations and the people’s movement be
secondary” (quoted in ICG (2005, 7)). At the same time, according to Maoist teachings, the
use of violence as a prioritized strategy was t into three “magic weapons”, decreasing
in strategic importance: party (most important), army (second important), united front
(third important). Yet, even though this statement clearly prioritizes violent over nonvio-
lent action, the popular focus is very apparent. Violence as a means to a political end was
thus enshrined in the CPN-M’s foundations; in this way, functional dierentiation was
part of CPN-M’s very identity.
The primacy of political authority and the plan to govern territory was clearly evident
in the “three magical weapons” organizational structure. The Party, led by the Chairman
of the Politburo (Prachanda), consisted of a nine-member Standing Committee (nine mem-
bers) and below it the full-member Politburo (twenty-seven members). The Politburo was
also the military “General Sta”, which made the two most inuential military comman-
ders (Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) and Mohan Vaidya (Kiran)) also inuential gures in
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the Standing Committee of the Politburo (Marks and Palmer 2005, 102). It appears that
the majority of the Standing Committee were political leaders and not eld commanders.
CPN-M’s main “legislative” body was the Central Committee (55-100 members), which
convened in plenary sessions approximately once or twice a year; however, the majority
of key decisions were taken in the Politburo, and Prachanda himself initiated most signif-
icant strategic decisions and shifts. The Central Committee only debated and approved
signicant strategic, structural and ideological shifts. Importantly, both Timor-Leste and
Nepal, then, had strong central leaders, not only strong political authority structures,
which allowed both of them to circumvent internal opposition to innovation.
The political control over military aairs was also replicated at the regional level once
CPN-M controlled and governed a piece of territory. In June 2002, the Central Commit-
tee approved the creation of additional key power positions in the form of three regional
commands led by regional political commissars that had signicant leeway in terms of ac-
tion: The Special Central Command, Western Command, Eastern Command, where they
were in charge of forming and administering regional party committees. These political
regions were merged with military regional divisions overseen by a military commander
after the creation of the People’s Liberation Army (see below). According to the Maoists,
a Political Commissar had authority over regional military commander (according to a
translation of a 2004 Maoist publication in ICG (2005, 9)). On paper, there were also sev-
eral departments in charge of policy, schools, human rights, health, etc., though not all of
them were actually functioning. The International Department, led by Bhattarai during
the key years 2004-2006, was in charge of international outreach (and later negotiations
with the SPA in India) and was the most eshed out of them.
The Maoist armed wing at rst consisted of a few dozen ghters with three levels
of authority below Prachanda, the Supreme Commander: “Fighting units” (ladaku dal),
“security units” (suraksha dal), and “volunteer units” (svayamsevak dal). CPN-M either
captured weapons through raids or bought them abroad through money from criminal ac-
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tivities (bank heists, kidnapping, etc.). In 1998, the Central Committee approved the con-
struction of base areas, where CPN-M both administered governance and recruited troops
through a mixture of propaganda and at times coercion.7 It was only when King Gyanen-
dra tightened executive control that CPN-M overhauled its military structure completely,
creating the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Nepal. The PLA’s organization was mod-
eled on that of a state military, matching their shift from guerrilla to positional warfare
strategies: There were three regional divisions, three brigades per division, battalions,
companies, platoons, squads, and militias (poorly armed, non-uniformed ghters without
guerrilla training). For urban areas, there were specialized, lightly armed task forces. It
was the PLA’s attacks on army barracks at Ghorahi that caused Gyanendra to bring the
Royal Nepalese Army out of the barracks.
The United Front was the Maoists’ ocial third “magic weapon”, fullling multiple
parallel functions that increased in number over the years, all representing nonmilitary
action. Ocially, it was established in accordance with the Maoist dictum to “unite with
all forces that can be united with in order to ght a common struggle against the en-
emy and win in revolution and construction” (Li 1995, 451). The United Front served
both as an umbrella for a broad coalition of associated organizations (“people’s class or-
ganizations”) assisting in the revolutionary struggle, but ocially also administered and
oversaw the governance institutions established in regions controlled by the Maoists. The
People’s Government, ocially under the purview of the United Front but in practice di-
rectly controlled by the party, included units devolved to the lowest administrative unit
of the country (more on this below), with each level overseen its own consultative com-
mittee (Basnett 2009, 23). Out of the key associated organizations, only one (All Nepal
National Free Students Union or ANNFSU-M) was grandfathered in; many others (unions
for dierent groups of workers, women, ethnic groups, etc.) were established directly
by Maoists. In 2001, the work of the United Front was streamlined with the creation of
7See Eck (2014) for a detailed review of CPN-M’s use of coercion.
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the United People’s Revolutionary Council, which coordinated the activities of associated
organizations. This was necessary as the second strategic stage (Strategic Stalemate) fore-
saw increased propaganda and mobilization activities to prepare for urban insurrection
under the label “Prachanda path,” which would be largely carried out by the 21 associated
groups (Dahal 2005, 2). It was through the United Front that CPN-M organized its rst
strike in 2000, when ANNFSU-M shut down 30,000 schools all over Nepal in November
2000 (ICG 2005, 11).
Political authority and strategic evolution: Towards nonviolent
action
CPN-M underwent two key moments of innovation that moved the organization towards
nonviolent action: The Central Committee meetings of November 2001 and October 2005,
respectively. In November 2001, the party decided to put more eorts into popular mobi-
lization and propaganda outside of their base areas in preparation for an urban, popular
insurrection down the line; and in October 2005, they moved to institute urban insurrec-
tion in conjunction with the SPA with a concurrent signicant shift in military strategy.
How did these strategic shifts happen? Who made the key decisions? And how were they
implemented?
November 24, 2001 marks the organizational shift from “Strategic Defense” to “Strate-
gic Stalemate,” which on the military side included a military shift from guerrilla warfare
to positional warfare. In order to accomplish this, CPN-M formed the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), organized akin to a state military given its new military-strategic approach
(Ogura 2008, 18). More importantly given the focus of this analysis, CPN-M also embarked
on the so-called “Prachanda Path,” devised by and named for Prachanda. The “Prachanda
Path” seems connected to a growing realization that the classic Maoist expectation that a
slow build-up of capacity and support in rural areas would lead in itself to a decisive revo-
lution in more urban areas of the country did not materialize. The strategic approach was
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unsuited to highly centralized, mountainous Nepal, where Kathmandu was controlled by
King Gyanendra and rural areas essentially cut o from the capital. This led to a marrying
of Maoist and Leninist tactics: the “people’s war” in the villages would be complemented
by a push for “people’s rebellion” in towns and cities. Practically speaking, this meant in-
creasing urban mobilization via non-military means and intensifying the military struggle
in the periphery. Importantly, while mobilization sometimes did include small-scale non-
violent events such as protests or strikes, these were not intended as large-scale popular
mass action but were rather instances of propaganda that helped to make mass action
possible at a later date.
Within the organizational hierarchy, the 2005 decision to move towards nonviolent
action would likely have failed without personnel shakeups in 2004. CPN-M came clos-
est to a split in 2004 during the August plenum where the start of the strategic oensive
was announced. Disagreements focused on three key questions: The balance between
political and military strategies, the personality cult over (and inuence of) Prachanda,
and whether struggle against the Nepali monarchy should take precedence over oppos-
ing Indian expansionism and achieving a full Maoist revolution. Prachanda was for a
struggle against Nepali monarchy but against a compromising alliance with the SPA, pre-
ferring negotiating with the King (Vanaik 2008). Baburam Bhattarai, on the other hand,
argued for a conditional alliance with mainstream parties against the monarchy, and was
suspended briey in early 2005 for his “traitorous” position (Chalmers 2012, 75). On the
other extreme was Comrade Kiran, who was opposed to Prachanda’s compromise stance
with regard to negotiations (he deemed it “weak”) but he was arrested in the same year
(Thapa 2015, 197). In fact, during the rst ceasere and round of peace negotiations in
2001, the military faction headed by Kiran walked out of negotiations, eectively end-
ing the ceasere (Basu and Riaz 2010). Kiran’s absence in particular seems like a large
reason why Prachanda was able to unite CPN-M behind him in joining into an alliance
with SPA and eectively abandon the armed struggle. Likewise, Bhattarai’s suspension
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showed that the party as a whole supported Prachanda even in a move against Bhattarai,
demonstrating that Bhattarai could not pose a threat to Prachanda’s position within the
organization.
King Gyanendra’s February 2, 2005 coup provided the impetus for nonviolent action.
Yet, the immediate reaction on the part of the Maoists was a display of their full military
capability. Prachanda demonstrated the Maoists’ military strength, realizing that the coup
had foreclosed the possibility of dialogue with the monarch for the foreseeable future.
He ordered large-scale attacks on a well-fortied army base in Khara (Rukum district),
which were not entirely successful. As a consequence, he reshued local commanders
in the summer of 2005, which allowed for a successful attack on a heavily fortied army
engineering base in Pili (far-western Kalikot district) (Chalmers 2012, 75). These attacks
likely served not only to demonstrate the Maoist’s strength to Gyranendra but also the
SPA, making clear that CPN-M could spoil an agreement not to their liking in an instant
through military action.
Internally, the King’s coup shifted the strategic incentives in favor of Bhattarai’s pre-
ferred moderate approach: Collaboration with Nepal’s mainstream parties in the Seven-
Party Alliance. Bhattarai was released shortly after the King’s fatal move, and the Maoist
Central Committee held a meeting in Chunbang (a village in Rolpa) where they rst con-
ceived of the new party concept of inter-party collaboration (Shahi 2010, 30). Bhattarai
himself frames this outcome in a positive light, glossing over the preceding rift: “After the
king’s coup, our internal dispute over issues of priority was automatically resolved be-
cause it had become clear that he was the main enemy. Actually, the king’s move against
the state brought us together” (quoted in Ogura (2008, 21)).
The coup provided both internal and external justication for a rapprochement with
SPA. Prachanda could now move towards a more moderate approach, especially as he had
already demonstrated his internal power by sanctioning Bhattarai. His ability to accede to
changes in strategy even when proposed by others in the organization madePrachanda’s
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rebel leadership style remarkable. Along these lines, Lawoti (2010, 13) argues that apart
from his charisma and leadership abilities, Prachanda was strategic in balancing dierent
factions and leaders by not veering to far into either ideological direction before the King’s
coup, and he would often incorporate issues raised by others into the ocial party line,
though only sometimes follow up with action. This is remarkably similar to Xanana’s
willingness and exibility to allow for innovation originating in dierent parts of his
organization and incorporate them into his organizational structure without loosening his
own hold on the organizational leadership. It also mirrors innovation in Xanana’s CNRM
in 1989, which were also preceded by organizational reshuing and also originated from
elsewhere in the organization.
The second instance of major innovation — which directly concerned nonviolent ac-
tion — occurred in October 2005 as both Prachanda and CPN-M as a whole ocially de-
clared their willingness to ally themselves with the SPA and together plan and organize a
nonviolent uprising. In an interview with Vanaik (2008, 65), Prachanda provided his rea-
soning behind this signicant shift. First of all, by abandoning the path of armed struggle
in favor of peaceful mass mobilization, the Maoists had hoped to achieve a new form of
legitimacy both domestically and internationally that would aord them greater protec-
tion in the long run. Second, given the international balance of forces, while the Maoists
might have been able to capture power militarily, they might not have been able to hold
on to it very long, as they would have needed international support for their government.
This latter reasoning is very similar to the statement of a highly placed Maoist in an Inter-
national Crisis Group interview in 2005: “They [Maoist leaders] don’t just want to seize
power, they want to retain it and use it to transform Nepal. They know that smashing the
state by force of arms will be dicult and ultimately unsustainable. They’re well aware
of how the world would react to a violent overthrow of Kathmandu and how dicult that
would make it for them to remain in power” (27). Vanaik himself oers a third reason
behind the shift, namely that the strategic shift was likely inuenced by the awareness
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that to try and achieve a climactic military victory against a force of 15,000 to 20,000
RNA troops stationed to defend Kathmandu would have been very bloody with a highly
uncertain in outcome and would thus have represented a signicant gamble (2008, 66).
At the plenum in Rolpa of October 2005 that preceded the talks with the SPA in New
Delhi during a ceasere, CPN-M committed to its new pragmatic approach by admitting
the inadequacy of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao, and publicly “argued the party’s need
to enter into the spirit of the 21st Century to face the contemporary challenges of glob-
alization” (Dahal 2005, 2). This lofty statement was accompanied by practical shifts that
provide background on their intent: CPN-M announced that they would allow other par-
ties to participate in politics in areas they controlled, announced their ocial intent to
join multiparty politics following the war, and even sought the UN’s help in supervis-
ing the post-war process of disarmament and constituent assembly elections (Dahal 2005,
5). The same plenum also elevated (and thus solidied) Prachanda’s position of power
within the organization as he demoted all military commanders by one hierarchical level
and divided the three regional divisions into seven (thus giving each commander a smaller
sphere of inuence). He also replaced the Central Committee with a Seventh Convention
Organizing Committee, likely to signal the organization’s willingness to turn away from
militant action in the medium term and weaken the Communist organizational terminol-
ogy (ICG 2006b, 9). Prachanda’s ability to shake up the internal formal hierarchy in his
favor shows just how signicant (and consolidated) his authority within the party was.
The dominance of Prachanda as a political leader within the organization both in theory
and practice over time demonstrates how political authority was a dominant structural
feature in CPN-M.
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6.3 Maoist communication, mobilization and control
While Prachanda’s authority over the internal structure has now been demonstrated, how
did CPN-M’s control and inuence extend geographically? While the Timorese commu-
nication structure that linked urban and rural resistance activists was largely covert and
invisible – and necessitated minutious process-tracing to gain a full picture of its opera-
tion – CPN-M’s geographic reach was directly related to its military control of territory
and is thus directly observable. The CPN-M’s communication and control network was
expanded through four key channels:
• Military control and governance
• Regional autonomy arrangements for ethnic minorities
• Propaganda/mobilization campaigns and events
• Strategic collaboration with erstwhile rivals
CPN-M was highly strategic in employing dierent mobilization mechanisms for dierent
groups of people. Popular mobilization was considered paramount to achieving a “Peo-
ple’s Revolution” even before the war. In 1995, CPN-M stated that “it is impossible for
armed struggle in Nepal to make a quick leap into an insurrection and defeat the enemy;
however, it is possible by systematic development of [the masses]” (CPN-M 1995). Ac-
cording to Shahi (2010), the Maoist leadership was keenly aware of the dierent social
and demographic groups in Nepal and how mobilization would proceed very dierently
for the rural poor, ethnic minorities, and the city population (22).
While the Maoists only resorted to large-scale mass-based nonviolent action in 2006,
it is important to note that small-scale nonviolent action served as an urban mobilization
tool after the adoption of the Prachanda Path. Once their control and supreme positioning
among opposition organizations was thoroughly established, collaboration with the SPA
that lled some of the CPN-M’s urban gaps.
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Popular links through military control and governance
As in the case of Timor, the CPN-M’s focus on popular mobilization was driven by an
interplay of ideological, practical and political incentives that made their popular focus a
reliable and durable constant in their campaign. While the Nepalese government and with
them the APF and later the RNA had external backers in India and the United States (mil-
itary, nancial, political support), CPN-M had neither foreign government sponsorship
nor access to natural resources. Thus, they had to generate funds through their pop-
ular support base supplemented by criminal activities such as extortion, bank robbery,
kidnapping-for-ransom, etc. (Marks and Palmer 2005, 103).
While I have already highlighted their startling buildup in military capacity, the Maoists’
expansion of their popular base in only ten years is also remarkable. The Maoist geo-
graphic expansion and organization from 1996 to 2006 doggedly followed Mao-Tse Tung’s
military strategy to encircle the cities after taking over the villages, describing it with the
slogan of “tactically pitting ten against one [and] strategically one against ten” (Dahal
2005, 2). Accordingly, even though the party’s founders were highly educated Brahmins
from Kathmandu Valley, their early mobilization eorts were focused on marginalized
classes in the Mid-Western Region hill districts, from where their predecessor organiza-
tion had also sent several representatives to parliament in the early 1990s (Marks and
Palmer 2005, 103). Areas captured and controlled by CPN-M were declared “base ar-
eas” and incorporated into a clandestine infrastructure or alternative society orchestrated
through quasi-governmental institutions run by the CPN-M (Basnett 2009).
In accordance with their mass-based ideology, CPN-M’s intent to wage conict was
communicated directly to the population of the midwestern mountain districts they in-
tended to focus on rst via a leaet disseminated on February 13, 1996, which was ad-
dressed “Dear Masses of the People.” The leaet ended with the message: “Finally, we
appeal to the workers, peasants, women, students, teachers, intellectuals and the masses
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of the people of all categories and trades to march along the process of people’s war for
establishing a people’s New Democratic state and to extend to it all forms of support and
help. It is right to rebel!”, ending their message with “revolutionary greetings” (CPN-M
1996a). In parallel, they organized meetings throughout Nepal - including in Kathmandu
- to publicize their intent to start an armed insurrection, campaign for support, and pub-
licize grievances (Ogura 2008, 12).
As planned, the plan to rst control the rural areas and then proceed to the cities is
reected in the actual progression of the Maoist insurgency: In 1996, CPN-M built their
rst bases in rural midwestern and western districts of Nepal. Between 1996 and 2000,
their bases expanded into rural souther districts, slowly building a ring around Kath-
mandu. From 2002 to 2003, they began occupying semi-urban areas. Finally, in 2005,
there were increasing small-scale violent events reported from Kathmandu, and 2006 saw
major protests in Kathmandu itself (Bhattacharya 2013, 578).
After gaining control of an area militarily, the Maoists would proceed to replace state
institutions with their own, which Nepal’s highly centralized state and lack of rural de-
velopment made easier; in many places, the local administration consisted of only one or
two people. Under the ocial purview of the United Front, Maoists would establish their
own parallel governments and associated institutions, thereby exacerbating the discon-
nect between rural areas and urban centers (Huang 2012, 166). By 2001, the Maoists had
created a “people’s government” in 21 out of 75 districts, exercising complete control in
at least seven of them (Sharma 2004). By 2005, they had spread to all but two of seventy-
ve districts, though it’s unclear how deeply the governance institutions penetrated in
the newer areas (Vanaik 2008, 62). By the same year, they had established three main
regions (plus Kathmandu and “abroad”, i.e. India) with three sub-regions each that were
run by people’s district committees that were coordinated by the Central Committee and
answered to Prachanda. Further down, they also established representative people’s com-
mittees at the ward and village level (Vanaik 2008, 62). In areas where the Maoist control
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ran deeply, they provided services such as hospitals, schools, and even court system, even
imposing income and “in-kind” taxes on local residents (Huang 2012; Ogura 2008; Sharma
2004). In accordance with their ideological views, CPN-M implemented community farm-
ing projects, constructed roads and even planned a hydro-power plant in Western Nepal.
UN-aliated organizations were often not allowed to work in areas without permission
from CPN-M, which dealt with such players directly (Bhattacharya 2013, 582).
Gaining support through regional autonomy
Another important CPN-M pathway to rural popular support ran through the devolution
of power to ethnic minority groups. Previously, ethnic minority groups had been incorpo-
rated into CPN-M through a dozen or so specialized fronts under the aegis of the United
Front (Sharma 2004, 41). In early 2004, CPN-M formed Autonomous People’s [provin-
cial] Governments, thus formally devolving power to ethnic minority groups which they
termed “Embedded Autonomy”. The CPN-M publicized this through an ocial statement:
On January 9, Magarat Autonomous Region [the region inhabited by the
Kham Magar] People’s Government was declared amidst a huge mass meeting
of over 75 thousand people in the historic Thawang village in Rolpa district.
The Autonomous People’s Government was formed under the leadership of
Com. Santosh Budha Magar [from the Kham Magar tribe], in which members
from various other nationalities and classes and masses are represented. As
may be recollected, this is the main base area of the revolution and is inhab-
ited by the most oppressed Kham Magar nationality. (CPN-M 2004)
At the same time, CPN-M was circumspect and selective in choosing which groups were
awarded autonomy status, and who was to administer these territories (Basnett 2009, 24).
Propaganda and mobilization
Active political engagement was an important part of the Maoists’ way of governing
and mobilization. In their emphasis on civilian engagement, CPN-M strongly resem-
bled Fretilin. Eck argues that active civilian mobilization was a key part of the Maoists’
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success and startling growth in support in only ten years: “By addressing the villagers,
discussing their problems, and requesting their assistance, the Maoists encouraged the
villagers to be active political agents, a radical departure from villagers’ previous experi-
ences of marginalization” (Eck 2010, 44). In this way, CPN-M was able to build both trust
and awareness among the population. For example, in their ethnographic study of the
Dolakha district under Maoist rule, Sneiderman and Turin (2004) found that “while many
villagers had never heard of Mao Zedong or the results of Maoism in China, when they
were asked what the [Nepali] Maoists stood for they immediately answered ‘reclaiming
our land’ or ‘bringing the exploiters to justice”’ (93).
Depending on the location, CPN-M used a combination of mass meetings, print media,
radio talks, door-to-door visits, service provision, or cultural programs to engage civilians
(Eck 2010). Propaganda and mobilization were well planned and strategized: They ran
their own FM radio stations and publications, held “orientation” sessions at schools and
public arenas to disseminate their ideology and mission (Huang 2012, 164). It should be
noted that there were instances of explicit or implicit coercion, though considerably less
than on the side of the Nepali government.
Practically, the Prachanda Path called for more urban insurrection while simultane-
ously continuing the build-up in rural areas and working to surround the towns through
specically targeted mobilization and propaganda campaigns carried out via fraternal or-
ganizations who mobilized their own networks. The necessity for increased attention to
mobilization in urban areas had been demonstrated starkly a few months before the ini-
tiation of the Prachanda Path. In 2001, the stark dierence between Maoist mobilization
in rural versus urban areas is exemplied by an attempt three months earlier to hold an
anti-monarchist demonstration in Kathmandu: Coordination mechanisms failed, and the
government easily blocked the small group of protesters that had shown up. (ICG 2005,
23-24) It is hard not to see at least a tenuous connection between this failed demonstration
attempt and the adoption of the Prachanda Path three months later.
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Events would be aimed at demonstrating government inability and recruiting new
members. For example, events organized through ANNFSU-M targeted ineciencies in
the school system such as fee-paying private schools by mobilizing teachers and students
to participate in strikes (ICG 2005, 23-24). Such events were coordinated through the
newly minted United Revolutionary People’s Council (URPC) (Dahal 2005, 2). However,
one key issue with the 2001 innovation was that there was not yet a concurrent adjustment
to violent strategies, so that sometimes there would be violent and nonviolent actions in
the same place (a mass meeting and a bomb, for instance), which prevented large popular
turnout (ICG 2005, 24). The Prachanda Path was initiated at the same time as Prachanda’s
position was changed from “Secretary General” to “Chairman”. The large-scale coordi-
nation of military and nonviolent actions would not take hold until 2006. The Prachanda
Path can be clearly read as a way for Prachanda to cement his position in the party to-
wards the outside and tie his persona to the identity of within the party. It also clearly
signied the centralized political authority structure of the group.
The importance of building up organizational capacity in urban areas as such was
not new. CPN (Unity Center) had already acknowledged its importance in 1991: “In the
specicities of our country and the current world situation, the signicance of urban mass
movements has denitively increased” (Political Line of CPN (Unity Center) quoted in
(ICG 2005, 23)). In their usual quasi-academic manner of writing, a 1995 CPN-M document
adopted at a meeting of the Central Committee expanded on this point:
Give priority to the rural work, but do not leave out the urban work; give
priority to illegal struggle, but do not leave out the legal struggle, too; give
priority to specic strategic areas, but do not leave out work related to the
mass movement, too . . . give priority to guerrilla actions, but do not leave out
political exposure and propaganda, too . . . give priority to build army organi-
zation, but do not leave out building front organizations. (quoted in (Shahi
2010, 21))
Accordingly, there was no apparent pushback on the development of an urban front
within the organization, although there was some opposition within CPN-M over the
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close association between the new approach and the person of Prachanda; this opposi-
tion did not prevail, further cementing Prachanda’s control over the organization. (ICG
2005, 23)
Part of the Prachanda Path was the increased reliance on associated organizations un-
der the control of the United Front, coordinated via the United Revolutionary People’s
Council, supplemented by a terror campaign that proved counterproductive (Marks and
Palmer 2005; Ogura 2008). Writing about the relative importance of organizations un-
der the United Front umbrella, Marks and Palmer concluded in 2005 that “most active in
the united front campaign [sic] are student and ethnic liberation groups. The latter have
not proved particularly vibrant, but the former function openly and appear to execute
instructions issued by the CPN-M leadership” (115). However, during ceaseres, CPN-M
would also openly recruit in urban areas directly. For example, during the 2003 cease-
re, Prachanda appeared at press conferences in the capital that were well-attended by
journalists and onlookers, straining to get a view of the underground leaders, who were
surrounded by a sort of notorious air of glamor (ICG 2005, 25). Importantly, the initiation
of the Prachanda path can not in and of itself be considered an instance of nonviolent inno-
vation, as military activities were not adjusted to allow for large-scale nonviolent events;
rather, nonviolent events during the Prachanda Path period should be considered a means
of increasing the popular base. Bhattarai describes the mobilization gains made during
the 2001 negotiations: “During the rst truce, we gained more and lost less. We were
able to go among the masses and propagate our political demands in a variety of ways.
Internally, the more open environment allowed us to hold some important meetings and
training sessions. Although the negotiations were unsuccessful, we did not regret this at
all“ (Bhattarai quoted in Ogura (2008, 17)).
255
Mobilizing through erstwhile rivals
For their nal push towards mass-based nonviolent action, the Maoists collaborated with
the Seven-Party Alliance, as they alone would not have been able to mobilize the requi-
site number of people. While the collaborative nature of nonviolent action might speak
against nonviolent action as a rebel strategy in this instance, the Maoist innovation pro-
cess and their crucial role in organizing and controlling the actual nonviolent events speak
against such an interpretation. The SPA alone would not be able to build sucient mo-
mentum to eect King Gyanendra’s abdication; Thapa (2015) argues that “during the 2005
royal takeover there was a silent consent of the population to King Gyanendra’s rule as
people were frustrated with the corrupt practices of party politics” (198). In other words,
the SPA was not particularly popular with the population after their years of collabo-
ration and collusion with the monarchy. In an analysis relying on a bevy of in-person
interviews, the International Crisis Group concludes that the SPA was keenly aware that
they did not command enough popular support to ensure that a critical mass of people
would show up to protest, as a failed attempt at a mass demonstration in the summer
of 2005 had brought into sharp relief (ICG 2006b, 10). Thapa concludes from the same
event that “when the SPA announced its nonviolent movement against King Gyanendra
to restore democracy in Nepal, very few people supported it, posing a serious challenge
to the parties’ political future” (2015, 198). The practical complications of a nonviolent
urban movement without the Maoists once again showed on January 20 (before plans on
the precise form of an SPA-Maoist collaboration were nalized) when a SPA mass rally in
Kathmandu on 20 January 2006 failed because of simultaneous Maoist military action es-
sentially justifying the king’s crackdown on Kathmandu; the SPA was simply not strong
enough to do a nonviolent movement without Maoists (ICG 2006a, 2).
Thus, the Maoists did not join a nonviolent movement bound for success in either
case, but the movement could only succeed if they participated. Their own commitment
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to a nonviolent approach going forward is exemplied in their actions during the end of
February/ early March, was they argued over concrete plans with the SPA. The Maoists
had planned a large-scale strike on March 14, 2006, and had already set in motion the
military blockades to support the event. The concretization of their plans with the SPA
caused them to call o the endeavor and allies publicly recommitted themselves to their
alliance. (ICG 2006a, 3).
The Maoists were instrumental to organizing a successful nonviolent campaign and
prepared for it in several key ways, outlined by Prachanda in a press statement on April
3, in which he also made clear the CPN-M’s prioritization of the nonviolent movement:
Through the Special Central Command, they were at the ready to intervene in case of a
mass insurrection and subsequent potential state retaliation against civilians. At the same
time, to send a costly signal of their commitment to a nonviolent path, they declared a
unilateral ceasere in the Kathmandu Valley and reiterated commitment to support hu-
man rights through both Nepali and international media channels. They also held mass
meetings (i.e. demonstrations) in the run-up to the general strike that were not coordi-
nated with SPA, though these were not publicly announced and did thus not run counter
to the terms of their alliance (ICG 2006a, 3). For several months in the run-up to April
2006, Maoist representatives were sent to travel across the country to ensure turnout and
local organization capacity, instructing local activists on slogans and crowd control (ICG
2006a). This ensured that protesters would reinforce Maoist rather than SPA demands.
As mentioned earlier, CPN-M also bussed in thousands of protesters from rural areas into
Kathmandu.
While preparations for the nonviolent strike and demonstrations were running in high
gear and CPN-M completely ceased military activities in the immediate environs of Kath-
mandu, they increased their eorts in peripheral areas in order to draw the RNA out of
the urban centers and essentially blockaded Kathmandu for the passage of army vehicles
through their control of highways and rail lines. Their placement of troops in Kathmandu
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just in case there was large-scale unrest likely also had the eect of demonstrating their
power to SPA, should they defect from their agreement (which SPA actually attempted).
By this time, the CPN-M’s military capacity was at parity with that of many state mili-
taries. By the time the Maoists entered into an alliance with SPA, they had just conducted
their largest-ever military oensive in Beni, expanded their military forces to include two
divisions, seven brigades, and 19 battalions (Huang 2012, 160). An oensive in Beni in
2004 exemplies the military power of CPN-M: There, they had used mortars in a clas-
sic night-time assault on a xed defensive position with detailed preparations that even
included the commandeering of stretchers and medical supplies and setting up eld med-
ical posts; civilians had been warned ahead of the attack. Probably most impressive, they
were even able to move the attack forward by two days at the last minute (ICG 2005, 26).
Conclusions
The Nepalese case study conrms both political authority hypotheses. Prachanda was the
uncontested leader of the CPN-M from the moment he took on the leadership of CPN-
Mashal. This was particularly pronounced on the eve of the nonviolent campaign, when
Comrade Kiran was in jail, which removed the most extremist military leader from the
strategic deliberations about a SPA alliance and the decision to shift the operational focus
to nonviolent action.
Throughout, the Maoists identied as a political organization, and considered or-
ganized violence as one political strategy. Yet, violence was not used as the main tool
for popular mobilization, but CPN-M maintained separate organizational structures and
means for both political education and mobilization. The inuence of Bhattarai, widely
acknowledged as the second most important personality in CPN-M, further speaks to the
primacy of the political within the organization.
CPN-M also conrms the hypotheses about urban-rural organizational links, though
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they present very dierently from Timor-Leste. The construction of an urban-rural mo-
bilization network in Nepal followed an almost completely opposite trajectory to Timor,
where Fretilin enjoyed broad pre-war support and was able to maintain their bases even
as they quickly lost territory after Indonesia’s invasion. In contrast, the Maoists acquired
support across territories as they increased their territorial gains. In drawing conclusions
about the successful expansion of CPN-M’s territory and its successful rural mobilization
campaign, Bhattacharya (2013, 578) concludes that “the gradual process adopted by the
Maoists to take control of key rural areas of Nepal is directly linked with the levels of
civilian support for the Maoists and the [eventual] choice of nonviolent action.”
While they were able to rely on SPA for some of the mobilization of the urban popula-
tion, CPN-M only partook in organizing a nonviolent campaign once they were assured of
broad levels of support even in urban areas, following the King’s coup. They had focused
on political mobilization either directly or through aliate organizations in Kathmandu
for ve years prior to April 2006. In order to control the nonviolent events, they sent
representatives to urban areas for months prior to the strike and demonstration in order
to make sure that protesters would mirror the CPN-M’s demands and to instruct local
emissaries in crowd control. To make sure that the situation would not get out of hand,
CPN-M also blockaded the RNA’s access to Kathmandu as much as possible and distracted
them in the periphery, as well as posting CPN-M soldiers in Kathmandu to intervene.
CPN-M also had signicant levels of functional dierentiation in its organization. The
organization’s direct predecessors had experience participating in parliament at the same
time as Prachanda and his associates received instruction about guerrilla warfare. Dur-
ing the war, military conquest was directly combined with political governance, and both
of these tasks were directly reected in the organizational structure. Just as in Timor-
Leste, it was only when organizational mobilization links into the cities were solidied
that the widespread use of strategic nonviolent action became possible for the Nepali
Maoists. However, the highly organized top-down structure of CPN-M combined with its
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approach of immediately instituting political control after gaining military control (thus
rmly incorporating territorial control mechanisms into the hierarchical party organi-
zation) would have aorded the Maoists unparalleled mobilization and communication
capacity in areas under their rule. Therefore, even though the conict trajectories are
vastly disparate, the Nepali Maoists exemplify the same two key dominant structures —
political authority combined with urban-rural structural links — that allowed for the use
of nonviolent action.
260
7. Increasing Condence: A Negative case
and Refuting Alternative Hypotheses
“Our nal oensive two weeks from now will be backed by all Salvadorans.”
— FMLN Spokesperson, 19811
“[T]he masses are not insurrectionary.”
— FMLN guerrilla ghter, 19832
The aim of this chapter is to increase condence in the necessity of the hypothesized
conditions and to refute alternative explanations. To do so, I proceed in two steps: First, I
present the case of the Salvadoran FMLN, which attempted but did not succeed at eect-
ing urban mass mobilization. It is a particularly good case to show that the organizational
process conditions are necessary for rebel use of nonviolent action, as the broad support
enjoyed by the FMLN, its populist orientation, and its composite organizations’ history
of actually using nonviolent mass action should have made it a likely candidate for suc-
cessful mass mobilization. The FMLN case also provides evidence against the alternative
hypotheses that popular support is a sucient condition for rebel use of nonviolent ac-
tion.
Second, I explore the alternative hypotheses. To do so, I present two short case exam-
ples — the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front — that
address the alternative hypotheses related to opportunity and ideology.
1Quoted in Wickham-Crowley (1989, 511-512)
2Quoted in Wickham-Crowley (1989, 511-512)
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7.1 The Salvadoran FMLN: A failed attempt at urban
popular mobilization
The Salvadoran Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para
la Liberación Nacional or FMLN) exemplies how in the absence of the hypothesized
necessary conditions the strategic use of nonviolent mass action is not possible even if
it is attempted. There were two times when there was a hope that mass popular action
would reinforce FMLN’s military action (in 1981 and 1989), but this did not materialize in
San Salvador, though small-scale nonviolent action was used as a rural mobilization tool
(Wood 2003).
The FMLN’s strongholds were in the north and east of El Salvador, but their urban
presence in San Salvador was barely developed by the “nal oensive” in 1989. Their ur-
ban weakness is widely acknowledged. Rhetorically, Wickham-Crowley (1989, 517) asks:
“How could they win a revolution with virtually no urban component to the insurrec-
tion?” Likewise, there was not a dominant political authority structure. In narratives
of the conict, the group’s internal organization is complex, inecient, and lacks coor-
dination mechanisms. There was a clear prioritization of military action in the group’s
statements, but no clear chain of command and no centralized command, as FMLN was a
composite of ve organizations that had been merged but retained relatively autonomous
structures. There was never a clear political leader. On the other hand, the Front did pur-
sue multiple functions, and had a complex rural governance and bureaucracy apparatus.
The FMLN ts Mahoney’s “possibility principle” for selecting negative cases that “only
cases where the outcome of interest is possible should be included in the set of negative
cases” (2004, 653). Given the organization’s broad popular support and attempts at gov-
ernance and their attempt at actually mobilizing urban masses, nonviolent action seemed
like a feasible and perhaps even likely strategy. For example, FMLN enjoyed wide popu-
lar support, measured in terms of ghting strength (in this sense, it was Latin America’s
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strongest guerrilla movement). During the Front’s strongest periods, there was one FMLN
guerrilla for every 500 people; by comparison, this gure reached perhaps one guerrilla
per 3,000 people in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Alvarez 2009,
6). Where the Salvadoran guerrillas numbered between 10,000 and 12,000 by 1983, the
neighboring Sandinistas in Nicaragua numbered half of this during their nal oensive
(Wickham-Crowley 1989, 512). Not only did the FMLN boast swollen ranks during the
war, political popular mobilization had started well before the conict and even at times
took on the shape of nonviolent mass action in urban areas prior to the conict, as nonvio-
lent social groups mobilized extensively in urban areas to persuade state actors to address
their grievances (Wood 2008, 542). Given the insights gleaned from Fretilin’s prewar po-
litical mobilization, this should have been a signicant advantage for nonviolent action.
Their popular support can also be measured in other ways: FMLN still enjoyed consid-
erable social backing by the time they agreed to lay down arms; after the war, they became
the opposition’s leading political force, overcoming political parties with much greater ex-
perience in electoral politics. In 2000, the FMLN became most powerful party within the
Legislative Assembly, and won the presidency in March 2009 (Alvarez 2009, 6). As pop-
ular support is absolutely essential for successful nonviolent action, FMLN would at the
surface seem like a good candidate for nonviolent action. Similarly, FMLN was cognizant
of the importance of international legitimacy — the key pathway for leveraging nonvi-
olent action — and in fact enjoyed considerable international support, as exemplied by
the Franco-Mexican declaration of August 1981that recognized the alliance between the
FMLN and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) as a representative political force
and thereby legitimized it (Alvarez 2009, 18).
The key argument against the possibility for nonviolent action in El Salvador is the
high degree of violent state repression. After all, this is a war that killed between 50,000
and 75,000 people, depending on estimate (Finn (2009, 60), Seligson and McElhinny (1996)).
Yet, the conict is in no way unique in this feature; in fact, the civilian toll in the Timorese
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conict was much higher. While repression certainly plays a role in making nonviolent
action more dicult, it is not the decisive factor (and can actually make the strategy more
successful overall).
As I will show below, the two structural features absolutely necessary for successful
nonviolent action were lacking in FMLN. Similar to the structure of the Nepalese case, I
will rst briey outline the relevant political background and the trajectory of the civil
war. I will then discuss decision-making within the organization and discuss the spatial
dispersion of mobilization structures and discuss functional dierentiation throughout.
Political background
By the 1970s, the vast majority of Salvadorans were excluded from “all but the most mea-
ger life opportunities” (Wood 2003, 11). Much this was due to El Salvador’s economic
history. The expansion of coee production in the late nineteenth century had displaced
the country’s indigenous communities, and the expropriation of small-scale landholders
resulted in the control of most of the most arable land in the hands of two small elite
groups, namely plantation owners and coee processors. Meanwhile, indigenous people
were forced into landlessness and barely survived on bonded seasonal labor. An indige-
nous uprising as early as 1932 was brutally crushed by government forces and left 17,000
dead, with rural residents afterwards silenced and without any political recourse. Brutal
security forces controlled the daily lives of most people, exclusively protecting landed
interests and economic production, and for most of the 20th Century, the Salvadoran
government was controlled by shifting alliances between the military and the landed oli-
garchy. (Wood 2003, 20-24)
In the 1960s and early 1970s, demands for land reform and increased political inclu-
sion grew increasingly louder again, especially at universities in San Salvador, which led
to a mushrooming of community-based organizations (radical leftist student organiza-
tions, urban trade unions, and faith-based groups). The Salvadoran state responded with
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brutal repression designed to eliminate all forms and faces of subversive, leftist behav-
ior (Alvarez 2009; Finn 2009). During this time, we can observe a repeated dynamic of
mass-based nonviolent activism and subsequent government repression: During a stu-
dent demonstration on 30 July 1975, dozens died, and during a demonstration in the Plaza
Libertad on February 27, 1977, the military shot into the crowd of protesters indiscrimi-
nately (Alvarez 2009, 10). By 1980, more than 1500 people were killed monthly as a result
of political violence (Finn 2009, 63). It was this escalating cycle of protest and repression
that gave rise to insurgency (Wood 2008).
Civil war and strategy
The rst two guerrilla groups created were Popular Liberation Forces Farabundo Marti
(Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí or FPL), founded on April 1, 1970, and
the People’s Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo or ERP), ocially
founded on March 2, 1972 (Alvarez 2009, 11). FPL is a good example of how guerrilla
groups grew out of the popular activism of the 1960s and 1970s; FPL’s founding mem-
bers were university students and union workers, many of them former members of the
Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) who were frustrated with the PCS’s timid opposition
(Alvarez 2009, 11). Other guerrilla groups soon followed: The National Resistance (Re-
sistencia Nacional, RN), Revolutionary Party of the Central American Workers (Partido
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos, PRTC), and an extremist splinter
of the PCS.
In mid-1979, the guerrilla forces initiated a dialogue with the aim of establishing a
common coordinating platform with a common leadership with mediation by Cuban gov-
ernment (Alvarez 2009, 16). On October 15 of the same year, a military coup in San Sal-
vador by a civic-military junta established a government with nominal representation
from center parties. Bolstered by this move, the PCS, RN and FPL established a new co-
ordinating structure, the Political-Military Coordination on December 17, 1979 (Alvarez
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2009, 16). The organizations also created a coordinating committee (Revolutionary Co-
ordinating Committee of the Masses or CRM) for the multi-sectoral organizations of the
social movement in San Salvador. The guerrilla groups had inltrated these organizations
for the past ten years or so, recruiting their members for violent action by participating
in meetings and trying to get their own leaders elected into leadership positions (Alvarez
2009, 16). In the same year, the guerrilla groups created in the Revolutionary Democratic
Front (FDR) in April, which grouped together opposition political parties and dissidents
that went by the name of “Social Christian Popular Movement”, several universities, and
the social movements that were partly incorporated into the guerrilla structure (Alvarez
2009, 16). Note how there are three parallel coordination structures only in the rst year
of the guerrilla alliance, which speaks to the highly complex, sprawling organizational
structure.
The FMLN was formally established on October 19, 1980 when the ERP joined the
other guerrilla organizations (Alvarez 2009, 16). In January 1981, the newly consolidated
FMLN launched a joint military attack — called the “nal oensive” — intended to over-
throw the regime, which failed. What went wrong? The plan for January 10 had been to
launch a national-scale oensive with the aim of quickly defeating the armed forces and
taking power before Ronald Reagan took power in the US, as this was expected to bring
additional support to the government. At this point, the Front had 2,500 fully armed and
trained guerrillas, plus an undisclosed number of local militias (Alvarez 2009, 17). The
hope was that in urban areas, local militias would protect the population as they rose
up in support of the guerrillas, as in the 1970s. The oensive was launched from safe
campsites in the rural area, and two thirds of the country witnessed a series of severe
clashes, with civilians experiencing brutal repression. According to Alvarez, “the lack of
arms and training as well as the lack of coordination among the dierent organizations,
stopped the FMLN from reaching its strategic goal. Also, the mass popular insurgency
that the guerrilla groups had expected did not take place” (Alvarez 2009, 16).
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One week later, FMLN staged a tactical retreat. Following the defeat of their “nal
oensive”, the FMLN swiftly moved out of San Salvador and other cities and gradually
acquired control of rural areas in eastern, central and northern parts of the country, and
the conict turned into a grand-scale civil war. Signicantly, most of the social movement
activists who were collaborating with the guerrilla groups moved away from cities, too,
leaving FMLN with no notable urban infrastructure (Alvarez 2009, 17).
Between 1981 and 1983, the FMLN focused on large-scale attacks on military and
economic infrastructure targets and gained territory. The military responded by attack-
ing FMLN-controlled areas without discrimination, death squads executing civilians sus-
pected of supporting them. From mid-1982 to late 1983, FMLN peaked in military terms
as it had 10,000-12,000 fully trained armed militias at their disposal and was able to build
two military units the size of a brigade (1,500 men) (Byrne 1996, 84).The Front was able
to take several smaller cities and towns and multiple military strongholds during this pe-
riod (Alvarez 2009, 19). However, the Salvadoran military grew stronger as well. They
received US funding, training, and arms supplies.3 The government forces’ indiscriminate
use of violence against civilians decreased after US-voiced concerns and after the Chris-
tian Democratic Party won the presidency in 1984 and was able to exert some moderating
inuence (Finn 2009, 64). After 1984, the FMLN focused increasingly on organizing small,
mobile units and covertly inltrating rural and urban areas in northern half of country
(Finn 2009, 64).
The FMLN’s 1989 oensive targeting San Salvador, codenamed “Out With the Fas-
cists; Febe Elizabeth is Alive,” was a turning point in the conict; it provided a signal to
both parties that neither was positioned to win militarily anytime soon Alvarez (2009, 6).
Perceptions of the “mutually hurting stalemate” led the government and the FMLN to ap-
3The FMLN was funded through war taxes and illegal activity as well as foreign sponsors. Through
Cuban and Nicaraguan mediation, they had gained access to arms, ammunition, training and logistics sup-
port from countries such as Vietnam, Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic Republic, as well as soli-
darity committees in US, Mexico and Europe (Alvarez 2009, 17).
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proach the United Nations separately for assistance in December (Söderberg Kovacs 2007,
66). Álvaro de Soto, Special Representative to the Secretary General, led the negotiations,
which began in Geneva in April 1990. Negotiations of a series of accords took place over
a two-year period and ended in a nal peace agreement on December 31, 1991. The gov-
ernment agreed to reduce and reconstruct the military, disband the security forces and
establish a new civilian police force that included FMLN members. Judiciary and elec-
toral systems would undergo signicant reforms, and the latter would include a broader
spectrum of political parties (de Soto and del Castillo 1995, 192). The rebels committed to
disarm, accept the terms of the existing constitution and enter the political system as a
legal party (Finn 2009, 66). The January 1992 Chaputepec Agreements ended the conict.
Attempt at nonviolent action
“Popular insurrection” was a key part of the plan for FMLN’s 1989 Febe Elizabeth oensive
(Grenier 1991, 63). Sources are contradictory on the precise meaning of “popular insur-
rection”; FMLN documents and statements allow for both violent and purely nonviolent
interpretations of the term. For example, in one front document, the goal of “unleash[ing]
the violence of the masses” was stated (though not in connection with the 1989 oensive),
whereas other documents stated that “we need to organize the masses to struggle for clin-
ics, schools, drinking water, credits, land, but oppose decisively the installation of mayors
and civil defense” (FMLN documents quoted in Byrne (1996, 133-134)). An interpretation
of “popular insurrection” as large-scale protests and demonstrations can be made clearest
from the following quote from a Front meeting in late 1988: In order to gain interna-
tional support and a favorable bargaining position, “it is indispensable . . . to strengthen
the struggle of the popular movement and the Democratic Popular Front and thus con-
tribute to a change in the correlation of forces that favors the revolution” (quoted in Byrne
(1996, 136)).
Given previous use of nonviolent action by the FMLN (at a small scale) and concur-
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rent nonviolent events, it is reasonable to infer that “popular insurrection” was likely to
have a nonviolent component. For example, in 1984, a series of strikes began that were
organized by FMLN-associated organizations against the freezing of salaries and the loss
of purchasing power, and lasted until 1986 (Alvarez 2009, 21). Likewise, Byrne (1996,
149) identies a series of small-scale FMLN-associated protests and demonstrations in San
Salvador. The United States experienced large-scale protests with over 2000 participants
following the assassination of Jesuit priests by the government in the immediate run-up
to the oensive (Harris 1989).4 That nonviolent mass action would have been possible
if organized properly became clear in the following year: In 1990, San Salvador saw the
largest demonstration in the past decade when 80,000 marched for a peaceful settlement
of the war (Brockett 2005, 315). The lack of clarity with regards to the precise meaning of
“popular insurgency” is likely indicative of why it failed: There was a lack of a clear, co-
ordinated message to the urban population and not sucient mobilization in the run-up
to Febe Elizabeth.5
The main aim of FMLN to strengthen their bargaining position through Febe Eliza-
beth is well documented. According to Goodwin (2001, 177-178), the purpose of the 1989
oensive was not to defeat the ocial armed forces once and for all, but to “provoke a
qualitative change in the correlation of forces that would help to restart the stale-mated
negotiation process for a political solution to the war”. Militarily, the oensive demon-
strated the FMLN’s strength and it also made clear that the government was not in control
of its stronghold of San Salvador. The minimum goal was to wage an oensive in San Sal-
vador for 72 hours, which was achieved; the FMLN brought 2,000 guerrilla ghters into
San Salvador and took over complete neighborhoods, and actually lasted for three weeks
(Byrne 1996, 152). As summed up by the Los Angeles Times: “The intensity and duration
4The US protests led to the withholding 50 percent of US military aid to El Salvador ($42.5 million)
(Grenier 1991, 64).
5Even if the intent for popular insurrection was purely violent, it was still to be mass-based and urban,
which means that some of the hypotheses would still apply.
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of the oensive . . . has mocked all ocial predictions and sent Cristiani’s elected right-
wing government reeling” (quoted in Byrne (1996, 152)).
While they did succeed in demonstrating that neither side could militarily win the war,
Febe Elizabeth was also tactical failure as it did not produce a decisive popular uprising
(Byrne 1996, 153). As summed up by Goodwin: “The decisive action by the FMLN secured
important support from the population of the northern and eastern districts of the capital,
although the popular insurrection that some had erroneously envisioned did not take
place” (Goodwin 2001, 178). Alvarez’ summary of events is even clearer about the failure
of popular action:
The oensive was launched from a safe camp side in the rural area, and two
thirds of the country witnessed a series of severe clashes. However, the lack
of arms and training, as well as the lack of coordination among the dierent
organizations, stopped the FMLN from reaching its strategic goal. Also, the
mass popular insurgency that the guerrilla groups had expected did not take
place. (Alvarez 2009, 18)
Alvarez’ account is explicit about why popular insurrection failed by arguing that
there was a lack of coordination among dierent organizations. The second relevant ele-
ment in his account is that the oensive was launched from the rural areas, which further
compounded local coordination eorts. According to Alvarez, there was some small-scale
popular demonstrations of support, for example by a few hundred workers living in the
labor belt of San Salvador (Alvarez 2009, 21). However, this was nowhere near the mass
showing of support that FMLN had repeatedly noted as indispensable; in fact, winning
popular support had been its stated priority in the period from 1984 to 1989 (Byrne 1996,
145). This came out clearly in their statement that their strategy in the run-up to 1989
was for “the reactivation of the urban masses to lay the basis for the insurrection” (Byrne
1996, 136). Yet, the FMLN had severely overestimated its popular support. As put by
Alvarez (2009, 21), “the population’s lack of response in that they failed to support the in-
surgents en masse demonstrated the fact that they were not in a state of insurgency and
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that the people’s support for the Front was not as great as some guerrilla commanders
had expected.”
FMLN’s plans for urban mass popular action were not accompanied by either clear
directives nor an adjustment of military strategy (CPN-M provides an example for eec-
tive military coordination with nonviolent action). To provoke the army, FMLN launched
military attacks in heavily populated areas (Ayutuxtepeque, Ciudad Delgado, Ilopango,
Mejicanos, Soyapango and Zacamil) to get supposedly moderate government to “show its
true face” (Grenier 1991, 63). Grenier elaborates:
The argument can be made that if the rebels launched the oensive in the
most crowded neighborhood of San Salvador in November 1989, it was not
in spite of but because they expected a violent and indiscriminate response
from the military. Furthermore, the use (and misuse) of heavy artillery by the
rebels against military targets located in densely populated areas have caused
numerous casualties amongst innocent civilians. It has been repeatedly criti-
cized across the board, even by FMLN sympathizers concerned with the polit-
ical cost of such operations. However, it has not led to any signicant change
in the FMLN’s behavior. All these indicators raise doubts about the intellec-
tual evolution of the FMLN’s leadership and rank-and-le, whose radicalism
is certainly unparalleled in Latin America, including Cuba and Nicaragua dur-
ing their insurrectional periods. (Grenier 1991, 57)
Thus, FMLN’s military strategic planning appeared not to have been coordinated with
the political objectives they wanted to achieve; their operational planning on the ground
in San Salvador was poor at best; and their general strategic trajectory was unlikely to
be conducive to political mobilization. In what follows, I will show how FMLN lacked
both a consolidated political authority and urban-rural coordination structures, which can
explain all of these reasons for why Febe Elizabeth failed in terms of popular mobilization
and participation.
Organizational processes and leadership
What in the FMLN’s organizational structure and decision-making processes can explain
their failure to successfully mobilize the urban population for nonviolent action? FMLN
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possessed neither a streamlined decision-making and delegation structure, nor a central-
ized, uncontested political authority. In fact, it is impossible to pinpoint a clear power
center.
Organizational structure
The main issue in the FMLN’s decision-making process was its true Front character, which
“usually means a coalition of various organizations, united for a specic goal and in which
each retains its own identity” (Grenier 1991, 51). The ve main Salvadoran revolutionary
organizations merged to form the FMLN in October 1980 with the dual goal of procuring
the government’s defeat and realizing their socialist project (Alvarez 2009, 7). This led to
a highly complex command structure that was only partially integrated and coordinated
between the dierent composite groups, despite a joint leadership structure (Wood 2008).
How were actions within FMLN coordinated, and how did the Front make and implement
decisions about strategy?
Even though there was a joint leadership to FMLN, the ve composite organizations
maintained their separate identities within the organization. However, in addition to this,
each of the ve organizations also had political or central committees (Alvarez 2009, 6).
Each of the organizations also had their own military wings, so that the “rebel group”
FMLN was represented by all of the following on the battleeld.6 As succinctly summed
up by Alvarez (2009, 16): “Each organization within the FMLN kept its own military, lo-
gistic and chain of command structures.” Not only were the ve composite organizations
disjointed structurally, but FMLN organizations were separated by profound ideological
and strategic dierences: Mistrust between the dierent organizations persisted, in par-
ticular between the ERP and its former RN comrades (the ERP had been created through
a split within RN). All groups were wary of the Communist Party, which in turn did not
6These were: Popular Armed Forces of Liberation (FAPL/FPL), Armed Forces of National Resistance
(FARN/RN), Popular Armed Forces of Liberation (FARPL/PRTC) and the Armed Forces of Liberation
(FAL/PCS) (Grenier 1991, 52).
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take the other organizations seriously from an ideological standpoint (Alvarez 2009, 17).
The organizations disagreed on major strategic questions: While the RN wanted to create
an alliance with the moderate parties in the government, the FPL maintained a radical
opposition position against any agreement with the military (Alvarez 2009, 17).
As briey alluded earlier, even in its early history as a front, the FMLN maintained a
plethora of parallel coordination structures. These separate wings were rst coordinated
by the Unied Revolutionary “Political-Military” Direction (DRU-PM) prior to the formal
foundation of the FMLN, though “it is dicult to know what groups — the military or
the political-military — this Direction coordinated”, which appears to have existed prior
to the FMLN and then probably was moved over to the Front and made into the General
Command (Grenier 1991, 52).7 Later, the highest executive body was either the General
Command of the FMLN, or the FMLN’s Joint Chiefs of Sta (Estado Mayor General Con-
junto), though unclear what exactly the division of labor and hierarchy between the two
was (Grenier 1991, 52). This uncertainty is very telling: It is not possible to clearly pin-
point the seat of authority within FMLN for much of its active history, which also makes
it very dicult to identify dominant structures. The nature of the FMLN’s alliance with
the FDR was also unclear; ocially, “the FDR is not the FMLN’s political wing, nor is the
latter the FDR’s military wing” (Grenier 1991, 53). The two organizations often publicly
disagreed (for example, over the FMLN’s decision to break o talks with the Salvadoran
government in the fall of 1989), which indicates that coordination between the two was
minimal.
Leadership and identity
It is dicult to pinpoint either a clear leader or a clear organizational “identity” as either
a military or political organization. Who was FMLN’s leader? The short answer is that
7Under the umbrella of the General Command, there were also several commissions with representa-
tives from each FMLN organization: Finance, solidarity, and propaganda, as well as the political-diplomatic
commission (Alvarez 2009).
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this is unclear. FMLN proclaimed itself the “vanguard” of the Salvadoran people, but it
was not clear who actually led this vanguard. In pinpointing FMLN’s key leadership, Gre-
nier states: “It seems, for example, that almost every rebel who can given an interview,
and they are several, is a comandante” (Grenier 1991, 53). During the last military oen-
sive, the FMLN General Command’s communiqués (though not the 1989 peace proposals)
were all signed by the same ve commanders: Eduardo Sanchez (nom de guerre Fer-
mán Cienfuegos), Francisco Jovel (Roberto Roca), Jorge Shak Handal, Salvador Sánchez
Ceréen (Leonel Gonzalez) and Joaquín Villalobos (René Cruz). In 1991, Rubén Zamora, a
center-left Salvadoran leader involved in the peace negotiations, stated: “Whether they
are “more equal” than other comandantes — like Claudio Armijo, Leo Cabral, Nidia Diaz,
Facundo Guardado, Ana Maria Guadalupe Martinez, among many others — is still an open
question” (quoted in Grenier (1991, 53)). It is telling that even during the 1991 peace pro-
cesses, there remained considerable uncertainty about who was representing FMLN as a
whole. Grenier draws the following conclusion about FMLN’s organizational and com-
mand structure during the peace process: “The elusiveness of its organizational structure,
in spite of tremendous ideological homogeneity, suggests that the issue of power is not
yet settled amongst the dierent groups, levels, zones, and leaders” (Grenier 1991, 53).
Not only the lack of a clearly identiable leadership makes it dicult to pinpoint the
Front as either clearly “military” or “political,” but it is also dicult to trace the group’s
self identication as either political or military, as the prioritization of one or the other
shifted over time. The DRU-PM dealt with decisions about both military and political
matters, with no clear domination over time (Grenier 1991, 52). Until 1984, the group did
not have a political front and hierarchy clearly favored the military; according to Alvarez,
between 1981 and the end of 1983 “the military development of the guerrilla organizations
superseded political action in the revolutionaries’ strategy during this period, although
the latter never completely disappeared” (Alvarez 2009, 19). One reason for this were the
disagreements between the composite organizations with regards to negotiations, which
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were particularly intense between 1981 and 1983 (Alvarez 2009, 20).
By 1984, it had become clear that the FMLN would not win the conict outright with
military means. As analyzed by Byrne (1996, 158), “drawing the lessons from the earlier
period, particularly 1982-1983, that it had focused too much on building military strength
and seeking a military victory, and not enough on political contestation with the govern-
ment, the FMLN saw the key to victory in the period 1984-1989 lying in the reactivation
of the masses.” In public statements, comandantes also were adamant about the primacy
of the military struggle. When asked about political means to end the conict and laying
down arms, commandante Villalobos replied very clearly: “Lay down the arms? We don’t
have any conditions because we are not about to lay down arms, ever” Grenier (1991,
62). He continued: “El Salvador needs a revolutionary change to establish a democratic
and pluralistic society; that change needs to be guaranteed by military power” (Villalobos
Spring 1989, 122). This leaves the question of whether FMLN saw itself as a military orga-
nization advancing political freedom or as a political organization using military means.
Urban and rural mobilization
FMLN lacked a clear organizational structure linking it to urban areas, which made urban
political mobilization dicult to impossible. The three key dierences between FMLN
and Fretilin/CNRM and CPN-M were as follows: There was no sustained eort to in-
corporate urban areas into the organizational structure; there was no standardized, clear
way to control and coordinate with associated popular organizations that could have lled
some urban mobilization gaps; and the organization engaged in civilian targeting. There
are also strong similarities. As with Fretilin and CPN-M, the population was a key part
of FMLN’s strategy; accordingly, the overall strategy guiding FMLN’s insurgency was
“Prolonged Popular War,” borrowed from Mao (Moroni Bracamonte and Spencer 1995,
13-15). In his writings about his organization, Villalobos (Spring 1989, 107) emphasized
the importance of the population in the Front’s conception of conict: “The FMLN is
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not a terrorist organization. Its military practices seek to win the support of society, not
to intentionally and premeditatedly cause civilian casualties.” Yet, popular support (and
political mobilization) was largely limited to rural areas.
The key problem with the popular uprising planned as part of Febe Elizabeth was its
theater in San Salvador, where the war had almost no presence, but which required sig-
nicant resources; as with the “nal oensive”, FMLN staged the eort from rural areas,
bringing in all of the supplies and personnel from the periphery (Goodwin 2001, 178). The
lack of urban political resources is puzzling, since all of the FMLN founding organizations
had historical ties with urban popular organizations in the 1970s. This urban organiza-
tional base was used strategically for mobilization purposes before the war by appropri-
ating their infrastructure; for example, they would try to get their own militants elected
into leadership position within popular organizations or create coordinating committees
(Alvarez 2009, 15). These early eorts led to a rapid growth in insurgent ranks from 1979
and 1981, as intense and indiscriminate state violence left many formerly nonviolent ac-
tivists disillusioned with conventional political forms (Wood 2003). Urban support for the
guerrillas was greatest in these two years (Wickham-Crowley 1989, 517). After the failed
“nal oensive” of 1981, the popular movements in the cities were essentially dismantled,
and radicalized activists ed into the northeastern parts of El Salvador alongside FMLN
(Alvarez 2009, 20). This organizational ssure between urban and rural political action
was never bridged.
Once FMLN had left the cities for rural areas, their ranks swelled with rural guerrillas.
The majority of insurgent combatants were from poor, rural backgrounds (McClintock
1998, 266-267). During these early years of the war, the rebels expanded their forces
from a few hundred combatants in 1981 to several thousand by 1984 (McClintock 1998,
266-267). Recruitment happened through various dierent channels; it included forced
recruitment as well as the administration of governance apparatuses but also included
targeted recruitment of interest groups, such as organizing workers around calls for labor
276
reform (Finn 2009, 77).
The organization’s failure to recruit and mobilize in cities coincided (and can in part
be explained by) the Front’s prioritization of military over political action. Up until the
end of 1983, the warring style developed by the FMLN had “solely emphasized the cre-
ation of a great military contingent by militarizing all the insurgency’s human resources.
Revolutionaries had sought a strictly military defeat of the government, leaving aside the
need to carry out political work with the population of the cities, where at the end of the
day the war would ultimately be settled” (Alvarez 2009, 20). Thus, the complete severance
of urban political ties after the “nal oensive” was not considered bothersome, as rural
areas provided a much better military base and mobilization pool. In fact, the Front’s mil-
itary capacity really was formidable; by the late 80s, they were able to wage war in 10
of 14 departments in the country, and prevented local authorities from being established
in almost half the municipalities; but there was a lack of both meaningful political and
military action in urban areas (Alvarez 2009, 20).
After 1984, there were deliberate attempts at rectifying both the lack of urban mobi-
lization structures and the military focus. Between 1984 and 1989, the FMLN pursued a
deliberate strategy of renewing its political eorts at “reactivation of the masses” (Byrne
1996, 158). From 1984 on, FMLN dispersed forces throughout the Salvadoran territory, di-
viding them into small units with sucient communication and mobilization capacities to
rapidly concentrate them when necessary, which allowed them to launch actions of a cer-
tain magnitude Alvarez (2009, 20). It was also during this period that FMLN attempted to
construct a clandestine communication network (Alvarez 2009, 20). With regard to Febe
Elizabeth, documents stated that “in order to move with rm steps to the cities and be
capable of acting within them we must be strong in our rearguard . . . popular organizing
will be the detonator that will incorporate the masses into the strike and the insurrection”
(FMLN quoted in Byrne (1996, 134)).
Yet, there was no organizational path to incorporate the urban masses after most urban
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activists had left San Salvador with the FMLN to move to the Front’s rural strongholds and
participate in the guerrilla struggle; none of these “original” associated social organiza-
tions was still active by 1991 (Grenier 1991, 52). During the following decade, the FMLN’s
composite groups did have informal associations with several non-military organizations
such as the National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) or the Committee of Moth-
ers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, Disappeared, and Assassinated (COMADRES);
however, these groups were neither based in San Salvador, nor was there a central coor-
dinating mechanism for the Front as a whole (Grenier 1991, 52). Finally, there was the
formal association with the FDR, which mainly consisted of two political parties.8 While
the FDR was linked to FMLN through a “Politico-Diplomatic Commission,” it remained
ocially and in practice an autonomous organization and there were serious, repeated
disagreements between FMLN and FDR over both strategy and goals, which would have
made signicant coordination impossible (Grenier 1991, 52).
The last key hindrance to eective popular mobilization was the FMLN’s use of ter-
rorism, civilian targeting, and their failure to adjust their military strategy to allow for a
popular uprising. The FMLN saw civilian targeting and terrorism as key to popular mobi-
lization; according to Grenier’s analysis, “acts of sabotage and killing of opponents, even
civilians, [were] viewed as necessary in the process of raising the masses’ consciousness”
(Grenier 1991, 56). For example, the June 19, 1985 operation code-named “Yankee Aggres-
sor, Another Vietnam Awaits You in El Salvador” killed 4 US marines, 2 US businessmen,
1 Chilean, and 5 Salvadorans, in San Salvador. Villalobos himself said about the reasoning
behind this attack:
We not only hit the principal enemy [presumably the US capitalists], but they
did it in the fundamental zone, where the classes and the social contradic-
tions are expressed more acutely and shamefully for the popular movement
. . .Those acts moralize the people and demoralize the enemy. (Grenier 1991,
56)
8The Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario led by Guillermo Ungo and the Popular Social Christian
Movement led by Rubén Zamora.
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Their use of violence against civilians likely hurt the Front’s ability to mobilize the urban
population. According to a 1987 survey, the Salvadoran population was frightened by vi-
olence and preferred dialogue and negotiations to the continuation of violence by a large
margin (Grenier 1991, 56).9 It is unclear why FMLN got this so wrong; their lack of infras-
tructure and presence in urban areas certainly hurt eective planning and assessment of
the situation on the ground.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the FMLN had neither a consolidated, centralized political authority struc-
ture nor organizational links connecting their rural strongholds with the population of
San Salvador. What the FMLN did have were extensive governance structures in rural
areas under their control, where they created legal structures that were formally discon-
nected from the guerrilla organizations, with clandestine communication channels to the
guerrillas (Alvarez 2009, 20). Through their governance structures and rural communica-
tion channels, the FMLN sought to secure logistical supply channels and prevent support
to the regime; this strengthened the FMLN’s political capacity and support among the
rural population (Byrne 1996, 132-133). Their rural administrative capacity went as far as
organizing land redistribution schemes and charging and collecting taxes in their zonas
controlladas (Moroni Bracamonte and Spencer 1995, 46). Thus, while the front did have an
organizational focus on task dierentiation (though not from the beginning, as it formally
started as a guerrilla organization), none of the other main hypotheses are conrmed in
this case. This shows that widespread popular support and even the maintenance of po-
litical governance structures are insucient for the use of nonviolent action if the or-
ganizational structures do not extent into urban areas, which goes against Alternative
9Note that the pattern of civilian targeting on the part of the FMLN compared to the Salvadoran gov-
ernment was still one of “relative restraint”; about 85% of violence against civilians was perpetrated against
state actors. At the same time, the FMLN also used indiscriminate weapons against civilians, such as land
mines (Alvarez 2009, 18).
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Hypothesis 2.
7.2 The Free Aceh Movement and the insuciency of
opportunity
Opportunity played a big role in Timor-Leste’s and Nepal’s shift towards nonviolence. In
Timor-Leste, the sudden, partial opening of the island to international visitors and the an-
nouncement of the Pope’s visit in particular made nonviolent action a promising strategy;
the Indonesian pro-democracy movement in combination with the Asian nancial cri-
sis further propelled both popular mobilization in Indonesia and international attention.
Likewise, King Gyanendra’s coup in Nepal swiftly shifted both international and domes-
tic sympathies towards the Maoists, again making the success of a nonviolent movement
much more promising than before. It is possible that the organizational process theory
overstates the role of structure and organization, and that opportunity for using nonvi-
olent action is so rare that most rebel groups would seize on it, one way or another, and
organize a nonviolent action campaign.
To see how opportunity alone does not explain the use of nonviolent action, we need
only consider violent Indonesian resistance movements active at the same time as CNRM
in Timor-Leste. In all of Indonesia, Suharto’s fall was a “critical juncture” suddenly open-
ing the door wide to the mobilization of dierent movements (Bertrand 2004). Secession-
ist movements in Timor-Leste, Papua, and Aceh exploded (Aspinall 2009). Not only was
there an opening in Aceh for mass-based nonviolent action as the world was watching
Indonesia, but a mass-based, nonviolent pro-independence movement actually emerged
in Aceh in 1998 and 1999. Even so, GAM’s involvement was minimal, and the organiza-
tion did not make attempts to control or inltrate the organization of nonviolent events
in any signicant way.
After the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Indonesian pro-democracy movement
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grew exponentially and led to popular activism all over Indonesia. The rst student
protest in Aceh was organized by Student Solidarity for the People (Solidaritas Maha-
siswa untuk Rakyat) on March 19, 1998. While these early demonstrations were part of
the Indonesian-wide pro-democracy movement, by the end of the year, thousands peace-
fully occupied Banda Aceh’s radio station in November and demanded an independence
referendum. (Aspinall 2009, 125-127) Following Suharto’s resignation on May 21, 1998,
“within six months Banda Aceh was transformed from a political backwater into a cen-
ter of frenetic activism” (Aspinall 2009, 126). In 1999, hundreds of thousands lled the
grounds of Masjid Raya in Banda Aceh, calling for a referendum (King 1999). This means
that a pro-secession platform enjoyed broad popular support in Aceh, and that people
were willing to take to the streets.
While both the student activists of Banda Aceh and GAM favored independence, there
were key dierences between the two sides. The leaders of the 1998/1999 popular move-
ment in Banda Aceh were decidedly urban and middle class — many of them were univer-
sity students — and they were closely were linked to the Indonesia-wide activist network
that also collaborated with Timor-Leste’s student activists (Aspinall 2009, 123). The stu-
dent activists were not connected to GAM in any meaningful way. According to Aspinall,
“most of the key actors had little contact with GAM, and their outlook diered from that
of members of the older movement” (2009, 123). While GAM’s demands were based on
discourses of national survival and unique cultural heritage, Banda Aceh’s student ac-
tivists emphasized human rights and an inclusionary national identity; they were open
to negotiations with the central government (Aspinall 2009; Schulze 2004). Following the
nonviolent movement, Aceh’s autonomy status was broadened in 2001, which was insuf-
cient for GAM.
GAM’s involvement with the planning and execution of the Banda Aceh nonviolent
movement was minimal at best. In 1999, the organization released a statement in support
of the protesters’ main demand of a referendum, and some GAM guerrillas did attend the
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Masjid Raya protest (identiable by their GAM banners) (King 1999). GAM also claimed to
have aided in transporting some people to the protest from the countryside (ibid). How-
ever, this is a far cry from the rebel group consciously organizing and using nonviolent
action to further their aims, and GAM banners in the protests were few and far between.
Apart from a vaguely shared goal, the 1998/1999 protests were functionally unconnected
to GAM.
A cursory exploration of GAM’s organizational structure and processes as well as
its geographic spread reveals that none of the organizational necessary conditions out-
lined in Chapter 5 were present. In terms of political authority, GAM did have a clearly
dened, widely accepted leader in Teungku Hasan di Tiro, who was the wali negara, a
position modeled after that of a Sultan. Below the top leadership in exile, there was an
Aceh-based midlevel leadership, troops, members, and a support base in Aceh (Schulze
2004, 10). However, GAM’s strategic decision-making did not follow political imperatives.
Neither Hasan di Tiro’s background nor the organizational structure or actual practice
indicate that political concerns trumped military concerns; Schulze (2004) concludes her
organizational analysis of GAM by stating: “In practice [decisions] are dictated by the
realities of the conict and thus military imperatives” (11).
The central control of regional and subregional entities was also not strong. At the
subregional level in particular, GAM’s military command structure was highly factional-
ized and troops were very undisciplined (Schulze 2004, 10). These are not ideal conditions
for empowering new political actors in far-ung locales, as would have been necessary
for actively organizing nonviolent action. Not only was GAM’s regional and subregional
organization weak in general, the organization lacked organizational or even social ties to
Banda Aceh, which would have been key for GAM to meaningfully inuence, coordinate,
or control the nonviolent movement. Few of the organizers of the 1998/1999 protests had
any contact with GAM; most organizers and protesters had been isolated from GAM’s
almost entirely rural conict (Aspinall 2009, 125-126). Aspinall concludes: “Among the
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student protestors of 1998-1999, a few had relatives who had been involved in GAM;
more were only vaguely aware of the movement and the methods that had been used to
suppress it” (126).
None of this is to say that GAM was not able to prot from the popular movement.
After the movement had popularized the secessionist agenda, GAM was able to increase
its active membership vefold, and expand their stronghold areas into much of Aceh, at
one time controlling as much as 70 percent of the province and even establish shadow
civil service structures in some areas (Schulze 2004, viii). Interestingly, although it was
unable to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the 1998 popular movement, the
organization did appear to recognize its weaknesses in terms of organization, strategy
and message, and put increasing eort into popular mobilization, internationalization and
signaling their adherence to human rights, and nally did enter into negotiations with the
Indonesian government in 2002/2003 (Schulze 2004, 9). The organization also attempted
to streamline the command structure and centralize its decision-making, which could be
read as an attempt to implement an organizational structure more conducive to popular
political mobilization and its control (Schulze 2004, 12).
Overall, the case of GAM demonstrates that opportunity alone cannot explain the
use of nonviolent action, as it is hard to imagine a better opportunity for rebel use of
nonviolent action than in Aceh in 1998 and 1999.
7.3 The limited role of ideology: the Jammu Kashmir
Liberation Front
One striking common denominator in Timor-Leste and Nepal’s independence struggles is
that both grounded their populist approach to struggle in communist ideology with a par-
ticular reliance on Mao. To what extent do ideological roots drive rebel use of nonviolent
action or determine the organizational features necessary mobilization and coordination?
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A look at the list of identied cases reveals that while communist and/or socialist ideol-
ogy is a common theme, it does not appear to be necessary for an organization to shift
towards nonviolent action. One example for a rebel group that shifted from violent to
nonviolent action is the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
The JKLF was originally founded as a pro-Azadi (independence) group in Birmingham,
England, in 1964 to advocate for an independent country comprising Jammu, Kashmir,
Ladakh, Pakistan-held Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan (Anant 2009, 761). It promoted an
ideology of secular nationalism, ocially advocating for a multi-religious Kashmiri state
but did not promote a particular political philosophy (Bhatnagar 2009; Tremblay 1996).
Their clearest political agenda item was to demand a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir
regarding the political status of the region (SATP 2014). After decades as a diaspora group,
the organization established itself in Srinagar (the capital of Jammu and Kashmir) in 1987
(Bhatnagar 2009, 8).
In 1989, when the Kashmiri conict began in earnest, the JKLF was the most promi-
nent pro-Azidi rebel group, largely relying on guerrilla warfare (Anant 2009, 761). Af-
ter ve years of organized violence across Kashmir Valley, the group was losing ground
to both the Indian Army and the Pakistan-supported Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), among
other groups; though Pakistan had initially funded many of JKLF’s activities, they shifted
their funding exclusively towards the HM in 1992 (SATP 2014). When the President of
JKLF, Yasin Malik, was released from prison in 1994, he publicly declared his intention
to embrace mass-based nonviolent struggle as a political strategy inspired by Gandhi
(SATP 2014).10 Amanullah Khan, JKLF’s inuential founder, lobbied for the removal of
Malik from JKLF’s presidency, and the organization split in two, one group violent, the
other nonviolent in its strategic approach. In 1995, Malik’s JKLF began calling for hunger
strikes, organizing protests and demonstrations, and election boycotts, with widespread
10(Schoeld 2003, 268) attributes this shift in part to the changed strategic situation as eected by the
shift in Pakistani funding priorities.
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success (Anant 2009, 762). Malik publicly armed the JKLF’s values as peace, democ-
racy, pluralism, harmony, and brotherhood following his group’s shift to nonviolent ac-
tion (Anant 2009, 763). Later, JKLF also joined the pro-freedom political alliance, the All
Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC).
A cursory exploration of JKLF indicates that the two key organizational features of
political authority and urban organizational structures were present. The latter factor is
not as relevant in the case of JKLF; Kashmir Valley, where the insurgency took place, has
several cities with suburban areas and is densely populated. After putting down organi-
zational roots in Srinagar in 1987, JKLF continued to have support in that area, and even
organized bandhs (strikes) in 1989 (Puri 1993, 65). In the same year, their anti-election/pro-
boycott mobilization all across the valley was a great success (Tremblay 1996, 492) In 1989,
JKLF had enjoyed more signicant support in the Kashmir Valley region than any other
pro-secession groups (Tremblay 2009, 934).
JKLF also had a clearly political identity throughout its history. It claimed to sponsor
a political, and not a religious or militant movement since inception, although some indi-
vidual leaders were also suspected of instances of terrorist activity (Tremblay 1996, 489).
Its leaders were elected by relatively democratic means, and on 18 June 1990, Amanullah
Khan ocially announced the establishment of a 24-member“provisional government"
that would represent Kashmiris living under Indian rule; the “provisional government”
(though short-lived) even included a few non-JKLF members (IRB 1994). JKLF’s internal
structure also formally prioritized its political organ over its armed faction (SATP 2014).
The internal hierarchy was such that there was a President, but early on decisions were
taken by a core leadership of four, originally known by the acronym HAJY (Hamid, Ash-
faq, Javed, and Yasin), with Amanullah Khan, pulling signicant strings; however, among
the four members of the core leadership, Yasin was the only one who survived the rst
ve years of the conict, and signicant parts of the organization followed his call to
nonviolent activism (Bhatnagar 2009, 8).
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This short exploration of JKLF demonstrates that a particular ideology cannot be the
driving factor behind rebel use of nonviolent action, or the strategic shift under Yasin
Malik would not have been possible.
Conclusion
To sum up, the brief exploration of the FMLN increases our condence in the hypothe-
sized mechanisms. Although the FMLN hoped that the urban masses would rise up to
support them in their 1989 oensive, this did not happen. I was unable to identify ei-
ther a centralized political authority structure or an organizational structure linking rural
and urban areas. As the FMLN enjoyed high degrees of popular support and even con-
nected to the population through extensive governance structures, this case goes against
Alternative Hypothesis 2.
The case of GAM shows that opportunity for nonviolent action alone does not deter-
mine rebel use of nonviolent action, and is therefore not a enough for nonviolent action
in and of itself; this goes against Alternative Hypothesis 3. The JKLF’s lack of a populist
political ideology shows that this is not a necessary condition for the phenomenon in
question, which opposes Alternative Hypothesis 4. Meanwhile, the in-depth case study
of the Nepali Maoists already showed that nonviolent action is not a strategy exclusive to
militarily weak rebel groups, which strongly goes against Alternative Hypothesis 1.
In conclusion, this chapter provides key additional evidence for the proposed theory
and its operational mechanisms.
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8. Conclusion and Outlook
“[The Nazis] were experts in violence, and had been trained to deal with opponents who
used that method. But other forms of resistance baed them . . . It was a relief to them when
resistance became violent, and when non-violent forms were mixed with guerrilla action, thus
making it easier to combine drastic suppressive action against both at the same time.”
— Liddell Hart1
Over the last seven chapters, I have shown that the structure, organization and inter-
nal processes of rebel groups have a signicant impact on their ability to use nonviolent
action. What are the main conceptual and theoretical contributions of this dissertation,
and what are the policy implications? What are promising directions for future research?
I will briey address each of these questions and conclude with a brief summary of what
we do and do not know about rebel use of nonviolent action.
Theoretical contribution and implications
This dissertation identied, dened, and explored the concept of nonviolent action as a
promising rebel strategy. Using conceptions of strategic nonviolent action in general as a
starting point, I explained how the strategy has unique risks, benets and complications
if used in a civil war by violent actors. Using the example of Timor-Leste, I then showed
how nonviolent action is, in fact, sometimes used as a deliberate rebel strategy, and how
this requires signicant shifts in terms of internal organization, geographic scope, and
reconceptualization of how means relate to ends in civil war. Building on both the con-
ceptual chapters and the Timorese case study, I proposed a theory for why some rebel
1History of the Second World War (Hart 1970)
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groups are able to strategically shift towards using nonviolent action based on necessary
organizational structures and processes.
Nonviolent action as a rebel strategy
My conceptualization of nonviolent action as a rebel strategy expanded and built on the
insight that nonviolent action is a form of contentious, coercive political action that can
be highly eective. As framed by Tarrow (2011, 7), violent and nonviolent strategic ac-
tion have many features in common; after all, “the irreducible act that lies at the base
of all social movements, protests, rebellions, strike waves, and revolutions is contentious
collective action.” However, the strategic value of nonviolent action depends on both its
context and on who uses it, which makes rebel use of nonviolent action a beast of a very
peculiar nature. In a civil war, participation in nonviolent action is particularly risky, and
popular mobilization particularly dicult; the opponent has already proven their will-
ingness to use violent repression, and many means of communication and information
dissemination are unavailable. The contrast between a mass of nonviolent protesters and
government forces armed to the teeth will also be particularly striking, if the protesters
can reach an international audience.
If a rebel group can overcome these key mobilization and information problems and
organize mass nonviolent events, this will be a strong testament to their level of popular
support and organizational capacity and reach. Precisely because the idea of a violent
group using nonviolent action seems paradoxical, a rebel group’s ability to successfully
use the strategy can have a big impact. For example, the Nepali Maoists were able to move
their international image from one of “terrorists” (as evidenced by their appearance on
the US Department of State’s Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations) to defenders
of democratic values in 2006 during the April nonviolent movement to nally legitimate
political leaders in 2008. Their use of nonviolent action thus allowed them to reach an
international audience and sent a powerful signal about their adherence to international
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norms.
I also demonstrated how nonviolent action can purposefully be used as a conict strat-
egy by rebel organizations. Relying on interviews with violent and nonviolent activists
in Timor-Leste as well as several written rst-hand accounts, I showed how nonviolent
events in Dili and Indonesian university cities were carefully coordinated with Xanana
Gusmão and CNRM’s leadership, and can therefore be directly linked to the rebel orga-
nization’s core internal decision-making apparatus. The case also shows how extensive
underground networks, repurposing of pre-existing organizational communication struc-
tures, and a shift in target focus from the Indonesian government to the international
community was necessary for the rebel group to use nonviolent action. The existing
(very small) body of work on nonviolent action in conicts does not address the ques-
tion whether or not (or how) rebel groups themselves can be directly linked to the use of
nonviolent action; the Timorese chapter thus provides an important missing puzzle piece.
The identication of nonviolent action as a rebel strategy implies that nonviolent ac-
tion can temporally follow violent action, which means that conicts can move away from
violence (at least on one side) without a negotiated settlement or an outright victory by
either side, as is frequently claimed or assumed in the conict literature. As already out-
lined in the introductory chapter in greater detail, the conceptualization of nonviolent
action as a deliberate rebel strategy directly disagrees with an escalatory understanding
of conicts and violence as prevalent in rationalist explanations for war, where a conict
between two or more actors will only stop if a credible settlement has been reached or one
side has won a decisive victory. The fact that two rebel groups of disparate military ca-
pacity vis-à-vis their main opponent unilaterally “exited” means that we need to consider
a wider range of potential conict trajectories.
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Explaining rebel use of nonviolent action
The examples of Timor-Leste’s CNRM and the Nepali Maoists demonstrate how nonvi-
olent action can have signicant payos for rebel groups. Yet, it is a very rare conict
strategy. In part, this is because the opportunity to use nonviolent action in civil wars is
rare, as nonviolent action requires access to an international audience to be eective, and
international audiences are often shut out from conict regions by the central government
as press and international organization access is often barred. Opportunity for nonvio-
lent action via national and international attention played a large role both in Timor-Leste
and Nepal: In Timor-Leste, the Papal visit that engendered the rst nonviolent protest of
the conict was also the rst foreign visitor to Timor-Leste in fteen years. In Nepal,
King Gyanendra’s coup shifted both domestic and international sympathies towards the
Maoists, which made nonviolent action a feasible and promising strategy. However, even
given ideal conditions, many rebel groups do not choose to or manage to successfully
use nonviolent action (the Salvadoran FMLN was presented as an example). What, then,
explains the rarity of successful rebel use of nonviolent action?
I argued that there are three key necessary conditions related to the internal organiza-
tion of the resistance that determine a rebel group’s ability to use mass-based nonviolent
action. First, a rebel group with a centralized, political authority structure is much more
likely to recognize the opportunity for nonviolent innovation. In an organization where
the military faction does not dominate decision-making, it is also unlikely that individual
leaders’ power and personal prestige is tied to the use of a particular violent strategy. Sec-
ond, only a rebel organization with organizational structures that extend into urban cen-
ters can mobilize the relevant population segment for nonviolent action and coordinate
and control nonviolent entrepreneurs. Third, both of these organizational requirements
are closely connected to functional dierentiation, which also becomes a useful analytical
lens.
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This study contributes to a budding literature on organizational processes in civil
wars. Both the theory and accompanying case study demonstrated how important or-
ganizational structures and processes are to explaining signicant strategic shifts in con-
icts. This means that the developmental history of a rebel organization is determinative
in the group’s future strategic trajectory, as tracks for future development are laid early
and civil wars do not facilitate signicant organizational development; therefore, rebel
groups do not “start” when the rst shot is red. Rebel groups are political organizations,
and “politics have structures that mediate political struggle and that limit the realm of
the possible” (Ikenberry 1994, 3). Organizational structures not only determine the broad
development trajectory of a rebel group, but they also determine the range of strategic
choices open to rebel leaders. Therefore, organizational structures and processes are cru-
cial even to understand such a stark strategic decision as violent versus nonviolent action,
organizational structures and processes.
If we consider mass-based nonviolent action as a rebel strategy, this also requires a
shift in how we conceive of conict actors. In order to successfully use nonviolent action,
rebel groups largely rely on civilians. To mobilize masses of people, not only does the
rebel cause need to enjoy widespread support, but formal and informal structures and
links need to connect urban civilians to the rebel group. This means that we not only
need to consider the rebel group as a potentially complex organization, but we also need
to consider civilians as potentially important conict actors.
Policy implications
Both the concept and theory addressed in this dissertation yield relevant policy insights.
Nonviolent action is a contentious, wartime strategy that is often associated with signi-
cant decreases in violence. Knowing more about how violence — and therefore casualties
— can be reduced is intrinsically important and useful. In more practical terms, my study
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of rebel use of nonviolent action can provide important insights for both conict reso-
lution processes and postwar democratization support. A rebel organization capable of
mobilizing large swaths of the population and signicantly shift its operational focus re-
veals itself as both highly capable and broadly supported, which should make it a reliable
negotiating partner adhering to important international norms.
This kind of rebel group could also be an important facilitator of post-war democrati-
zation for two reasons. First, nonviolent action requires a population that is practiced at
political participation, which can make peacetime democratic processes smoother. Sec-
ond, this kind of rebel organization has already proven itself capable of maintaining com-
plex organizational processes, which could allow it to adjust to post-war political admin-
istration more quickly. To sum up, a rebel group that uses or used mass-based nonviolent
action is likely to become a viable, legitimate political organization that will respect demo-
cratic norms and the rule of law.
Third, the organizational process theory suggests that the history of a rebel organi-
zation and the development of its organizational structure over time can yield valuable
insights into the future potential for strategic shifts and trajectories. In many ways, rebel
use of nonviolent action can be considered as a development diametrically opposed to rad-
icalization and splintering. Often, foreign governments or organizations are faced with a
choice of supporting one group in a conict over another. By looking both at the organi-
zation’s full range of contentious actions and at its full organizational history, this choice
can become better informed and have better results.
Which way forward?
There are three clear avenues for further research on this subject. First, an exploration of
further cases could shed light on the generalizability of the structural process theory ei-
ther through quantitative or qualitative research. Further exploration of the phenomenon
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may well uncover more cases, and rene the theory presented here or an alternative ex-
planation not apparent from the cases considered here.
A second, related question is that of eect: What is the eect of rebel use of nonviolent
action, at either a small or large scale? Are the strategic payos of this strategy uniform
across cases? Are there conditions under which the use of nonviolent action is more ben-
ecial to rebel groups? Exploring the eectiveness of nonviolent versus violent action if
both are considered as rebel strategies could overcome some of the signicant selection
problems underlying the analysis in Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), which does not ad-
dress why some groups use violent and some groups use nonviolent strategies. Purely
focusing on organizations that have already embarked on a violent path could control for
signicant confounding variables.
Third, to what extent can the organizational process theory explain signicant inno-
vation in rebel groups that is not connected to nonviolent action? With a few notable
exceptions (Horowitz (2010) and Staniland (2014)), there are no systematic accounts of
strategic innovation in rebel organizations. My theory and my cases both show how
structural process factors can have a signicant impact both on a group’s ability to rec-
ognize the opportunity for innovation and for actually carrying it out, and there is no
prohibitive reason why the same logic should not apply to a wider set of innovation tra-
jectories beyond mass-based nonviolent action.
Rebel use of nonviolent action: What do we know?
What do we know about rebel use of nonviolent action, and what do we not know? In this
dissertation, I was able to show that nonviolent action is sometimes used as a rebel strat-
egy, and has even had signicant eects on conict outcomes both in the Timorese and
Nepalese case, and contributed to a successful political trajectory for the JKLF in Kash-
mir. We also know how specic organizational features and structures aected the use
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of nonviolent action in at least two cases. An exploration of these mechanisms revealed
that why rebel groups use nonviolent action and how they do it are intricately related.
One interesting theme that emerges throughout the dissertation is the intrinsic analytical
overlap between the questions of why rebel organizations use nonviolent action and how
they do so. If we consider rebel groups as potentially complex organizations that evolve
and adjust over time, then a group’s dominant structure and modus operandi come to
color and delimit the strategies and and trajectories open to the organization; in other
words, how an organization does some things comes to inuence why it acts or considers
acting in the rst place.
While the research design of this theory-building dissertation does not allow for gen-
eralization, the inclusion of the Nepali case does provide insights into the potential scope
of the theory, as the same basic conditions aected the use of nonviolent action, even
though the strategic interaction, intervening variables, and context were vastly dierent.
Finally, I can also conclude that four key alternative explanations cannot explain why
some rebel groups use nonviolent action whereas others do not.
In conclusion, this dissertation provides a plausible theory for why and how a rebel
group can unilaterally integrate nonviolent action into its resistance campaign.
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